Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

After Juan Mendez, Jr. was shot to death by a Border Patrol Agent, Taylor Poitevent, Mendez's family filed suit against Poitevent for, among other things, excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiffs also asserted various intentional tort claims against the United States. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court held that Poitevent did not use excessive force because a reasonable officer in his situation could have believed that plaintiff posed a threat of serious harm, justifying the use of deadly force. The court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the United States may not invoke Texas’s civil privilege defense. The court also rejected plaintiffs' argument that even if the United States may assert the civil privilege defense here, genuine disputes of material fact exist as to whether Poitevent’s conduct was privileged. The court concluded that Poitevent could have reasonably believed that there was a substantial risk that Mendez would cause death or serious bodily injury to him or another person if the arrest was delayed, and that he could have reasonably believed that deadly force was immediately necessary to make an arrest. Finally, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in implicitly denying plaintiffs’ motion for a continuance to conduct discovery. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Mendez, Sr. v. Poitevent" on Justia Law

After plaintiffs challenged a substantial increase in the taxes on two properties they own, the Parish sent two tax assessors to inspect the property. Plaintiffs filed suit in state court alleging violations of their state and federal constitutional rights stemming from the inspection. After removal to federal court, the district court determined that inspector Lloyd Handorf was not entitled to qualified immunity because he had exceeded the scope of his consent and therefore violated plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights. Specifically, the district court determined that while Handorf had consent to conduct a tax appraisal, he exceeded this consent by: (1) being on the curtilage; (2) peering into the windows; and (3) opening the pool house door. The court concluded that there is no guidance within this circuit regarding the actions a tax appraiser may take in an assessment. Further, other than conclusory allegations, plaintiffs have not identified the proper course of conduct for a tax appraiser. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment and concluded that Handorf is entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiffs' constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct. View "King v. Louisiana Tax Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the mother of Wayne Pratt, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that officers of the HCSD caused her son's death by using excessive force in restraining him during his arrest. Plaintiff also alleged a claim under Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, that the County was also liable for Wayne's death. The district court granted qualified immunity to HCSD officers in their individual capacities and denied the Monell claim. The court concluded that plaintiff has not shown that Deputies Lopez and Medina's use of tasers was clearly excessive or unreasonable. Therefore, the court held that the district court did not err in granting qualified immunity to these deputies. In light of Wayne's “on again, off again” commitment to cease resisting, his recurring violence, and the threat he posed while unrestrained, it was not, under the totality of the circumstances, clearly excessive or unreasonable for HCSD officers to restrain him by hog-tying him. Therefore, the court held that the district court did not err in granting Deputies Wilks, Goldstein, and Salazar qualified immunity. Because there is no Fourth Amendment violation, the court affirmed the judgment in all respects. View "Pratt v. Harris County, TX" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an observant Muslim in the custody of TDCJ, filed suit seeking permission to grow a "fist-length" beard and wear a kufi as required by his religious beliefs. Plaintiff alleged that TDCJ's grooming policy, as applied to him, violates the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq. The district court granted declaratory and injunctive relief enabling petitioner to grow the beard and to wear the kufi throughout TDCJ's facilities. The Director appealed. The court concluded that TDCJ has not carried its burden under RLUIPA with respect to its denial of plaintiff’s request for a fist-length beard not to exceed four inches. The court also concluded that, based on the record, TDCJ has not carried its burden under RLUIPA with respect to its denial of plaintiff's request to wear his kufi throughout TDCJ facilities. In this case, TDCJ has failed to demonstrate that prohibiting the four-inch beard or the wearing of the kufi is the least restrictive means of furthering its compelling interest in preventing contraband, inmate identification, and cost control and prison operations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ali v. Quarterman" on Justia Law

