Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against the school district under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging, inter alia, that the non-renewal of her teaching contract was in retaliation for expressing her First Amendment support for a candidate for school superintendent. The district court granted summary judgment for the school district. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to show that her protected speech was the cause of her discharge. The court also concluded that plaintiff failed to show that she was denied adequate pre-termination process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim and procedural due process claims in all respects. View "Dearman v. Stone Cnty. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that defendants violated her constitutional rights when she was required to participate in a mock performance of the Mexican Pledge of Allegiance. The district court entered summary judgment on some of plaintiff's claims and, after trial, entered judgment as a matter of law for defendants. The court concluded that, because plaintiff has graduated from high school, her only surviving claim is for nominal damages arising from the alleged violation of her rights; plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of an official policy or that the District had knowledge of the assignment, and thus judgment as a matter of law was proper for the District on municipal liability for any constitutional violation that may have arisen from the assignment or subsequent actions; the court's ruling also applies to the claims against the District for retaliation and violation of Equal Protection; qualified immunity was properly granted to Defendants Santos and Cavazos on the claim they violated plaintiff's First Amendment rights when they removed plaintiff from class; and, likewise, plaintiff's equal protection claim fails. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Brinsdon v. McAllen I.S.D." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, eight female alien detainees, filed suit alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq., as well as several state law claims, after a male CCA officer, Donald Dunn, sexually assaulted them. The court concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim against CCA and Evelyn Hernandez, the former CCA facility administrator, or in granting summary judgment for Dunn. The CCA defendants, in housing alien detainees according to ICE specifications, were performing a federal function, rather than operating the detention center under color of state law. Williamson County had almost no involvement in the detention center’s day-to-day operations. The court also concluded that summary judgment for Williamson County was proper where the county is not directly responsible for CCA’s failure to follow policy, and the county did not otherwise act with deliberate indifference in monitoring the detention center. Furthermore, plaintiffs have not plausibly asserted that ICE officials acted with deliberate indifference and the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' FTCA claims against the United States. The court affirmed as to the federal claims, but reversed the dismissal of the remaining state claims and remanded. View "Doe v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an employee of the School Board, filed suit alleging that she was sexually harassed by Timothy Graham, another board employee, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The district court granted the board’s motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the School Board is entitled to immunity under the Ellerth/Faragher defense. Therefore, the court reversed as to this issue. In this case, the district court erred in holding that the board’s efforts to prevent sexual harassment were reasonable as a matter of law. Plaintiff produced evidence that, if believed, would show that employees at the central office were not trained on sexual harassment, were not informed of the existence of a policy, were not shown where to find it, and were not told whom to contact regarding sexual harassment. The court concluded that this would be a sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to find that the company did not take reasonable steps to prevent and remedy sexual harassment. The court also concluded that, because plaintiff did not show the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Graham was her supervisor in the third harassment period, the district court was correct to conclude that he was not; the court rejected plaintiff's argument that using different liability standards for the distinct periods of harassment would unduly confuse the jury; and, because plaintiff does not have any properly presented and preserved argument for why the board knew or should have known about the harassment, she cannot make out a prima facie case under the standard for coworker sexual harassment. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Pullen v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was employed by Securitas, a security staffing company, and was placed as a receptionist at a company called Fidelity. Plaintiff filed suit against Securitas and Fidelity, alleging that they terminated her due to her age - she was 83-years-old. Plaintiff also alleged that Securitas terminated her in violation of Section 623(a) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621−34, and sought liquidated damages, injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees. The court concluded that the district court erred as to the identity of the employer where Securitas has admitted that it was plaintiff's employer; there was some evidence which created a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Securitas should have known of discrimination by Fidelity and the court reversed the grant of summary judgment as to this issue; and, depending on the outcome of the district court’s re-evaluation of whether Securitas did enough once learning Fidelity wanted plaintiff removed, the district court should also consider whether that re-evaluation affects its earlier analysis of Securitas’s decision to terminate her. