Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a former assistant county attorney, was terminated from her employment after she was elected to the City Counsel. Plaintiff filed suit challenging the County Attorney's decision to terminate her employment, contending that the County Attorney's actions violated her rights under the federal and state constitution, as well as a county ordinance. The district court dismissed the complaint. The court explained that, although plaintiff claims her termination was in violation of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has made clear that public employers may permissibly bar their employees from participating in a wide array of political activities, including running for elective office. In this case, the record reflects multiple potential points of conflict that could face plaintiff as a member of the City Council and an attorney in the Fairfax County Attorney’s Office. Therefore, the court rejected plaintiff's First Amendment arguments. Because plaintiff's termination did not violate the First Amendment, her section 1983 claim was also properly dismissed. Finally, the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's state law claim under Virginia Code 15.2-1512.2 and Fairfax County Ordinance 3-1-19. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Loftus v. Bobzien" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an Applications Developer for the CIA, was a covert employee who suffered from narcolepsy. Plaintiff first filed suit against the Agency, alleging discrimination and ultimately termination based on his disability, failure to accommodate, and retaliation. While the motion for summary judgment was pending on the first suit, plaintiff filed suit against the same defendants, alleging disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 791 et seq., and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. In this case, even if plaintiff establishes a prima facie case for his claims, the court found that its precedent nonetheless requires dismissal because any defense to these claims that the government could offer would undoubtedly rely on privileged information. Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that the information at issue is properly privileged and that litigation of the case would present an unjustifiable risk of disclosure of that information. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Abilt v. CIA" on Justia Law

Petitioner seeks review of the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas relief. Defendant argued that his petition was not time-barred because it was filed within one year of his discovery of his petitions' factual predicates -- his incorrect blood type and factual findings in the Zain III report -- which he argues could not have been discovered sooner. The court found, however, that had petitioner exercised due diligence, he would have discovered the factual predicates far earlier. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the petition. View "Gray v. Ballard" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, veterans who received medical treatment and health care at the Dorn VAMC, filed separate actions against the Secretary of Veterans Affairs and Dorn VAMC officials, alleging violations of the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552(a) et seq., and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq. Plaintiffs sought to establish Article III standing based on the harm from the increased risk of future identity theft and the cost of measures to protect against it. The district court dismissed based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, concluding that plaintiffs failed to establish a non-speculative, imminent injury-in-fact for purposes of Article III standing. View "Beck v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against law enforcement officers and others, alleging violation of her constitutional rights when she was arrested and held in police custody for eighty days. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, finding that the officers had probable cause to believe plaintiff illegally possessed and sold crack. The court concluded that the district court properly stylized plaintiff's false arrest claims against the investigating officers as malicious prosecution claims. The court also concluded that Officer Munday's application for an arrest warrant lacked probable cause and thus violated plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. In this case, Munday had no evidence about plaintiff's conduct whatsoever, let alone any evidence connecting her to the crime in question. Because it would be unreasonable for any officer to view Munday's dearth of evidence as sufficient to establish probable cause, he is not entitled to qualified immunity. The court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded to the district court to consider in the first instance plaintiff's state-law claims against all of the individual officers, and negligent-supervision and pattern-or-practice theories of liability against the Chief of Police and City of Lincolnton. The court affirmed as to the false arrest claim against Officers Greene and Lesassier because the officers merely executed the arrest as they were required to do, pursuant to a facially valid warrant. View "Smith v. Munday" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Maryland Transit Administration, alleging violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. Plaintiff suffers from cerebral palsy and uses a walker or crutches. She alleges that on numerous occasions, bus operators refused to use an assistance lift or otherwise assist her in boarding the bus. The district court applied the two-year statute of limitations from Maryland’s Anti-Discrimination Law, Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t 20–1035, 20-1013, and dismissed the suit as untimely. