Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
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Four businesses involved in the cultivation, manufacture, possession, and distribution of marijuana within Massachusetts, in compliance with state laws, sued the Attorney General of the United States in 2023. They claimed that the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) exceeded Congress's powers under Article I of the U.S. Constitution and violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. They sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction to prevent the enforcement of the CSA against their intrastate activities.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court reasoned that the Supreme Court's decision in Gonzales v. Raich, which upheld the CSA's application to intrastate marijuana activities under the Commerce Clause, was controlling. The District Court also found no precedent for recognizing a fundamental right to cultivate, process, and distribute marijuana, thus rejecting the plaintiffs' substantive due process claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's dismissal. The First Circuit held that the CSA's regulation of intrastate commercial marijuana activities was within Congress's power under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. The court found that Congress had a rational basis for concluding that intrastate marijuana activities substantially affect interstate commerce. Additionally, the court rejected the plaintiffs' substantive due process claim, holding that there is no fundamental right to cultivate, manufacture, possess, and distribute marijuana. The court emphasized that historical practices and recent state legislative trends do not establish such a fundamental right. View "Canna Provisions, Inc. v. Bondi" on Justia Law

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Victor Soto-Sanchez was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses was violated when a police officer testified about an informant's tip. He also challenged the application of a two-point enhancement for obstruction of justice in his sentencing.The United States District Court for the District of Maine allowed the police officer's testimony, overruling Soto-Sanchez's objections on Confrontation Clause and hearsay grounds. The court provided a limiting instruction to the jury, stating that the informant's statements were not to be considered for their truth but to explain the officer's investigative steps. The jury found Soto-Sanchez guilty, and the court applied the obstruction of justice enhancement based on Soto-Sanchez's alleged attempts to influence a witness.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed that Soto-Sanchez's Sixth Amendment rights were violated but deemed the error harmless due to overwhelming evidence against him, including physical evidence and witness testimony. The court also rejected Soto-Sanchez's sentencing challenge, concluding that he had waived his arguments regarding the obstruction of justice enhancement. Consequently, the First Circuit affirmed Soto-Sanchez's conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Soto-Sanchez" on Justia Law

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In 2023, James Broad and Rebecca McCrensky began operating a car-rental agency, Becky's Broncos, LLC, on Nantucket Island without the necessary local approvals. The Town of Nantucket and the Nantucket Town Select Board ordered Becky's to cease operations. Becky's sought preliminary injunctive relief in the District of Massachusetts to continue their business.The District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied Becky's request for a preliminary injunction. The court found insufficient evidence of discriminatory effect under the dormant Commerce Clause and concluded that Becky's had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of its claims. Becky's appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that Becky's did not show a likelihood of success on the merits of its dormant Commerce Clause claim, as the ordinance did not discriminate against out-of-state businesses. The court also found that Becky's failed to establish a likelihood of success on its antitrust claims due to a lack of a concrete theory of liability. Additionally, Becky's procedural due process argument was rejected because it did not establish a property interest in the required medallions. Lastly, the court held that the ordinance survived rational basis review under substantive due process, as it was rationally related to legitimate government interests in managing traffic and congestion on the island. View "Becky's Broncos, LLC v. Town of Nantucket" on Justia Law

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Miya Water Projects Netherlands B.V. (Miya) filed a lawsuit under the Transparency and Expedited Procedure for Public Records Access Act (TEPPRA) against the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico (the Board). Miya sought access to public records related to a canceled water infrastructure project. The Board, established by Congress in 2016, refused to provide the requested documents, claiming TEPPRA did not apply to it. Miya then sued the Board in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico.The district court dismissed Miya's case, ruling that the Board was protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity, which extends to Puerto Rico. The court applied the arm-of-the-state test and concluded that the Board, as an entity funded by the Commonwealth and with judgments paid by the Commonwealth, shared Puerto Rico's immunity. The court also determined that the Commonwealth did not waive this immunity through TEPPRA, as the statute did not meet the strict standards required to effect such a waiver under federal law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court's decision de novo. The appellate court agreed with the lower court's findings, holding that Puerto Rico's Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to the Board and that the Commonwealth did not waive this immunity through TEPPRA. The court emphasized that a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity must be unequivocally expressed in the statute's text, which TEPPRA did not do. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Miya's claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Miya Water Projects Netherlands B.V. v. Financial Oversight and Management Board" on Justia Law

