Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Maryland allows any voter to vote via absentee ballot. Plaintiffs filed suit under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12132, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794, against state election officials under federal law, alleging that marking a hardcopy ballot by hand without assistance is impossible for voters with various disabilities, and that they have therefore been denied meaningful access to absentee voting. Defendants argue that even if absentee voting is not fully accessible, the full accessibility of Maryland’s in-person polling places provides disabled voters with meaningful access to voting. The court concluded that defendants’ proposed focus is overbroad and would undermine the purpose of the ADA and its implementing regulations. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s conclusion that by effectively requiring disabled individuals to rely on the assistance of others to vote absentee, defendants have not provided plaintiffs with meaningful access to Maryland’s absentee voting program. The court also concluded that plaintiffs’ proposed use of the online ballot marking tool is a reasonable modification to Maryland’s absentee voting policies and procedures. The court agreed with the the district court that defendants have not met their burden to show that plaintiffs’ proposed modification - use of the online ballot marking tool - would fundamentally alter Maryland’s voting program. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "National Federation of the Blind v. Lamone" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging Maryland's Firearm Safety Act (FSA), Md. Code, Crim. Law 4-303(a), which, among other things, bans law-abiding citizens, with the exception of retired law enforcement officers, from possessing the vast majority of semi-automatic rifles commonly kept by several million American citizens for defending their families and homes and other lawful purposes. The court concluded that the FSA implicates the core protection of the Second Amendment and the court, pursuant to District of Columbia v. Heller, McDonald v. City of Chicago, and its own precedent, concluded the burden is substantial and strict scrutiny is the applicable standard of review for plaintiffs’ Second Amendment claim. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's denial of these claims and remanded for the district court to apply strict scrutiny. The court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' equal protection challenge to the statutory exception allowing retired law enforcement officers to possess prohibited semi-automatic rifles. Finally, the court affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the term “copies” as used by the FSA is not unconstitutionally vague. View "Kolbe v. Hogan, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against two former members of the North Carolina Army National Guard, Adjutant General William E. Ingram, and Lieutenant Colonel Peter von Jess, alleging that defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiff claimed that defendants, motivated by revenge, directed other service members to monitor plaintiff’s email messages, which he sent while serving on active duty in Kuwait, and to forward incriminating messages to von Jess. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants based on the justiciability doctrine in Mindes v. Seaman. Mindes provided a four-factor test for reviewability of claims based on internal military affairs. The court acknowledged that defendant now renounces any claim for equitable relief and affirmed the district court's judgment on the basis of the military abstention doctrine set forth in Feres v. United States. In this case, plaintiff's alleged injuries arose out of activity incident to his service where he was on active duty, deployed in a war zone, and used a computer system set up by the DOD for military personnel deployed at Camp Doha. View "Aikens v. Ingram, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit arguing that Virginia's certificate of need (CON) law, a program that governs the establishment and expansion of certain medical facilities inside the state, unconstitutionally violates the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause. The district court granted summary judgment to the Commonwealth. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that Virginia’s CON requirement violates the dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce in both purpose and effect, and rejected plaintiffs' argument that even if the program does not unconstitutionally discriminate, it nevertheless violates the dormant Commerce Clause because it places an undue burden on interstate commerce. Because the certificate requirement neither discriminated against nor placed an undue burden on interstate commerce, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Colon Health Ctrs. v. Hazel" on Justia Law

