Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Oregon enacted a law requiring prescription drug manufacturers to report detailed information about certain drugs, including pricing, costs, and factors contributing to price increases, to the state’s Department of Consumer and Business Services. The law also directs the agency to post most of this information online, but prohibits public disclosure of information designated as a trade secret unless the agency determines that disclosure is in the public interest. Since the law’s enactment, manufacturers have claimed thousands of trade secrets, but the agency has not publicly disclosed any such information.A trade association representing pharmaceutical manufacturers sued the director of the Oregon agency in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, raising several facial constitutional challenges. The district court granted summary judgment for the association on two claims: that the reporting requirement violated the First Amendment by compelling speech, and that any use of the public-interest exception to disclose trade secrets would constitute an uncompensated taking under the Fifth Amendment. The court declared the entire reporting requirement unconstitutional and held that any disclosure of trade secrets under the public-interest exception would violate the Takings Clause unless just compensation was provided.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It reversed the district court’s summary judgment for the association on both the First and Fifth Amendment claims. The Ninth Circuit held that the reporting requirement compels commercial speech and survives intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment, as it directly advances substantial state interests in transparency and market efficiency and is not more extensive than necessary. On the takings claim, the court found the association’s challenge justiciable but concluded that, under the Penn Central regulatory takings framework, none of the factors supported a facial claim that every disclosure under the public-interest exception would constitute a taking. The court remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment for the state on these claims. View "Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America v. Stolfi" on Justia Law

Two individuals alleged that the Arizona Department of Revenue, through its Unclaimed Property Act (UPA), unlawfully took possession of checks owed to them by various businesses. Under the UPA, property presumed abandoned is transferred from the holder to the state, which then lists it on a public website but does not provide direct notice to the apparent owners. The plaintiffs claimed that this process constituted an unlawful taking without just compensation and a deprivation of property without due process, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed the case. It found that the defendants were protected by sovereign immunity and that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for relief, both for retrospective and prospective relief. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing because they alleged a concrete injury: the state’s possession of their property without consent. The court also determined that sovereign immunity did not bar the claims, as the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and alleged unconstitutional conduct. On the merits, the Ninth Circuit held that the takings claim failed as a matter of law because property held in trust by the state is not considered “taken.” However, the court found that the plaintiffs stated a viable due process claim, as they plausibly alleged a property interest and that Arizona’s notice procedures were constitutionally inadequate under circuit precedent. The court affirmed the dismissal of the takings claim, reversed the dismissal of the due process claim, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "GARZA V. WOODS" on Justia Law

Two University of Washington professors, who serve as moderators for a faculty email listserv, were investigated by the Washington State Executive Ethics Board after forwarding emails that allegedly contained political discussion and requests for fundraising. The Board reviewed several months of their emails during its investigations. One professor was ultimately fined $750 for improper use of state resources, while the other was not disciplined. The professors, on behalf of themselves and a proposed class of listserv subscribers, filed suit challenging the Board’s investigatory policies and practices, alleging that these chill their First Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington dismissed the professors’ complaint as unripe under Article III, finding that they had not sufficiently alleged that the Board’s policies chilled their speech. The district court also concluded that the professors’ emails, as public employees, were public records and thus not protected by a First Amendment privacy interest. Additionally, the court found the claims prudentially unripe because the Board’s investigations were ongoing.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the professors’ claims are ripe under both constitutional and prudential ripeness doctrines. The court found that the professors had sufficiently alleged a credible threat of future enforcement and chilling of speech, given their ongoing roles and the Board’s history of enforcement. The court also determined that the issues presented are fit for judicial decision and that withholding review would impose substantial hardship on the professors. The panel remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the professors’ First Amendment claims against the Board’s investigatory policies and practices are ripe for adjudication. View "FLAXMAN V. FERGUSON" on Justia Law