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In June 2022, Karen Read was indicted for murder in Massachusetts. She pled not guilty, and the trial in Norfolk County Superior Court ended in a mistrial due to a non-unanimous jury verdict. The case attracted significant public attention and demonstrators gathered near the courthouse. The demonstrators' behavior, including loud protests and displaying materials directed at trial participants, raised concerns about the fairness of the trial.The state court issued an order creating a 200-foot buffer zone around the courthouse to prevent demonstrations during the trial. This order was challenged in state court but upheld by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. Before the retrial, the Commonwealth sought a broader order, which the state court granted, expanding the buffer zone to include additional areas around the courthouse. This new order was based on evidence of disruptions during the first trial, including noise from demonstrators that could be heard by jurors.A group of demonstrators filed for a preliminary injunction in the District of Massachusetts to challenge the expanded buffer zone. The district court denied the motion, finding that the order was likely narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. The plaintiffs then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.The First Circuit noted that the plaintiffs clarified they did not challenge the order as applied to courthouse property or seek to engage in noisy protests. They only sought to demonstrate quietly on public property without interfering with trial participants. The court vacated the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine if the order's lack of a mens rea requirement rendered it insufficiently tailored. The court suggested that the state court could amend the order to include a mens rea requirement to address the First Amendment concerns. View "Grant v. Trial Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts" on Justia Law

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Broc Waltermeyer, an incarcerated federal inmate, alleged that he received inadequate medical treatment for his chronic knee pain while at the Federal Correctional Institute in Berlin, New Hampshire. He claimed that despite receiving various non-surgical treatments, including cortisone injections, pain medication, special shoes, knee braces, access to a low bunk, and a cane, he continued to experience pain. Waltermeyer argued that he should have been provided with knee replacement surgery, which was recommended to be deferred by an outside specialist until he was older.The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire dismissed Waltermeyer's complaint, holding that his claims failed because he had an alternative administrative remedy. The district court also denied his motion for a preliminary injunction, as he had been transferred to a different facility, making the defendants no longer responsible for his care. Waltermeyer then amended his complaint to seek only money damages, leading to the current appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that Waltermeyer's claims were meaningfully different from those in Carlson v. Green, where the Supreme Court recognized a Bivens-type Eighth Amendment claim against federal prison officials for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. The court found that Waltermeyer received substantial treatment, albeit not the treatment he preferred, and that the medical procedures administered were in accordance with doctors' recommendations. The court concluded that the differences in the nature of the medical care provided and the absence of gross inadequacy or deliberate indifference made Waltermeyer's case distinct from Carlson, thus precluding the extension of a Bivens remedy. View "Waltermeyer v. Hazlewood" on Justia Law

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A Massachusetts law prohibits the sale, transfer, or possession of assault weapons and large capacity feeding devices. Joseph R. Capen, a Massachusetts resident, and the National Association for Gun Rights challenged the law, claiming it violates the Second Amendment. They sought a declaratory judgment and preliminary and permanent injunctions against the law's enforcement.The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. The court found that the law is consistent with the nation's historical tradition of regulating dangerous and unusual weapons, which are not typically used for self-defense. The court also found that the law's restrictions on large capacity magazines are supported by historical precedents of regulating items that pose a significant public safety threat.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the Massachusetts law's restrictions on assault weapons, specifically the AR-15, are consistent with historical regulations that aimed to protect public safety by restricting particularly dangerous weapons. The court also found that the law's restrictions on large capacity magazines are supported by historical analogues and do not impose a significant burden on the right to self-defense. Therefore, the plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction. View "Capen v. Campbell" on Justia Law

