Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The EEOC filed an antiretaliation claim on behalf of Mekeva Tennort. The district court granted summary judgment for Rite Way. The court noted that it has long been the law in this and other circuits that a plaintiff contending that she was retaliated against for proactively reporting employment discrimination need not show that the discrimination rose to the level of a Title VII violation, but must at least show a reasonable belief that it did. At issue on appeal is whether the “reasonable belief” standard applies to a retaliation claim brought by a third party witness who was fired soon after answering questions in response to a company investigation into harassment allegations. The court held that the statute, case law, and interest in uniformity and ease of application support applying the “reasonable belief” standard to retaliation cases involving both proactive and reactive opposition. In this case, the court concluded that there is a fact issue concerning whether Tennort could have reasonably believed that the conduct about which she chose to speak violated Title VII. The court rejected Rite Way's alternative argument, which focused on the sufficiency of the EEOC’s causation evidence. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "EEOC v. Rite Way Serv., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, brothers who worked in the pest control industry, filed suit against LDAF and LDAF's Assistant Director David Fields, in his individual capacity, alleging various claims related to the hearings before LDAF for violations of Louisiana's Pest Control Laws, La. Stat. Ann. 3:3363. The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to establish sufficient evidence to demonstrate that defendants retaliated against them for complaining before the Commission and others. Because summary judgment was proper as to plaintiffs' First Amendment claims, summary judgment is also proper as to plaintiffs' state law claims. The court also concluded that summary judgment was properly granted as to the substantive due process claims. In this case, although plaintiffs may have a protected interest in being free from arbitrary state action not rationally related to a state purpose, they do not have a constitutional right to violate rules and regulations of the Louisiana Pest Control law. The record establishes a substantial basis for defendants’ actions and precludes any inference that such actions were arbitrary. Because Louisiana courts have found the due process protections in the Louisiana Constitution to be coextensive with the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, the same determination applies to plaintiffs’ state law claims. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claim fails because, assuming that the Excessive Fines Clause applies in this instance, the record indicates that each of plaintiffs' offenses resulted in fines that do not exceed the limits prescribed by the statute authorizing it. Under the facts established in the summary judgment record, plaintiffs' claims against David Fields failed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cripps v. Louisiana Dep't of Agriculture & Forestry" on Justia Law

After plaintiff's son, Anthony Hudson, died from a gunshot wound, plaintiff filed suit against the Lancaster police and fire departments, law enforcement officers, and a hospital and its medical personnel. The district court dismissed without prejudice. The court concluded that there was federal-question jurisdiction and the wrongful death claims should not have been dismissed; it was error for the district court - ruling without benefit of the court's decision on this issue of first impression - to dismiss Rodgers’s survival action solely because she was proceeding pro se on behalf of the estate; a person with capacity under state law to represent an estate in a survival action may proceed pro se if that person is the only beneficiary and the estate has no creditors; the court remanded for further determination as to whether Rodgers is the sole beneficiary; and the court expressed no view on the merits of Rodgers's claims. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Rodgers v. Lancaster Police & Fire Dept." on Justia Law

Parents of a severely disabled child (T.R.) prevailed in a suit against the school district where the child was abused by his special education teacher. A jury awarded a substantial verdict and the school district challenged the verdict, alleging that the parents are not the proper parties to file suit. In this case, the victim was a minor when the challenged conduct occurred but turned 18 by the time of trial; his disability rendered him incompetent even after he reached majority; a bank had been appointed to serve as his guardian; and that same bank oversaw a trust that paid for the minor’s medical bills. The court concluded that the parents have Article III standing to directly seek past medical expenses and to seek future home care expenses on behalf of T.R.; the Bank, as guardian, should have filed suit to recover the claims T.R. would otherwise possess - those for future home care expenses, physical pain and anguish, and impairment - by suing in their name on his behalf; the Bank owed a fiduciary duty to T.R., and absent a showing of conflict, the parents could not circumvent the Bank by filing suit on T.R.'s behalf; the court found that the district court's refusal to allow ratification of the parents' actions was an abuse of discretion because nothing in the text of Federal Rule 17(a)(3) or the court's decisions applying it supports the district court's decision; and federal statutes at issue do not authorize recovery for the parents' mental anguish based on the mistreatment of their son. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rideau v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a class of children eligible for Texas's Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment program, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of federal Medicaid law. Plaintiffs subsequently entered into a consent decree with various Texas state officials (defendants) calculated to improve implementation of the Program. In 2007, the parties agreed to a "Corrective Action Order." In 2013, defendants moved to terminate a portion of the Order and associated consent decree paragraphs under Rule 60(b)(5). The district court granted the motion and plaintiffs appealed. Determining that plaintiffs have not forfeited their appeal, the court concluded that the district court properly terminated the portion of bullet points 8-10 concerning the completion of the four assessments at issue. The court relied on certain district court decisions to interpret the proper interpretation of "shortage" - which compares the provider-to-class-member ratio with the average client load of the relevant class of provider - and concluded that the district court erred in terminating the portion of bullet points 8-10 that orders defendants to develop plans to address “shortage[s]” identified by the assessments. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order in part and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the portion of the district court’s order terminating bullet points 6-7 and consent decree paragraph 93, and the court vacated the portion of the district court's order terminating the challenged sentence of bullet point 5. View "Frew v. Janek" on Justia Law

