Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., against JFS after JFS revoked its employment offer for a field engineer position at a mining site after learning that plaintiff had a rotator cuff impairment that prevented him from lifting his right arm above the shoulder. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of JFS. The court concluded that the district court's finding that plaintiff could not prove that he was disabled or a qualified individual was erroneous becuase it ignored Congress's expansion of the definition of disability when it amended the ADA in 2008. Under this more relaxed standard, the court concluded that evidence exists supporting a finding either that plaintiff is disabled or was regarded as disabled. Because a factual dispute exists on these issues, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded. View "Cannon v. Jacobs Field Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that the Psychologists’ Licensing Act, Tex. Occ. Code Ann. 501.001 - 501.505, violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court denied plaintiff's claim. The court agreed that Section 501.003(b)(1), under which “[a] person is engaged in the practice of psychology” if she represents herself “to the public by a title or description of services that includes the word ‘psychological,’ ‘psychologist,’ or ‘psychology,’” is unconstitutional as applied to speech on her political campaign website. In this case, plaintiff's campaign statements are entitled to full First Amendment protection where her speech on her campaign website was far removed from the context of professional speech and she was not providing advice to any particular client but communicating with the voters at large, so the professional speech doctrine is inapplicable. The court also concluded that the inclusion of “psychologist” on the website was not commercial speech, and therefore the decisions involving a state’s legitimate power to restrict the use of titles in the commercial context are inapplicable. Therefore, because the state’s interest in proscribing misleading speech is limited in the political context, and because the Board’s goal of preventing deception can be served by other means, Section 501.003(b)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff. The court declined to address plaintiff's overbreadth argument in regard to (b)(1), because that subsection is invalid as applied to her, but the court agreed with her that Section 501.003(b)(2) is overbroad. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Serafine v Branaman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, employed within the CDC in a bio-terrorism preparedness program, filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b) and 2671 et seq., alleging that his employers’ actions constituted numerous torts, including fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff claimed that he was terminated in retaliation for reporting perceived public health threats. The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), finding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction based upon its conclusion that plaintiff’s FTCA claims were precluded by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. The court agreed with the district court and concluded that the CSRA provides plaintiff's sole remedy against his employer because he is a federal employee, and due to the nature of his employment-related claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Tubesing v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Metrocare and others, alleging various federal and state law claims. The district court dismissed plaintiff's Texas Health & Safety Code claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and granted summary judgment for defendants on all other claims. The court concluded that plaintiff has failed to offer sufficient evidence that Metrocare’s articulated reason for firing him is a pretext for discrimination and therefore the district court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of Metrocare on plaintiff's claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.; Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.; and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's procedural due process claim because he received an adequate name-clearing hearing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Miller v. Metrocare Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an employment discrimination suit against the Commission. The district court granted summary judgment to the Commission and plaintiff appealed. The court concluded that most of plaintiff's various retaliation claims are unsupported by the record and are without merit. In regard to the claims that merit further discussion, the court concluded that plaintiff's mere assignment of janitorial duties, without further description or detail about what those duties actually were, does not state a materially adverse action; plaintiff produced no evidence to show that the delay in her evaluation or the failure to grant her 4% step increase - accompanied by a right of appeal that she did not exercise - constituted a materially adverse action; and the denial of a reassignment was not, as a matter of law, an adverse action. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Commission with respect to these retaliation claims. In regard to plaintiff's retaliatory termination claim, the court concluded that - based on the record before the court indicating that the Commission discharged some employees for excessive force, but not others - the mixed record constitutes substantial evidence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff’s discharge would have occurred “but for” exercising her protected rights. Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the Commission on this issue. The court vacated as to the retaliatory termination claim and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Wheat v. Florida Parish Juvenile Justice Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants for allegedly stating during a conference call that he destroyed and/or stole research data. The district court granted defendants' special motion to strike the claim under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure 971 (the anti-SLAPP statute). The court agreed with plaintiff that the district court erred in granting the motion despite the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. In this case, when the district court granted dismissal based on its assessment of the credibility of the parties’ affidavits and despite its acknowledgment that a triable fact issue existed, the court applied Article 971 in a manner that is contrary to Louisiana law. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Lozovyy v. Kurtz" on Justia Law

Machete, a film production company, filed suit claiming that a Texas film incentive program was unconstitutional under the First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and Texas Constitution. The district court dismissed all of Machete's claims. The court concluded that Machete lacked standing to pursue its only available federal claim against the director of the Texas Film Commission in her official capacity. The court also concluded that Machete has not shown that it has clearly established that the First Amendment requires a state which has an incentive program like this one to fund films casting the state in a negative light. Consequently, Machete cannot show that Governor Rick Perry’s general counsel, David Morales, violated Machete’s clearly established rights in this context. Machete's due process clause claims are similarly unavailing. Finally, the district court did not err in dismissing Machete's claims under the Texas Constitution because Morales did not forbid Machete from filming, producing, or releasing its movie, but merely opted not to subsidize the film with Texas taxpayer funds. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Machete Prod. v. Page" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Sage, alleging racial discrimination, wrongful termination, and retaliation, in violation of Title VII as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), and 42 U.S.C. 1981, as well as comparable Texas law and other state law claims. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the dismissal of her retaliation claims. The court affirmed the judgment because plaintiff, who was a supervisor familiar with company employment policies, has not created a genuine material fact issue that she suffered an adverse employment action. View "Brandon v. Sage Corporation." on Justia Law

Fortune, owner of a percentage working interest in a lease with ATP, appealed a Final Sale Order where ATP sought and received approval from the bankruptcy court to sell certain shelf and deepwater assets. The court concluded that, because Fortune failed to prove that it was directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by the ruling of the bankruptcy court, it lacks standing to appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Fortune's appeal. View "Fortune Nat. Resources Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Department on his claims of employment discrimination in violation of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), 42 U.S.C. 2000ff-1, retaliation in violation of GINA, and national origin discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The court concluded that the district court correctly dismissed the first claim because plaintiff presented no evidence that the Department requested, required, or purchased his genetic information, or discriminated against him on the basis of genetic information; the district court's conclusion that the timeline of events and the Department's submitted evidence showed that its actions were motivated by plaintiff's refusal to take a stress test; and the district court's findings - that the timing of plaintiff's placements on administrative duty showed that the Department’s motive was ensuring compliance with the Wellness Program and furthering its goals, not discriminating against plaintiff because of his national origin - were not erroneous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dept." on Justia Law