Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a former inmate on Rikers Island, filed suit against several correction officers and prison officials, as well as the City, claiming that the officers used excessive force against him and then fabricated evidence, leading to his prosecution and prolonged detention. The court concluded that the district court erred by dismissing plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim on summary judgment where, as here, actual malice can be inferred when a plaintiff is prosecuted without probable cause. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim and remanded for further proceedings. The court concluded that the district court erred in excluding the officers' reports from evidence where plaintiff offered the reports into evidence to show that defendants submitted false reports in an effort to justify their use of force and deny plaintiff a fair trial; the reports were not cumulative; and the district court's error was not harmless. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment as to the fair trial, excessive force, and failure to intercede claims, remanding for a new trial. The court need not consider plaintiff's remaining arguments, but provided guidance to the district court with regards to further trial proceedings. In regard to Captain Ruffin's cross-appeal, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the Rule 50 motion on his claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. View "Rentas v. Ruffin" on Justia Law

AFDI, a pro‐Israel advocacy organization known for its criticism of Islam, submitted an advertisement for display on the back of MTA buses. The MTA, invoking the provision in its advertising standards barring the display of any advertisement reasonably likely to incite violence, refused to display the Ad. AFDI filed suit against MTA, claiming that the application of the incitement prohibition to the Ad violated the First Amendment, and moved for a preliminary injunction. In this appeal, AFDI appealed from the district court's order dissolving the preliminary injunction on the ground that the claim underlying the injunction became moot. The MTA’s Board of Directors had voted to amend the MTA’s advertising standards, announcing an intention to convert the MTA’s property from a designated public forum to a limited public forum and, to accomplish that goal, included a prohibition on any advertisement that is “political in nature.” The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding AFDI’s claim moot and dissolving the preliminary injunction because the MTA has altered its conduct in a manner sufficient to present a fundamentally different controversy. Further, the MTA has carried its “heavy burden of persuasion” with respect to the two prongs of the voluntary cessation doctrine. Finally, the court rejected AFDI’s alternative argument that its claim is not moot because it has a “vested right” to display the Ad. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "American Freedom v. Metropolitan Transport" on Justia Law

This case stems from a feud over local governance matters. The threshold issue is whether the court has appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s order passing on the merits of defendants’ special motions to strike under Vermont’s anti‐SLAPP statute, 12 V.S.A. 1041. The court concluded that interlocutory appeals of such orders do not fall within the collateral order doctrine, and accordingly dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Ernst v. Carrigan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under federal and state laws, alleging that Defendant Hardwick, the former mayor of the Village of Freeport, had not appointed him chief of police because plaintiff was a white Italian‐American, and that Hardwick had instead appointed a less‐qualified Hispanic. The court rejected defendants’ argument that an employer who promotes a white Hispanic candidate over a white non‐Hispanic candidate cannot have engaged in racial discrimination. Based on longstanding Supreme Court and Second Circuit precedent, the court reiterated that “race” includes ethnicity for purposes of 42 U.S.C. 1981, so that discrimination based on Hispanic ancestry or lack thereof constitutes racial discrimination under that statute. The court also held that “race” should be defined the same way for purposes of Title VII. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment insofar as it denied defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50. The court held, however, that the district court erred in permitting lay opinion testimony that speculated as to Hardwick’s reasons for not appointing plaintiff. Such error was not harmless because this case was factually close. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded as to this issue. View "Village of Freeport v. Barrella" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former inmate of DOCCS, filed suit against New York State officials and employees for violating and conspiring to violate his right to due process in connection with the rescission of his grant of parole. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants and dismissal of his complaint. The court concluded that genuine issues of material fact remain with respect to the personal involvement of certain defendants in rescinding plaintiff's parole. Accordingly, the court vacated the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Victory v. Pataki" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a police officer and a member and officer of the police union, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendant, a police chief, violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for various episodes of speech critical of defendant's performance as chief. The court concluded that the district court did not correctly apply the law for determining whether a state actor is entitled by reason of qualified immunity to dismissal of a suit charging her under section 1983 with unconstitutional conduct. In this case, defendant was entitled to have the court construe disputed facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff and dismiss the claim if, at the time of defendant’s conduct, the law was unclear whether the facts, so construed, constituted a violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Therefore, the court concluded that defendant established her entitlement to summary judgment on plaintiff's 1983 claims by reason of her qualified immunity. The court reversed and remanded. View "Lynch v. Ackley" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit for constitutional violations against her mother, two New York law guardians, a New York ACS employee, and a Pennsylvania caseworker after ACS removed plaintiff's children from her custody and placed them with her mother. The district court dismissed the suit sua sponte. The court affirmed because the claims against the ACS employee and the caseworker are barred by the statute of limitations and because plaintiff's mother and the law guardians are not state actors for the purposes of 42 U.S.C.1983. View "Milan v. Wertheimer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint against the Village and the Village Fire Marshal on plaintiff's retaliation and abuse-of-process claim. The court (1) affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim, as the criminal summonses on which it is premised were supported by probable cause, the issuance of the non‐criminal Fire Prevention Violation Order on which it is premised was otherwise justified, and plaintiff has not made any argument that the issuance of the Fire Prevention Violation Order was significantly more serious than other action the Marshal had discretion to take; (2) affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's abuse‐of‐process claim on qualified‐immunity grounds because, at the time of the alleged conduct, although there was a clearly established right to be free from abuse of process under New York law, there was no clearly established right to be free from abuse of process where probable cause existed; and (3) affirmed the denial of plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial because it is clear that, when read in context, the district court’s jury instructions were not erroneous. View "Mangino v. Inc. Vill. of Patchogue" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, members of an electrical union, appealed the dismissal of their claims against their union. Plaintiff alleged age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C.621 et seq., violations of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. 411 et seq., the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. 141 et seq., and the union’s duty of fair representation (DFR), as well as unlawful retaliation for complaints. The court concluded that the district court erroneously ruled that a union official’s expressions of resentment of plaintiffs’ claims of age discrimination could not evince retaliatory animus existing prior to the time the resentful statements were made. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded with respect to the ADEA claims to which the magistrate judge’s recommendation of dismissal was based solely on the fact that the referral occurred prior to the February 2009 union meeting. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Kazolias v. IBEW" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed for divorce against his wife and sought custody of their two children. During the divorce proceedings, plaintiff filed suit against justices of the Matrimonial Parts of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 challenging the constitutionality of the New York laws that authorize State judges to order parents to pay for attorneys appointed for their children. In this appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint based on the Younger v. Harris abstention doctrine. The court affirmed the decision of the district court in light of Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs. The court concluded that the circumstances of this case clearly fall within Sprint’s third category: pending State civil proceedings involving orders “uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.” View "Falco v. Justices of the Matrimonial Parts of the Sup. Ct. of Suffolk Cnty." on Justia Law