Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Chapter 1301 of the Texas Insurance Code requires healthcare insurers to make coverage determinations and pay claims made by preferred healthcare providers within a specified time or face penalties. HCSC filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment against Methodist, seeking a declaration that Chapter 1301 does not apply to HCSC as the administrator of particular health plans, and the Federal Employee Health Benefits Act of 1959 (FEHBA), 5 U.S.C. 8901, et seq., preempts application of the statute to its administration of claims under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP). The district court granted summary judgment to HCSC. The court held that Chapter 1301 is not applicable to BCBSTX’s activities as administrator of the self-funded plans or state government plans, nor to those activities that it performs as administrator of claims under the BlueCard program. The court also held that FEHBA preempts Chapter 1301’s application to the claims processed by BCBSTX under FEHBP plans. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Health Care Serv. Corp. v. Methodist Hospitals" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and intervenor, prisoners awaiting execution in the state of Mississippi, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking an injunction preventing the state from conducting executions with compounded pentobarbital. The district court granted a broad preliminary injunction. The court vacated and remanded, concluding that plaintiffs have not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claims where they have not established a liberty interest in the enforcement of Miss. Code Ann. 99-19-51 and they have not shown that Mississippi's alleged deviation from section 99-19-51 would shock the conscience. In this case, Mississippi’s sovereign immunity prevents a federal court from enjoining state officials to follow state law, and plaintiffs have not shown they are likely to succeed in establishing a violation of either their procedural or substantive due process rights. View "Jordan v. Fisher" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former police officer, filed suit after he was terminated without notice or a hearing, alleging that the councilmembers’ actions violated state law and denied him constitutional due process. The district court dismissed the suit. The court concluded, however, that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's claims for lack of jurisdiction because he stated a claim for relief under a federal statute and the claim was not frivolous. The court concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim because Texas Government Code Section 614.023 is analogous to the charter provision in Henderson v. Sotelo. Both laws require some action to be taken before termination of employment can occur, but no property right is created by that requirement. The court further concluded that plaintiff's claims against the City and the mayor in his individual and official capacity were properly dismissed. Finally, the court reversed the district court's denial of leave to amend, remanding for an explanation of the district court's exercise of discretion. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Stem v. Gomez" on Justia Law

HPTA filed suit challenging SafeClear, the freeway towing program run by the City of Houston, contending that the program is preempted by 49 U.S.C. 14501 and violates its commercial-speech rights. The district court granted summary judgment for the City. HPTA has filed two previous suits challenging the program. The court concluded that HPTA has not demonstrated that there has been a change in the relevant facts undergirding its claim of federal preemption since the last suit; the nucleus of operative facts remains the same; and the claim of federal preemption is barred by res judicata. Likewise, HPTA’s commercial-speech claim is barred by res judicata. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Houston Prof'l Towing Ass'n v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, alleging that it violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k), by terminating her employment because she was pregnant. Plaintiff also alleged that the employer violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 207(a), by failing to pay her overtime. The district court entered judgment in favor of the employer. The court affirmed the judgment as to the FLSA claim, concluding that the district court did not clearly err in holding that the employer did not have notice, whether actual or constructive, that plaintiff was working overtime during the period at issue. The court also affirmed as to the Title VII claim, concluding that the employer was entitled to judgment as a matter of law after it established legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for plaintiff's termination. In this case, the record demonstrated that plaintiff had a contentious relationship with her manager, she caused problems regarding store morale and customer service, and she repeatedly had performance-related problems. View "Fairchild v. All American Check Cashing, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., against JFS after JFS revoked its employment offer for a field engineer position at a mining site after learning that plaintiff had a rotator cuff impairment that prevented him from lifting his right arm above the shoulder. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of JFS. The court concluded that the district court's finding that plaintiff could not prove that he was disabled or a qualified individual was erroneous becuase it ignored Congress's expansion of the definition of disability when it amended the ADA in 2008. Under this more relaxed standard, the court concluded that evidence exists supporting a finding either that plaintiff is disabled or was regarded as disabled. Because a factual dispute exists on these issues, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded. View "Cannon v. Jacobs Field Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that the Psychologists’ Licensing Act, Tex. Occ. Code Ann. 501.001 - 501.505, violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court denied plaintiff's claim. The court agreed that Section 501.003(b)(1), under which “[a] person is engaged in the practice of psychology” if she represents herself “to the public by a title or description of services that includes the word ‘psychological,’ ‘psychologist,’ or ‘psychology,’” is unconstitutional as applied to speech on her political campaign website. In this case, plaintiff's campaign statements are entitled to full First Amendment protection where her speech on her campaign website was far removed from the context of professional speech and she was not providing advice to any particular client but communicating with the voters at large, so the professional speech doctrine is inapplicable. The court also concluded that the inclusion of “psychologist” on the website was not commercial speech, and therefore the decisions involving a state’s legitimate power to restrict the use of titles in the commercial context are inapplicable. Therefore, because the state’s interest in proscribing misleading speech is limited in the political context, and because the Board’s goal of preventing deception can be served by other means, Section 501.003(b)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff. The court declined to address plaintiff's overbreadth argument in regard to (b)(1), because that subsection is invalid as applied to her, but the court agreed with her that Section 501.003(b)(2) is overbroad. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Serafine v Branaman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, employed within the CDC in a bio-terrorism preparedness program, filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b) and 2671 et seq., alleging that his employers’ actions constituted numerous torts, including fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff claimed that he was terminated in retaliation for reporting perceived public health threats. The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), finding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction based upon its conclusion that plaintiff’s FTCA claims were precluded by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. The court agreed with the district court and concluded that the CSRA provides plaintiff's sole remedy against his employer because he is a federal employee, and due to the nature of his employment-related claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Tubesing v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Metrocare and others, alleging various federal and state law claims. The district court dismissed plaintiff's Texas Health & Safety Code claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and granted summary judgment for defendants on all other claims. The court concluded that plaintiff has failed to offer sufficient evidence that Metrocare’s articulated reason for firing him is a pretext for discrimination and therefore the district court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of Metrocare on plaintiff's claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.; Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.; and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's procedural due process claim because he received an adequate name-clearing hearing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Miller v. Metrocare Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an employment discrimination suit against the Commission. The district court granted summary judgment to the Commission and plaintiff appealed. The court concluded that most of plaintiff's various retaliation claims are unsupported by the record and are without merit. In regard to the claims that merit further discussion, the court concluded that plaintiff's mere assignment of janitorial duties, without further description or detail about what those duties actually were, does not state a materially adverse action; plaintiff produced no evidence to show that the delay in her evaluation or the failure to grant her 4% step increase - accompanied by a right of appeal that she did not exercise - constituted a materially adverse action; and the denial of a reassignment was not, as a matter of law, an adverse action. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Commission with respect to these retaliation claims. In regard to plaintiff's retaliatory termination claim, the court concluded that - based on the record before the court indicating that the Commission discharged some employees for excessive force, but not others - the mixed record constitutes substantial evidence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff’s discharge would have occurred “but for” exercising her protected rights. Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the Commission on this issue. The court vacated as to the retaliatory termination claim and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Wheat v. Florida Parish Juvenile Justice Comm'n" on Justia Law