Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a pharmaceutical sales representative diagnosed with PTSD, filed suit against Eli Lilly, alleging claims of retaliation under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq., and discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims. In regard to the ADA claim, because plaintiff did not contest at least two of the five business reasons for his termination and did not provide evidence showing any of the five reasons were false, he did not establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether these reasons were pretext for discrimination due to his PTSD. Likewise, in regard to the FMLA claim, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Eli Lilly terminated him in retaliation for his request for FMLA leave. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Eli Lilly. View "Rodriguez v. Eli Lilly and Co." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's grant of the DEA's petition for enforcement. The DEA sought medical records of 67 of defendant's patients in an investigation into violations of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. 801-904. The court concluded that the CSA preempts the Texas Occupations Code, Tex. Occ. Code 159.002, and state law affords defendant no defense against enforcement of the subpoena; 28 U.S.C. 2403(b) does not require notice to the Texas Attorney General, even though providing notice is the better practice; the court rejected defendant's argument that the patients named by the subpoena should be given notice and the opportunity to intervene where defendant could have notified the patients, and did, but no patients have intervened; the district court did not err in applying the reasonable relevance standard to evaluate the enforceability of the subpoena; and the evidence is insufficient to meet the court's standard for denying enforcement where the district court did not err in rejecting the doctor’s abuse of process objections and enforcing the subpoena. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment as modified and remanded. View "United States v. Zadeh" on Justia Law

Appellant, a criminal defense attorney practicing in Lafayette, Louisiana, challenged his six-month suspension from the Western District of Louisiana. The suspension was imposed due to his violation of L. Crim. R. 53.5, which operates as a prior restraint against attorney speech during the pendency of a criminal trial. The court concluded that, under the plain language of Rule 53.5, appellant falls within the scope of the rule as an attorney associated with the defense where appellant stressed that, although he was not counsel of record, he was helping the defendant with his case, appellant assisted the defendant with trial preparation, and appellant attended several of the pretrial hearings. The court also concluded that the district court was not required to make a finding of bad faith before sanctioning appellant. Finally, the court held that Rule 53.5 is unconstitutional as applied to appellant and the court need not address appellant's facial challenge. Rule 53.5 does not incorporate either a “substantial likelihood standard” or even a “reasonable likelihood” standard, as required under United States v. Brown. In this case, the Government failed to demonstrate that the prior restraint is narrowly tailored and provides the least restrictive means to achieve the Government's goal. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "In re: William Goode" on Justia Law

After plaintiff lost his position as a paralegal instructor, he filed suit against Kaplan under the anti-retaliation provision of the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3730(h). The district court granted summary judgment to Kaplan because plaintiff failed to show pretext. The court did not consider plaintiff's pretext argument on appeal because he failed to raise it in the district court and he has not shown extraordinary circumstances. The court also concluded that the district court properly considered the affidavits of Kaplan's Executive Director and Director of Operations. Finally, the court rejected plaintiff's claim that the district court discounted and found irrelevant the affidavit of Julio Lopez and the student allegation that another instructor had committed fraud with respect to attendance records. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Diaz v. Kaplan Higher Educ., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against 24 Hour Fitness, alleging that their membership contracts did not strictly comply with several technical provisions of the Texas Health Spa Act, Tex. Occ. Code Ann. 702.304, 702.305, 702.401, 702.402(a)(2). The district court dismissed the suit based on lack of standing. Because plaintiffs are not entitled to a full refund of their membership dues, and because 24 Hour’s alleged violations of the Act did not cause plaintiffs actual damages or any other form of economic harm, plaintiffs have sustained no economic injury. Furthermore, plaintiffs have not suffered a non-economic injury where plaintiffs have suffered no cognizable statutory injury under the Act. The Act does not authorize members to sue health clubs for technical statutory violations which cause the member no harm. Moreover, the Act does not authorize health club members to recover statutory or nominal damages for mere technical violations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment because plaintiffs lack Article III standing. View "Wendt v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc." on Justia Law

