Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against the State Bar, alleging a due process claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that the State Bar’s rules applied the same standards and procedures for reinstatement for disbarred attorneys to attorneys suspended for more than 90 days, amounted to “defacto disbarment,” and violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The district court dismissed the complaint as barred by the Eleventh Amendment and then denied plaintiff's motion to alter or amend the judgment. Determining that the court has jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's appeal, the court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the Alabama State Bar is an arm of the state of Alabama and thus enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity from plaintiff's section 1983 claim. Further, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's FRCP 59(e) motion where, to the extent plaintiff contends his due process claim was a “direct action” under the Fourteenth Amendment, his amended complaint did not allege such a claim, and he could not use his Rule 59(e) motion to do so. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Nichols v. Alabama State Bar" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. 1983, against the School District and the School Board, alleging that they discriminated and retaliated against her by refusing to renew her employment contract and filing an ethics complaint against her. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The court concluded that the proper framework for examining mixed-motive claims based on circumstantial evidence is the approach adopted by the Sixth Circuit in White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., - not the McDonnell Douglas framework. Applying the proper mixed-motive framework to plaintiff's discrimination claims, the court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on her claims against the School District and School Board members Scott Morgan and Mark Nesmith. However, the court found that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's remaining discrimination claims, as well as all of her retaliation claims. Therefore, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Quigg v. Thomas Cnty. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3604, against Aimco, on behalf of herself and her son Karl, who was born with Down Syndrome, alleging that Aimco threatened her and her son with eviction and non-renewal of their lease purportedly because Karl had harassed and made threats to members of the apartment complex’s staff. The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint. As a preliminary matter, the court noted that this case is not moot despite the fact that plaintiff and her son were ultimately allowed to remain in their apartment. The court concluded that plaintiff sufficiently pled a claim alleging that Aimco discriminated against her and her son by making their apartment unavailable because of Karl's disability; plaintiff stated a claim for disparate treatment in the terms, conditions, or privileges of the rental where she alleged that, because of Karl’s disability, Aimco representatives mistreated him by yelling at him, making him do maintenance work around the complex, and barring him from the community rooms and the office; and plaintiff stated a claim for failure to reasonably accommodate where plaintiff requested Aimco staff to let her and her son remain in their apartment while she made arrangements for Karl to be placed in offsite care to avoid future incidents or misunderstandings. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Hunt v. Aimco Properties, L.P." on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, plaintiff challenged the regulations implementing the contraceptive mandate of the Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a), arguing that the regulations’ accommodation for nonprofit organizations with a religious objection to providing contraceptive coverage violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb, et seq. The court concluded that the regulations do not substantially burden plaintiffs' religious exercise and, alternatively, because (1) the government has compelling interests to justify the accommodation, and (2) the accommodation is the least restrictive means of furthering those interests. The court rejected EWTN’s challenges under the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses because the accommodation is a neutral, generally applicable law that does not discriminate based on religious denomination. The court also rejected EWTN’s challenge under the Free Speech Clause because any speech restrictions that may flow from the accommodation are justified by a compelling governmental interest and are thus constitutional. View "Eternal Word Television Network v. Secretary" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City and its officers under 42 U.S.C.1983, federal maritime law, and state law, alleging that defendants seized his sailboat and destroyed it without justification and without notice. