Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
by
In these consolidated cases, plaintiffs filed suit challenging two redistricting laws, alleging that some Wake County School Board and Wake County Board of County Commissioners districts have been over-populated, while others have been under-populated. Plaintiffs further assert that these discrepancies result in some votes counting more while others count less, and that the discrepancies stem from illegitimate redistricting factors. The court concluded that, to succeed on the merits, plaintiffs in one person, one vote cases with population deviations below 10% must show by a preponderance of the evidence that improper considerations predominate in explaining the deviations. In this case, plaintiffs have proven that it is more probable than not that the population deviations at issue here reflect the predominance of an illegitimate reapportionment factor, namely an intentional effort to create a significant partisan advantage. Therefore, the district court committed reversible error in granting judgment for defendants. For the same reasons that plaintiffs succeed with their federal claim, they also succeed with their North Carolina state one person, one vote claim. Finally, the district court did not commit clear error in rejecting plaintiffs' racial gerrymandering claim. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded in part, and affirmed in part. View "Raleigh Wake Citizens Ass'n v. Wake Cnty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

by
Thai Palace filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the First Amendment, challenging the Board's revocation of its alcoholic beverage license, as well as its orders imposing conditions on the license. At issue on appeal is whether the district court properly applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to dismiss this federal action challenging the actions of a state administrative agency that were reviewed in state court. The court concluded that, at bottom, this federal action qualifies as an independent, concurrent action that does not undermine the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments, and accordingly the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Thana v. Board of License Commissioners" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff filed suit against FRBR, alleging claims for interference and retaliation in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq., and failure to accommodate and discriminatory discharge in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the FMLA retaliation claim and the ADA claims. The court concluded, however, that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether FRBR interfered with plaintiff’s FMLA rights by providing him defective notice that omitted his right to reinstatement at the conclusion of the medical leave term. Accordingly, the court held that the district court's grant of summary judgment as to that claim was not warranted. The court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Vannoy v. Federal Reserve Bank" on Justia Law

by
Petitioner challenged the denial of her petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking relief as next friend of R.M.B., her minor son. R.M.B., a native of Guatemala, is being held as an unaccompanied alien child (a UAC) by the Office of Refugee Resettlement, an agency of DHHS. The court could not say that R.M.B.’s detention is based on an erroneous application or interpretation of the UAC definition where the Office found, after conducting a home study and gathering other evidence, that petitioner was incapable of providing for R.M.B.’s physical and mental well-being. The court rejected petitioner's contention that the Office lacks authority to detain R.M.B. now that his immigration proceedings have terminated. Even after R.M.B.'s immigration proceedings concluded, the Office was not entitled to release him to anyone unless it first determined that the proposed custodian was capable of providing for his physical and mental well-being. The court rejected petitioner's substantive due process claim, concluding that the Office's determination suffices to address any substantive due process concerns and renders inapposite those decisions involving challenges to state interference with control of children by fit parents. The court concluded, however, that the district court, in denying petitioner's procedural due process claim, did not utilize the proper Mathews v. Eldridge framework. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Beltran v. Cardall" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff, a political figure in the Libertarian Party of Virginia, filed suit challenging Virginia's three-tiered ballot ordering law, Virginia Code 24.2-613. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff principally argued on appeal that Virginia's three-tiered ballot ordering law advantages candidates from what he calls “major parties” and disadvantages candidates like him that hail from what he calls “minor parties.” The court noted that the text and history of the Constitution, well established Supreme Court precedent, and the structural principles inherent in our federal system counsel respect for the Virginia General Assembly’s power to administer elections in Virginia. With state legislatures’ longstanding authority to regulate elections in mind, the court employed the Supreme Court’s Anderson/Burdick decisional framework to distinguish those laws whose burdens are uniquely unconstitutional from the majority of laws whose validity is unquestioned. The court concluded that the three-tiered ballot ordering law imposes little burden on plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and Virginia articulates several important interests supporting the law. The ballot ordering law imposes only the most modest burdens on plaintiff's rights where the law is facially neutral and nondiscriminatory. Furthermore, the law is supported by important regulatory interests where the law may assist the voting process by reducing voter confusion and preserving party-order, as well as reduce multi-party factionalism and promote political stability. Therefore, the court concluded that it has no basis for finding the state statute unconstitutional and affirmed the judgment. View "Sarvis v. Alcorn" on Justia Law

