Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A Texas law, Senate Bill 12, regulates sexually oriented performances on public property and in the presence of minors. The law defines such performances as visual acts featuring nudity or sexual conduct that appeal to the prurient interest in sex. Several organizations and individuals involved in drag performances brought a pre-enforcement challenge, arguing that the law facially violates the First Amendment. The plaintiffs included groups that host pride festivals and drag events, as well as individual performers and entertainment companies.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas held a two-day bench trial. After reviewing the evidence, the district court found that the law was a facially unconstitutional restriction on speech and issued a permanent injunction preventing the Attorney General of Texas, certain district attorneys, counties, and a city from enforcing the law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether each plaintiff had standing to seek injunctive relief against each defendant. The Fifth Circuit found that most plaintiffs did not intend to engage in conduct arguably proscribed by the law and therefore lacked standing. Only one plaintiff, 360 Queen Entertainment, LLC, demonstrated standing to seek an injunction against the Attorney General, as its performances arguably included conduct regulated by the statute and minors were sometimes present.The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s injunction and remanded the case. The court instructed the district court to dismiss claims against all defendants except the Attorney General and to reconsider the facial challenge to Section One of the law under the framework set forth in Moody v. NetChoice, LLC. The court emphasized that a facial challenge requires showing that a substantial number of the law’s applications are unconstitutional in relation to its legitimate sweep. View "Woodlands Pride v. Paxton" on Justia Law

The plaintiff resided at an apartment complex with his son, who was arrested for aggravated armed robbery by the local police department. After the arrest, the police informed the apartment management, which then evicted both the plaintiff and his son based on a lease provision prohibiting criminal conduct. The plaintiff sought information about his son’s arrest from the city and police department under the Texas Public Information Act, but his request was denied after the city consulted the Texas Attorney General and invoked a law-enforcement exception.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, the plaintiff filed suit against the city, the police department, the apartment complex, a debt collection agency, and the Texas Attorney General, alleging violations of the U.S. Constitution, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and Texas law. All defendants either appeared, filed answers, or moved to dismiss. The plaintiff moved for default judgment against each defendant, but the district court denied those motions and granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. On appeal, the plaintiff only challenged the denial of default judgment, as he did not brief arguments regarding the dismissals and thus forfeited them.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed only the denial of default judgment for abuse of discretion. The court held that default judgment was not warranted because the city, police department, and debt collector had all appeared or answered, and the Attorney General had not been properly served. The court also found that arguments regarding attorney conflict and judicial bias were either forfeited or unsupported. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of default judgment. View "Clark v. City of Pasadena" on Justia Law

Several former students and their parents challenged a school district’s policy restricting the length of male students’ hair, alleging that the policy constituted race and sex discrimination and violated constitutional and statutory rights. The school district amended its hair policy during the 2019–2020 school year, removing language that previously allowed certain hairstyles, such as cornrows or locs, if they complied with other requirements. The plaintiffs argued that the enforcement of this policy infringed upon their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amendment, Title VI, Title IX, and Texas law.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. During discovery, the plaintiffs sought to depose the superintendent and a former board president. The school district moved for a protective order, asserting legislative privilege to prevent inquiries into the subjective motivations of board members regarding the hair policy. The district court partially denied the motion, establishing a procedure where deponents could assert the privilege but would still be required to answer, with disputed portions of testimony marked confidential for later review. The district court declined to rule on the privilege’s applicability until specific questions were asked during depositions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether the district court erred in its handling of the legislative privilege and the protective order. The Fifth Circuit held that none of the appellants—including the school district, the board of trustees, and the individual former officials—had standing to appeal the district court’s order because the privilege holders had not personally invoked the privilege or participated adequately in the proceedings. As a result, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and also dismissed the pending motion to stay as moot. View "Arnold v. Barbers Hill Independent School District" on Justia Law

