Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
by
After Carleton J. Wallace was fatally shot by a police officer, Wallace's estate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied the officer summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, but granted summary judgment to the chief of police and the city. The officer appeals. The court concluded that, under the totality of the circumstances, the record does not establish that the officer's use of deadly force was reasonable as a matter of law. In this case, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the estate, Wallace did not pose an immediate and significant threat of serious injury to the officer or bystanders because he may not have committed any violent felony, the physical struggle was minimal, and he was not "holding a firearm" when he attempted to flee. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the estate, a reasonable fact finder could thus conclude that the seizure violated a clearly established constitutional right. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Wallace v. Cummings" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff, who is of Turkish and Kurdish descent, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Officers Mathews and Collins arrested him on account of his ethnicity, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Officers Matthews and Collins came upon plaintiff while investigating a report of a suspicious person casing the neighborhood. Plaintiff matched the description. The district court granted summary judgment on the claims of selective enforcement and failure to intervene against Officers Matthews and Collins. The court affirmed the judgment and concluded that plaintiff failed to establish that the enforcement had a discriminatory effect and that the enforcement had a discriminatory purpose. View "Gilani v. Matthews" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Vermillion Police Department (VPD) officers, alleging violations of their First and Fourth Amendment rights. Given the totality of the circumstances, the relatively low .02 BAC limit under the minor DUI statute, and the absence of judicial decisions interpreting that statute, the court found that the officers had at least arguable probable cause to believe that Plaintiff Callissa Schaffer had violated SDCL 32-23-21. Therefore, the court concluded that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to plaintiffs' claim that officers violated Callissa's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. Likewise, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to plaintiffs' claim that the officers deprived Callissa of her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches when she was frisked before being placed in the patrol car. The court also concluded that Officer Foley is entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs' claim that he deprived Callissa of her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches because he purposefully misrepresented facts in his affidavit for a search warrant. In this case, plaintiffs failed to show that any of the omissions at issue were intentional or reckless. Finally, the court concluded that the officers are also entitled to qualified immunity on Jill Schaffer's claim that the officers retaliated against her for engaging in speech protected by the First Amendment, and Chief Betzen is entitled to summary judgment on both the official capacity and individual capacity claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Schaffer v. Beringer" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff filed suit against the City, alleging violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621-634, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff alleged that he was terminated from his job on account of his race and age after being employed by the City for twenty-seven years. The court affirmed the district court's grant of the City's motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the district court did not err in setting aside the entry of default judgment where the City's delay in filing its answer was excusable and there was no bad faith or intentional effort to delay on the City's part; plaintiff failed to identify no similarly situated employee outside plaintiff's protected class who was treated more favorably by the City, and thus the inference-of-discrimination element of plaintiff's prima facie case has not been established on this basis; plaintiff failed to identify any biased comments made by a decisionmaker that might establish an animus-based inference of discrimination; there has been no showing that the City failed to follow any applicable policy in making the decision to fire plaintiff and no inference of discrimination has been established on this basis; and the City consistently cited insubordination as its reason for firing plaintiff, and thus there is no record-based shifting-reasons basis for an inference of discrimination. Accordingly, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to substantiate his claims of race and age discrimination with sufficient probative evidence to permit a rational trier of fact to find in his favor. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Grant v. City of Blytheville, Arkansas" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiffs, a group of drivers, filed suit against the City and Gatso, alleging that the Automatic Traffic Enforcement (ATE) system violates their right to procedural due process, their fundamental right to travel, Iowa Code 602.6101, and causes unjust enrichment for the City and Gatso. The City contracted with Gatso to install and operate the ATE system. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims. The court concluded that the district court did not err by determining that plaintiff Hughes lacks Article III standing where he does not allege that he has incurred any costs to mitigate or avoid the threat of ATE enforcement, or that the threat of an ATE citation is sufficiently imminent, and plaintiff Mazgaj lacks third party standing where he failed to show a hindrance to his wife’s ability to protect her own interests. The court concluded, however, that plaintiff Lee's claims are ripe where he was found guilty of violating the ordinance and no further factual development is necessary. Thus, Lee has the hardship of citation and the cost of litigation. The court further concluded that the district court never had jurisdiction of Hughes and Mazgaj’s claims and therefore their claims should be remanded to state court. Plaintiffs Robinson, Sparks, Northrup, Yarpezeshkan, French, and Stimpson have established standing to bring procedural-due-process claims. However, these plaintiffs failed to state a violation of their procedural due process rights. The court rejected plaintiffs' claims that the system violated their substantive rights, Equal Protection claim, and unjust enrichment claim. Because the City’s appeal of the IDOT’s ruling is still pending, this claim is not ripe. Therefore, the district court should dismiss without prejudice the drivers’ state-law claims based on the alleged violation of IDOT rules. