Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Brandon Wade Kurns, a convicted felon, began working at Modern Pawn & Consignment in Helena, Montana, in June 2021, where he sold firearms and ammunition. In July 2021, after an investigation linked stolen gunpowder to the shop, ATF agents searched Modern Pawn and found evidence that Kurns had possessed several firearms. Kurns was indicted and pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm.The United States District Court for the District of Montana sentenced Kurns to 36 months in prison, applying a base offense level of 20 under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B)(i)(I) for possessing a semiautomatic firearm capable of accepting a large capacity magazine, and a four-level enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B) for possessing eight or more firearms. Kurns objected, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support these enhancements and that the court violated his Fifth Amendment rights by drawing an adverse inference from his silence during sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the evidence, including surveillance footage and ATF transfer forms, supported the finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Kurns possessed a semiautomatic firearm with a large capacity magazine and at least eight firearms. The court also found no Fifth Amendment violation, as there was no indication that the district court drew an adverse inference from Kurns' silence. Additionally, the court declined to consider Kurns' Second Amendment challenge based on New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, as it was raised for the first time after the completion of appellate briefing. View "USA V. KURNS" on Justia Law

Gregory W. Pheasant was charged with driving an off-road vehicle on public lands at night without a taillight, violating 43 C.F.R. § 8341.1(f)(5). This regulation was issued by the Secretary of the Interior under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). Pheasant allegedly refused to stop for Bureau of Land Management rangers, made obscene gestures, and sped away before being apprehended. He was indicted on three counts, including the taillight violation.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada dismissed the taillight count, ruling that section 303(a) of the FLPMA was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The court held that the statute gave the Secretary of the Interior too much authority without sufficient guidance or restraint, violating Article I of the Constitution, which vests all legislative powers in Congress.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's dismissal, holding that section 303(a) of the FLPMA satisfies the "intelligible principle" test established by the Supreme Court. The Ninth Circuit found that the FLPMA provides clear guidance by requiring the Secretary to manage public lands under principles of multiple use and sustained yield, ensuring the land's value is realized sustainably. The court concluded that these constraints are sufficient to meet constitutional requirements, and thus, section 303(a) does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "USA V. PHEASANT" on Justia Law

A high school student, K.J., was involved in a fight on campus and was initially suspended for three days. After reviewing surveillance footage and learning about injuries sustained during the fight, school officials extended K.J.'s suspension and recommended his expulsion, without informing him of the new charges or evidence. K.J. was not given an opportunity to respond to these new allegations.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California found that the school officials violated K.J.'s procedural due process rights by not informing him of the new charges or evidence. However, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that they were entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established regarding due process protections for suspension extensions. The court also held that K.J. lacked standing to seek expungement of his disciplinary record, as it was speculative that the record would harm his reputation or future prospects.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit agreed that K.J.'s due process rights were violated, as he was not given notice of the new charges or an opportunity to respond. The court held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because the requirements for due process in school suspensions were clearly established in Goss v. Lopez. The court also held that K.J. had standing to seek expungement of his disciplinary record and that such relief was not barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. The case was remanded to the district court to consider K.J.'s claims for damages and expungement. View "K. J. V. JACKSON" on Justia Law

Haley Olson was arrested in Idaho for marijuana possession and consented to a search of her phone by Idaho police, who created a copy of its contents. Glenn Palmer, then-Sheriff of Grant County, Oregon, learned of the arrest and, curious about Olson's relationship with Grant County Deputy Tyler Smith, asked County Attorney Jim Carpenter to request the phone extraction from the Idaho prosecutor. Carpenter obtained and reviewed the extraction, allegedly deleting it afterward. However, Olson later heard gossip about the contents of her phone, including nude photos, seemingly originating from the sheriff’s office. Olson sued Palmer, Carpenter, and Grant County, alleging Fourth Amendment violations.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon granted summary judgment for Palmer, finding no supervisory liability, and for Carpenter, granting him qualified immunity as his actions did not violate clearly established law. Olson appealed these decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. The court agreed that Palmer was not liable due to lack of supervisory authority over Carpenter. The court also held that Carpenter was entitled to qualified immunity because Olson’s right to be free from Carpenter’s search was not clearly established at the time. However, the court concluded that Carpenter’s search did violate Olson’s Fourth Amendment rights, as it was conducted without a warrant, consent, or suspicion of criminal activity. The court emphasized the importance of developing constitutional precedent in this area, despite affirming the grant of qualified immunity to Carpenter. View "OLSON V. COUNTY OF GRANT" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to an Arizona law that requires criminal defense attorneys and their agents to initiate any contact with crime victims through the prosecutor’s office. The plaintiffs, a group of criminal defense attorneys and their association, argue that this law violates the First Amendment's Speech Clause by restricting their ability to communicate directly with victims.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona initially dismissed the case for lack of standing, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed that decision, allowing the case to proceed. On remand, the district court held a bench trial and concluded that the law was unconstitutional on its face, issuing a permanent injunction against its enforcement. The district court found that the law's requirement for defense attorneys to communicate through the prosecutor's office was a content- and viewpoint-based regulation of speech.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs' facial challenge failed because they did not challenge the law's primary application to victim-interview requests, which remain regulated under a similar Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure. The court noted that the unchallenged applications of the law, which include requests for victim interviews, are substantial and legitimate. Therefore, the challenged applications related to non-interview contacts are not substantial enough to render the entire statute unconstitutional.The Ninth Circuit vacated the permanent injunction and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that the facial challenge to the Victim Contact Limit, as framed by the plaintiffs, must fail. View "ARIZONA ATTORNEYS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE V. MAYES" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging California Penal Code 28225 on Second Amendment grounds, alleging that California's allocation of $5 of a $19 fee on firearms transfers to fund enforcement efforts against illegal firearm purchasers was unconstitutional. The Ninth Circuit held that, even assuming the collection and use of the fee fell within the scope of the Second Amendment, the fee survived intermediate scrutiny because of the State's important interest in promoting public safety and disarming prohibited persons, and because there was a reasonable fit between these important objectives and the challenged fees. Because section 28225 did not violate the constitution, the panel affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the State. View "Bauer v. Becerra" on Justia Law

