Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Robert Montano, a pretrial detainee in the county jail, died of acute renal failure after approximately four-and-one-half days’ detention in a glass-walled observation cell in the jail’s infirmary. This 42 U.S.C. 1983 action was filed against the county on three theories of liability: unconstitutional condition of confinement relative to a county custom for holding incoherent pretrial detainees; episodic acts or omissions; and unconstitutional condition of confinement relative to a county custom of failing to meet basic human needs. In regards to the unconstitutional-condition-of-confinement claim, the court concluded that the district court properly denied the county JMOL against the jury’s finding the condition. In this case, trial testimony adequately established the protocol exercised in Mr. Montano’s experience was standard jail practice; the record demonstrates his experience was not a mere “isolated example”, but was, instead, a “pervasive pattern of serious deficiencies in providing for his basic human needs”. The court concluded that the district court properly denied the county's Rule 50(b) motion regarding the $1.5 million awarded for pain Mr. Montano suffered. Because section 1983 liability and damages are upheld, the court concluded that plaintiffs remain the prevailing parties and are entitled to those fees and costs. Because the constitutional deprivation is well established and the causal link was admitted at trial, satisfying Texas’ causation standard, the court concluded that the standard for wrongful-death damages is satisfied. Therefore, JMOL was improperly awarded to the county on wrongful-death damages. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Montano v. Orange County, Texas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against LIT, alleging claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., based on LIT's failure to grant his requested disability accommodation. Plaintiff, who suffers from an anoxic brain injury, sought an accommodation in which he could take two exams per class. The district court dismissed the claims. The court concluded that the district court erred in concluding that LIT is entitled to sovereign immunity where Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity does not bar plaintiff's Rehabilitation Act claim for money damages. The court also concluded that plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages is not moot. Here, plaintiff alleges that he sustained a direct injury from LIT’s past intentional discrimination. Thus, whether or not the President’s letter remedies plaintiff's injury prospectively does not moot plaintiff's claim for retrospective relief for the period in which LIT denied his accommodation request. However, upon a full review of the summary judgment evidence, the court afforded deference to LIT’s decision because plaintiff has not demonstrated that LIT intentionally discriminated against him. In this case, each of the six alleged statements and actions recited by plaintiff is either not supported by the record or could not plausibly be construed by a reasonable fact finder as an example of intentional discrimination. Even if he had adduced a triable fact issue on discrimination, plaintiff cannot recover injunctive or declaratory relief from LIT because he lacks standing where his alleged prospective injury is entirely speculative, hypothetical, and lacks imminence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Campbell v. Lamar Institute of Technology" on Justia Law

The family of Jason Hyatt filed suit against Officer Brianna Thomas, alleging a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim related to Hyatt's suicide while in police custody. The district court concluded that no genuine issue of material fact precluded Thomas from being entitled to qualified immunity. The court held that, while not ideal, Thomas's failure to exercise even greater care to avoid Hyatt’s suicide did not amount to deliberate indifference. In this case, Thomas took measures to prevent Hyatt's suicide: she withheld from him the most obvious potential ligature, placed him under video surveillance, and directed her relieving officer to keep a close watch over him. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Hyatt v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Officer Brewer in his individual capacity, alleging that Brewer used constitutionally excessive force in effecting plaintiff's arrest. The district court granted Officer Brewer’s motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that Brewer’s conduct in executing the initial takedown was not constitutionally unreasonable in the light of clearly established law; Brewer is entitled to qualified immunity as to the claims stemming from his attempts to handcuff plaintiff while plaintiff was on the ground; and the use of force was the sort of “split-second judgment” in a difficult situation that qualified immunity is designed to protect. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court did not err in holding that Brewer is entitled to qualified immunity and affirmed the judgment. View "Griggs v. Brewer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Luke & Associates alleging race-based discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court granted summary judgment for Luke. The court concluded that plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie case of discrimination where she has not shown that any of the other employees shared her history of on-the-job violations. Even assuming that plaintiff had shown a prima facie case, Luke provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its decision. Likewise, plaintiff's retaliation claim fails because plaintiff failed to provide evidence that "but for" her complaints to the Air Force, Luke would have given a pay raise. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to compel. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Outley v. Luke & Associates, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former employees of the County, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, after they were reassigned, and later terminated, from their positions allegedly because they failed to support the sheriff's reelection. Plaintiffs also filed grievances with the Nueces County Civil Service Commission, alleging only that they were subjected to adverse employment actions in violation of county rules prohibiting such actions on grounds of participating or failing to participate in political activity. The state court affirmed the Commission's decision against plaintiffs. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on claim-preclusion grounds. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the district court applied the law of res judicata incorrectly, and that res judicata was inappropriate because plaintiffs had deliberately abstained from litigating their federal claims in state court. The court rejected plaintiffs' arguments and concluded that, because plaintiffs could and should have brought these claims in their state suit, their stated reasons for not doing so are inadequate to prevent res judicata. The court also rejected plaintiffs' claim of abstention. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cox v. Nueces County, TX" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the City's former chief of police, filed a First Amendment retaliation suit alleging that he was terminated for suing the mayor. The district court granted summary judgment for the City. The court concluded that although plaintiff spoke as a citizen, his suit against the mayor in his personal capacity was not on a matter of public concern and thus was not protected speech. The court also concluded that plaintiff's state-law claim of malicious interference with employment (MIE) against the mayor is barred because plaintiff failed to bring notice of the claim before suing as required by state law. View "Gibson v. Kilpatrick" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the State Department, seeking to enjoin enforcement of certain laws governing the export of unclassified technical data relating to prohibited munitions. This case concerns plaintiffs' desire to share all of its 3D printing and CNC milling files online, available without cost to anyone located anywhere in the world, free of regulatory restrictions. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' preliminary injunction based on their failure to carry their burden of persuasion on two of the three non-merits requirements for preliminary injunctive relief, namely (a) the threatened injury to them outweighs the threatened harm to the State Department, and (b) granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s denial and declined to reach the question of whether plaintiffs have demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. View "Defense Distributed v. U.S. Dept. of State" on Justia Law

Integrity and Buentello filed suit against the City, alleging that its refusal to include them on the non-consent tow list violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. On appeal, the City challenged the district court's order requiring it to include plaintiffs on the City's non-consent tow list and to develop neutral criteria for that list. The court has previously held that a class-of-one equal-protection claim is unavailable in a public employment context. The court concluded that this conclusion logically applies as well to a local government’s discretionary decision to include or not include a company on a non-consent tow list. In the alternative, the court concluded that Integrity and Buentello’s class-of-one equal-protection claim fails because they have not shown that the City had a discriminatory intent and because the City has a rational basis for excluding them. Accordingly, the court reversed and rendered a judgment of dismissal for the City. View "Integrity Collision Center v. City of Fulshear" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an evangelical Christian, filed suit against the City, alleging that he was denied his First Amendment right to hand out religious literature at a public festival. The parties entered into a consent decree where the City agreed to pay plaintiff a dollar in nominal damages and where, among other provisions, the City was prohibited from interfering with plaintiff's free speech rights or other individuals at future public events in downtown Ft. Worth. At issue are the attorney's fees. Because a plaintiff is a prevailing party when nominal damages are awarded, and this case does not present the special circumstances in which a prevailing civil rights plaintiff may be denied fees altogether, the court vacated the order denying fees and remanded for an assessment of the reasonableness of the fee request. View "Grisham v. City of Fort Worth" on Justia Law