The EEOC filed an antiretaliation claim on behalf of Mekeva Tennort. The district court granted summary judgment for Rite Way. The court noted that it has long been the law in this and other circuits that a plaintiff contending that she was retaliated against for proactively reporting employment discrimination need not show that the discrimination rose to the level of a Title VII violation, but must at least show a reasonable belief that it did. At issue on appeal is whether the “reasonable belief” standard applies to a retaliation claim brought by a third party witness who was fired soon after answering questions in response to a company investigation into harassment allegations. The court held that the statute, case law, and interest in uniformity and ease of application support applying the “reasonable belief” standard to retaliation cases involving both proactive and reactive opposition. In this case, the court concluded that there is a fact issue concerning whether Tennort could have reasonably believed that the conduct about which she chose to speak violated Title VII. The court rejected Rite Way's alternative argument, which focused on the sufficiency of the EEOC’s causation evidence. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "EEOC v. Rite Way Serv., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, brothers who worked in the pest control industry, filed suit against LDAF and LDAF's Assistant Director David Fields, in his individual capacity, alleging various claims related to the hearings before LDAF for violations of Louisiana's Pest Control Laws, La. Stat. Ann. 3:3363. The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to establish sufficient evidence to demonstrate that defendants retaliated against them for complaining before the Commission and others. Because summary judgment was proper as to plaintiffs' First Amendment claims, summary judgment is also proper as to plaintiffs' state law claims. The court also concluded that summary judgment was properly granted as to the substantive due process claims. In this case, although plaintiffs may have a protected interest in being free from arbitrary state action not rationally related to a state purpose, they do not have a constitutional right to violate rules and regulations of the Louisiana Pest Control law. The record establishes a substantial basis for defendants’ actions and precludes any inference that such actions were arbitrary. Because Louisiana courts have found the due process protections in the Louisiana Constitution to be coextensive with the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, the same determination applies to plaintiffs’ state law claims. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claim fails because, assuming that the Excessive Fines Clause applies in this instance, the record indicates that each of plaintiffs' offenses resulted in fines that do not exceed the limits prescribed by the statute authorizing it. Under the facts established in the summary judgment record, plaintiffs' claims against David Fields failed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cripps v. Louisiana Dep't of Agriculture & Forestry" on Justia Law

After plaintiff's son, Anthony Hudson, died from a gunshot wound, plaintiff filed suit against the Lancaster police and fire departments, law enforcement officers, and a hospital and its medical personnel. The district court dismissed without prejudice. The court concluded that there was federal-question jurisdiction and the wrongful death claims should not have been dismissed; it was error for the district court - ruling without benefit of the court's decision on this issue of first impression - to dismiss Rodgers’s survival action solely because she was proceeding pro se on behalf of the estate; a person with capacity under state law to represent an estate in a survival action may proceed pro se if that person is the only beneficiary and the estate has no creditors; the court remanded for further determination as to whether Rodgers is the sole beneficiary; and the court expressed no view on the merits of Rodgers's claims. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Rodgers v. Lancaster Police & Fire Dept." on Justia Law

Parents of a severely disabled child (T.R.) prevailed in a suit against the school district where the child was abused by his special education teacher. A jury awarded a substantial verdict and the school district challenged the verdict, alleging that the parents are not the proper parties to file suit. In this case, the victim was a minor when the challenged conduct occurred but turned 18 by the time of trial; his disability rendered him incompetent even after he reached majority; a bank had been appointed to serve as his guardian; and that same bank oversaw a trust that paid for the minor’s medical bills. The court concluded that the parents have Article III standing to directly seek past medical expenses and to seek future home care expenses on behalf of T.R.; the Bank, as guardian, should have filed suit to recover the claims T.R. would otherwise possess - those for future home care expenses, physical pain and anguish, and impairment - by suing in their name on his behalf; the Bank owed a fiduciary duty to T.R., and absent a showing of conflict, the parents could not circumvent the Bank by filing suit on T.R.'s behalf; the court found that the district court's refusal to allow ratification of the parents' actions was an abuse of discretion because nothing in the text of Federal Rule 17(a)(3) or the court's decisions applying it supports the district court's decision; and federal statutes at issue do not authorize recovery for the parents' mental anguish based on the mistreatment of their son. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rideau v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a class of children eligible for Texas's Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment program, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of federal Medicaid law. Plaintiffs subsequently entered into a consent decree with various Texas state officials (defendants) calculated to improve implementation of the Program. In 2007, the parties agreed to a "Corrective Action Order." In 2013, defendants moved to terminate a portion of the Order and associated consent decree paragraphs under Rule 60(b)(5). The district court granted the motion and plaintiffs appealed. Determining that plaintiffs have not forfeited their appeal, the court concluded that the district court properly terminated the portion of bullet points 8-10 concerning the completion of the four assessments at issue. The court relied on certain district court decisions to interpret the proper interpretation of "shortage" - which compares the provider-to-class-member ratio with the average client load of the relevant class of provider - and concluded that the district court erred in terminating the portion of bullet points 8-10 that orders defendants to develop plans to address “shortage[s]” identified by the assessments. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order in part and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the portion of the district court’s order terminating bullet points 6-7 and consent decree paragraph 93, and the court vacated the portion of the district court's order terminating the challenged sentence of bullet point 5. View "Frew v. Janek" on Justia Law