Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

After Manuel Diaz was shot by an Anaheim police officer, Diaz's estate and mother filed suit against the officer and the city, alleging federal civil rights violations. The jury returned the verdict in favor of defendants. The court concluded that the trial court erred in failing to bifurcate liability from compensatory damages where graphic and prejudicial evidence about the victim has little, and in large part no, relevance to the liability issue. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded to the district court with some guidance. First, the evidence of Diaz’s drug use and gang affiliation has marginal, if any, probative value as to damages, and none as to liability. On retrial, the district court should closely review this evidence under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403, and should assure that such evidence is admitted only to the degree that the testimony is connected up with Ms. Huizar’s reaction to her son’s death. Second, if plaintiffs are willing to stipulate that Diaz was a gang member (which they claim they tried to do during trial), no expert testimony about gangs - such as gang activities, tattoos, or monikers - should be admitted. Third, while there is a “strong presumption that jurors follow instructions,” a limiting instruction may not sufficiently mitigate the prejudicial impact of evidence in all cases. And fourth, if the district court is going to sustain an objection and grant a motion to strike, merely saying “stricken” does not sufficiently inform the jury about the proper use of the evidence it just heard. Finally, the court concluded that the trial court did not err in ruling force was not excessive as a matter of law. View "Estate of Diaz v. City of Anaheim" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging facial constitutional challenges to California’s law prohibiting state-licensed mental health providers from engaging in sexual orientation change efforts (SOCE) with minor patients (Senate Bill 1172, Business and Professions Code sections 865, 865.1, and 865.2). The court rejected plaintiffs' claim that SB 1172 violates the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment and that SB 1172 violates the privacy rights of their minor clients. In this case, SB 1172 does not regulate conduct outside the scope of the counselor-client relationship, and thus the law does not excessively entangle the State with religion. The court further concluded that the evidence falls far short of demonstrating that the primary intended effect of SB 1172 was to inhibit religion. The court rejected plaintiffs' claims under the Religion Clauses and declined to apply strict scrutiny where the court held in Pickup v. Brown that SB 1172 survives rational basis review because “SB 1172 is rationally related to the legitimate government interest of protecting the well-being of minors.” Finally, plaintiffs' privacy claim is foreclosed (see Pickup v. Brown). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Welch v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Party brought a facial First Amendment challenge to Hawaii’s open primary system, seeking to limit the participants in its primary elections to its formal members or to voters who are otherwise willing publicly to declare their support for the Party. The Party claims that Hawaii’s open primary system, which allows registered voters to participate in any party’s primary without formally joining or declaring support for that party, severely burdens the Party’s associational rights. Under Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, the court concluded that the extent of the burden that a primary system imposes on associational rights is a factual question on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof. In this case, the court concluded that the Party's preference for limiting primary participants to registered Party members, coupled with the fact that more people vote in Democratic primaries than are formally registered with the Party, is not sufficient to show that Hawaii’s open primary system severely burdens the Party’s associational rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Democratic Party of Hawaii v. Nago" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City for retaliation, alleging that he was terminated for planning to testify against the City in a lawsuit relating to age discrimination. Plaintiff alleged that his termination violated both the First Amendment and the retaliation provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 623(d). The court rejected the City's argument that plaintiff's speech was not speech as a citizen on a matter of public concern and so fell outside the First Amendment's protections. In this case, plaintiff's sworn statement and imminent testimony were outside the scope of his ordinary job duties, which means that he was engaged in speech as a citizen for First Amendment purposes. The court also concluded that the retaliation provision of the ADEA does not preclude a plaintiff such as the one in this case from bringing a First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Given the substantial difference between the level of scrutiny afforded age discrimination equal protection claims and First Amendment retaliation claims, the court cannot assume that Congress intended the ADEA to affect the availability of section 1983 claims in the same manner in both subject areas. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Stilwell v. City of Williams" on Justia Law