ATBS and its owner filed a First Amendment retaliation claim against the City of Jackson, alleging that the mayor, acting through city employees, ended support for a development project proposed by ATBS after Hewitt had made public statements claiming corruption in city government. The district court entered judgment as a matter of law (JML) to the city. The court concluded that the city council was the final policymaker with ultimate authority to approve (or reject) project funding. The mayor did not have final authority over individual funding decisions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Advanced Tech. Bldg. Solutions LLC. v. Jackson, Mississippi" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Sergeant Cisneros and Officer Montelongo, among others, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officers violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff participated in several demonstrations throughout the City of Houston that led to his detention and arrest by police officers. The district court denied the officers’ motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The court concluded that the district court erred in holding that Officer Montelongo is not entitled to qualified immunity because the genuine factual dispute identified by the court - whether plaintiff had entered the roadway - is not material to the determination of qualified immunity. Plaintiff's possession of his shofar independently provided reasonable suspicion for his detention. The court also concluded that the district court erred in denying qualified immunity to Sergeant Cisneros. In this case, neither of the remaining factual disputes identified by the district court - whether plaintiff complied with Sergeant Cisneros’ orders and whether plaintiff remained bound by Sergeant Cisneros’ prior orders - is material for determining whether Sergeant Cisneros is entitled to qualified immunity for his detention and subsequent arrest of plaintiff. Sergeant Cisneros had a lawful reason for detaining plaintiff independent of any potential failure to comply by plaintiff. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for entry of judgment for the officers. View "Allen v. Cisneros" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a high school JROTC instructor, filed suit against the School Board and two school employees, alleging claims of retaliation under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733; 42 U.S.C. 1983; and state law. The court concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's section 1983 and state law claims where plaintiff was not prejudiced because the suit was still in its infancy when defendants raised the time-bar defense. In this case, plaintiff had notice and opportunity to respond to the motion to dismiss and he does not challenge the conclusion that his claims are time-barred. In regard to the FCA claim, plaintiff's primary theory of liability against the School Board is that the School Board's agents opposed plaintiff's protected actives and they used pretext to convince the Marine Corps to remove plaintiff from the school. Plaintiff also argued that the agents retaliated against him directly for engaging in protected activity, and that the School Board is liable for their conduct. The court concluded that plaintiff has pled enough facts to state a claim under this latter theory. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded as to the FCA claim. The court otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "Bias v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

This case arose from a New York Times article about Senator Rand Paul, which briefly quotes Walter Block, an economics professor. Block filed suit against defendants asserting claims for defamation and false light invasion of privacy. Although Block does not dispute that he made the statements at issue, he argues that the article takes the statements so far out of context as to make them untrue and defamatory. The district court granted a special motion to strike under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 971 (anti-SLAPP law), dismissed the complaint, and awarded defendants attorney's fees. In Lozovyy v. Kurtz, the court interpreted Louisiana law and concluded that “the Louisiana Supreme Court would recognize that Article 971’s ‘probability of success’ standard does not permit courts to weigh evidence, assess credibility, or resolve disputed issues of material fact.” Because the district court lacked the benefit of the court's recent guidance in Lozovyy, the court vacated and remanded for the district court to apply the standard. On remand, the district court should consider whether Block has established a genuine dispute of material fact on each element of his claims. View "Block v. New York Times Co." on Justia Law

Texas merchants filed suit challenging Texas’ Anti-Surcharge Law, Tex. Fin. Code 339.001. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and denied a preliminary injunction. Merchants claim that the law penalizes them for characterizing pricing as a “surcharge”, while at the same time not prohibiting a “discount” for non-credit-card transactions; and is unconstitutionally vague. Reviewing the parties’ claims de novo, and in the light of the States’ broad authority to regulate economic conduct, the court held that Texas’ law regulates conduct, not speech, and, therefore, does not implicate the First Amendment. Instead, the law ensures only that merchants do not impose an additional charge above the regular price for customers paying with credit cards. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Rowell v. Pettijohn" on Justia Law