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In November 2004, Julio Rodríguez-Méndez participated in a carjacking in Puerto Rico while possessing a firearm. He was first prosecuted in a Puerto Rico Commonwealth court for robbery of a motor vehicle and carrying a weapon without a license, to which he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to twelve years in prison. Subsequently, a federal grand jury indicted him on three counts related to the same carjacking, including unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. Rodríguez pleaded guilty to the felon-in-possession count, and the other charges were dismissed. He was sentenced to 216 months in prison, partly due to being classified as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).Rodríguez filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 seeking to vacate his conviction on double jeopardy grounds and to challenge his ACCA enhancement. The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico denied his motion, holding that double jeopardy did not apply and that his prior convictions for motor vehicle robbery qualified as ACCA predicates.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court rejected Rodríguez's double jeopardy claim, stating that the federal felon-in-possession offense and the Commonwealth firearm offense are separate offenses under the Blockburger test, as each requires proof of an element that the other does not. However, the court agreed with Rodríguez that his prior convictions under Article 173B of the Puerto Rico Penal Code did not qualify as ACCA predicates. The court found that the statute's definition of "intimidation" was broader than the ACCA's requirement for violent felonies, as it included threats against property, not just persons.The First Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Rodríguez's double jeopardy claim but reversed the denial of his § 2255 motion regarding the ACCA enhancement, vacating his sentence and remanding for resentencing. View "Rodriguez-Mendez v. United States" on Justia Law

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The case involves a challenge by eighteen states and other plaintiffs against the enforcement of Executive Order No. 14,160, which limits the recognition of U.S. citizenship for certain individuals born in the United States. The Executive Order specifies that individuals born to mothers unlawfully present in the U.S. or temporarily present mothers, where the father is not a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident, will not be recognized as U.S. citizens. The plaintiffs argue that this order violates the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 8 U.S.C. § 1401.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted a preliminary injunction preventing the enforcement of the Executive Order. The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims, would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction, and that the balance of harms and public interest favored the injunction. The court issued a "universal" preliminary injunction, applying nationwide, to prevent the enforcement of the Executive Order.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the government's motion for a stay pending appeal of the preliminary injunction. The court denied the stay, concluding that the government failed to make a "strong showing" that it was likely to succeed on the merits of its appeal, particularly regarding the plaintiffs' standing and the lawfulness of the Executive Order. The court also found that the government did not meet its burden on the other factors required for a stay, including irreparable harm and public interest. The court upheld the nationwide scope of the preliminary injunction, noting that the government did not adequately address the necessity of such broad relief to prevent harm to the plaintiffs. View "State of New Jersey v. Trump" on Justia Law

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In this case, José M. Rojas-Tapia appealed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petitions for post-conviction relief, which he filed in the District of Puerto Rico. Rojas's convictions and sentences stem from his October 2000 guilty pleas to charges related to two separate post office robberies. The first indictment involved the Levittown Post Office, and the second involved the Sabana Seca Post Office. Both indictments included charges under 18 U.S.C. § 2114(a) for assaulting postal employees with intent to rob, and under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for using a firearm during a crime of violence. Additionally, Rojas was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) for being a felon in possession of a firearm.Rojas did not challenge his convictions or sentences on direct appeal. However, in 2017, he filed two habeas petitions challenging his § 924(c) convictions and the application of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) to his § 922(g) convictions. He argued that his § 924(c) convictions could not stand under Johnson v. United States (2015) and United States v. Davis (2019), as his underlying offenses did not qualify as crimes of violence. He also contended that his ACCA-enhanced sentences were improper because his prior convictions did not qualify as violent felonies or serious drug offenses.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico denied both petitions. The court concluded that Rojas's federal mail robbery convictions under § 2114(a) qualified as crimes of violence under the force clause of § 924(c). Additionally, the court found that Rojas's prior convictions for attempted murder, second-degree murder, and armed carjacking under Puerto Rico law qualified as violent felonies under the ACCA.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Rojas's convictions for aggravated mail robbery under § 2114(a) qualified as crimes of violence under § 924(c)'s force clause. The court also rejected Rojas's argument that his aiding and abetting convictions did not qualify as crimes of violence, reaffirming that aiding and abetting liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2 does not alter the application of the categorical approach. The court did not address Rojas's ACCA-related arguments, as his request for a Certificate of Appealability on those claims had been denied. View "Rojas-Tapia v. United States" on Justia Law