The City of Glendale installed a public monument in 2013 commemorating the “Comfort Women,” an unknown number of women that South Korea asserts, but Japan disputes, were forced to serve as sexual partners to members of the Japanese Imperial Army during World War II and the decade preceding it. A Japanese-American resident of Los Angeles and a non-profit organization filed suit claiming that the installation of the monument intrudes on the federal government’s exclusive foreign affairs power and is thereby preempted under the foreign affairs doctrine. In plaintiffs’ view, Glendale’s monument disrupts the federal government’s foreign policy of nonintervention and encouragement of peaceful resolution of the Comfort Women dispute. The complaint seeks an order declaring Glendale’s installation of the monument unconstitutional and compelling Glendale to remove the monument from public property. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' constitutional claims with prejudice. The court concluded that plaintiffs have standing where the “inability to unreservedly use” Glendale’s Central Park constitutes an injury in fact for purposes of Article III standing. Plaintiffs can also establish that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and that a favorable decision is likely to redress the injury. On the merits, the court concluded that plaintiffs have not plausibly claimed that Glendale’s actions are preempted where Glendale's installation of the monument concerns an area of traditional state responsibility and does not intrude on the federal government’s foreign affairs power. Furthermore, the Supremacy Clause does not preempt a local government’s expression, through a public monument, of a particular viewpoint on a matter related to foreign affairs. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Gingery v. City of Glendale" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the denial of his special motion under the California anti-strategic lawsuit against public participation (“anti-SLAPP”) statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 425.16, to strike the second amended complaint filed by Travelers. Defendant maintains that Travelers' claims arise out of his representation of Travelers' insured, VDG, as Cumis counsel, and thus defendant's activity was protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. Determining that the court has jurisdiction to consider the appeal, the court concluded that Travelers' causes of action for declaratory judgment, unjust enrichment, breach of Cal. Civ. Code 2860(d), and concealment do no arise from protected activity because they are not based on an act in furtherance of defendant's right of petition or free speech; Travelers has made a prima facie showing of facts supporting its causes of action so as to establish a probability of prevailing on the merits sufficient to survive the motion to strike; and, because the causes of action at issue arise from defendant's post-settlement conduct, not his communications with VDG in settling the prior lawsuit, California’s litigation privilege, Cal. Civ. Code 47(b), does not bar this suit. The court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to review defendant's challenge to the district court’s striking count two, alleging breach of a defense handling agreement, because the denial was without prejudice, and there is no final order as to this claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hirsh" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Leah Manzari, famous under her professional name, Danni Ashe, for her groundbreaking work in monetizing online pornography, filed a defamation suit claiming that the Daily Mail Online, an online news outlet, used a photograph of her to convey the defamatory impression that she had tested positive for HIV. The Daily Mail filed an interlocutory appeal under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 425.15. The court agreed with the district court that, at this stage in the litigation, Manzari has presented sufficient evidence to move forward with her claim that the Daily Mail Online employees acted with actual malice when they published the article implying that Manzari was an HIV-positive sex worker. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the Daily Mail's motion to strike the complaint. View "Manzari v. Associated Newspapers" on Justia Law

In the midst of a federal investigation into activities of the former Governor of Oregon, John Kitzhaber, a grand jury subpoena seeks a broad range of information from the State of Oregon. For several years before Kitzhaber left office, copies of his personal emails were archived on Oregon’s computer servers. Because this cache would be turned over to the government under the subpoena, Kitzhaber argues the subpoena is unreasonably broad. The government disclaims any interest in Kitzhaber’s communications with his personal attorneys but argues it is otherwise entitled to everything it has requested. The court agreed with Kitzhaber that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in much of his personal email (although the Fourth Amendment’s protection does not extend to any use of a personal email account to conduct public business), and that the subpoena in this case - which is not even minimally tailored to the government’s investigatory goals - is unreasonable and invalid. The court disagreed, however, that Kitzhaber may assert the attorney-client privilege for his communications, including communications regarding potential conflicts of interest and ethics violations, with the State of Oregon’s attorneys. Whatever privilege may protect those communications belongs to the State of Oregon, not to Kitzhaber as an individual officeholder in his personal capacity. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to quash the government’s present subpoena in its entirety. View "In re Grand Jury Subpoena" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, appellants challenged the constitutionality of five city ordinances that regulate mobile billboards. One of the ordinances limits the type of sign that may be affixed to motor vehicles parked or left standing on public streets; the other ordinances prohibit non-motorized, “mobile billboard advertising displays” within city limits. Unlike the Supreme Court's recent decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the mobile billboard ordinances in this case do not single out a specific subject matter for differential treatment, nor is any kind of mobile billboard exempted from regulation based on its content. The court explained that an officer seeking to enforce the non-motorized billboard ordinances must decide only whether an offending vehicle constitutes a prohibited “advertising display” because its primary purpose is to display messages, as opposed to transporting passengers or carrying cargo. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court appropriately found the ordinances to be content neutral. The court also concluded that none of the ordinances are substantially broader than necessary to accomplish the cities' goals of eliminating visual blight and promoting the safe and convenient flow of traffic. Furthermore, the mobile billboard ordinances leave open adequate alternative opportunities for advertising. Because the mobile billboard ordinances are content neutral, narrowly tailored to serve the government's significant aesthetic and safety interests, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Lone Star Sec. & Video v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Brooks and Smith, bail enforcement agents, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, against various defendants after they were removed from a court room by a courtroom marshal at the request of a judge. The court concluded that neither precedent nor first principles justify giving courtroom officials absolute immunity when they allegedly use force in excess of what their judge commanded and the Constitution allows. In this case, the marshal was not performing a judicial function and he employed more force than the judge ordered him to use. The court concluded, however, that the marshal was entitled to a qualified immunity defense. Given the chaos in the courtroom and the undisputed evidence that Brooks was intent on disobeying the court’s instructions - and given his extremely vague and insubstantial allegations about his injury - it is simply not “beyond debate” that the marshal employed an unreasonable amount of force. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the marshal's absolute immunity defense and reversed the district court's denial of his qualified immunity defense. View "Brooks v. Clark County" on Justia Law