Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In August 2022, law enforcement officers in Sterling, Virginia, stopped a Ford Explorer as part of an operation to execute an arrest warrant for a suspected armed robber. Herbert Murillo-Lopez was driving the vehicle. During the stop, officers recovered a firearm from a satchel worn by Murillo-Lopez. He admitted to being an undocumented non-citizen. Subsequent investigation confirmed he was born in El Salvador, had no lawful status in the United States, and had no record of legal entry.A grand jury indicted Murillo-Lopez for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A), which prohibits possession of a firearm by an undocumented non-citizen. He moved to suppress the evidence from the stop, arguing the stop and search were unconstitutional, but the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied the motion. Shortly before trial, he moved to dismiss the indictment on Second Amendment grounds, but the district court found the motion untimely and unpersuasive. After a jury found him guilty, the district court denied his motion for judgment of acquittal and sentenced him to eight months in prison and three years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Murillo-Lopez knew he was unlawfully present in the United States. The court also found the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion that Murillo-Lopez might be the subject of the arrest warrant, and that the search of his satchel was consensual. Finally, the court rejected his Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(5)(A), holding that existing circuit precedent remains valid after recent Supreme Court decisions. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Murillo-Lopez" on Justia Law

Maryland enacted a statute imposing a tax on digital advertising revenues, targeting only large companies with at least $100 million in global annual gross revenues. In response to concerns that these companies would pass the tax cost onto customers and potentially blame the state for price increases, Maryland amended the law to include a “pass-through provision.” This provision prohibited companies from directly passing the tax cost to customers by means of a separate fee, surcharge, or line-item on invoices, though it did not prevent companies from raising prices or otherwise recouping the tax cost in a non-itemized way.A group of trade associations challenged the pass-through provision, arguing that it violated the First Amendment by restricting their ability to communicate with customers about the tax and its impact on pricing. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland initially dismissed the First Amendment claims for lack of jurisdiction under the Tax Injunction Act. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit determined that the Act did not bar the claims and remanded for consideration on the merits. On remand, the district court found that the provision regulated speech but dismissed the facial challenge, reasoning that the provision had constitutional applications.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the pass-through provision is a content-based restriction on speech, as it prohibits companies from communicating certain truthful information to customers. The court found that the provision could not survive even intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment, as it was not adequately tailored to any substantial government interest. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case for consideration of the appropriate remedy, holding that the pass-through provision is facially unconstitutional in all its applications. View "Chamber of Commerce v. Lierman" on Justia Law

A United States citizen, formerly known as Paul Anderson and now Saadiq Long, was placed on the federal government’s Terrorist Screening Dataset (commonly called the Terrorist Watchlist) and, at one point, on its No Fly List subset. After experiencing travel restrictions, employment issues, and other alleged harms, Long challenged his placement on these lists, asserting constitutional and statutory violations. He claimed that his inclusion was based on impermissible factors such as race, religion, and protected activities, and that the government’s information-sharing practices and redress procedures were unlawful. While the litigation was ongoing, Long was removed from the No Fly List, but remained on the broader Watchlist. He also alleged that his Watchlist status led to the denial of credentials necessary for his work as a truck driver.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia initially transferred some of Long’s claims to the Fourth Circuit and stayed others. After Long’s removal from the No Fly List, a prior Fourth Circuit panel found his No Fly List claims moot and remanded for the district court to determine which claims remained justiciable. On remand, the district court dismissed all of Long’s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that his removal from the No Fly List mooted those claims and that he lacked standing for his Watchlist-related claims, as his alleged injuries were either resolved or not sufficiently imminent.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal. The Fourth Circuit held that, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in FBI v. Fikre, Long’s removal from the No Fly List did not necessarily moot his claims, as the government had not shown it could not repeat the challenged conduct. The court also found that Long had standing to challenge his Watchlist status based on the denial of transportation credentials, and remanded for the district court to consider the merits of his claims. View "Long v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A prisoner at Eastern Correctional Institution was suspected of possessing a knife, prompting two correctional officers to search him. The officers escorted the prisoner and his cellmate to a recreation area, where a strip search occurred. The parties dispute the events that followed: the officers claimed the prisoner was noncompliant and bit one of them during a struggle, while the prisoner alleged he complied with orders and was then violently assaulted without justification, suffering injuries to his head, neck, and back. Medical records documented a bruise and other injuries, and the prisoner sought treatment over several months. An internal investigation cleared the officers of wrongdoing.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the prisoner’s state law claims and claims against a supervisory official, then granted summary judgment to the correctional officers on the remaining Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. The district court found that the undisputed evidence did not support a finding that the officers acted maliciously or sadistically, and characterized the prisoner’s injuries as minor. The court also denied the prisoner’s requests for discovery and for appointment of counsel.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that genuine disputes of material fact remained regarding the amount and justification for the force used, as well as the officers’ intent. The court found that the prisoner’s verified complaint and medical evidence could support a finding of more than de minimis force and potentially malicious conduct. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the prisoner to renew his motion for counsel and proceed to trial. View "Escobar-Salmeron v. Moyer" on Justia Law

