Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against her employer, UPS, alleging a state law gender-based hostile work environment claim. A jury returned a verdict for plaintiff on that claim, but the district court granted UPS's motion for a new trial on the ground that the claim was preempted under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 185(a). The jury in the second trial found for UPS. The court concluded that the district court erred in holding plaintiff's claim preempted. The court fashioned a two-part test to determine whether a state law claim is preempted under section 301. At the first step, the court asks “whether a particular right inheres in state law or, instead, is grounded in a CBA.” Only if the claim is “founded directly on rights created by collective-bargaining agreements” is preemption warranted at this step. At step two, “to determine whether a state law right is ‘substantially dependent’ on the terms of a CBA,” the court asks “whether the claim can be resolved by ‘look[ing] to’ versus interpreting the CBA.” In this case, the jury did not have to decide what any provision of the CBA requires. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's conclusion that plaintiff's claims were preempted to the extent they relied on her allegations regarding UPS’s extra work assignments, and reinstated the jury verdict from the first trial. The court also reversed the district court’s conclusion that the jury’s damages award was “grossly excessive” and remanded for reconsideration. View "Matson v. United Parcel Service, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the State Defendants, alleging state and federal claims arising out his discharge from the Hospital and subsequent transportation to Sacramento. The district court dismissed the federal statutory claims with prejudice as a sanction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), and the supplemental state law claims without prejudice. The court held that plaintiff waived the argument that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing his federal claims under Rule 41(b). The court explained that, in the absence of a showing that the district court abused its discretion, because the prior interlocutory order of dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is not reviewable, there would be no basis to appeal. Therefore, the court concluded that, because plaintiff failed to make in his opening brief the abuse of discretion argument as to Rule 41(b), he has waived it. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal. View "Brown v. Rawson-Neal Psychiatric Hospital" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, three former baristas, filed a class action against Starbucks, challenging the legality of Starbucks’ practice of withholding state and federal taxes from baristas’ paychecks based on the cash tips they receive. As a general practice, the baristas do not report to Starbucks how much they receive in tips. Instead, for tax withholding purposes, the company simply imputes 50 cents per hour in estimated tip income to each barista and withholds state and federal taxes from the baristas’ paychecks based on that amount. The district court granted Starbucks' motion to dismiss. The court concluded that, under the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 1341, and the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. 7421(a), the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The court also concluded that the federal-state comity doctrine bars the district court from awarding statutory damages on the state-tax component of plaintiffs’ claims, from which the federal-tax component cannot be severed. Because all of the claims are jurisdictionally barred or foreclosed by the comity doctrine, the court concluded that the entire action must be remanded to state court. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Fredrickson v. Starbucks Corp." on Justia Law

Arizona enacted a statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-122, 16-135, 16-584, in 1970, which required each voter who votes in person to cast his or her ballot at the precinct polling station at which the voter was registered to vote. Plaintiff and others challenge the precinct vote rule on the grounds that it violated the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), 52 U.S.C. 10301, and unjustifiably burdened their election rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. After the district court denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, plaintiff filed an emergency appeal. The court found that the precinct vote rule, as administered by Arizona, probably does not impermissibly burden minority voters by giving them less opportunity than non-minorities to participate in the political process. But even assuming, without deciding, that it imposes a cognizable burden on minority voters, plaintiff has not shown that Arizona’s enactment of the precinct vote rule is linked to social and historical conditions that have or currently produce racial discrimination against minority voters. Therefore, the court found that the district court correctly denied relief for the claimed violation of the VRA. The court also affirmed the district court's finding that the constitutional violation claims failed because the precinct vote rule, when considered together with other options available to Arizona voters, imposes only a minimal burden upon minority and majority voters. The court explained that such a minimal burden is sufficiently justified by Arizona’s interests in effective administration of voting in the State. View "Feldman v. Arizona Secretary of State's Office" on Justia Law

