Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Raymond Fryberg, Jr., appealed his conviction for possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. He argued several grounds for reversal, including the allegedly erroneous admission into evidence of a return of service that the Government used to prove that Defendant had been served with notice of a hearing on a domestic violence protection order. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the admission of the return of service did not violate either the rule against hearsay or the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction. View "United States v. Fryberg, Jr." on Justia Law

In 2015, Hugo Rivera-Muniz pleaded guilty to reentering the United States without authorization after having been deported or removed. At the sentencing hearing, the district court considered Rivera-Muniz’s previous conviction for voluntary manslaughter under California Penal Code section 192(a) and concluded that it was an enumerated crime of violence that triggered a 16-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). However, the district court also applied a 7-level downward variance, thus sentencing Rivera-Muniz to twenty-seven months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Rivera-Muniz challenged the 16-level enhancement, arguing that California Penal Code section 192(a) was not categorically a crime of violence. Finding no error in the district court’s decision, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Rivera-Muniz" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Joann Davis and Paul Cilley filed suit against the United States and NASA officials, alleging, among other things, a claim for wrongful detention under the Fourth Amendment pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents. The court concluded that the federal agent involved in the detention was not entitled to qualified immunity from suit for detaining Davis, an elderly woman, in a public parking lot for two hours, while she stood in urine-soaked pants, to question her, incident to a search, about her possession of a paperweight containing a rice-grain-sized bit of lunar material. The court agreed with Davis that, in light of Franklin v. Foxworth, the agent violated the Fourth Amendment because his detention of her was unreasonably prolonged and degrading. In this case, the agent was aware of several facts that color the reasonableness of his actions: he knew that Davis was a slight, elderly woman; Davis had lost control of her bladder and had visibly wet her pants; Davis and Cilley were unarmed and the search warrant had been fully executed; Davis had not concealed possession of the paperweights, but rather had reached out to NASA for help in selling the paperweights; and the agent knew that Davis was experiencing financial distress as a result of having to raise grandchildren after her daughter died, her son was severely ill and required expensive medical care, and Davis needed a transplant. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity. View "Davis v. United States" on Justia Law

This case arose from a dispute over which California government entity would be responsible for funding the education of K.G. pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400(d)(1)(A). The School District contended that the district court erred in granting K.G. relief from its original judgment denying attorneys' fees. The court concluded that the district court did not apply the incorrect legal rule in evaluating whether to grant relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) where the district court's determination that K.G.'s delay in pursuing Rule 60(b) relief was understandable in light of the original attorney's poor mental and physical health; K.G. was the prevailing party entitled to attorney fees because K.G.'s prayer was answered in full when the ALJ designated the School District as the responsible agency and granted K.G.'s requested relief; K.G. qualified as a prevailing party under the IDEA, and this victory was not trivial or merely technical; but it was not clear from the district court's award that it took into account forgoing considerations in reducing the fees originally requested. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Irvine Unified School District v. K.G." on Justia Law