A woman from El Salvador, after her husband fled to the United States due to gang threats, was subjected to repeated extortion and threats of violence, including sexual extortion, by gang members who targeted her because she was a woman living alone with her children. Despite seeking help from local police, she was told to comply with the gang or flee. After enduring escalating threats and payments, she eventually fled to the United States with her children.Upon arrival, she retained an attorney to represent her in her asylum proceedings. She informed her attorney of both the financial and sexual extortion she faced, but he failed to include the sexual extortion in her application and proposed a legal theory for asylum based on a particular social group (PSG) that was foreclosed by existing precedent. The immigration judge, sitting in the Immigration Court, found the proposed PSG not cognizable and denied her claim, concluding the gang’s motivation was financial rather than based on group membership. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, adopting the immigration judge’s reasoning and denying her appeal.Represented by new counsel, she moved to reopen her case before the Board of Immigration Appeals, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) and proposing alternative, plausible PSGs. The Board denied the motion, finding no IAC and concluding her harm was not due to a protected characteristic. She then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for review.The Fourth Circuit held that noncitizens who retain counsel in removal proceedings have a Fifth Amendment right to a fundamentally fair hearing, which can be violated by ineffective assistance of counsel. The court found her original attorney’s performance objectively unreasonable and prejudicial, as alternative PSGs could have led to a different outcome. The court granted the petition for review, reversed the Board’s denial of her motion to reopen, vacated the denial of her asylum and withholding claims, and remanded for a new hearing. View "Guandique-De Romero v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The petitioner pleaded guilty in 2003 to attempted bank robbery and to carrying and using a firearm during a crime of violence. At sentencing, he was classified as a career offender under the then-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines, resulting in a sentence of 274 months’ imprisonment. Over the years, he filed several postconviction motions, including a first motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which was denied. After subsequent changes in Supreme Court precedent regarding the constitutionality of certain sentencing provisions, the petitioner argued that the mandatory Guidelines’ career-offender provision was unconstitutionally vague and sought habeas relief.The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia dismissed his habeas petition brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, finding that he could not proceed under § 2241 because he did not satisfy the requirements of the “saving clause” in § 2255(e). The district court determined that the petitioner was procedurally barred from bringing a second or successive § 2255 motion and that this procedural bar did not render § 2255 “inadequate or ineffective” to test the legality of his detention.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Fourth Circuit held that, under the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. Hendrix, the inability to satisfy the procedural requirements for a second or successive § 2255 motion does not make § 2255 inadequate or ineffective, and thus does not permit recourse to § 2241 via the saving clause. The court also held that this result does not violate the Suspension Clause of the Constitution, relying on its en banc precedent in In re Vial. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Bell v. Streeval" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers suspected that the defendant was involved in a drug trafficking operation based out of his apartment in a large, multi-unit building. To investigate further, officers, with the building management’s permission, conducted a warrantless dog sniff in the common hallway immediately outside the defendant’s apartment door. The trained dog alerted to the presence of drugs, and this information was used to obtain a search warrant. The subsequent search uncovered drugs, firearms, and other evidence. The defendant was indicted on drug and firearm charges.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, rejecting his arguments that the dog sniff constituted an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment. The court found that the dog sniff did not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy because it only revealed the presence of contraband, and that the area outside the apartment door was not protected “curtilage” since it was a common hallway accessible to other residents and building staff. The defendant was convicted by a jury on all counts and sentenced to 150 months in prison.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. The Fourth Circuit held that a dog sniff at an apartment door in a common hallway does not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy, as established by United States v. Place and Illinois v. Caballes, because it only reveals the presence of contraband. The court also held that the common hallway outside the apartment door is not curtilage protected by the Fourth Amendment, as the defendant had no right to exclude others from that area. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "US v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress enacted legislation to provide financial assistance to small businesses, including relief payments on certain small business loans. PACEM Solutions International, LLC applied for a $5 million loan under the Small Business Administration's (SBA) 7(a) loan program. Due to repeated missed payments, PACEM and its lender, Atlantic Union Bank, modified the loan multiple times. When the CARES Act was passed, PACEM's loan was not in "regular servicing status," a requirement for receiving relief payments under the Act. The SBA determined that PACEM's loan was ineligible for relief payments and requested the return of previously disbursed funds.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment in favor of the SBA. The court found that the SBA did not violate the CARES Act, as PACEM's loan was not performing appropriately and was in default. The court also concluded that the SBA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in its decision to withhold payments and that any notification defects were harmless.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that the SBA acted reasonably in determining that PACEM's loan was ineligible for relief payments under the CARES Act. The court found that the SBA provided a satisfactory explanation for its actions and did not violate the terms of the CARES Act. The court also declined to address PACEM's constitutional claim regarding the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, as PACEM sought only a declaratory judgment without requesting a hearing before the SBA. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the SBA. View "PACEM Solutions International, LLC v. U. S. Small Business Administration" on Justia Law

