Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

After a teacher at Carver Middle School submitted an application for the approval of the Carver Gay-Straight Alliance, the superintendent denied the application on the ground that the application failed to identify an allowed purpose for the club. Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging violations of their constitutional rights and the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. 4071-72. On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the dismissal of their complaint alleging that the Board violated the Act. The court concluded that the complaint is ripe because the Board made a final decision when it rejected the application of the Alliance to form a club, and the complaint is not moot because the district court can still fashion relief for a violation of the Act. The court also concluded that the Act applies to Carver Middle School because it provides courses for high school credit and, under Florida law, these courses constitute “secondary education.” Accordingly, the court vacated the order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Carver Middle School Gay-Straight Alliance v. School Board of Lake County, Florida" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Major Wheeler and others, alleging, inter alia, a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violation of his First Amendment rights and a claim under Georgia law for defamation. After plaintiff reported constitutional violations by his fellow officers, Major Wheeler issued a county-wide alert to all law-enforcement officers, picturing plaintiff, warning that he was a “loose cannon” who presented a “danger to any [law-enforcement officer] in Douglas County,” and directing officers to “act accordingly.” The district court denied Wheeler's motion for qualified immunity and official immunity on the defamation claim. The court concluded that plaintiff's allegations allow for the reasonable inferences that the Police Department communicated with the Sheriff’s Department about plaintiff's complaints prior to Wheeler’s issuance of the be-on-the-lookout advisory (BOLO), that the Sheriff’s Office and Wheeler knew about the termination-appeal hearing, and that Wheeler issued the BOLO at least in part in retaliation for plaintiff's complaints. Therefore, the court concluded that plaintiff sufficiently alleged that Wheeler violated plaintiff's First Amendment rights when he issued the BOLO and the court affirmed the denial of qualified immunity. The court also concluded that plaintiff's constitutional right to be free from retaliation that imperiled his life was clearly established at the time that Wheeler issued the BOLO. The allegations satisfy the showing of a deliberate intention to do wrong—that is, actual malice. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of official immunity. View "Bailey v. Major Tommy Wheeler" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, formerly a pretrial detainee, filed suit against defendants under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The court concluded that, viewing the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, there is evidence that defendant had a serious medical need for treatment after he fell, broke his left humerus, dislocated the hardware in his arm, and began to experience severe pain. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Dr. Fowler and Deputy Booth; reversed the grant of summary judgment for Nurse Ray, Dr. Sullivan, Sheriff Abston, Deputy Abston, Chief Deputy Carr, and Deputy Ellis; and held that Sheriff Abston and the deputy defendants are immune from suit in their official capacities as Alabama state officials. View "Melton v. Abston" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging unlawful seizure by Officers Allen and Crews, false imprisonment by Officer Allen, and municipal liability against the City for the officers' actions. The district court granted qualified immunity to Officer Allen with respect to plaintiff's federal and state claims. The district court also granted summary judgment to Officer Crews and the City. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court concluded that Officer Allen had arguable probable cause to seize plaintiff and found that the district court’s erroneous conclusion that the standard was not clearly established was harmless error. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's ultimate holding as to the propriety of Officer Allen’s initial decision to seize and transport plaintiff to the hospital. The court similarly concluded that Officer Allen is entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's 1983 false imprisonment claim. However, the court concluded that the district court erred in granting Officer Allen qualified immunity for his conduct during the seizure. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded on the question of whether Officer Allen’s conduct during the seizure was done in an extraordinary manner unusually harmful to plaintiff's privacy interests. View "May v. City of Nahunta, Georgia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Major Michael Skelton in his official capacity as a deputy sheriff of Cobb County, seeking declaratory relief, damages, fees, and costs for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq. The court reversed the district court's denial of Major Skelton's motion for summary judgment against plaintiff's claims for damages, concluding that the sovereign immunity of Georgia extends to a deputy sheriff who denies a dietary request of an inmate in a county jail. Accordingly, the court remanded with an instruction to enter judgment for Major Skelton on those claims. View "Lake v. Skelton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, convicted of murder and sentenced to death, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging Alabama’s use of midazolam in its lethal injection protocol. The district court denied relief. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the district court’s fact findings and, thus, plaintiff has shown no clear error in them. The court also concluded that plaintiff has shown no error in the district court’s conclusions of law, inter alia, that: (1) plaintiff failed to carry his burden to show compounded pentobarbital is a feasible, readily implemented, and available drug to the Alabama Department of Corrections for use in executions; (2) Alabama’s consciousness assessment protocol does not violate the Eighth Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause; and (3) plaintiff's belated firing-squad claim lacks merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Arthur v. Commissioner, AL DOC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Poarch Band of Creek Indians, alleging that she was terminated from her job because of her age pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621-634. The district court adopted the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation to grant the Poarch Band's motion to dismiss the suit based on the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. In this case, there is no evidence that the Poarch Band waived its immunity, either generally or in the present suit. The court rejected plaintiff's comparison of the definitions of the term "employer" found in the ADEA and Title VII, in conjunction with the Supreme Court's opinion in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer; plaintiff's argument that the ADEA is a statute of general applicability is foreclosed by the court's precedent; and other circuits that have considered the issue raised by this appeal also have determined that federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over an ADEA claim asserted against a federally-recognized Indian tribe. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's decision to grant the Poarch Band’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Williams v. Poarch Band of Creek Indians" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the personal representative of James Clifton Barnes, filed suit against defendants after Barnes died from injuries he sustained while he was involved in a struggle with Deputy Sheriff Kubler. Barnes was tased five times, and at least two of those tases occurred after Barnes had ceased resisting arrest. The district court denied Kubler's motion for summary judgment, determining that Kubler's use of the Taser gun amounted to an unconstitutional use of excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, that was clearly established at the time. The court concluded that the record evidence, construed in favor of plaintiff, demonstrates that Barnes was not a flight risk or a threat to the safety of the officers or the public prior to the conclusion of the tasings. In this case, Kubler's multiple tasings of Barnes, after an arrest had been fully secured and any potential danger or risk of flight eliminated, violated Barnes's clearly established constitutional right to be free from excessive force. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Wate v. Kubler" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former sonography students at Valenica College, a public college, filed suit alleging that employees of the college violated their rights under the First and Fourth Amendments, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed the students’ complaint for failure to state a claim. In this case, the employees encouraged students to submit voluntarily to invasive ultrasounds performed by peers as part of a training program in sonography. When some students objected, the employees allegedly retaliated against the objecting students. The court vacated the order dismissing the complaint because the district court erroneously classified the students’ speech as school-sponsored expression, rather than pure student expression under Tinker v. DesMoines, and the district court erroneously ruled that the transvaginal ultrasound was not a search under the Fourth Amendment where inserting a probe into a woman’s vagina is plainly a search when performed by the government. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Jane Doe I v. Shaheen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, including two deputies, after he was arrested for violating an injunction prohibiting his possession of firearms. The deputies were escorting plaintiff's former lover into plaintiff's residence in order to retrieve her personal belongings when they saw the firearms in plain view. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's claim of unlawful entry where the law was not sufficiently clearly established at the time of the alleged violation to give Deputies Harrison and Loucks fair warning that their entry into plaintiff's sunroom under the circumstances of this case would violate his Fourth Amendment rights; Harrison and Loucks are also entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's claim for unlawful entry into his home from the sunroom where plaintiff consented to the deputies' entry; the district court correctly found that Harrison and Loucks did not violate plaintiff's constitutional rights when they seized firearms within his home, because the firearms were in plain view; and the district court correctly found that defendants had at least arguable probable cause to arrest plaintiff. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Fish v. Brown" on Justia Law