Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, five members of Whittier Alliance, a private neighborhood organization, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the City and Alliance itself. Plaintiffs claim that the City "commanded and encouraged" the members of the Alliance to adopt an antidefamation bylaw which unconstitutionally restricted the members' First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of standing and state action. In this case, the antidefamation bylaw restricts plaintiffs' ability as members of the Alliance to vote for the board candidate of their choice, and the antidefamation bylaw prevents plaintiffs from voting for themselves or any other candidates who might be considered malicious critics by the board. The court concluded that plaintiffs have suffered sufficient injury as voting members of the Whittier Alliance; their asserted injury may be traced to the objected bylaw and could be redressed by the relief they seek; and, since they have standing to raise an as applied challenge to the antidefamation bylaw, they may also challenge its overbreadth in a facial challenge. Therefore, plaintiffs have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the bylaw. The court concluded, however, that the adoption of the bylaws did not amount to state action. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Sabri v. Whittier Alliance" on Justia Law

After the school districts sought termination of the Garland County School Desegregation Case Comprehensive Settlement Agreement and relief from the district court’s 1992 order enforcing it, the district court denied the school districts' Rule 60(b)(5) motion. The district court rejected the school districts' argument that the Agreement is no longer just or equitable to give the 1992 order or the Agreement prospective application in light of the repeal of the Arkansas School Choice Act of 1989 (School Choice Act), Ark. Code Ann. 6-18-206 (repealed 2013). The court concluded that the school districts have presented no evidence that they have either fully complied or that there have been changed circumstances in those other areas of the Agreement. Therefore, termination of the entire Agreement would be supported by nothing more than the notion that it is no longer convenient to live with. The court affirmed the judgment. View "W.T. Davis v. Cutter Morning Star Sch." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the USDA and others, claiming that defendants violated the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. 1691 et seq., because they denied his debt settlement offers on the basis of his race and in retaliation for his being a member of the Pigford class-action litigation. Plaintiff also alleged that defendants engaged in a conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) to interfere with his civil rights, and that they violated his rights under the Fifth and Thirteenth Amendments. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims. The court held that a final agency decision by the USDA resolving a complaint under 7 C.F.R. Pt. 15d using the administrative procedures currently in effect does not result in claim preclusion. In this case, the complaint does not contain sufficient allegations to state a plausible claim that Thomas Brown and M. Terry Johnson, both of whom are employed with the USDA’s National Appeals Division, are creditors for ECOA purposes. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the ECOA claims with respect to Thomas Brown and M. Terry Johnson, and reversed the dismissal of these claims with respect to the remaining defendants. The court also concluded that plaintiff's conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) were properly dismissed pursuant to the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. Finally, the court reversed the dismissal of the Bivens claims because, when a remedial scheme is created entirely by regulation, it does not preclude a Bivens claim. View "Johnson v. USDA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Missouri inmate, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Missouri Department of Correction officials violated his constitutional rights when they censored his Chinese-language mail and denied him the ability to place telephone calls to China. The district court granted summary judgment to the officials. The court concluded that the restrictions were reasonably related to legitimate penological interests - specifically, security. The court also concluded that both the mail and telephone regulations were neutral and plaintiff had alternative means of communicating with outsiders. Furthermore, he also retained the ability to make domestic calls, send correspondence in English, and receive visitors; the Constitution does not require the State to bear the burden of paying for translation in any event; plaintiff has not demonstrated that there is a readily available alternative that would have eased the restriction on his ability to communicate without imposing financial burdens on the State; and thus the district court correctly rejected plaintiff's First Amendment claim based on the periods where he could neither correspond in Chinese nor international phone calls. The officials, a fortiori, did not violate Yang’s rights during periods when he could correspond in Chinese, but was prohibited from placing international telephone calls. Finally, there is no evidence that differential treatment of foreign-language mail was motivated by race or national origin or that the treatment of Chinese-language mail was a pretext for discrimination. Plaintiff's due process claim was rejected. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Yang v. MO Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint against the Department, alleging a sexual harassment claim based on hostile work environment and a retaliation claim. The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b). In support of her sexual harassment claim based on hostile work environment, plaintiff alleges seven incidents of harassment by two different men over a nearly three-year period. The court found as a matter of law that plaintiff's complaint failed to show harassment so severe or pervasive that they satisfy the high threshold for a sexual harassment claim based on hostile work environment. The court also found that plaintiff's purported "direct evidence" of retaliation fails as a matter of law for lack of causation where she failed to plausibly allege that the retaliation was a but-for cause of the Department's adverse action. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Blomker v. Jewell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former police captain, filed suit against the City and city officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the City violated her constitutional right to due procedural process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by terminating her employment. The district court granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion for summary judgment. The district court denied the defense of qualified immunity asserted by Chief Burton in response to plaintiff's procedural due process claim. Chief Burton appealed. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of qualified immunity because genuine issues of material fact exist regarding Chief Burton's role in the termination of plaintiff. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "Bramblet v. City of Columbia, MO" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an Iowa prison inmate, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against prison officials for deliberate indifference to his serious medical need. Plaintiff alleged that Director Baldwin and Dr. Deol were deliberately indifferent to his need for dentures, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. The district court granted Director Baldwin and Dr. Deol's motion for summary judgment. For the purposes of this appeal, the court will assume that plaintiff suffered from an objectively serious medical need. However, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to establish that Director Baldwin and Dr. Deol deliberately disregarded his need for dentures. The undisputed facts show that the delay in providing plaintiff with dentures was caused by a turnover or shortage of dentists in the prison. The undisputed facts also show that over the time that plaintiff waited for dentures, the IDOC made efforts to secure additional dental staff. Finally, Dr. Deol and Director Baldwin neither created the shortage of dentists nor the general issues with recruitment and retention. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cullor v. Baldwin" on Justia Law