Keith Moore was stopped by Richmond, Virginia police officers after they observed his vehicle displaying a temporary license tag number that matched two other vehicles they had stopped earlier that day. Moore fled from the police, leading to a chase that ended with him crashing his car. Upon his arrest, officers found a gun in his vehicle and discovered that Moore had a prior felony conviction. He was subsequently indicted for illegal possession of a firearm.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed Moore’s indictment, finding that the traffic stop was racially motivated and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court based its decision on statistical evidence showing that Black drivers were disproportionately stopped by Richmond police and historical evidence of racial discrimination in Richmond. The court concluded that Moore’s stop was part of a pattern of selective enforcement against Black drivers.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court found that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Moore’s stop and arrest were motivated by racial discrimination. The court noted that the officers had probable cause to stop Moore due to the fake license tag and his subsequent flight. The statistical evidence presented did not adequately demonstrate a discriminatory purpose, and the historical evidence was not contemporaneous with the events in question. The Fourth Circuit remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the indictment against Moore. View "US v. Moore" on Justia Law

Evy Orellana suffered serious injuries when a tactical canine bit her leg as a U.S. Marshals fugitive task force executed an arrest warrant for her boyfriend, Eric Trinidad. Orellana, Trinidad, and their baby lived in the basement of Trinidad’s mother’s home. The officers breached a sealed door to access the basement, and the dog bit Orellana during the search. Orellana sued the officers under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, claiming a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights due to unreasonable search and seizure.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied the officers' motion to dismiss, reasoning that the case was similar enough to Bivens to apply its cause of action. The court also denied the officers' motion for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that this case presented a new context for Bivens because the officers were part of a specialized federal-state task force operating under a warrant. The court emphasized that the Supreme Court has cautioned against extending Bivens to new contexts, particularly when Congress is better suited to create a cause of action. The court concluded that special factors, including federalism concerns and the existence of alternative remedial procedures, counseled against extending Bivens in this situation. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the district court's decision, denying Orellana a Bivens remedy. View "Orellana v. Deputy United States Marshal Godec" on Justia Law