Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Cornelius Burgess, the former CEO of Herring Bank, was the subject of a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) enforcement action that began with an investigation in 2010 and formal proceedings in 2014. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recommended in 2017 that Burgess be removed from his position, barred from the banking industry, and fined $200,000. The FDIC Board adopted this recommendation, but the enforcement order was stayed pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucia v. SEC, which addressed the constitutionality of ALJ appointments. After Lucia, the case was remanded for a new hearing before a properly appointed ALJ, who again recommended the same sanctions in 2022. Before the FDIC Board could issue its final order, Burgess filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, seeking to enjoin the Board from issuing its decision on constitutional grounds.The district court found it had jurisdiction to hear Burgess’s claims despite 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1), which generally precludes such jurisdiction. The court denied injunctive relief on Burgess’s claims regarding unconstitutional removal protections for the Board and ALJs, finding he had not shown harm from those provisions. However, it granted an injunction based on his Seventh Amendment claim, concluding he was likely to succeed on the merits and that the other factors for injunctive relief were met. The FDIC appealed the injunction, and Burgess cross-appealed the denial of relief on his removal claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1) explicitly strips district courts of subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin or otherwise affect the issuance or enforcement of FDIC orders, including on constitutional grounds. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of injunctive relief and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, declining to reach the merits of Burgess’s constitutional claims. View "Burgess v. Whang" on Justia Law

Ernest Clark, while on probation for a Louisiana felony conviction of aggravated assault with a firearm, was found in possession of a firearm. He was indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits felons from possessing firearms. Clark moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to him under the Second Amendment, violated the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee, and exceeded Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. The district court denied his motion. Clark then pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, which included a waiver of most appellate rights except for a direct appeal of the district court’s order denying his motion to dismiss under the Second Amendment, as interpreted in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi sentenced Clark to 64 months in prison and three years of supervised release. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Clark raised several claims, but acknowledged that most were foreclosed or waived by his plea agreement, except for his as-applied Second Amendment challenge and his Fifth Amendment equal protection claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that disarming individuals convicted of violent felonies, such as aggravated assault with a firearm, and those found in possession of a firearm while on probation, is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court relied on its own recent precedents to conclude that Clark’s as-applied Second Amendment challenge failed. The court also found that Clark’s equal protection claim was waived by his plea agreement. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "USA v. Clark" on Justia Law

Three employers—SpaceX, Energy Transfer, and Findhelp—each faced unfair labor practice complaints before the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Before administrative proceedings began, each employer filed suit in a different federal district court in Texas, challenging the constitutionality of the NLRB’s structure. Specifically, they argued that the dual for-cause removal protections for both NLRB Board Members and Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) unconstitutionally insulated these officials from presidential removal, violating Article II and the separation of powers.Each district court granted a preliminary injunction, halting the NLRB’s proceedings against the respective employer. The courts found that the removal protections for ALJs (and, in one case, for Board Members) were unconstitutional, that the employers would suffer irreparable harm if forced to proceed before an unconstitutionally structured agency, and that the balance of equities and public interest favored injunctive relief. The NLRB appealed, arguing that the district courts lacked jurisdiction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act and that the employers had not shown a likelihood of success or irreparable harm.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the consolidated appeals. The court held that the district courts had jurisdiction to enjoin the NLRB’s proceedings, as the employers’ constitutional challenges to the agency’s structure did not “grow out of a labor dispute” within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. On the merits, the Fifth Circuit held that the dual for-cause removal protections for NLRB ALJs are unconstitutional, following its own precedent in Jarkesy v. Securities & Exchange Commission. The court further held that the removal protections for Board Members likely violate Article II, as the NLRB’s structure does not fit within the narrow exception recognized in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States. The court also found that being subjected to proceedings before an unconstitutionally structured agency constitutes irreparable harm. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunctions granted by the district courts. View "Space Exploration v. NLRB" on Justia Law