The court filed an amended opinion reversing in part and affirming in part the denial of habeas relief, and order denying a petition for rehearing en banc. Petitioner, convicted of two counts of murder and sentenced to death, appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition. The court concluded that the relevant state court decision, relating to petitioner's claims regarding (1) the use of a leg brace as a security measure during trial; (2) the use of dual juries; (3) juror bias; (4) counsel's performance during the plea process; and (5) counsel's performance during the penalty phase, was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts before that court. The court concluded, however, that the Arizona Supreme Court applied a "causal nexus” test, whereby not all mitigating evidence was considered under Lockett v. Ohio, Eddings v. Oklahoma, and their progeny. Consequently, this decision was contrary to established federal law and the court reversed, remanding with instructions to grant the petition with respect to petitioner's sentence. View "Hedlund v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging claims arising out of injuries he sustained while he was housed in the county jail. On appeal, the county and Conmed, a private contractor, challenged the district court's denial of their motion to dismiss the complaint as time-barred. Plaintiff argued that the applicable statute of limitations was tolled under RCW 4.96.020. The court held that RCW 4.96.020 is a special statute of limitations as opposed to a typical tolling provision, and thus it is not applicable to claims filed under section 1983. Therefore, the court found that plaintiff filed his federal complaint after the applicable three-year statute of limitations had expired, and that his section 1983 claims were thus time-barred. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order and remanded with instructions to dismiss the section 1983 claims. View "Boston v. Kitsap County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a 53-year-old garbage truck driver, filed suit against USA Waste, his employer of 32 years, alleging wrongful termination based on age discrimination and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment for USA Waste. The court held that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of USA Waste because plaintiff established a prima facie case under both his age discrimination and retaliation theories, and USA Waste failed to introduce any evidence that it had a legitimate reason for firing him. In this case, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub.L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, did not require proof of employment eligibility from plaintiff, and USA Waste could not make plaintiff's reinstatement contingent on verification of his immigration status because doing so would violate California public policy. Furthermore, plaintiff's use of an attorney was activity protected by California public policy, USA Waste fired plaintiff because he was represented by his attorney at the Settlement Agreement negotiations, and the district court erred by holding that USA Waste provided a legitimate reason for firing plaintiff. Therefore, the court concluded that USA Waste failed to meet its burden as to plaintiff's claim based on retaliation discrimination. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied plaintiff's oral request for leave to amend the complaint eight months after the filing deadline. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Santillan v. USA Waste of California" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, parents of a student at the District, filed suit alleging claims that the District violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. Plaintiffs argued that the district court misapplied the statute of limitations in 20 U.S.C. 1415(f)(3)(C) to their claims that the District failed to identify their child's disability or assess him for autism in 2006 and 2007. The court concluded, as a question of first impression, that the IDEA's statute of limitations requires courts to bar only claims brought more than two years after the parents or local educational agency "knew or should have known" about the actions forming the basis of the complaint. In this case, the district court barred all claims "occurring" more than two years before plaintiffs filed their due process complaint. Therefore, the court remanded so that the district court could determine when plaintiffs knew or should have known about the actions forming the basis of their complaint. View "Avila v. Spokane School District 81" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a tattoo artist and long-time resident of Long Beach, filed suit against the City, alleging that the City's zoning ordinances violated the First Amendment by unreasonably restricting his ability to open and operate a tattoo shop in Long Beach. The district court entered judgment for the City. The court concluded that the district court inaccurately narrowed plaintiff's claims in its order by framing plaintiff's challenge as only to the conditional use permit (CUP) requirement, when plaintiff also challenged the location restrictions on tattoo shops; ignoring plaintiff's claim that the CUP process vests unbridled discretion in the City; and stating that plaintiff's claim only concerned his desire to open a shop at 316 Elm Street in the East Village Arts District, when this was just one of three locations that plaintiff initially identified in his letter to the City. The court held that plaintiff has standing to bring a facial first amendment challenge to the City's zoning ordinances where he was not required to first apply for, and then be denied, a CUP to bring this claim under a permitting system that allegedly gives City officials unfettered discretion over protected activity; plaintiff has standing to bring an as-applied First Amendment challenge to the City's zoning ordinances where it appeared likely that the City would take action against plaintiff if he opened a tattoo shop without a CUP; plaintiff raised a cognizable claim that the City's zoning ordinances constituted an unlawful prior restraint on speech; and plaintiff raised a cognizable claim that the City's ordinances constituted unlawful time, place, or manner restrictions on speech. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Real v. City of Long Beach" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of ten different state criminal charges, appealed the district court's interlocutory orders requiring an Arizona state corrections official to reimburse petitioner for deposition expenses incurred in his pending habeas proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Determining that it had interlocutory jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine, the court concluded that the district court could not order a state to reimburse an indigent habeas petitioner for deposition expenses in a section 2254 habeas proceeding when, as here, the state did not request the deposition. Accordingly, the court reversed the relevant orders and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether petitioner could obtain reimbursement under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA), 18 U.S.C. 3006A, from the federal government. View "Copeland v. Ryan" on Justia Law