A professor at a public university alleged that several university administrators violated his First Amendment rights. The professor, known for his outspoken criticism of university policies and administrators on social media and in public forums, claimed that university officials attempted to silence him. He asserted that they threatened his job security, pay, research opportunities, and academic freedom, and that a university employee requested police surveillance of his speech. The professor stated that these actions caused him to self-censor, including making his social media account private and ceasing to post, out of concern for potential retaliation.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas reviewed the case after the professor filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging both retaliation for protected speech and the existence of an unwritten speech code that chilled his speech. The district court dismissed the retaliation claim, finding that the professor had not sufficiently alleged an adverse employment action, and granted summary judgment on the chilled-speech claim for the same reason. The court also dismissed the claim regarding the unwritten speech code, concluding that the professor had not adequately alleged a facial or as-applied First Amendment violation. Additionally, the court resolved two discovery disputes in favor of the university.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fifth Circuit held that the professor had standing to bring his claims but could not prevail on the merits. The court determined that, under established Fifth Circuit precedent, a First Amendment retaliation claim requires an adverse employment action, which the professor did not experience. The court also found that the chilled-speech claim was not distinct from the retaliation claim and failed for the same reason. The court further held that the allegations regarding an unwritten speech code were too conclusory to state a plausible claim. The court upheld the district court’s discovery rulings, finding no abuse of discretion or prejudice. The judgment was affirmed. View "Lowery v. Mills" on Justia Law

Legacy Housing Corporation purchased several hundred vacant lots in Horseshoe Bay, Texas, intending to develop manufactured housing. The lots were subject to zoning restrictions, including a cap on speculative housing permits, contractor requirements, utility hookup fees, and setback rules. Legacy also acquired adjacent land in the city’s extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ) to build a road connecting the lots to a nearby highway, but this land was restricted to agricultural and residential use. Despite these limitations, Legacy constructed a road over the ETJ property, a greenbelt strip, and some development lots, advertising it as a shortcut and access to planned amenities. The City and other defendants opposed the road, citing violations of existing restrictions. Legacy alleged a conspiracy among the City, the property owners’ association (POA), and developers to prevent its development.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas addressed multiple claims and counterclaims. It denied Legacy’s motion to dismiss the City’s counterclaims, granted the City’s motion to dismiss most claims against it, and granted summary judgment to all defendants on the remaining claims, including regulatory takings, Section 1983 violations, civil conspiracy, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and a strips and gores claim. Legacy’s own motion for partial summary judgment was denied, and final judgment was entered.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings, with one modification. The appellate court held that Legacy’s regulatory takings claim regarding the two-permit cap was not prudentially ripe and should be dismissed without prejudice. The court otherwise affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, finding no genuine dispute of material fact and concluding that Legacy did not have property rights to build the road, nor did the defendants breach any legal duties or restrictive covenants. View "Legacy Hsing v. City of Horseshoe Bay" on Justia Law

A group of voters in Tarrant County, Texas, challenged the county’s decision to redraw the boundaries of its four commissioners precincts in 2025, a process that occurred outside the usual post-census redistricting cycle. The new map, adopted by a narrow 3–2 vote, shifted a significant number of voters—disproportionately Black, Latino, and Democratic—into precincts that would not hold commissioner elections until 2028, effectively postponing their opportunity to vote for a county commissioner by two years. The plaintiffs, who are racially diverse, argued that the redistricting was intended to harm racial minorities and Democratic voters, and that the mid-cycle timing unlawfully disenfranchised certain residents.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction to block the use of the new map in the 2026 election. The district court dismissed the First Amendment claims as nonjusticiable under Supreme Court precedent, but allowed the race discrimination and vote postponement claims to proceed, ultimately finding that the plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. The Fifth Circuit held that claims of partisan gerrymandering are nonjusticiable in federal court, even when staggered elections result in some voters’ ballots being postponed. The court further held that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that race was a motivating factor in the adoption of the new map, applying the Arlington Heights framework and finding no clear error in the district court’s assessment of the evidence. Finally, the court concluded that postponement of voting opportunities due to redistricting in a staggered election system does not violate the Constitution, as there is no right to vote on a particular schedule. View "Jackson v. Tarrant County" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner was arrested after an incident in which he was accused of firing a gun into a neighbor’s trailer. Law enforcement recovered evidence at the scene and, following his arrest, the petitioner gave a written statement after being advised of his rights. He was indicted on two counts: shooting into a dwelling and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Due to a series of administrative errors, judicial conflicts, and continuances, the petitioner remained incarcerated for over three years before trial. During this period, a key defense witness died. The petitioner repeatedly asserted his right to a speedy trial through pro se motions.The Circuit Court of Tishomingo County, Mississippi, applied the four-factor test from Barker v. Wingo to the petitioner’s speedy trial claim. The court found a violation as to the first count (shooting into a dwelling) but not the second (firearm possession), and dismissed only the first count. The petitioner was tried and convicted on the remaining count and sentenced as a habitual offender. The Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the speedy trial right could be analyzed and remedied on a count-by-count basis in a multi-count indictment. The Mississippi Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court denied further review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case on habeas corpus. The court held that, under clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court, when a speedy trial violation is found, the only permissible remedy is dismissal of the entire indictment, not just the affected count. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the Mississippi appellate court’s approach was an unreasonable application of federal law. The judgment of the district court was reversed, and the case was remanded with instructions to grant the writ of habeas corpus. View "Berryman v. Huffman" on Justia Law

