Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Several residential property owners and a short-term rental platform challenged two ordinances enacted by the city. The first ordinance, adopted in 2023, restricts short-term rental licenses to one per residential block and distributes them by lottery. The second ordinance, adopted in 2024, requires short-term rental platforms to verify the license status of properties before facilitating transactions, and to periodically reverify this status. Plaintiffs alleged that these ordinances infringed upon their constitutional and statutory rights, including claims under the Takings Clause and Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana reviewed the plaintiffs’ claims. It dismissed all claims under Rule 12(b)(6), except for Airbnb’s Fourth Amendment challenge regarding a monthly reporting requirement in the 2024 Ordinance. The district court granted Airbnb summary judgment on that particular claim. Airbnb appealed the dismissal of its other claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit examined the case de novo. The court held that the 2023 Ordinance did not constitute a per se or regulatory taking under the Takings Clause, noting that the ordinance neither physically appropriated property nor severely impaired economic expectations. It also found the ordinance to be a reasonable zoning regulation that balanced public interests. Regarding Section 230, the Fifth Circuit ruled that neither the booking nor verification requirements of the 2024 Ordinance treated Airbnb as the publisher or speaker of third-party content, and thus were not preempted. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Takings Clause claim and the Section 230 claim, as well as the dismissal of other claims raised by the plaintiffs. View "Bodin v. New Orleans" on Justia Law

A legal resident of Florida, currently living in Illinois, applied for a Texas escrow-officer license. He is an attorney licensed in at least forty jurisdictions, including Texas, and holds title-producer licenses in twenty-four states. The Texas Department of Insurance denied his application solely because he did not reside in Texas or a state bordering Texas, despite admitting that he met all other licensure requirements. The plaintiff claimed that this residency requirement prevented him from serving existing Texas clients, securing new clients, and maintaining relationships with clients who needed title and escrow services in multiple jurisdictions.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied both the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction and the State’s motion to dismiss. The district court reasoned that it would be “precipitous” to overturn a long-standing statute on a preliminary basis, inferred little irreparable harm due to the plaintiff’s litigation choices in similar cases elsewhere, and found the merits “unclear” given the present record and lack of factual clarity. The plaintiff timely appealed the denial of preliminary relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion. The Fifth Circuit found the plaintiff likely to succeed on the merits of his claim under Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause, determining escrow work is a protected common calling and that Texas had offered no substantial justification for its discriminatory residency requirement. The court also found that irreparable harm existed because sovereign immunity barred damages, and the equities and public interest favored preliminary relief. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial and remanded with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the residency requirement against the plaintiff. View "Polk v. Crawford" on Justia Law

The defendant, Munson Hunter, was indicted on multiple counts of bank and wire fraud for his role in a scheme that caused significant financial losses. After raising concerns about his mental health and undergoing a competency evaluation, Hunter pleaded guilty to one count in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining charges. His plea agreement included a waiver of the right to appeal his conviction and sentence, except for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. At sentencing, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas imposed a term of supervised release with a special condition requiring Hunter to participate in a mental health program and take any medication prescribed by his physician. Hunter objected to being compelled to take medication.Despite the appellate waiver, Hunter appealed the medication condition, arguing it infringed on his due process rights. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit initially dismissed his appeal, relying on circuit precedent that recognized only limited exceptions to appeal waivers. The Supreme Court of the United States subsequently granted certiorari and announced a new rule: appeal waivers are unenforceable if their enforcement would result in a "miscarriage of justice"—that is, if they would leave in place an obvious and egregious error undermining the integrity of the judicial system.On remand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s new standard. The court determined that the record supported the imposition of the medication condition, finding no "blatant" constitutional error or egregious statutory violation. The court concluded that requiring Hunter to take prescribed medication as part of supervised release did not constitute the kind of obvious judicial error that would render the waiver unenforceable. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held that Hunter’s appeal waiver remained effective and dismissed the appeal. View "USA v. Hunter" on Justia Law

