Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Rebecca Hartzell, a parent of children attending Dove Mountain K-CSTEM school, was banned from the school premises following an incident where she allegedly assaulted the school principal, Andrea Divijak. Hartzell claimed that she was banned in retaliation for her protected speech criticizing the school and its administration. The Marana Unified School District and Divijak argued that the ban was due to Hartzell's conduct, specifically the alleged assault.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on Hartzell's procedural due process claim, her First Amendment retaliation claim against Divijak, and part of her defamation claim. The court also denied Hartzell's motion to amend her complaint to add a First Amendment theory to her procedural due process claim. At trial, the court precluded Hartzell from pursuing a Monell claim against the District based on a "final policymaker" theory and granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of the District on her First Amendment claim. The jury found in favor of Divijak on the remaining defamation claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Hartzell's "final policymaker" theory but erred in granting judgment as a matter of law on her First Amendment claim against the District. The court found that a reasonable jury could conclude that Hartzell was banned pursuant to an unconstitutional District policy prohibiting "offensive or inappropriate" speech. The court also affirmed the district court's ruling that Divijak was entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment claim. Additionally, the court reversed the summary judgment on Hartzell's defamation claim regarding one of the documents sent to her employer, finding it potentially defamatory. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "HARTZELL V. MARANA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT" on Justia Law

Jackson Daniel Bowers was convicted in 2019 of possession of heroin with intent to distribute and sentenced to 36 months imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. In 2023, while on supervised release, Bowers was accused of committing two state crimes: fourth-degree assault and violating a protective order. His probation officer recommended revoking his supervised release. Bowers resolved his state charges by entering a deferral agreement without admitting guilt.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington held a revocation hearing. Bowers requested a jury trial, which the district court denied. The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Bowers had committed the alleged violations and revoked his supervised release, sentencing him to nine months imprisonment followed by 36 months of supervised release. Bowers appealed, arguing that Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial in revocation proceedings, separate from the Sixth Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Article III’s jury provision and the Sixth Amendment are equivalent in scope. It found that the history and precedent indicate that the Sixth Amendment was meant to complement, not supersede, Article III. Therefore, a right not triggered by the Sixth Amendment cannot be independently triggered by Article III. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s revocation of Bowers’ supervised release. View "United States V. Bowers" on Justia Law

Reed Day and Albert Jacobs, Arizona residents, wanted to ship wine directly from out-of-state retailers who do not have in-state premises in Arizona. Arizona law, however, requires retailers to have a physical presence in the state to ship wine directly to consumers. Plaintiffs filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Arizona state officials, claiming that this statutory scheme violates the Commerce Clause.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted summary judgment in favor of the state officials and the intervenor-defendant, the Wine and Spirits Wholesalers Association of Arizona. The district court found that the plaintiffs likely lacked standing and that, even if they did, the Arizona laws were not discriminatory. The court reasoned that the physical presence requirement applied equally to in-state and out-of-state retailers and was essential to Arizona’s three-tier system for alcohol distribution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had standing because the district court could grant some form of relief. However, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to show that Arizona’s physical presence requirement was discriminatory. The requirement applied even-handedly to all retailers, regardless of their state of origin, and was not so onerous as to be discriminatory. The court noted that out-of-state businesses could and did obtain retail licenses in Arizona, indicating that the laws did not have a discriminatory effect in practice. The court concluded that Arizona’s laws did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. View "Day v. Henry" on Justia Law

Ryan Smith was shot and killed by Seattle police officers Christopher Myers and Ryan Beecroft during a response to a 911 call from Smith's girlfriend, Katy Nolan, who reported that Smith was threatening to kill both himself and her with a knife. When the officers arrived, they kicked in the door to Smith's apartment, and within 5.87 seconds, they shot Smith, who was holding a pocketknife. Smith raised his right arm across his chest and took a step forward before being shot. The officers did not issue any warnings before using deadly force.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington denied the officers' motion for partial summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court found that there were factual disputes regarding whether a reasonable officer would have believed Smith posed an immediate threat and whether less drastic measures were feasible. The court concluded that the law was clearly established that officers may not use deadly force against suspects who do not pose an immediate threat.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal and that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court determined that a reasonable juror could conclude that Smith did not pose an immediate threat to the officers or others, and that the use of deadly force was not justified. The court emphasized that it was clearly established law that a fatal shooting under these circumstances violated the Fourth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity. View "JOHNSON V. MYERS" on Justia Law

Brandon Wade Kurns, a convicted felon, began working at Modern Pawn & Consignment in Helena, Montana, in June 2021, where he sold firearms and ammunition. In July 2021, after an investigation linked stolen gunpowder to the shop, ATF agents searched Modern Pawn and found evidence that Kurns had possessed several firearms. Kurns was indicted and pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm.The United States District Court for the District of Montana sentenced Kurns to 36 months in prison, applying a base offense level of 20 under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B)(i)(I) for possessing a semiautomatic firearm capable of accepting a large capacity magazine, and a four-level enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B) for possessing eight or more firearms. Kurns objected, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support these enhancements and that the court violated his Fifth Amendment rights by drawing an adverse inference from his silence during sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the evidence, including surveillance footage and ATF transfer forms, supported the finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Kurns possessed a semiautomatic firearm with a large capacity magazine and at least eight firearms. The court also found no Fifth Amendment violation, as there was no indication that the district court drew an adverse inference from Kurns' silence. Additionally, the court declined to consider Kurns' Second Amendment challenge based on New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, as it was raised for the first time after the completion of appellate briefing. View "USA V. KURNS" on Justia Law

