Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs sought an injunction against the enforcement of Louisiana’s statutory requirement that each physician who performs outpatient abortions must have admitting privileges at a nearby hospital, The Unsafe Abortion Protection Act of 2014, La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 620 (H.B. 388). The district court held that the admitting-privileges requirement was facially unconstitutional and enjoined enforcement of the law against plaintiffs. Louisiana subsequently filed this emergency motion to stay the district court's preliminary injunction pending the resolution of Louisiana's appeal. The court granted the motion, concluding that Louisiana has made a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the merits. In this case, Louisiana is likely to prevail in its argument that plaintiffs failed to establish an undue burden on women seeking abortions or that the Act creates a substantial obstacle in the path of a large fraction of women seeking an abortion. The court also concluded that Louisiana has made an adequate showing as to the remaining factors considered in determining whether to grant a stay pending appeal. View "June Medical Servs. v. Cald" on Justia Law

Marcus Cass was fatally shot by Officer Chris Smith during the execution of a warrant to collect certain business records. Plaintiffs, Cass's family members, filed suit against the City, along with Smith and the Chief of Police in their individual capacities, alleging retaliation in violation of the First Amendment and various Fourth Amendment violations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Smith and the Chief on the basis of qualified immunity. The court affirmed summary judgment as to the Chief because plaintiffs produced no summary judgment evidence that he was involved with the execution of the warrant or Cass’s death. Although a reasonable jury could find that the manner in which Smith executed the warrant was unconstitutional and neither the district court nor the parties has addressed whether the violation was clearly established in the law, the court affirmed summary judgment on plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim as it relates to the execution of the warrant because plaintiffs have not shown that Smith violated clearly established law. Finally, the court affirmed summary judgment on the remaining claims against Smith because plaintiffs failed to raise fact issues to support constitutional claims for retaliation or excessive force as it relates to Smith's shooting of Cass. View "Cass v. City of Abilene" on Justia Law

This dispute arose from injuries sustained by a platform worker employed by Vertex. Continental appealed the district court's final judgment in favor of Tetra and Maritech, requiring Continental and its codefendant insured, Vertex, to indemnify them. The court concluded that the summary judgment record is inadequate to determine whether the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. 1333(a)(1), (a)(2)(A), requires the adoption of Louisiana law as surrogate federal law where the court cannot determine whether there is an OCSLA situs, the court cannot determine whether federal maritime law applies, and the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act (LOIA), La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 9:2780, is consistent with federal law. Accordingly, the court concluded that neither party is entitled to summary judgment as to whether LOIA must be adopted as surrogate federal law under OCSLA. The court remanded to the district court to determine the dispositive issue of whether Louisiana law must be adopted as surrogate federal law. View "Tetra Tech. v. Vertex Servs." on Justia Law

These two consolidated appeals stem from suits between Donald Cuba and Julia Pylant where Julia accused Cuba of rape and Cuba was later acquitted of the charge. In No. 15-10212, Cuba sued Julia and her parents (collectively “the Pylants”) for malicious prosecution, defamation, and tortious interference with contractual relations. In No. 15-10213, Julia sued Cuba for assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), and Cuba counterclaimed with causes of action substantially identical to those in his suit. The Pylants moved, in both suits, to dismiss Cuba's claims under the Texas Citizens' Participation Act (Texas's anti-SLAPP statute), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 27.004. The district court eventually held that the TCPA motions were moot because they had already been denied by operation of law. The court agreed with the Pylants that, under the TCPA framework, the 30-day deadline before a motion is deemed denied by operation of law runs only from the date of the hearing on the motion. But, because no such hearing was held in these cases, the TCPA motion was not denied by operation of law. In this case, the appeals are timely where the operative date from which the 30-day clock under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure ran was March 6, 2015, the date of the order denying the motion. On the merits, the court concluded that the TCPA applies in this case where, as Cuba concedes, all of the acts that the Pylants are being sued for are exercises of the right to petition as defined under the statute. The court further concluded that Cuba's claims of malicious prosecution and defamation are pleaded in sufficient detail. However, as to the defamation claim, the Pylants have established an affirmative defense as to certain of the communications at issue. Finally, Cuba’s tortious interference claim does not survive the motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the court vacated the orders from which these interlocutory appeals are taken, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cuba v. Pylant" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, mother of decedent Marcus Dewayne Slade, filed a wrongful death suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the City and various local officials after Marcus died in police custody. The cause of death was determined to be PCP toxicity. Plaintiff concedes that she does not have evidence sufficient to recover under Texas's wrongful death statute because she cannot demonstrate that defendants' wrongful actions more likely than not caused Marcus's death. However, plaintiff urges the court to decline to apply Texas's causation standard. The court rejected plaintiff's claim that case law supports an exception when the need for medical care is obvious, and that the standard is inconsistent with federal law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Slade v. City of Marshall" on Justia Law