A group of researchers at the University of California received multi-year federal research grants from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH). In April 2025, the EPA and NEH sent form letters to these researchers, terminating their grants. The letters cited changes in agency priorities and referenced the implementation of several Executive Orders issued in early 2025, which directed agencies to eliminate funding for projects related to diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI), environmental justice, and similar initiatives. The researchers alleged that these terminations were not based on individualized assessments but were instead the result of broad policy changes.The researchers filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, challenging the mass termination of grants on constitutional and statutory grounds, including violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the First and Fifth Amendments, and separation of powers. The district court provisionally certified two classes: one for those who received form termination letters without specific explanations, and another for those whose grants were terminated due to the DEI-related Executive Orders. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, ordering the agencies to reinstate the terminated grants, finding that the terminations were likely arbitrary and capricious and, for the DEI class, likely violated the First Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the government’s motion for a partial stay of the injunction. The court denied the motion, holding that the government had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits regarding jurisdiction, standing, or the substantive claims. The court found that the agencies’ actions were likely arbitrary and capricious under the APA and likely constituted viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment. The court also concluded that the balance of harms and public interest did not favor a stay. View "THAKUR V. TRUMP" on Justia Law

A man born in New York City in July 1950 lived for nearly seventy years in the United States, believing himself to be a U.S. citizen. His father, a Nicaraguan national, was working for Nicaragua’s permanent mission to the United Nations at the time of his birth. Over the years, the government repeatedly issued him passports and affirmed his citizenship. However, in 2018, after a review of historical records, the government determined that his father had been an attaché, not a consul, at the time of his birth. This distinction was crucial because, under federal and international law, the children of diplomats (such as attachés) are not considered “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States for purposes of birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment.The United States District Court for the Central District of California reviewed the case after the government revoked the man’s passport and denied his claim to citizenship. The Secretary of State presented a recently executed certificate asserting that the man’s father had diplomatic immunity at the time of his birth. The district court declined to treat this certificate as conclusive evidence but, after considering the full record, found by clear and convincing evidence that the father was an attaché with diplomatic immunity, and thus the plaintiff was not a birthright citizen.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that while the President’s reception of a person as a diplomat is conclusive, whether that reception occurred is a factual question for the courts to decide, even when presented with a certificate from the executive branch. The court found no clear error in the district court’s determination that the plaintiff’s father held diplomatic immunity at the time of birth, and therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to birthright citizenship. View "MONCADA V. RUBIO" on Justia Law

A nonprofit Christian ministry that provides youth programs in Oregon applied for state grant funding from the Oregon Department of Education’s Youth Development Division. The Division had recently added a rule requiring all grant applicants to certify that they do not discriminate based on religion in employment, vendor selection, subcontracting, or service delivery. The ministry, whose mission is to share Christian teachings, requires all employees and volunteers to affirm a Christian Statement of Faith and be involved in a local church. After initially awarding the ministry a conditional grant, the Division withdrew the award upon discovering the ministry’s religious hiring requirements.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon denied the ministry’s request for a preliminary injunction to reinstate the grant and enjoin enforcement of the rule, finding the ministry unlikely to succeed on the merits of its First Amendment claims. The court also dismissed all claims, including those for damages, based on qualified immunity, even though the defendants had only moved to dismiss the damages claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Ninth Circuit held that the rule, as applied to grant-funded initiatives, is likely neutral and generally applicable, thus not violating the Free Exercise Clause, and is a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral condition for participation in the grant program. The court also found that the ministry’s religious autonomy claims were unlikely to succeed, as the relevant doctrines are affirmative defenses, not standalone claims. However, the court held that applying the rule to the ministry’s non-grant-funded initiatives likely imposes an unconstitutional condition on expressive association. The Ninth Circuit directed the district court to enjoin enforcement of the rule as to non-grant-funded initiatives, affirmed the dismissal of damages claims due to qualified immunity, and reversed the dismissal of claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. View "YOUTH 71FIVE MINISTRIES V. WILLIAMS" on Justia Law

Three California churches sought to challenge the California Child Day Care Facilities Act and its regulations, which require child day care facilities to be licensed, ensure that children are free to attend religious services or activities of their choice as decided by a child’s authorized representative, and provide notice to parents of this right. The churches, which either had their license revoked or had not yet applied for one, alleged that these requirements conflicted with their religious beliefs and practices, particularly their desire to operate preschools with mandatory religious curricula and without state licensure.Previously, the United States District Court for the Southern District of California dismissed the churches’ Free Speech and Free Exercise claims for lack of standing, and their Establishment Clause and Due Process claims for failure to state a claim. The district court entered judgment in favor of the state officials after the churches declined to amend their complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the churches lacked standing to challenge the religious services provision under the Free Exercise Clause because there was no credible threat of enforcement against their intended conduct, given the state’s disavowal of such enforcement and the absence of any history of similar prosecutions. However, the court found that the churches had standing to challenge the licensure requirement under the Free Exercise Clause, but concluded that the requirement was neutral and generally applicable, thus subject only to rational basis review, which it satisfied. The court also rejected the Establishment Clause challenge, finding that the statutory exemptions were based on program type, not religion. The court found standing for the Free Speech challenge to the notice requirement but held that the compelled disclosure was factual, uncontroversial, and reasonably related to a substantial government interest. The Due Process challenge was also rejected. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment but remanded to amend the judgment so that the dismissal of the Free Exercise challenge to the religious services provision would be without prejudice. View "FOOTHILLS CHRISTIAN MINISTRIES V. JOHNSON" on Justia Law