Texas enacted a law imposing new requirements on certain social media platforms, termed "digital service providers" (DSPs), to restrict minors’ access to specific categories of content. These requirements included monitoring and filtering content deemed harmful, prohibiting targeted ads to minors, preventing unlawful ads, verifying user age for access to certain material, and requiring age registration for account creation. Two groups challenged the law: one group, including technology industry organizations, contested the monitoring and filtering requirement; another group, comprised of a student coalition, individuals, and an ad agency, challenged several provisions, including the monitoring and filtering, targeted ads, unlawful ads, and age-verification requirements.In the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, both plaintiffs sought preliminary injunctions against enforcement of the law. The district court granted injunctions in part, enjoining the monitoring and filtering requirements for both groups, and enjoining the targeted ads, unlawful ads, and age-verification requirements for the student coalition group. The court found these provisions likely unconstitutional or vague, and held that the plaintiffs had standing based on the chilling effect on their speech and listening rights. The Attorney General of Texas appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit consolidated the cases.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the student coalition plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the monitoring and filtering, targeted ads, and unlawful ads requirements, as they were not directly regulated and failed to show a substantial risk of imminent harm. Their challenge to the age-verification requirement was foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent. However, the court held that the monitoring and filtering requirement, as challenged by the industry groups, is preempted by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s injunction as to the industry group, but vacated and remanded the injunction as to the student coalition plaintiffs. View "Computer & Communications Industry Association v. Paxton" on Justia Law

The defendant, after previously pleading guilty to aggravated criminal damage to property under Louisiana law, was found in possession of a firearm. His earlier offense involved intentionally damaging vehicles during a police traffic stop, endangering human life, which led to a three-year sentence. After serving his sentence, he was again found with a firearm, resulting in an indictment for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana reviewed the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment, in which he argued that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to him. The district court denied the motion. The defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial, and was sentenced to 56 months’ imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as applied to the defendant, considering whether the government's justification for permanent disarmament was supported by a historical tradition consistent with the Second Amendment, as outlined in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). The Fifth Circuit found that the government had not met its burden to demonstrate a relevant historical analogue for disarming individuals with a property crime predicate like the defendant’s. The court declined to expand precedent by treating aggravated property damage as sufficiently violent for permanent disarmament under historical going-armed laws.The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying the motion to dismiss and remanded the case for reconsideration. The main holding was that, absent sufficient evidence of a historical tradition supporting disarmament for this type of predicate felony, the government had not justified the application of § 922(g)(1) to the defendant. View "USA v. Debrow" on Justia Law

A fire captain who served as vice president of a local firefighters’ union was also a member of the Jefferson Parish Fire Civil Service Board. The union previously paid for legal counsel for members appearing before the Civil Service Board, but stopped doing so after the Louisiana Board of Ethics issued an advisory opinion, and later a binding declaratory opinion, stating that such payments violated Louisiana law while any union officer served on the board. The union challenged the Board of Ethics’ interpretation in state court, arguing that it misapplied state law, and then filed a federal lawsuit claiming this restriction violated its First Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted the union a preliminary injunction on First Amendment grounds, preventing enforcement of the ethics board’s opinion against the union. The district court also declined to abstain under the doctrines established in Younger v. Harris and Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co. The Louisiana defendants appealed, arguing the district court should have abstained and that granting the injunction was an abuse of discretion. While the appeal was pending, all relevant state court proceedings concluded, and, just before oral argument, the fire captain resigned from the Civil Service Board.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that the case was moot due to the resignation, as neither party retained a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. The court determined that no live controversy remained, rejected arguments that mootness exceptions applied, and ruled that the appeal and the entire case must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The court vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss the case. View "Jefferson Parish Firefighters Association, Local 1374 v. Roberts" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted in Texas state court in 2004 for assault causing bodily injury to a family member, which qualifies as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under Texas law. The incident involved the defendant pushing his wife during an argument and, when she attempted to call 911, striking her in the face while trying to knock the phone from her hand. Based on this conviction, he was later indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) for possessing a firearm after being convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.Before the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, raising two constitutional challenges: that the statute exceeds Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, and that, as applied to him, it violates the Second Amendment. The district court denied the motion. The defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss, and was sentenced to imprisonment and supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It rejected the Commerce Clause challenge, extending the reasoning from United States v. Alcantar to § 922(g)(9). The court then addressed the as-applied Second Amendment challenge, applying the historical tradition test articulated in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen and clarified in United States v. Rahimi. The Fifth Circuit concluded that § 922(g)(9), as applied to the defendant, is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of disarming individuals found to threaten the physical safety of others. The court found that the statute’s rationale and burden are supported by historical analogues and that the defendant’s conduct was sufficiently dangerous to warrant disarmament. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA v. Allred" on Justia Law