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Hughes v. City of Cedar Rapids" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiffs, six drivers, filed suit against the City alleging that the Automatic Traffic Enforcement (ATE) system violates federal and state law. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs argue that the district court should not have relied on Hughes v. City of Cedar Rapids because the facts here are materially different. The court concluded that Cedar Rapids and Des Moines offer direct access to the district court or an optional administrative proceeding with de novo appellate review. Based on this court’s holding, the other differences that the drivers allege are irrelevant. Therefore, plaintiffs' claims are addressed in the Hughes opinion. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Brooks v. City of Des Moines" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff, the former building commissioner of the city, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that she was fired in retaliation for engaging in protected speech. The district court granted summary judgment to the city. The court concluded that the present record does not support a conclusion that the city is liable because a municipality cannot be held liable under section 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor. In this case, plaintiff maintains that the city is liable because her harm stemmed from an official municipal policy or an unofficial municipal custom. The court explained that plaintiff tangentially refers to other evidence of the custom that she claims victimized her, but the materials cited reveal only unsubstantiated suspicions. Because no reasonable jury could conclude that the evidence demonstrated a reasonable dispute about the presence of a continuing, widespread, and persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct that led to her termination, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bolderson v. City of Wentzville" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff was removed from the Associate Degree Nursing Program for behavior unbecoming of the profession and transgression of professional boundaries after CLC received student complaints about plaintiff's posts on his Facebook page. Plaintiff filed suit alleging violations of his First Amendment rights and due process. After some defendants were dismissed, the district court granted summary judgment to the remaining defendants. The court concluded that, given the strong state interest in regulating health professions, teaching and enforcing viewpoint-neutral professional codes of ethics are a legitimate part of a professional school’s curriculum that do not, at least on their face, run afoul of the First Amendment; plaintiff made no allegation, and presented no evidence, that defendants’ reliance on the Nurses Association Code of Ethics was a pretext for viewpoint, or any other kind of discrimination; college administrators and educators in a professional school have discretion to require compliance with recognized standards of the profession, both on and off campus, so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns; plaintiff's contention, that his offensive Facebook posts were unrelated to any course assignment or requirements, is factually flawed where the posts were directed at classmates, involved their conduct in the Nursing Program, and included a physical threat related to their medical studies; plaintiff's statements had a direct impact on the students' educational experience and had the potential to impact patient care; and the First Amendment did not bar educator Frisch from making the determination that plaintiff was unable to meet the professional demands of being a nurse. The court rejected plaintiff's due process and remaining claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Keefe v. Adams" on Justia Law

by
After plaintiff's convictions for second-degree murder and first-degree robbery were vacated, plaintiff filed suit against several detectives who investigated the murder. In this interlocutory appeal, the detectives challenge the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff moved to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Because the court concluded that the detectives raised the qualified-immunity issue on the face of the papers, the court remanded the case to the district court for consideration of the motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. In considering that motion, the court explained that the district court can decide as a preliminary matter whether the detectives discussed the issue of qualified immunity in sufficient detail and with sufficient citations to undisputed record evidence to enable the district court to rule on the matter. View "Ferguson v. Short" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff filed suit alleging that her former employer, Trinity Health, and former supervisors violated her rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the North Dakota Human Rights Act, N.D. Cent. Code 14-02.4-03(1). The district court granted summary judgment against plaintiff, concluding that she failed to show she was capable of performing the essential functions of her position, and that Trinity did not have a duty to reassign plaintiff to an alternate position. The court concluded, however, that plaintiff produced evidence that she could have performed the essential functions of her position with reasonable accommodation. In this case, plaintiff's written notification that she would be unable to complete the basic life support certification without medical clearance, and her statement that she required four months of physical therapy before completing the certification, could readily have been understood to constitute a request for a reasonable accommodation of her condition. Consequently, there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff made a request for an accommodation sufficient to trigger Trinity’s duty to engage in the interactive process of identifying a reasonable accommodation. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kowitz v. Trinity Health" on Justia Law