The Commission may refuse a permit to any applicant who has not been a citizen of Texas for at least one year before filing an application. This case stems from the original plaintiffs' attempt to acquire a night club twenty-five years ago. The district court declared the residency requirement invalid and permanently enjoined the Commission from enforcing it. The district court denied TPSA's motion for relief from the injunction under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 60(b), concluding that there was no case or controversy because the original plaintiffs had not appeared and seemed to lack an ongoing interest and because TPSA lacked standing. The court concluded that, although the original plaintiffs have not appeared and may no longer possess any direct stake in the outcome of the proceeding, there remains a live case or controversy because of the intervention of Fine Wine and Southern Wine. Their intervention ensures that this proceeding involves an actual dispute between adverse litigants. The court also concluded that TPSA has associational standing to bring its Rule 60(b) motion where the interests of TPSA’s members in the enforcement of the residency requirement are germane to TPSA’s purpose, and neither TPSA’s claim for relief nor the relief it requests requires the participation of its individual members. Addressing the injury in fact prong and the redressability prong, the court concluded that TPSA has standing. On the merits, the court concluded that the Twenty-first Amendment does not authorize states to impose a durational-residency requirement on the owners of alcoholic beverage retailers and wholesalers. Finally, TPSA has failed to address the district court’s holding that Texas’s residency requirement violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Accordingly, the court reversed and rendered an order denying the motion on the merits. View "Cooper v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a pharmaceutical sales representative diagnosed with PTSD, filed suit against Eli Lilly, alleging claims of retaliation under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq., and discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims. In regard to the ADA claim, because plaintiff did not contest at least two of the five business reasons for his termination and did not provide evidence showing any of the five reasons were false, he did not establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether these reasons were pretext for discrimination due to his PTSD. Likewise, in regard to the FMLA claim, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Eli Lilly terminated him in retaliation for his request for FMLA leave. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Eli Lilly. View "Rodriguez v. Eli Lilly and Co." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's grant of the DEA's petition for enforcement. The DEA sought medical records of 67 of defendant's patients in an investigation into violations of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. 801-904. The court concluded that the CSA preempts the Texas Occupations Code, Tex. Occ. Code 159.002, and state law affords defendant no defense against enforcement of the subpoena; 28 U.S.C. 2403(b) does not require notice to the Texas Attorney General, even though providing notice is the better practice; the court rejected defendant's argument that the patients named by the subpoena should be given notice and the opportunity to intervene where defendant could have notified the patients, and did, but no patients have intervened; the district court did not err in applying the reasonable relevance standard to evaluate the enforceability of the subpoena; and the evidence is insufficient to meet the court's standard for denying enforcement where the district court did not err in rejecting the doctor’s abuse of process objections and enforcing the subpoena. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment as modified and remanded. View "United States v. Zadeh" on Justia Law

Appellant, a criminal defense attorney practicing in Lafayette, Louisiana, challenged his six-month suspension from the Western District of Louisiana. The suspension was imposed due to his violation of L. Crim. R. 53.5, which operates as a prior restraint against attorney speech during the pendency of a criminal trial. The court concluded that, under the plain language of Rule 53.5, appellant falls within the scope of the rule as an attorney associated with the defense where appellant stressed that, although he was not counsel of record, he was helping the defendant with his case, appellant assisted the defendant with trial preparation, and appellant attended several of the pretrial hearings. The court also concluded that the district court was not required to make a finding of bad faith before sanctioning appellant. Finally, the court held that Rule 53.5 is unconstitutional as applied to appellant and the court need not address appellant's facial challenge. Rule 53.5 does not incorporate either a “substantial likelihood standard” or even a “reasonable likelihood” standard, as required under United States v. Brown. In this case, the Government failed to demonstrate that the prior restraint is narrowly tailored and provides the least restrictive means to achieve the Government's goal. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "In re: William Goode" on Justia Law

After plaintiff lost his position as a paralegal instructor, he filed suit against Kaplan under the anti-retaliation provision of the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3730(h). The district court granted summary judgment to Kaplan because plaintiff failed to show pretext. The court did not consider plaintiff's pretext argument on appeal because he failed to raise it in the district court and he has not shown extraordinary circumstances. The court also concluded that the district court properly considered the affidavits of Kaplan's Executive Director and Director of Operations. Finally, the court rejected plaintiff's claim that the district court discounted and found irrelevant the affidavit of Julio Lopez and the student allegation that another instructor had committed fraud with respect to attendance records. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Diaz v. Kaplan Higher Educ., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against 24 Hour Fitness, alleging that their membership contracts did not strictly comply with several technical provisions of the Texas Health Spa Act, Tex. Occ. Code Ann. 702.304, 702.305, 702.401, 702.402(a)(2). The district court dismissed the suit based on lack of standing. Because plaintiffs are not entitled to a full refund of their membership dues, and because 24 Hour’s alleged violations of the Act did not cause plaintiffs actual damages or any other form of economic harm, plaintiffs have sustained no economic injury. Furthermore, plaintiffs have not suffered a non-economic injury where plaintiffs have suffered no cognizable statutory injury under the Act. The Act does not authorize members to sue health clubs for technical statutory violations which cause the member no harm. Moreover, the Act does not authorize health club members to recover statutory or nominal damages for mere technical violations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment because plaintiffs lack Article III standing. View "Wendt v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc." on Justia Law