A group of foster children in Oregon, through their representatives, brought a class action lawsuit against the Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS) and state officials, alleging violations of their substantive due process rights due to serious abuses experienced while in ODHS’s legal custody. The plaintiffs sought relief on behalf of all children for whom ODHS had or would have legal responsibility, including those in ODHS’s legal custody but physically placed with their parents, either because they had not been removed from their homes or because they were on a temporary “Trial Home Visit” after removal.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon certified a general class that included all children in ODHS’s legal or physical custody. After extensive litigation, the parties reached a settlement agreement, but disagreed on whether the term “Child in Care” in the agreement included children in ODHS’s legal custody who were physically with their parents (the “Disputed Children”). The district court concluded that these children were not covered by the settlement, reasoning that children living with their biological parents did not have substantive due process rights to be free from serious abuses while in ODHS’s legal custody.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s interpretation of the settlement agreement and the scope of substantive due process protections. The Ninth Circuit held that the Disputed Children—those in ODHS’s legal custody but physically with their parents—are entitled to substantive due process protections. The court found that once the state assumes legal custody, it has an affirmative duty to provide reasonable safety and minimally adequate care, regardless of the child’s physical placement. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "WYATT B. V. KOTEK" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted by an Arizona jury of child molestation after he helped bathe young girls who were in his and his wife’s care through the foster system. The relevant Arizona statute defined child molestation as any direct or indirect touching of a child’s private parts, and, at the time, allowed a defendant to raise an affirmative defense by proving he was not motivated by sexual interest. The petitioner admitted to the touching but argued he lacked sexual motivation.After his first trial ended in a mistrial, the Arizona Supreme Court decided State v. Holle, which held that sexual motivation was not an element of the crime and that the lack of sexual interest was an affirmative defense the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. At the petitioner’s second trial, the court instructed the jury accordingly, and he was convicted on some counts. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on Holle, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. The United States Supreme Court also denied certiorari. The petitioner then sought federal habeas relief in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, arguing that the statutory scheme unconstitutionally shifted the burden of disproving an essential element of the crime to him. The district court denied relief, finding the state courts’ application of federal law was not objectively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that Arizona’s statutory scheme violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by shifting to the defendant the burden of disproving sexual motivation, which is the critical fact distinguishing criminal from innocent conduct. The court concluded that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision upholding the conviction was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The Ninth Circuit ordered the district court to grant the writ of habeas corpus. View "BIEGANSKI V. SHINN" on Justia Law

A religious association that supports abortion as part of its core beliefs challenged Idaho’s laws criminalizing abortion. The association, which operates a telehealth abortion clinic in New Mexico, claimed to have members in Idaho who would be affected by the abortion bans. However, it did not have any patients in Idaho, no clinic or doctors licensed to practice in Idaho, and could not identify any Idaho citizen who had sought or would imminently seek an abortion through the organization. The association argued that Idaho’s laws harmed its members and frustrated its mission, and that it had diverted resources to open its New Mexico clinic in response to abortion bans in Idaho and other states.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the association lacked both associational and organizational standing. The court also addressed the merits of the association’s constitutional claims and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal on the grounds of lack of Article III standing. The appellate court held that the association failed to show associational standing because it did not identify any specific member who had suffered or would imminently suffer an injury due to Idaho’s abortion laws. The court also found no organizational standing, as the association’s diversion of resources and alleged frustration of its mission were insufficient to establish standing under recent Supreme Court precedent. The Ninth Circuit did not reach the merits of the constitutional claims. The court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the complaint could be saved by amendment, noting that dismissals for lack of jurisdiction should generally be without prejudice. View "THE SATANIC TEMPLE V. LABRADOR" on Justia Law