Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Officer Thompson of the Houston Police Department (HPD) applied excessive force and unreasonable deadly force during his arrest, causing plaintiff to be partially paralyzed. Plaintiff also alleged a claim under Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, against the City of Houston based on the same conduct and injuries. The court affirmed the district court's grant of qualified immunity to Officer Thompson in his individual capacity. The court concluded that, based on the totality of the circumstances - including plaintiff's resistance, intoxication, disregard for the officer's orders, the threat he and the other three men in his truck posed while unrestrained, and his actions leading up to the shooting (including reaching for his waistband) - it is clear that it was not unreasonable for an officer in Officer Thompson’s position to perceive plaintiff's actions to be an immediate threat to his safety. Therefore, it was not “clearly excessive” or “unreasonable” for Officer Thompson to use deadly force in the manner he did to protect himself in such circumstances. Because plaintiff has not shown a violation of his constitutional rights, all of his Monell claims against the City of Houston fail as a matter of law. View "Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against prison officials within the TDCJ, alleging First Amendment and 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims, challenging TDCJ policies on the wearing of medicine bags, the use of pipes during Native American religious pipe ceremonies, and grooming, based on the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim, medicine-bag RLUIPA claim, and pipe-ceremony RLUIPA claim. The court vacated and remanded in part for further proceedings as to plaintiffs' grooming-policy claim under RLUIPA because the district court did not strike plaintiffs’ summary judgment evidence, including George Sullivan’s expert testimony; genuine issues of material fact remain regarding the legitimacy of TDCJ’s cost and security concerns created by the wearing of a kouplock by plaintiffs as low security risk Native American inmates; and the district court did not consider plaintiffs’ grooming-policy claim in light of plaintiffs’ individual circumstances. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Davis v. Davis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Austin police officers and the City of Austin for violating his constitutional rights after officers arrested plaintiff three times for interfering with police duties while he filmed police department interactions with other citizens. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The district court reasoned that, under the court's independent intermediary doctrine, the officers could not be held liable for arrests the grand jury found supported by probable cause. The court declined to overrule its cases applying the independent intermediary doctrine where the doctrine has been a well-settled Fifth Circuit rule of orderliness and plaintiff cites no intervening change. Therefore, the court concluded that, under established circuit law, plaintiff had the burden of affirmatively showing that the grand jury’s deliberations were tainted, and failed to do so. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Buehler v. City of Austin/Austin PD" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Louisiana tort law against defendants after plaintiff was called as a witness in state court to testify at a bond hearing for a criminal defendant. At issue is whether a state prosecuting attorney is absolutely immune from suit for money damages for (1) ordering a sheriff’s deputy to make a warrantless arrest without probable cause of a witness in retaliation for the witness’s refusal to testify that her boyfriend had struck her in the face during a domestic violence altercation, and (2) subsequently maliciously prosecuting the witness for making a false report of domestic violence. The court concluded that the prosecuting attorney is absolutely immune from liability for initiating an alleged malicious prosecution against the witness but not absolutely immune from liability for ordering the officer to make a warrantless arrest. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim but otherwise vacated the grant of the attorney's motion to dismiss the suit for money damages based on her alleged wrongful arrest. The court remanded plaintiff's federal and state claims in that respect to the district court for further proceedings. View "Loupe v. O'Bannon" on Justia Law

After Ptech terminated plaintiff's employment, he filed suit against PTech claiming that the company violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for PTech on the disability discrimination claim, concluding that plaintiff failed to rebut PTech's legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing him. In this case, the company dismissed plaintiff because he violated the company's attendance policy. The court also affirmed summary judgment on the failure to accommodate claim where a reasonable juror could only conclude that plaintiff caused a breakdown in the interactive process by failing to provide the documentation requested. View "Delaval v. PTech Drilling Tubulars, LLC" on Justia Law

After Juan Mendez, Jr. was shot to death by a Border Patrol Agent, Taylor Poitevent, Mendez's family filed suit against Poitevent for, among other things, excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiffs also asserted various intentional tort claims against the United States. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court held that Poitevent did not use excessive force because a reasonable officer in his situation could have believed that plaintiff posed a threat of serious harm, justifying the use of deadly force. The court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the United States may not invoke Texas’s civil privilege defense. The court also rejected plaintiffs' argument that even if the United States may assert the civil privilege defense here, genuine disputes of material fact exist as to whether Poitevent’s conduct was privileged. The court concluded that Poitevent could have reasonably believed that there was a substantial risk that Mendez would cause death or serious bodily injury to him or another person if the arrest was delayed, and that he could have reasonably believed that deadly force was immediately necessary to make an arrest. Finally, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in implicitly denying plaintiffs’ motion for a continuance to conduct discovery. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Mendez, Sr. v. Poitevent" on Justia Law