This appeal stems from multi-district litigation involving transvaginal mesh medical devices used to treat pelvic organ prolapse and other pelvic issues. The jury awarded plaintiff $250,000 in compensatory damages, and the punitive damages award was split pursuant to a Georgia statute, with seventy-five percent going to the State of Georgia and twenty-five percent going to plaintiff. Both parties appealed. The court affirmed the district court's exclusion of evidence that Bard had complied with the FDA's 510(k) product safety process under F.R.E. 402 for lack of relevance; affirmed the district court's decision to admit evidence of a material data safety sheet pertaining to polypropylene, a material used in the construction of the Avaulta Plus implanted in plaintiff's body, as non-hearsay, finding that any use of the evidence by plaintiff that went beyond the limited purpose for which it was admitted as non-hearsay resulted in harmless error and was not prejudicial to Bard’s defense; and concluded that the district court did not err in giving the Georgia pattern jury instruction, in denying Bard’s request for a modified instruction, or in upholding the jury’s causation finding. The court also concluded that the punitive award was not constitutionally excessive. In regard to plaintiff's challenges, the court affirmed the district court's conclusion that Georgia's split-recovery statute garnishing seventy-five percent of any punitive damages award arising from a product liability judgment does not violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cisson v. C. R. Bard, Inc." on Justia Law

The Estate of Ronald H. Armstrong appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Village and members of the police department on its excessive force claims. The court held that defendants used unconstitutionally excessive force when seizing Armstrong. Had defendants limited themselves to permissible uses of force when seizing Armstrong, they would have had every tool needed to control and resolve the situation at their disposal. However, the court concluded that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity where Armstrong’s right not to be tased while offering stationary and non-violent resistance to a lawful seizure was not clearly established. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Estate of Ronald Armstrong v. The Village of Pinehurst" on Justia Law

After plaintiff flunked out of the FBI Academy by failing to perform the required amount of push-ups, he filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c). Plaintiff alleged that the FBI discriminated against him on the basis of sex, in that female New Agent Trainees were required to complete only fourteen push-ups. The district court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and the Attorney General appealed. The court held that an employer does not contravene Title VII when it utilizes physical fitness standards that distinguish between the sexes on the basis of their physiological differences but impose an equal burden of compliance on both men and women, requiring the same level of physical fitness of each. Because the FBI purports to assess physical fitness by imposing the same burden on both men and women, this rule applies to plaintiff’s Title VII claims. The court concluded that the district court erred in failing to apply the rule in its disposition of plaintiff's summary judgment motion. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bauer v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), against the United States, alleging that prison officials had been negligent in failing to protect him from an attack by several other inmates. The district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court affirmed the district court’s holding that the prison officials’ discretionary decision not to separate plaintiff from his attackers is subject to the discretionary function exception of the FTCA, depriving the court of jurisdiction over that claim. In regard to plaintiff's claim that prison officials did not perform the searches properly, the court remanded for additional discovery because jurisdictional facts are intertwined with the merits of that claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Rich v. United States" on Justia Law

The County petitions for review of an FCC order, which issued rules implementing Section 6409(a) of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, 47 U.S.C. 1455(a), also known as the Spectrum Act. The County contends that the procedures established in the Order conscript the states in violation of the Tenth Amendment, and that the Order unreasonably defines several terms of the Spectrum Act. The court concluded that the FCC’s “deemed granted” procedure comports with the Tenth Amendment where the Order does not require the states to take any action whatsoever. The court also concluded that the FCC has reasonably interpreted the ambiguous terms of Section 6409(a): "substantially change" and "base station." Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Montgomery County v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff collapsed with exertional heatstroke while practicing as a member of the Towson University football team. Plaintiff was in a coma for nine days, almost died, and suffered multi-organ failure, requiring a liver a transplant and numerous additional surgeries. Plaintiff subsequently recovered and pursued his plan to return to playing football. However, the Team Physician, a board-certified sports medicine doctor, concluded that allowing plaintiff to participate in the football program at the University presented an unacceptable risk of serious reinjury or death. Plaintiff filed suit against the University, alleging that its decision to exclude him from the football program amounted to a violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq. The district court entered judgment against the University. The court reversed, concluding that plaintiff was not “otherwise qualified” to participate fully in the University’s football program because the University reasonably applied its Return-to-Play Policy. The court was required to give deference to the University's judgment. The court did not reach the University's challenge to the district court's evidentiary rulings. View "Class v. Towson Univ." on Justia Law