After MFA formed a campaign committee less than 30 days before the November 4, 2014, election and violated Missouri law section 130.011(8), MFA filed suit against the executive director of the Missouri Ethics Commission (MEC), in his official capacity, seeking to declare unconstitutional the 30-day formation deadline. The district court granted a temporary restraining order, but after the election, dismissed MFA’s suit as not ripe. The court concluded that MFA has Article III standing to challenge section 130.011(8) on First Amendment grounds where MFA’s self-censorship is objectively reasonable; although the 2014 election has passed, this case is not moot where MEC can at any time implement its policy and assess the fee for violation of the formation deadline in section 130.011(8) and, in the alternative, this action is not moot under the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to mootness; and MFA’s case is ripe for review where MFA asserts the harm of self-censorship, based on its compliance with section 130.011(8). Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Missourians for Fiscal Accountability v. Klahr" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Siemens, her former employer, alleging unlawful discrimination based on race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. Plaintiff, an African American, was terminated as part of a reduction in force. The district court granted summary judgment to Siemens. The court concluded that the district court did not err by proceeding to the McDonnell Douglas analysis because the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, does not show a genuine issue of material fact as to Siemens’ liability under a cat’s paw theory. Under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the court concluded that there is no evidence in the record to support a finding of pretext as to the actual decisionmaker. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cherry v. Siemens Healthcare Diagnostics" on Justia Law

After a halfway house resident, Angenaldo Bailey, seriously injured plaintiff when he broke into her house, plaintiff filed suit against the City of Ames, several Ames police officers, the Center, John McPherson (the Center’s manager), the State of Iowa, and John Baldwin (the director of the Iowa Department of Corrections). On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for McPherson, Baldwin, the Center, and the State. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that there is no evidence in the record that McPherson knew about Bailey’s history of abusing plaintiff or her telephone call to the Center on the afternoon of the shooting; McPherson cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for constitutional violations of a subordinate based on a respondeat superior theory; there is insufficient evidence to show that McPherson’s subordinates at the Center were deliberately indifferent to a known or obvious substantial risk of harm to plaintiff when they authorized Bailey to visit the Hy-Vee store; plaintiff has not established that McPherson or employees of the Center created a new danger to plaintiff or increased the danger that Bailey posed to her, because the danger to plaintiff existed before Bailey resided at the Center and would have continued to exist thereafter; plaintiff's claim against Baldwin failed for insufficient evidence where he had no personal involvement in the Center and cannot be held liable under a respondeat superior theory; and the Eleventh Amendment bars plaintiff’s claims against the State and the Center, because the State and its agencies are immune from suits for damages. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Montgomery v. City of Ames" on Justia Law