A student organization at West Texas A&M University, focused on supporting LGBT+ students, planned a charity drag show to raise funds for a suicide prevention initiative. The event was to be held in a university venue that had previously hosted a wide range of student and community events, including a prior drag show. The organizers took steps to ensure the show would be appropriate for a general audience, restricting lewd content and requiring minors to be accompanied by adults. Shortly before the event, the university president canceled the show, citing concerns that drag performances were discriminatory against women and did not align with the university’s values.Following the cancellation, the student group and two of its officers filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, seeking a preliminary injunction to allow future drag shows on campus. The district court denied the injunction, holding that drag shows were not inherently expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment and that the university president was entitled to qualified immunity. The court also found that the plaintiffs had standing against certain university officials but not others, and rejected the claim of irreparable harm.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the denial of the preliminary injunction de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the planned drag show was expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment, as it conveyed a clear message of support for the LGBT+ community in its context. The court determined that the university venue was a designated public forum, making the content-based restriction on the drag show subject to strict scrutiny, which the university did not attempt to justify. The court found the plaintiffs faced irreparable harm from the ongoing ban and that the balance of equities and public interest favored an injunction. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction against the university president and a vice president, affirmed the denial as to the chancellor for lack of standing, and remanded for entry of the injunction. View "Spectrum WT v. Wendler" on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S. House of Representatives adopted a rule permitting remote voting and proxy participation, allowing Members to be counted as present for quorum purposes even if not physically on the House floor. Using this procedure, the House passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023, with a majority of votes cast by proxy. The Act was subsequently passed by the Senate and signed into law by the President. The State of Texas challenged the validity of certain provisions of the Act, arguing that the Constitution’s Quorum Clause required a physical majority of Members to be present in the House chamber for business to be conducted.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas held a bench trial and found that Texas had standing to challenge the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, a provision of the omnibus legislation. The district court concluded that the enrolled-bill rule, which generally bars courts from questioning the validity of a law based on legislative procedure, did not apply to this constitutional challenge. On the merits, the district court determined that the Quorum Clause required physical presence and enjoined enforcement of the challenged provision against Texas.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of a permanent injunction. The Fifth Circuit held that the enrolled-bill rule did not bar judicial review of Texas’s constitutional claim because the facts were undisputed and the challenge was purely legal. The court then concluded that the Quorum Clause does not require physical presence, relying on the constitutional text, Supreme Court precedent, and historical congressional practice. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and vacated the permanent injunction, holding that the House’s proxy-voting rule did not violate the Quorum Clause. View "State of Texas v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Evan Norman visited a bar where he consumed several alcoholic drinks and fell asleep. At the request of the establishment, Deputy Ingle removed Norman and instructed him to go home, warning that he could be arrested for public intoxication. Norman repeatedly asked for the deputies’ names and badge numbers and made comments to them. As the deputies returned to the bar, Norman followed and continued to engage with them. The situation escalated when Norman reached over Deputy Sutton’s arm and pointed at Deputy Ingle, leading to physical shoving. Norman then attempted to punch Deputy Ingle and placed him in a headlock. In response, the deputies used force to subdue Norman, including multiple punches to his head. Norman was arrested and left facedown for about ten minutes while awaiting medical assistance, during which he suffered significant facial injuries.Norman filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas against the deputies and others, alleging excessive force, denial of medical care, failure to intervene, wrongful arrest, malicious prosecution, and First Amendment violations. The district court dismissed claims against the county and sheriff but allowed claims against the deputies to proceed. The deputies moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied their motions, finding genuine disputes of material fact regarding the use of force, resistance, and medical care, and ruled that the deputies were not entitled to qualified immunity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the denial of qualified immunity de novo, considering video evidence of the incident. The court held that the video evidence resolved any material factual disputes and showed that the deputies’ actions did not violate clearly established constitutional rights. The court found the use of force reasonable under the circumstances, no denial of medical care, and no basis for failure to intervene or other claims. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment, holding the deputies were entitled to qualified immunity. View "Norman v. Ingle" on Justia Law

A sheriff’s deputy in Brewster County, Texas, observed a pickup truck towing a horse trailer near a border patrol checkpoint during a shift change—a time and place known for smuggling activity. The deputy recognized the driver, who had previously been identified as a possible smuggler. Without being signaled or ordered, the driver pulled over to the shoulder, and the deputy parked behind him. During a casual conversation, the deputy noticed an open alcohol container in the truck. The driver gave inconsistent and suspicious answers about the trailer’s contents and ownership, and after further questioning, eventually admitted that there were people hidden in the locked compartment of the trailer. The deputy then discovered three undocumented immigrants inside.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding that the defendant had been seized with reasonable suspicion and that his consent to search the trailer attenuated any taint from the deputy’s actions. The defendant pleaded guilty to one count of transporting illegal aliens but reserved the right to appeal the suppression ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The appellate court held that there was no Fourth Amendment violation. It found that the initial encounter was consensual, that the deputy’s actions did not constitute a seizure until reasonable suspicion had developed, and that the deputy’s incidental contact with the truck did not amount to a trespassory search. The court also determined that the discovery of the open alcohol container was lawful and that the subsequent evidence was not subject to suppression. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. Larremore" on Justia Law