Chapter 1301 of the Texas Insurance Code requires healthcare insurers to make coverage determinations and pay claims made by preferred healthcare providers within a specified time or face penalties. HCSC filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment against Methodist, seeking a declaration that Chapter 1301 does not apply to HCSC as the administrator of particular health plans, and the Federal Employee Health Benefits Act of 1959 (FEHBA), 5 U.S.C. 8901, et seq., preempts application of the statute to its administration of claims under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP). The district court granted summary judgment to HCSC. The court held that Chapter 1301 is not applicable to BCBSTX’s activities as administrator of the self-funded plans or state government plans, nor to those activities that it performs as administrator of claims under the BlueCard program. The court also held that FEHBA preempts Chapter 1301’s application to the claims processed by BCBSTX under FEHBP plans. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Health Care Serv. Corp. v. Methodist Hospitals" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and intervenor, prisoners awaiting execution in the state of Mississippi, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking an injunction preventing the state from conducting executions with compounded pentobarbital. The district court granted a broad preliminary injunction. The court vacated and remanded, concluding that plaintiffs have not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claims where they have not established a liberty interest in the enforcement of Miss. Code Ann. 99-19-51 and they have not shown that Mississippi's alleged deviation from section 99-19-51 would shock the conscience. In this case, Mississippi’s sovereign immunity prevents a federal court from enjoining state officials to follow state law, and plaintiffs have not shown they are likely to succeed in establishing a violation of either their procedural or substantive due process rights. View "Jordan v. Fisher" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former police officer, filed suit after he was terminated without notice or a hearing, alleging that the councilmembers’ actions violated state law and denied him constitutional due process. The district court dismissed the suit. The court concluded, however, that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's claims for lack of jurisdiction because he stated a claim for relief under a federal statute and the claim was not frivolous. The court concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim because Texas Government Code Section 614.023 is analogous to the charter provision in Henderson v. Sotelo. Both laws require some action to be taken before termination of employment can occur, but no property right is created by that requirement. The court further concluded that plaintiff's claims against the City and the mayor in his individual and official capacity were properly dismissed. Finally, the court reversed the district court's denial of leave to amend, remanding for an explanation of the district court's exercise of discretion. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Stem v. Gomez" on Justia Law

HPTA filed suit challenging SafeClear, the freeway towing program run by the City of Houston, contending that the program is preempted by 49 U.S.C. 14501 and violates its commercial-speech rights. The district court granted summary judgment for the City. HPTA has filed two previous suits challenging the program. The court concluded that HPTA has not demonstrated that there has been a change in the relevant facts undergirding its claim of federal preemption since the last suit; the nucleus of operative facts remains the same; and the claim of federal preemption is barred by res judicata. Likewise, HPTA’s commercial-speech claim is barred by res judicata. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Houston Prof'l Towing Ass'n v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, alleging that it violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k), by terminating her employment because she was pregnant. Plaintiff also alleged that the employer violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 207(a), by failing to pay her overtime. The district court entered judgment in favor of the employer. The court affirmed the judgment as to the FLSA claim, concluding that the district court did not clearly err in holding that the employer did not have notice, whether actual or constructive, that plaintiff was working overtime during the period at issue. The court also affirmed as to the Title VII claim, concluding that the employer was entitled to judgment as a matter of law after it established legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for plaintiff's termination. In this case, the record demonstrated that plaintiff had a contentious relationship with her manager, she caused problems regarding store morale and customer service, and she repeatedly had performance-related problems. View "Fairchild v. All American Check Cashing, Inc." on Justia Law