by
NAAMJP filed suit challenging the conditions placed on the privilege of admission to the Bar of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland in Local Rule 701. Among other things, the Rule contains requirements based on the state of licensure and, in some instances, the location of the attorney’s law office. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss and denied NAAMJP's motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that Rule 701 does not violate the First Amendment where it qualifies as a general applicable licensing provision, prescribing which attorneys may practice in the District Court based on their state of licensure in relation to the location of their principal law office; Rule 701 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause where it does not infringe a fundamental right or disadvantage a suspect class; Rule 701 does not violate the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. 2071, where the Rule does not violate any Acts of Congress or any federal rules of practice and procedure adopted by the Supreme Court pursuant to section 2072; and Rule 701 does not violate the Supremacy Clause where it remains a federal rule prescribed pursuant to federal statute. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "NAAMJP v. Lynch" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against several correctional officers, medical personnel, and prison administrators for alleged violations of his constitutional rights after he underwent surgery to remove penile implants while incarcerated. Prior to his incarceration, plaintiff had marbles implanted in and tattoos drawn on his penis. Plaintiff alleged that prison officials threatened him with segregation for the remainder of his sentence and loss of parole eligibility if he did not consent to surgery to have the marbles removed. In his complaint, plaintiff alleged, among other things, physical injury and mental anguish. The court held that the Bell v. Wolfish factors weigh against reasonableness of the sexually invasive search and thus reversed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint. In this case, plaintiff pleaded sufficient facts to establish a Fourth Amendment claim plausibly entitling him to relief. The court also held that plaintiff's complaint plausibly satisfies both prongs of an Eighth Amendment claim. Furthermore, plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to state a class-of-one equal protection claim. The court rejected plaintiff's remaining claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part. Because the district court did not consider plaintiff's potential due process claim, the court remanded for reconsideration of this claim. View "King, Jr. v. Rubenstein" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff, enrolled in Marshall University's Master of Arts in Teaching (MAT) program, filed suit against defendants raising various claims, including violation of her due process and equal protection rights, after she unsuccessfully pursued reconsideration through Marshall’s internal grade-appeals process. Plaintiff had left her student-teaching post in protest over differences with her supervising teacher. Consequently, plaintiff was not awarded credit and did not receive her MAT nor teaching license. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's order granting defendants' motion to dismiss. The court concluded that the district court properly determined both that sovereign immunity bars plaintiff's claims against the Marshall University Board of Governors, and that the allegations in plaintiff's pro se complaint against the other defendants failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kerr v. Marshall Univ. Bd." on Justia Law

by
After plaintiff went to the police station to report the theft of his cable services, he ended up involuntarily detained for six days for a mental-health evaluation. Plaintiff then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that he was unlawfully seized without probable cause in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court concluded that the claims against the mental-health evaluator and her employer were properly dismissed. However, as to the two officers who initially took plaintiff into custody, the court found that the allegations in the complaint were sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss. When the statements in the Incident Report are treated not as true, but as assertions made by the Officers, the court had little difficulty in concluding that plaintiff's claims against the Officers should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff alleged that he has no mental illness and the facts he describes in the complaint provided no basis for the Officers to have reasonably concluded otherwise. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd." on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff filed suit against employees of SCDC and others, alleging that the food served to him at a prison managed by the SCDC was so deficient as to violate his Eighth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), concluding that plaintiff's claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata because it is the same as a complaint filed against SCDC employees by a fellow inmate in 2010, which the district court dismissed on the merits. The court concluded that, because plaintiff was a nonparty to the earlier suit, he is not precluded from pursuing the same claims on his own behalf in the instant action unless the state defendants are able to demonstrate that at least one of the six exceptions to the general rule against nonparty preclusion applies pursuant to Taylor v. Sturgell. Because the state defendants have not demonstrated that any of the exceptions apply, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Duckett v. Fuller" on Justia Law