A flight attendant employed by an airline and represented by a labor union was terminated after sending graphic anti-abortion images and messages to the union president and posting similar content on social media. The employee, a pro-life Christian and vocal opponent of the union, had previously resigned her union membership but remained subject to union fees. The union’s leadership had participated in the Women’s March, which the employee viewed as union-sponsored support for abortion, prompting her messages. The airline investigated and concluded that while some content was offensive, only certain images violated company policy. The employee was terminated for violating social media, bullying, and harassment policies.Following termination, the employee filed a grievance, which the union represented. The airline offered reinstatement contingent on a last-chance agreement, which the employee declined, leading to arbitration. The arbitrator found just cause for termination. The employee then sued both the airline and the union in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, alleging violations of Title VII and the Railway Labor Act (RLA), among other claims. The district court dismissed some claims, allowed others to proceed, and after a jury trial, found in favor of the employee on several Title VII and RLA claims. The court awarded reinstatement, backpay, and issued a broad permanent injunction against the airline and union, later holding the airline in contempt for its compliance with the judgment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment for the employee on her belief-based Title VII and RLA retaliation claims against the airline, remanding with instructions to enter judgment for the airline on those claims. The court affirmed the judgment against the airline on practice-based Title VII claims and affirmed all claims against the union. The court vacated the permanent injunction and contempt sanction, remanding for further proceedings, and granted the employee’s motion to remand appellate attorney’s fees to the district court. View "Carter v. Transport Workers Union of America Local 556" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, who is civilly committed as a sexually violent predator at the Texas Civil Commitment Center, brought a pro se lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Commissioner of the Texas Department of Family Protective Services and the Executive Commissioner of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission. He alleged that these agencies failed to investigate his reports of misconduct and abuse at the facility, claiming violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process, as well as rights under the Bill of Rights for Mental Health Patients. The plaintiff asserted that he should be able to file complaints with these agencies rather than being required to use the internal grievance procedure of the Texas Civil Commitment Office.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because the plaintiff was proceeding in forma pauperis. The district court found that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for relief and that amendment would be futile, so it dismissed the complaint without prejudice. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that he had adequately stated equal protection and due process claims, that he should have been allowed to amend his complaint, and that the district court was biased.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the plaintiff failed to state an equal protection claim because he was not similarly situated to other Texas citizens and the different grievance procedures had a rational basis. The court also found no protected liberty or property interest to support a due process claim and concluded that the alleged conduct did not rise to the level of a substantive due process violation. The court further held that amendment would have been futile and found no evidence of judicial bias. The plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel was denied. View "Dunsmore v. Muth" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case are homeowners and rental-property supervisors in New Orleans who challenged the City’s regulations governing short-term rentals (STRs), defined as lodging offered for less than thirty days. The City’s regulatory scheme requires permits for both owners and operators of STRs, restricts eligibility to “natural persons,” mandates that operators reside at the property, and imposes specific advertising requirements. The regulations were enacted in response to concerns about neighborhood disruption and loss of affordable housing attributed to the proliferation of STRs. Plaintiffs argued that these regulations violated various constitutional provisions, including the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, the First Amendment, and the dormant Commerce Clause.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted summary judgment largely in favor of the City, upholding the constitutionality of most aspects of the STR regulations. The district court found that the City had authority under state law to regulate STRs and rejected the plaintiffs’ due process and equal protection claims, except for one provision not at issue on appeal. The court also upheld the advertising restrictions and the operator residency requirement, interpreting the latter as not requiring permanent residency.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The Fifth Circuit held that the City’s prohibition on business entities obtaining owner or operator permits violated the Equal Protection Clause, as the distinction was arbitrary and not rationally related to a legitimate government interest. The court also found that the requirement that each STR advertisement list only one dwelling unit violated the First Amendment. However, the court upheld the City’s authority to regulate STRs, the due process analysis, most advertising restrictions, and interpreted the operator residency requirement as not violating the dormant Commerce Clause. View "Hignell-Stark v. City of New Orleans" on Justia Law