Texas law allows certain students, including those who are not lawfully present in the United States, to qualify for in-state tuition rates at public colleges if they meet residency requirements. The Texas Education Code provisions in question—sections 54.051(m) and 54.052(a)—permit illegal aliens who establish residency in Texas to pay discounted tuition, while out-of-state U.S. citizens must pay higher rates. The United States brought suit against Texas, alleging that these provisions violate federal law, specifically 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a), which bars states from granting postsecondary education benefits to illegal aliens based on residency unless all U.S. citizens and nationals are eligible for the same benefit regardless of residency.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas approved a consent judgment permanently enjoining Texas from enforcing the challenged provisions. After judgment, advocacy groups, a community college, and a student moved to intervene and sought to vacate or alter the judgment, arguing the provisions were not preempted by federal law. The district court denied intervention, reasoning it was legally futile because 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a) expressly preempts the Texas statutes.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the denial de novo and affirmed. The court held that intervention was futile because federal law expressly preempts the Texas provisions, barring states from conferring in-state tuition benefits to illegal aliens based on residency unless all U.S. citizens and nationals may receive the same benefit without regard to residency. The court also dismissed the remaining claims for lack of appellate jurisdiction, as the movants were not parties to the case and therefore had no right to appeal the consent judgment. View "USA v. Texas" on Justia Law

Several pharmaceutical manufacturers and a trade association challenged a Louisiana statute enacted in 2023, which prohibits drug manufacturers and distributors from interfering with the acquisition or delivery of discounted drugs—purchased under the federal Section 340B Drug Pricing Program—to pharmacies contracted by certain healthcare providers. The 340B Program requires drug manufacturers participating in Medicaid and Medicare to provide discounted outpatient drugs to designated healthcare providers serving low-income and rural populations. Many of these providers lack in-house pharmacies and use external contract pharmacies. In response to manufacturer-imposed limits on contract pharmacy use, Louisiana enacted Act 358 to preserve covered entities’ ability to use such pharmacies.The plaintiffs, including AbbVie, AstraZeneca, and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, filed separate lawsuits in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana against the Louisiana Attorney General, arguing that Act 358 is preempted by federal law, constitutes an unconstitutional taking, impairs contracts in violation of the Contracts Clause, and is unconstitutionally vague. The district court consolidated the cases, granted summary judgment for Louisiana and the Louisiana Primary Care Association (an intervenor), and rejected all of the manufacturers’ claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fifth Circuit held that Act 358 is not preempted by federal law, as the federal 340B Program does not regulate drug distribution logistics or the use of contract pharmacies, and thus leaves room for state regulation. The court further concluded that Act 358 does not effect a taking under the Fifth Amendment, does not substantially impair contractual obligations under the Contracts Clause, and is not unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause. The Fifth Circuit thus upheld summary judgment for Louisiana on all claims. View "AbbVie v. Murrill" on Justia Law

Three individuals, each having entered the United States unlawfully more than a decade ago, were detained by federal immigration authorities after routine traffic stops in Texas. None had criminal histories, and each was a long-term resident and father of U.S. citizen children. They petitioned for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), claiming exceptional hardship to their U.S. citizen children if removed. After being detained without bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), they filed habeas corpus petitions, asserting their detention violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas reviewed each petition, applying the procedural due process framework from Mathews v. Eldridge. The district courts found the mandatory detention regime unconstitutional as applied to these petitioners, ordered their immediate release, and required that any future detention must be preceded by a hearing to determine dangerousness or risk of flight. The government appealed these rulings, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit consolidated the cases.The Fifth Circuit examined precedent, including Zadvydas v. Davis, Demore v. Kim, and Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, and concluded that physical presence and long-term residence within the United States entitles aliens to due process protections. The court held that mandatory, indefinite detention of noncriminal, long-term resident aliens under § 1225(b)(2)(A) without a bond hearing violates the Fifth Amendment. The government must provide a bond hearing within ninety days of detention to determine if continued detention is justified by individualized findings of dangerousness or flight risk. The court affirmed the district courts’ grants of habeas corpus and clarified the scope of its decision to similar aliens detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A). View "Sosnava Rodriguez v. Ortega" on Justia Law