After plaintiffs challenged a substantial increase in the taxes on two properties they own, the Parish sent two tax assessors to inspect the property. Plaintiffs filed suit in state court alleging violations of their state and federal constitutional rights stemming from the inspection. After removal to federal court, the district court determined that inspector Lloyd Handorf was not entitled to qualified immunity because he had exceeded the scope of his consent and therefore violated plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights. Specifically, the district court determined that while Handorf had consent to conduct a tax appraisal, he exceeded this consent by: (1) being on the curtilage; (2) peering into the windows; and (3) opening the pool house door. The court concluded that there is no guidance within this circuit regarding the actions a tax appraiser may take in an assessment. Further, other than conclusory allegations, plaintiffs have not identified the proper course of conduct for a tax appraiser. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment and concluded that Handorf is entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiffs' constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct. View "King v. Louisiana Tax Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the mother of Wayne Pratt, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that officers of the HCSD caused her son's death by using excessive force in restraining him during his arrest. Plaintiff also alleged a claim under Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, that the County was also liable for Wayne's death. The district court granted qualified immunity to HCSD officers in their individual capacities and denied the Monell claim. The court concluded that plaintiff has not shown that Deputies Lopez and Medina's use of tasers was clearly excessive or unreasonable. Therefore, the court held that the district court did not err in granting qualified immunity to these deputies. In light of Wayne's “on again, off again” commitment to cease resisting, his recurring violence, and the threat he posed while unrestrained, it was not, under the totality of the circumstances, clearly excessive or unreasonable for HCSD officers to restrain him by hog-tying him. Therefore, the court held that the district court did not err in granting Deputies Wilks, Goldstein, and Salazar qualified immunity. Because there is no Fourth Amendment violation, the court affirmed the judgment in all respects. View "Pratt v. Harris County, TX" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an observant Muslim in the custody of TDCJ, filed suit seeking permission to grow a "fist-length" beard and wear a kufi as required by his religious beliefs. Plaintiff alleged that TDCJ's grooming policy, as applied to him, violates the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq. The district court granted declaratory and injunctive relief enabling petitioner to grow the beard and to wear the kufi throughout TDCJ's facilities. The Director appealed. The court concluded that TDCJ has not carried its burden under RLUIPA with respect to its denial of plaintiff’s request for a fist-length beard not to exceed four inches. The court also concluded that, based on the record, TDCJ has not carried its burden under RLUIPA with respect to its denial of plaintiff's request to wear his kufi throughout TDCJ facilities. In this case, TDCJ has failed to demonstrate that prohibiting the four-inch beard or the wearing of the kufi is the least restrictive means of furthering its compelling interest in preventing contraband, inmate identification, and cost control and prison operations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ali v. Quarterman" on Justia Law

The Commission may refuse a permit to any applicant who has not been a citizen of Texas for at least one year before filing an application. This case stems from the original plaintiffs' attempt to acquire a night club twenty-five years ago. The district court declared the residency requirement invalid and permanently enjoined the Commission from enforcing it. The district court denied TPSA's motion for relief from the injunction under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 60(b), concluding that there was no case or controversy because the original plaintiffs had not appeared and seemed to lack an ongoing interest and because TPSA lacked standing. The court concluded that, although the original plaintiffs have not appeared and may no longer possess any direct stake in the outcome of the proceeding, there remains a live case or controversy because of the intervention of Fine Wine and Southern Wine. Their intervention ensures that this proceeding involves an actual dispute between adverse litigants. The court also concluded that TPSA has associational standing to bring its Rule 60(b) motion where the interests of TPSA’s members in the enforcement of the residency requirement are germane to TPSA’s purpose, and neither TPSA’s claim for relief nor the relief it requests requires the participation of its individual members. Addressing the injury in fact prong and the redressability prong, the court concluded that TPSA has standing. On the merits, the court concluded that the Twenty-first Amendment does not authorize states to impose a durational-residency requirement on the owners of alcoholic beverage retailers and wholesalers. Finally, TPSA has failed to address the district court’s holding that Texas’s residency requirement violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Accordingly, the court reversed and rendered an order denying the motion on the merits. View "Cooper v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n" on Justia Law