Gregory W. Pheasant was charged with driving an off-road vehicle on public lands at night without a taillight, violating 43 C.F.R. § 8341.1(f)(5). This regulation was issued by the Secretary of the Interior under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). Pheasant allegedly refused to stop for Bureau of Land Management rangers, made obscene gestures, and sped away before being apprehended. He was indicted on three counts, including the taillight violation.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada dismissed the taillight count, ruling that section 303(a) of the FLPMA was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The court held that the statute gave the Secretary of the Interior too much authority without sufficient guidance or restraint, violating Article I of the Constitution, which vests all legislative powers in Congress.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's dismissal, holding that section 303(a) of the FLPMA satisfies the "intelligible principle" test established by the Supreme Court. The Ninth Circuit found that the FLPMA provides clear guidance by requiring the Secretary to manage public lands under principles of multiple use and sustained yield, ensuring the land's value is realized sustainably. The court concluded that these constraints are sufficient to meet constitutional requirements, and thus, section 303(a) does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "USA V. PHEASANT" on Justia Law

A high school student, K.J., was involved in a fight on campus and was initially suspended for three days. After reviewing surveillance footage and learning about injuries sustained during the fight, school officials extended K.J.'s suspension and recommended his expulsion, without informing him of the new charges or evidence. K.J. was not given an opportunity to respond to these new allegations.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California found that the school officials violated K.J.'s procedural due process rights by not informing him of the new charges or evidence. However, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that they were entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established regarding due process protections for suspension extensions. The court also held that K.J. lacked standing to seek expungement of his disciplinary record, as it was speculative that the record would harm his reputation or future prospects.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit agreed that K.J.'s due process rights were violated, as he was not given notice of the new charges or an opportunity to respond. The court held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because the requirements for due process in school suspensions were clearly established in Goss v. Lopez. The court also held that K.J. had standing to seek expungement of his disciplinary record and that such relief was not barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. The case was remanded to the district court to consider K.J.'s claims for damages and expungement. View "K. J. V. JACKSON" on Justia Law

Haley Olson was arrested in Idaho for marijuana possession and consented to a search of her phone by Idaho police, who created a copy of its contents. Glenn Palmer, then-Sheriff of Grant County, Oregon, learned of the arrest and, curious about Olson's relationship with Grant County Deputy Tyler Smith, asked County Attorney Jim Carpenter to request the phone extraction from the Idaho prosecutor. Carpenter obtained and reviewed the extraction, allegedly deleting it afterward. However, Olson later heard gossip about the contents of her phone, including nude photos, seemingly originating from the sheriff’s office. Olson sued Palmer, Carpenter, and Grant County, alleging Fourth Amendment violations.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon granted summary judgment for Palmer, finding no supervisory liability, and for Carpenter, granting him qualified immunity as his actions did not violate clearly established law. Olson appealed these decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. The court agreed that Palmer was not liable due to lack of supervisory authority over Carpenter. The court also held that Carpenter was entitled to qualified immunity because Olson’s right to be free from Carpenter’s search was not clearly established at the time. However, the court concluded that Carpenter’s search did violate Olson’s Fourth Amendment rights, as it was conducted without a warrant, consent, or suspicion of criminal activity. The court emphasized the importance of developing constitutional precedent in this area, despite affirming the grant of qualified immunity to Carpenter. View "OLSON V. COUNTY OF GRANT" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to an Arizona law that requires criminal defense attorneys and their agents to initiate any contact with crime victims through the prosecutor’s office. The plaintiffs, a group of criminal defense attorneys and their association, argue that this law violates the First Amendment's Speech Clause by restricting their ability to communicate directly with victims.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona initially dismissed the case for lack of standing, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed that decision, allowing the case to proceed. On remand, the district court held a bench trial and concluded that the law was unconstitutional on its face, issuing a permanent injunction against its enforcement. The district court found that the law's requirement for defense attorneys to communicate through the prosecutor's office was a content- and viewpoint-based regulation of speech.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs' facial challenge failed because they did not challenge the law's primary application to victim-interview requests, which remain regulated under a similar Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure. The court noted that the unchallenged applications of the law, which include requests for victim interviews, are substantial and legitimate. Therefore, the challenged applications related to non-interview contacts are not substantial enough to render the entire statute unconstitutional.The Ninth Circuit vacated the permanent injunction and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that the facial challenge to the Victim Contact Limit, as framed by the plaintiffs, must fail. View "ARIZONA ATTORNEYS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE V. MAYES" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging California Penal Code 28225 on Second Amendment grounds, alleging that California's allocation of $5 of a $19 fee on firearms transfers to fund enforcement efforts against illegal firearm purchasers was unconstitutional. The Ninth Circuit held that, even assuming the collection and use of the fee fell within the scope of the Second Amendment, the fee survived intermediate scrutiny because of the State's important interest in promoting public safety and disarming prohibited persons, and because there was a reasonable fit between these important objectives and the challenged fees. Because section 28225 did not violate the constitution, the panel affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the State. View "Bauer v. Becerra" on Justia Law