If the government seeks to shackle a defendant, it must first justify the infringement with specific security needs as to that particular defendant. Before a presumptively innocent defendant may be shackled, the court must make an individualized decision that a compelling government purpose would be served and that shackles are the least restrictive means for maintaining security and order in the courtroom. The Ninth Circuit construed defendants' appeal as petitions for writs of mandamus under its supervisory authority and found that it had jurisdiction to consider them. The en banc court held that there was still a live controversy over the shackling policy and the case was not moot because of the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception to mootness. The en banc court clarified the right to be free from shackles and held that it applies whether the proceeding is pretrial, trial, or sentencing, with a jury or without. Although the en banc court held that the policy was unconstitutional, the court withheld the issuance of a formal writ of mandamus. View "United States v. Sanchez-Gomez" on Justia Law

M.N. filed a due process complaint alleging that the District committed procedural and substantive violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400(d)(1)(A). The ALJ denied all claims and the district court affirmed. The Ninth Circuit filed an amended opinion reversing the district court's judgment, holding that neither the duration of the hearing, the ALJ's active involvement, nor the length of the ALJ's opinion can ensure that the ALJ was thorough and careful in its findings of fact; plaintiffs' claim that the District committed a procedural violation of the IDEA by failing to adequately document its offer of the visually impaired (TVI) services was not waived; the District committed two procedural violations as to the individualized education plan (IEP); the District's failure to specify the assistive technology (AT) devices that were provided infringed M.N.'s opportunity to participate in the IEP process and denied the student a free appropriate education (FAPE); the panel remanded for a determination of the prejudice the student suffered as a result of the District's failure to respond to the complaint and the award of appropriate compensation; in regard to substantive violations, the panel remanded so the district court could consider plaintiffs' claims in light of new guidance from the Supreme Court in Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017); and M.N., as the prevailing party, was entitled to attorneys' fees. View "M.C. v. Antelope Valley Union High School District" on Justia Law

Although 28 U.S.C. 1448 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) give plaintiffs additional time to effect service of process, these rules do not extend or revive a state statute of limitations that expired before removal. If the period of time for bringing an action expired under state law before the action was removed to federal court, a defendant can raise the state statute of limitations as an affirmative defense in federal court. Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging federal civil rights and negligence claims after plaintiff was injured by a flash-bang grenade a deputy threw during the execution of a warrant at plaintiff's house. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's suit based on statute of limitations grounds. In this case, although section 1448 and Rule 4(m) allowed plaintiff to serve process on defendants after removal, these laws did not change the period of time for commencing an action under the state statute of limitations. The panel explained that, because the time for commencing the action expired before the case was removed to federal court, defendants were entitled to raise the state statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. View "Whidbee v. Pierce County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a street performer. She and her friend were arrested and charged with conducting business without a license, because they were dressed in "sexy cop" outfits on the Las Vegas strip and posed for photos with the officers in exchange for a tip. After the charges were dropped, plaintiff filed suit against the officers, alleging eleven federal and state causes of action. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the officers because the district court misconceived the scope of the applicable First Amendment protections. The record indicated the officers had no evidence before them when they decided to arrest plaintiff that suggested that the "sexy cops" association had any purpose that could have fallen outside the protection of the First Amendment under Berger v. City of Seattle. To infer from plaintiff and her friend's shared costumes and joint performance, alone, an agreement to engage in a regulable transaction impermissibly burdens the right to engage in purely expressive activity and association. The panel held that something more than that constitutionally protected activity is required to justify plaintiff's arrest. Viewing plaintiff's activities separately from her friend's, the panel held that summary judgment for the officers was improper because plaintiff's actions were entirely protected speech. The panel reversed in part and remanded in part. View "Santopietro v. Howell" on Justia Law