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims. The court concluded that the district court should not have placed a “heightened pleading” burden on plaintiff for his section 1983 claims. The court also concluded that the district court erred to the extent that it dismissed the federal constitutional claims in Counts I, II, and V, and the maritime claims in Counts III and IV, based on the contents of the incident reports. On remand, the court instructed the district court to assess the sufficiency of the procedural due process, search and seizure, and takings claims without reliance on the disputed portions of the incident reports. The court further instructed that the district court should assume that the sailboat was not derelict, and that plaintiff was never given adequate notice that it was derelict and subject to removal and destruction. The court further concluded that the district court erred with respect to the procedural due process claim in Count I and the Fourth Amendment claim in Count II. In this case, all plaintiff needed to do to establish municipal liability was allege a policy, practice, or custom of the City which caused the seizure and destruction of his sailboat, which he did. Further, defendants cannot point to any post-Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit Supreme Court or circuit cases - and the court has not been able to locate any - holding that a complaint asserting a section 1983 municipal liability claim must, as a Rule 8(a) pleading matter, always specifically identify the municipality’s final policymaker by name. Finally, plaintiff also sufficiently stated a claim for an unconstitutional seizure under the Fourth Amendment. However, the court agreed with the district court that plaintiff failed to state a substantive due process claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Hoefling, Jr. v. City of Miami" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the officers who searched their home, the officers who arrested them, and the sheriff in charge of the jail. Plaintiffs' trailer was searched because officers believed the trailer belonged to someone else. Contraband was found in the trailer and plaintiffs were arrested. However, charges against plaintiffs were dropped after the evidence from the trailer was suppressed. They alleged violations of their federal constitutional and statutory rights, 42 U.S.C. 1983, and various claims under state law. The district court denied the officers' motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the deputies are entitled to official immunity from the claim of trespass under Georgia law; the deputies and investigator are entitled to qualified immunity from the claim of malicious prosecution; the court joined its sister circuits and held that the exclusionary rule does not apply in a civil suit against police officers; but the sheriff is not entitled to sovereign immunity from the claim under Title II of the Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Black v. Wigington" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the personal representative of Victor Arango and the administrator of his estate, filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C.1983, alleging that defendant used excessive force in the fatal shooting of Arango. Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity grounds. The court held that the district court properly denied summary judgment where, taking the facts in the light most favorable to the Estate, defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. In this case, the Estate proffered evidence that defendant fatally shot Arango in the back while Arango was compliant and non-resisting, which constitutes excessive force and violates clearly established law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Perez v. Suszczynski" on Justia Law

After the City barred plaintiff from opening a tattoo establishment in the City's designated historic district, plaintiff filed suit contending that the act of tattooing is entitled to First Amendment protection and that the City's ordinance limiting the number of tattoo establishments permitted to operate in the historic district is an unconstitutional restriction on his freedom of expression. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that tattooing is protected artistic expression. However, the court reversed the summary judgment because the court concluded that the City has failed to show that the ordinance is a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction. In this case, aside from the City's vague statement of purpose, the City has presented insufficient evidence that it had a reasonable basis for believing that its ordinance would actually serve the significant governmental interests it propounds. View "Buehrle v. City of Key West" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, MetLife, alleging claims of age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(1), as well as a retirement benefits interference claim under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1140. The district court granted summary judgment for MetLife. The court concluded that plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADEA where plaintiff was replaced by someone substantially younger, plaintiff was qualified for the job for which he was discharged, and the justifications offered for plaintiff's termination were not a proper basis for rejecting plaintiff's prima facie showing. The court vacated the district court's order as to this claim and remanded for reconsideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate under the McDonnell Douglas framework. The court also concluded that the district court erred in granting judgment in favor of MetLife before deciding on the admissibility of certain declarations. Accordingly, the court vacated the grant of summary judgment as to this issue and remanded for the district court to rule on the admissibility of the declarations. View "Liebman v. MetLife Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(2), alleging that RJ Reynolds discriminated against him on the basis of his age when it rejected his application for employment. The court held that section 4(a)(2) of the ADEA authorizes disparate impact claims by applicants for employment even though the statute is unclear. The EEOC has reasonably and consistently interpreted the statute to cover such claims and the court deferred to the agency's reading of the statute. The court concluded that, in this case, plaintiff is entitled to equitable tolling of the ADEA's limitations period where plaintiff alleges that he could not have even suspected age discrimination until shortly before he filed his charge of discrimination. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co." on Justia Law