Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, former American and British soldiers assigned to protect employees of an industrial water injection facility, filed suit claiming that KBR did not responsibly handle the contamination at the facility, leading plaintiffs to suffer injuries stemming from hexavalent chromium exposure. The district court granted summary judgment for KBR. The court concluded that the political question doctrine does not bar the court's review of this case where, under Lane v. Halliburton, this appeal primarily raised legal questions that may be resolved by the application of traditional tort standards. On the merits, the court concluded that plaintiffs have not adduced sufficient evidence to prove that exposure to sodium dichromate caused their injuries based on a reasonable medical probability and scientifically reliable evidence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "McManaway v. KBR, Inc." on Justia Law

KPCC filed suit against KBR, a general contractor supporting the Government's military operations in Iraq, alleging claims for breach of contract, fraud, and promissory estoppel. At issue was a 2010 contract for, inter alia, KBR's leasing, with an option to purchase, a dining facility constructed by KPCC in Iraq. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the political-question doctrine rendered nonjusticiable the contract dispute at issue. Applying de novo review, under the discriminating inquiry required by Baker v. Carr, the court concluded that the claims presented required resolution of contractual disputes for which there existed judicially manageable standards. Therefore, there was no justiciable political question. The court disposed of KBR's remaining claims regarding the act-of-state doctrine and regarding a contractor's defense from its strict execution of a constitutionally authorized government order. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded. View "Kuwait Pearls Catering Co. WLL v. Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc." on Justia Law

AHA and Isaiah Smith filed suit against the school district, alleging that the school district's policy of inviting students to deliver statements, which can include invocations, before school-board meetings violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. The district court granted summary judgment for the school district. The court agreed with the district court that a school board was more like a legislature than a school classroom or event where the board is a deliberative body, charged with overseeing the district's public schools and other tasks. In Town of Greece v. Galloway, the Supreme Court stated unequivocally that the legislative-prayer exception in Marsh v. Chambers extends to prayers delivered at town-board meetings. In this case, the court concluded that the school board was no less a deliberative legislative body than was the town board in Galloway. Accordingly, the court affirmed the summary judgment in No. 16-11220, and reversed the order denying summary judgment in No. 15-11067. View "American Humanist Assoc. v. Birdville I.S.D." on Justia Law