After Hurricane Harvey caused significant flooding at the Arbor Court apartment complex in Houston in 2017, the property’s owner, DM Arbor Court, Limited (DMAC), sought permits from the City of Houston to repair the damage. The City denied these permits, invoking a provision of its flood control ordinance that had not previously been used for such denials. The City determined that a majority of the complex’s buildings had sustained “substantial damage,” requiring costly elevation before repairs could proceed. As a result, DMAC was unable to repair or redevelop the property, which led to the loss of tenants and the property sitting idle.DMAC filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, alleging that the City’s denial of repair permits constituted an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment. The district court dismissed the case as unripe, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding the case ripe once the City’s Director of Public Works formally denied the permit application. On remand, after a bench trial, the district court rejected DMAC’s takings claim, concluding that the property retained some economic value and that DMAC was not deprived of all economically beneficial use. The court also found that the City’s actions were justified under the Penn Central framework, emphasizing the public interest in flood management.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the City’s denial of the repair permit deprived DMAC of all economically viable use of Arbor Court, constituting a categorical taking under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the City’s regulatory action amounted to a per se taking requiring just compensation. View "DM Arbor Court v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

Ronald Donell Brown led a drug trafficking organization that transported large quantities of cocaine and marijuana from Houston, Texas, to Atlanta, Georgia. In 2014, after a shipment of cocaine was stolen, Brown believed two associates were responsible and sought to retaliate. He and others kidnapped one associate, Eric Williams, who escaped, but was later shot and wounded by Brown. Brown then orchestrated the murder of the second associate, Marcus Celestine, by providing information and a weapon to intermediaries, resulting in Celestine’s death outside a parole office. Brown was arrested in 2017 on unrelated charges and later indicted federally on multiple counts, including conspiracy to commit murder for hire, intentional killing during drug trafficking, and firearm offenses related to crimes of violence.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied Brown’s motion to suppress evidence, finding that communications involving a confidential informant and Brown’s attorneys were not protected by attorney-client privilege, and that Brown’s Sixth Amendment rights had not been violated because the government’s alleged intrusion occurred before adversarial proceedings began. At trial, Brown was convicted on several counts. The government later moved to dismiss two firearm-related counts (Counts Three and Four) after trial, citing double jeopardy concerns. The district court granted this motion, denied Brown’s request for a continuance to respond, and sentenced him to life imprisonment on the remaining counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Brown’s motion to suppress, holding that the attorney-client privilege did not apply and that no Sixth Amendment violation occurred. However, the appellate court vacated the district court’s dismissal of Counts Three and Four and the sentences for Counts One and Two, holding that the district court, not the government, must exercise its discretion to determine which multiplicitous convictions to dismiss and then resentence accordingly. The case was remanded for that purpose. View "USA v. Brown" on Justia Law

The defendant, who had a prior Louisiana felony conviction for illegal use of a weapon stemming from a drive-by shooting in 2021, was released on parole in March 2023. One month later, he was found as a passenger in a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation, where police discovered four loaded firearms, including one reported stolen. He was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and with possessing unregistered firearms under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d).In the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, the defendant moved to dismiss both counts, arguing that the statutes were unconstitutional both facially and as applied to him. The district court denied the motion, holding that convicted felons are not protected by the Second Amendment and that the statutes align with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The defendant then pleaded guilty to the felon-in-possession charge in exchange for dismissal of the other count, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the preserved as-applied constitutional challenge de novo. The court held that, under current precedent, the statute’s facial constitutionality was foreclosed. Addressing the as-applied challenge, the court found that the defendant’s prior conviction qualified as a predicate felony and that the government had identified relevant historical analogues—specifically, founding-era “going armed” laws that imposed similar burdens and justifications. The court concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), as applied to the defendant, is consistent with the Second Amendment and the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. Morgan" on Justia Law