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that, because the Maryland Law does not contain a cause of action for disability discrimination in the provision of public services, the closer state-law analog to plaintiff's claim is a general civil action, which is subject to a three year statute of limitations. In this case, the complaint alleges discrimination occurring within three years of its filing. View "Brilliant Semenova v. MD Transit Administration" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendant, individually and in his official capacity as a state trooper, alleging federal claims of unlawful arrest, retaliatory arrest, and excessive force, and state claims of outrage/intentional infliction of emotional distress and battery. On appeal, defendant challenges the district court's denial of his motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The court explained that, under West Virginia law, police officers have the authority to effect an arrest for minor traffic violations, including the one at issue here. The district court’s determination that defendant arrested plaintiff “in practicality” for assault and obstruction of justice, instead of an expired inspection sticker, is irrelevant. Therefore, the district court erred in failing to grant summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff's claim of unlawful arrest. The probable cause inherent in plaintiff's minor traffic violation also defeats his First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim. In this case, plaintiff claims abrasions minor enough that he treated them at home with Neosporin and peroxide and did not seek medical assistance. The court held that an efficient, lawful arrest of a resisting suspect that causes the suspect to suffer only de minimis injuries does not constitute excessive force. Because defendant's actions were objectively reasonable and he is entitled to qualified immunity, the court concluded that the district court erred in holding otherwise. Finally, the court concluded that defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on the state claims. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions. View "Pegg v. Herrnberger" on Justia Law

Police Chief Dixon revised a department policy governing officers’ use of social media platforms: “Negative comments on the internal operations of the Bureau, or specific conduct of supervisors or peers that impacts the public’s perception of the department is not protected by the First Amendment . … Officers may comment on issues of general or public concern (as opposed to personal grievances) so long as the comments do not disrupt the workforce, interfere with important working relationships or efficient work flow, or undermine public confidence in the officer.” The policy “strongly discourages employees from posting information regarding off-duty activities.” While off-duty, officers Liverman and Richards posted messages to Facebook, concerning “rookie cops” being given duties without adequate training, and referencing an unnamed supervisor who had not earned respect. Each received an oral reprimand and six months’ probation. Weeks later, Dixon altered another policy, excluding officers on probation from participating in the promotion process. The officers became ineligible to sit for the promotional exam. They indicated that they intended to challenge the disciplinary actions. Shortly thereafter, they were the subject of several complaints and investigations. Dixon decided to fire Liverman. The officers filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court found that Dixon was entitled to qualified immunity because the policy fell within a “gray zone” and concluded that the internal investigations were not retaliatory. The Fourth Circuit reversed in part, acknowledging need for discipline, but stating that the policy and the disciplinary actions taken pursuant to it would, if upheld, lead to an utter lack of transparency in law enforcement operations that the First Amendment cannot countenance. View "Liverman v. City of Petersburg" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Va. Code 24.2-643(B), the voter identification law enacted as part of SB 1256. Plaintiffs alleged that the statutory requirement that voters present photo identification when they vote or shortly thereafter violates the Voting Rights Act and the federal Constitution. Specifically, Plaintiffs claimed hat the photo identification requirement “unduly burdens the right to vote, imposes discriminatory burdens on African Americans and Latinos, and was enacted with the intent to discriminate against minorities, young voters, and Democrats.” Following a bench trial, the district court entered final judgment against Plaintiffs. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the substance of SB 1256 does not impose an undue burden on minority voting, and there was no evidence that there was racially discriminatory intent in the law’s enactment. View "Lee v. Virginia State Board of Elections" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for unlicensed dealing in firearms and conspiracy to deal firearms without a license. After the district court denied defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment, he timely appealed. The court held that the prohibition against unlicensed firearm dealing comports with the Second and Fifth Amendments both facially and as applied. The court also concluded that the unlicensed dealing of firearms, even in intrastate sales, implicates interstate commerce and may be constitutionally regulated by Congress under the Commerce Clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Hosford" on Justia Law