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Nicholson v. Securitas Security" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former police officer for the town, filed suit against the town and several individual defendants, alleging that defendants violated his First Amendment rights when they terminated him for cooperating with an FBI investigation of public corruption. Plaintiff also asserted a claim under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3730(h), alleging that he was fired in violation of the Act’s whistleblower protections. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing his First Amendment retaliation claims against all defendants and dismissing his FCA claims against the individual defendants. The town cross-appealed the denial of summary judgment with respect to the FCA claim against it. The court found that the district court erred in holding that plaintiff’s involvement in the FBI investigation was not entitled to First Amendment protection. Although the court held that plaintiff asserts a violation of his right of free speech, the court held that the right at issue was not “clearly established” at the time of his discharge. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of the individual defendants on the basis of qualified immunity. However, the court reversed and vacated the grant of summary judgment for the town because plaintiff has demonstrated a viable claim of municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services. The court also dismissed the town's cross-appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Finally, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the FCA claims against the individual defendants. View "Howell v. Town of Ball" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the City, arguing that the City's pension reforms violate the Texas Constitution, Tex. Const. art. XVI 66(d). Two district courts ruled in favor of the City. In these consolidated appeals, the court concluded that Section 66 permits prospective changes to the pension plans of the public employees within its reach. In this case, the Pension Reform complies with Section 66 where Section 66 did not turn plaintiffs’ variable-rate cost-of-living adjustment into a one-way ratchet capable only of upward movement. The court rejected claims raised by plaintiffs of Case No. 15-10416, that only the Texas legislature has the City of Dallas v. Trammel "reserved power" to amend pension plans and thus abrogate contractual rights. The court concluded that this argument is foreclosed by Klumb v. Houston Mun. Employees Pension Sys. Finally, the court concluded that the Pension Reform does not violate the United States Constitution’s contracts clause and takings clause where neither clause create property rights and the right to public pension benefits in Texas is subject to legislative power. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgments. View "Houten, Jr. v. City of Fort Worth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, as trustee of his own revocable trust, submitted an application to the ATF to manufacture a machinegun. After the ATF denied his application pursuant to a 1986 statute that makes possession of a machinegun unlawful, 18 U.S.C. 922(o), plaintiff filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the 1986 statute. The district court dismissed the suit, holding that plaintiff lacked standing, and, in the alternative, that machineguns are not protected by the Second Amendment. The court concluded that plaintiff did have standing and disagreed with the district court's determination that Tex. Penal Code 46.05(a)(1)(A)-(B) moots the federal claim. On the merits, the court concluded that, even when a trust is a separate legal entity that can possess property, it may well be included in the definition of “person.” The court also concluded that machineguns do not receive Second Amendment protection because they are dangerous and unusual and therefore not in common use. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. Because plaintiff has not briefed his other arguments, they are waived. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of discovery under Rule 56(d). Finally, the court denied as moot plaintiff's motion for judicial notice. View "Hollis v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the district, alleging a claim of racial discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. Plaintiff twice applied for employment as a master electrician with the district and was rejected both times. The district court granted summary judgment for the district. The court concluded that, even if plaintiff had adequately briefed the claim, he failed to establish a prima facie case for disparate impact where there is no evidence that the district maintained a policy of "excluding from consideration for employment all persons who have been convicted of a felony." In this case, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the district hired someone outside of his protected class or otherwise treated him less favorably than others similarly situated outside of his protected class. Plaintiff argued that another district employee, Russell Leon Alvis, was similarly situated as plaintiff. The court concluded, however, that Alvis's criminal history was not comparable to that of plaintiff's where Alvis was convicted of delivery of marijuana and sentenced to 10 years probation, and plaintiff was convicted of at least three drug crimes for which he received a far more severe sentence than 10 years probation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Rogers v. Pearland I.S.D." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Town and Mayor Ragusa, alleging a claim of racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The court held that plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie case of discrimination where plaintiff has offered no evidence that the comparator, or any other employee, was retained despite performance concerns. To the extent that the Sixth Circuit’s requirement that the differences between a plaintiff and proffered comparators be relevant to the challenged employment action differs from the law in this circuit, about which the court expressed no opinion, plaintiff has not made the requisite showing. The court also concluded that to the extent plaintiff's claims are intended to support a failure-to-train or failure-to-promote cause of action, they are deemed abandoned. Plaintiff has failed to identify any Town employees that received training or promotions while plaintiff did not. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Morris v. Town of Independence" on Justia Law