Leslie Feldman and others filed suit challenging Arizona House Bill 2023 (H.B. 2023), which precludes individuals who do not fall into one of several exceptions (e.g., election officials, mail carriers, family members, household members, and specified caregivers) from collecting early ballots from another person. Plaintiff argues that this state statute violates section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. 10301, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the First Amendment because, among other things, it disproportionately and adversely impacts minorities, unjustifiably burdens the right to vote, and interferes with the freedom of association. The district court denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and plaintiff filed this emergency interlocutory appeal. The court concluded that it has jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1). The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on her Voting Rights Act claim. In this case, the district court did not clearly err in concluding that plaintiff adduced no evidence showing that H.B. 2023 would have an impact on minorities different than the impact on non-minorities, let alone that the impact would result in less opportunity for minorities to participate in the political process as compared to non-minorities. The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in finding that H.B. 2023 imposed a minimal burden on voters’ Fourteenth Amendment right to vote, in finding that Arizona asserted sufficiently weighty interests justifying the limitation, and in ultimately concluding that plaintiff failed to establish that she was likely to succeed on the merits of her Fourteenth Amendment challenge. The court also concluded that ballot collection is not expressive conduct implicating the First Amendment, but even if it were, Arizona has an important regulatory interest justifying the minimal burden that H.B. 2023 imposes on freedom of association. Therefore, the district court did not err in concluding that the plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on the merits of her First Amendment claim. In this case, plaintiff is not only unlikely to prevail on the merits, but, as the district court concluded, her interest in avoiding possible irreparable harm does not outweigh Arizona’s and the public’s mutual interests in the enforcement of H.B. 2023 pending final resolution of this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. View "Feldman v. Arizona Secretary of State's Office" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that a prison official retaliated against him for reporting a correctional officer and the officer's use of excessive force while escorting plaintiff to a holding cell. The district court granted the official's motion for summary judgment. The court rejected the official's claim that Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, 3335(a) required him to transfer plaintiff to administrative segregation as soon as plaintiff alleged that the officer assaulted him. The court concluded that plaintiff has established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the officer retaliated against him and that plaintiff has shown that the official is not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court affirmed the jury verdict for the officer in a memorandum disposition filed concurrently with this opinion. View "Shepard v. Wise" on Justia Law

A fifth-grade student and her mother filed suit against the school district and its employees because the student allegedly experienced retaliation after the mother complained to the school principal about the student's teacher. The district court dismissed the First Amendment retaliation claim without prejudice; plaintiffs failed to meet the filing deadline, and the school district filed a proposed judgment of dismissal; plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint (SAC) the following day; the district court then entered a final judgment dismissing the First Amended Complaint, citing plaintiff's failure to file the SAC within the time allowed; and plaintiffs moved for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) based on excusable neglect. The district court found that counsel's neglect was not excusable and the district court, in the meantime, moved for attorney's fees under the California Public Records Act (CPRA), Cal. Gov't Code 6259(d). The district court denied the fees. Plaintiffs appeal both the district court’s judgment of dismissal and the order denying relief from judgment. Defendants cross-appeal a portion of the dismissal order and the order denying attorney’s fees. The court concluded that the district court’s decision cannot be supported by the record and thus it abused its discretion by denying plaintiffs relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(1). The court also concluded that plaintiffs' CPRA claim was neither indisputably without merit nor prosecuted for an improper motive. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "M.D. v. Newport-Mesa Unified School District" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of the California Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act, Assem. Bill No. 775, which requires that licensed pregnancy-related clinics disseminate a notice stating the existence of publicly-funded family-planning services, including contraception and abortion. The Act also requires that unlicensed clinics disseminate a notice stating that they are not licensed by the State of California. As a threshold matter, the court concluded that plaintiffs' claims are justiciable. On the merits, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction where plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success on their First Amendment Free Speech claims. The court explained that, although the Act is a content-based regulation, it does not discriminate based on viewpoint. In this case, the Licensed Notice survives intermediate scrutiny and the Unlicensed Notice survives any level of scrutiny. The court also concluded that plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success on their First Amendment Free Exercise claim where the Act is a neutral law of general applicability, subject to only rational basis review. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "NIFLA v. Harris" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a prisoner at Salinas Valley State Prison, alleges that defendants wrongfully classified him as a gang member in retaliation for filing a section 1983 suit against defendants' colleagues. Plaintiff was denied habeas relief because California courts rejected his claims on the ground that there was sufficient evidence to support the gang validation. Plaintiff then filed the present action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights, based on violation of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. The district court dismissed his suit on claim preclusion grounds. The court concluded that California claim preclusion law governs whether, in light of his earlier state habeas petition, plaintiff's section 1983 claims may be brought in federal court. The court held that the same primary right—defendant's right to be free from unlawful gang validation and placement in the SHU—was at issue in both suits. Because plaintiff's suit involves the same cause of action between the same parties after a final judgment on the merits of the first suit, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. Finally, the court declined defendants' request to assess a strike against defendant under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). View "Furnace v. Giurbino" on Justia Law

After the Party failed to meet the deadline for recognition as an official political party on the 2014 Arizona ballot, it challenges the constitutionality of Arizona’s filing deadline for new party petitions, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The Party claims that by requiring "new" parties to file recognition petitions 180 days before the primary, Arizona unconstitutionally burdens those parties’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court concluded that, without evidence of the specific obstacles to ballot access that the deadline imposes, the Party did not establish that its rights are severely burdened. Moreover, the court concluded that, at best, any burden is de minimus. Finally, after the court balanced the impact of the 180-day filing deadline on the Party's rights against Arizona's interests - administering orderly elections - in maintaining that deadline, the court concluded that the Party has not demonstrated an unconstitutional interference with ballot access. View "Arizona Green Party v. Reagan" on Justia Law