Air Evac filed suit against state defendants, claiming that, as applied to air-ambulance entities, Texas' workers'-compensation system was federally preempted. Air Evac argued that, because the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), 49 U.S.C. 4173(b)(1), expressly preempted all state laws related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier, Texas may not use state laws to regulate air-ambulance services. The district court granted state defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1). The court concluded that Air Evac had Article III standing because it had a pecuniary injury that could be redressed with injunctive and declaratory relief; Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. conferred federal-question jurisdiction because Air Evac's complaint sought injunctive relief on the basis that the ADA preempted Texas law; the Ex parte Young exception applied to this case where, to the extent Ex parte Young required that the state actor "threaten" or "commence" proceedings to enforce the unconstitutional act, state defendants' pervasive enforcement satisfied that test; and the court declined to exercise abstention under Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. State of Texas, Department of Insurance" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a national association of charter-bus companies, sought to enjoin regulations affecting their operations enacted by the City of Austin. At issue was whether federal law preempted the City's exercise of its regulatory authority over the intrastate operation of charter buses. The court affirmed the district court's holding that the regulations were not preempted. The arguments about preemption were based on a federal statute captioned "Federal authority over intrastate transportation." See 49 U.S.C. 14501. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that section 14501(c)(2)(A) may appropriately be considered in interpreting and applying section 14501(a)(2), because both subsections use identical language. The court concluded that the distinctions between sections 14501(a) and (c) do not persuade it to construe "safety regulatory authority" more narrowly in the former than in the latter. The court applied a test that was similar to the Ninth Circuit, concluding that, in light of the permitting regulation's expressed purpose and effect, there was a safety motivation for the ordinance, and there was a nexus between the permitting regulations and the safety concern. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United Motorcoach Association, Inc. v. City of Austin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, Dow, alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The district court granted summary judgment for Dow. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to produce any evidence that he was treated less favorably than others similarly situated outside of his protected class, and thus his Title VII discrimination claim failed as a matter of law. In regard to the retaliation claim, the court concluded that no reasonable fact finder could conclude that plaintiff would not have been fired but for his decision to engage in activity protected by Title VII. The court explained that poor performance was not an activity protected by Title VII and, even assuming that plaintiff completed the Performance Improvement Plan (PIP), his negative, post-PIP evaluation independently justified plaintiff's termination. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Alkhawaldeh v. Dow Chemical Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, Harris County, after Constable Alan Rosen terminated plaintiff's employment while he was on leave recovering from back surgery. Plaintiff alleged discrimination and retaliation claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the Texas Labor Code (TLC), as well as a First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment to the County. The court concluded that, because plaintiff failed to provide evidence showing any available reasonable accommodations that would have enabled him to perform the essential functions of his job, he cannot establish that he was qualified under the ADA at the time of his termination; because plaintiff failed to raise a material issue of fact on the question of whether he was qualified for his job under the ADA, he also failed to make out a prima facie retaliation claim under the ADA; the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's Title II claims where plaintiff presented no evidence that Harris County discriminated against him outside of the employer–employee context, or that Harris County was not a covered entity under the ADA; and, to the extent plaintiff was not speaking as an employee, he failed to provide evidence showing that he was terminated because of his protected speech under the First Amendment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Moss v. Harris County Constable Precinct One" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a detective in the Sheriff's Department, filed suit against former Sheriff James Michael Byrd and Jackson County, alleging claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and under Mississippi tort law, including claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The district court granted Byrd's motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) and denied plaintiff's motion for JMOL. The court found that the district court erred in "decoupling" the evidence when considering Byrd's motion for JMOL and thus reversed as to that issue. The court remanded for reinstatement of the jury's verdict and entry of judgment thereon. The court found no other errors and affirmed the district court in all other respects. View "Seibert v. Jackson County, Mississippi" on Justia Law

After plaintiff filed an administrative complaint claiming disability discrimination by the Postal Service, the Postal Service and EEOC determined that her case was subsumed within a pending administrative class action. Plaintiff then filed suit against the Postmaster General. On remand, the magistrate judge subsequently determined that plaintiff's claim was properly subsumed within the class action and dismissed plaintiff's case for failure to exhaust. The court concluded that the district court properly determined that plaintiff's claims were subsumed within the McConnell v. Potter class action; the EEOC's notice of plaintiff's right to sue did not establish that she exhausted her administrative remedies with respect to the merits of her disability discrimination claims; the court rejected plaintiff's contention that the magistrate judge erred in dismissing her complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6); and, even if the magistrate judge had dismissed plaintiff's claims under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the dismissal would have been without prejudice and the court's review would remain unchanged. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ruiz v. Brennan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a math professor at Southern University's New Orleans campus, filed suit against the University, alleging that plaintiff's supervisor engaged in a campaign of harassment that has continued through the filing of this lawsuit. Plaintiff sued the University under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and the supervisor individually under section 1983. The magistrate judge granted summary judgment for defendants. Principally at issue on appeal was whether the continuing violation doctrine required consideration of a lengthier period of time in evaluating the merit of plaintiff's claims. Like the Tenth Circuit, the court expressly recognized that the court's post-National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan test for the continuing violation doctrine has long implicitly acknowledged: Morgan overruled the court's prior cases to the extent they held that the continuing violation doctrine does not apply when an employee was or should have been aware earlier of a duty to assert her rights. Therefore, the magistrate judge erred by using this factor to prevent plaintiff from showing a continuing violation that would enable her to support her harassment claim with conduct occurring more than 300 days before she filed her EEOC charge. The court further concluded that Morgan's disclaiming of an "on notice" inquiry should also apply to section 1983 hostile work environment claims; concluded that plaintiff has alleged a continuing course of conduct dating back to her return from leave in 2011; remanded for the magistrate judge to evaluate the full scope of the allegedly harassing conduct; and affirmed the dismissal of the Title VII retaliation claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Heath v. Southern University System" on Justia Law