Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee, filed suit pro se under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendants provided him inadequate security and impermissibly delayed medical care. The district court dismissed plaintiff's amended complaint. The court concluded that the district court correctly dismissed plaintiff's failure-to-protect claims against Chief of Security George Byrnes, Administrative Assistant Sheila Spinner, Warden Lance Moore, Captain Kelly Moore, and Captain Jackie Johnson; the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's claims of inadequate medical care against Administrative Assistant Sheila Spinner, Warden Lance Moore, and Head Nurse Debra Cowan; and, although the district court correctly dismissed plaintiff's failure-to-protect claims and plaintiff's medically related claims against Administrative Assistant Sheila Spinner, Warden Lance Moore, and Head Nurse Debra Cowan, the dismissal should have been without prejudice because it is not clear that plaintiff amended his complaint with a sufficient understanding of the inadequacies in his original pleading or that he has pleaded his best case. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further consideration. View "Alderson v. Concordia Parish Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Parker County Deputy Sheriffs Hollis and Iglesias, alleging that the deputies arrested him without probable cause in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court granted the deputies' motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. Defendant was arrested for interfering with an officers' duties after he refused to follow the deputies' orders to move his truck. The court explained that Texas courts have found that failure to comply with an officer's instructions under similar circumstances violates Texas Penal Code 38.15 and is not protected speech. In Haggerty v. Tex. S. Univ., the court has held that failure to comply with a police officer’s instruction to stand back is not protected speech and gives the officer probable cause to arrest under Texas Penal Code 38.15. Therefore, based on this precedent, the court concluded that a reasonable officer could have believed that there was a fair probability that plaintiff violated Texas Penal Code 38.15 by failing to comply with Iglesias' instruction to move the truck. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Childers v. Iglesias" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was arrested during a protest at a Planned Parenthood, he filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights. The district court held that individual officers were entitled to qualified immunity and that plaintiff failed to create a dispute of fact for municipal liability for the City of Stafford. The court concluded that the district court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of Officers Flagg and Jones where plaintiff was arrested without probable cause in violation of clearly established law; rejected plaintiff's claim that the City had an official policy of improperly applying Texas Penal Code 38.02 and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City on plaintiff's section 1983 municipality liability claim; concluded that the district court correctly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's claim for liability of Chief Kahn in his individual capacity where plaintiff's evidence failed to create a material dispute of fact as to deliberate indifference; and agreed with plaintiff that the district court failed to address his claims that defendants' understanding of sections 38.02 and 42.03 and plaintiff's arrest resulted in an as-applied violation of his First Amendment rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Davidson v. City of Stafford, Texas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging, inter alia, violation of his First and Fourth Amendment rights after he was silenced and then ejected at a city council meeting. The court dismissed Councilman Roberts's appeal of the district court's denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity because a factual dispute exists as to whether Roberts's conduct was viewpoint-based; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Roberts as to punitive damages where there is no question that Roberts's conduct did not rise to the level of reckless indifference or evil intent; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Black on the First Amendment claim because his actions as sergeant-at-arms were not objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Black on the Fourth Amendment claim based on qualified immunity; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the false arrest claim; and dismissed Black’s cross-appeal on the state tort claims for lack of jurisdiction. View "Heaney v. Roberts" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendant's use of force was objectively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and denied defendant qualified immunity. The court concluded that, under the facts in this record, permitting a police dog to continue biting a compliant and non-threatening arrestee is objectively unreasonable. Because plaintiff's right was clearly established at the time, the court affirmed the order denying qualified immunity. The court dismissed the appeal of the partial summary judgment for plaintiff for want of appellate jurisdiction. View "Cooper v. Brown" on Justia Law

Ahmede Bradley and Officer Eric Copeland were involved in a fight that ended with Copeland firing three shots at Bradley, killing him. Plaintiffs, Bradley's heirs, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Copeland violated Bradley's Fourth Amendment rights, used excessive force, and used unlawful lethal force. Officer Copeland appealed the district court's denial of qualified immunity. The court held that the district court erred in holding that—in the absence of video evidence—eyewitness testimony should not be considered for summary judgment purposes until subject to cross examination. In this case, giving full weight to the undisputed eyewitness testimony, the court concluded that plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment argument is waived; Copeland’s conduct prior to the shooting was neither excessive nor unreasonable; and because plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a constitutional violation, the court held that they have failed to satisfy their burden of showing that Copeland is not entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the court reversed and held that Copeland is entitled to qualified immunity. View "Orr v. Copeland" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Keilon Sanders (a/k/a "Bird") pled guilty to one count of conspiracy involving 1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana, for which he received 120 months imprisonment. Sanders argued on appeal of that conviction and sentence that his guilty plea was entered involuntarily and that the district court violated his right to self-representation. After review, the Fifth Circuit affirmed as to the voluntariness of the plea but vacated Sanders’s sentence and remanded for resentencing because the district court failed to honor his request for self-representation. View "United States v. Sanders" on Justia Law

Cesar Bernel-Aveja was convicted of illegal reentry after deportation and appealed his sentence. He argued that his prior 1996 Ohio conviction for burglary did not qualify as "burglary of a dwelling," a specifically enumerated "crime of violence" under United States Sentencing Guideline 2L1.2,1 and therefore that the district court erred in applying a 12-level sentence enhancement. The Fifth Circuit found that Ohio offense for which Bernel-Aveja was convicted could have consisted of unlawful entry with the intent to commit a crime on the premises formed after that unlawful entry. This offense did not come within the "generic" definition of burglary as the Court articulated that definition in the applicable caselaw. Accordingly, the Court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Bernel-Aveja" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Efrain Piedra-Morales was caught and pled guilty to illegal reentry. Previously, he had been deported three times from the United States. Piedra-Morales appealed the district court’s application of an eight-level aggravated felony enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) for deportation after an earlier aggravated felony conviction. He contended that his prior convictions for illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. 1326(b)(2) were not aggravated felonies because they were predicated on his prior cocaine possession convictions, which were no longer considered aggravated felonies, and as such, his prior illegal reentry convictions are also not aggravated felonies. The Fifth Circuit found no error and affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Piedra-Morales" on Justia Law

In 2015, defendant-appellant Guadalupe Castro and Cynthia Uribe were arrested for transporting six bricks of heroin weighing 5,992 grams in their vehicle, which Castro was driving. In post-arrest interviews, Castro and Uribe admitted to transporting narcotics for a drug trafficking organization (“DTO”). A federal grand jury charged Castro with one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance. Castro pled guilty. During pre-sentencing, Probation did not recommend a mitigating role adjustment under section 3B1.2 in Castro’s Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”). Despite Castro’s objection, in the PSR’s Addendum, Probation maintained that Castro was not entitled to an adjustment. In a pre-sentencing order and at sentencing, the district court concluded that Castro’s objection was without merit. Castro appealed, asking the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to vacate the district court’s judgment and remand for resentencing because: (1) the district court committed clear error by adopting Probation’s interpretation of section 3B1.2, which Amendment 794 clarifies was the wrong standard because it focuses on the integral nature of Castro’s role in the drug conspiracy; and (2) the court’s error was not harmless. Finding no reversible error, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Castro" on Justia Law