Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A high school senior in New York posted a photo on social media after school hours and off school grounds, depicting a friend kneeling on his neck with the caption “Cops got another.” The image resembled the murder of George Floyd, and although the student claimed he did not intend this resemblance, he removed the post within minutes after receiving negative reactions. However, another student took a screenshot and shared it more widely, leading to public outcry, in-school discussions, a student demonstration, and a school investigation. The school superintendent suspended the student and barred him from extracurricular activities for the rest of the school year.The student initially filed suit in New York State Supreme Court, alleging that the school’s disciplinary actions violated his First Amendment rights. After the state court granted limited injunctive relief allowing him to attend graduation, the defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Following discovery, the district court granted summary judgment for the school district, finding that the student’s off-campus speech caused substantial disruption in school and thus was not protected by the First Amendment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. Applying the standards from Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District and Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L., the Second Circuit held that the school’s disciplinary actions violated the student’s First Amendment rights. The court found that the off-campus nature of the speech, its lack of threatening content, and the school’s interests did not justify the punishment imposed. The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Leroy v. Livingston Manor Central School District" on Justia Law

Three U.S. citizens each sponsored a close family member for an immigrant visa to the United States. After their petitions were approved by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, the family members applied for visas at the U.S. Consulate General in Guangzhou, China. Following interviews, the consular officers denied the visa applications, citing fraud or misrepresentation as the basis for inadmissibility. The U.S. citizen sponsors challenged these denials in federal court, alleging that the decisions were not facially legitimate or bona fide, were issued in bad faith, and that the notices were untimely.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the claims. It found that one plaintiff’s claim was brought in an improper venue and dismissed it without prejudice. The remaining claims were dismissed with prejudice under the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, which generally bars judicial review of consular visa decisions. The district court concluded that, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Department of State v. Muñoz, U.S. citizens do not have a constitutional right to reunite with parents or siblings through visa sponsorship, and thus no constitutional right was burdened by the denials. The court also found the allegations of bad faith insufficient and rejected the timeliness argument as a repackaged merits challenge.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Second Circuit held that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability precludes judicial review of the visa denials because the plaintiffs did not have a constitutional right implicated by the denials. The court also agreed that the plaintiffs’ alternative arguments lacked merit and that the consular officers’ decisions were insulated from judicial review. View "Chen v. Rubio" on Justia Law

The case concerns a former CEO of a brand-management company who was prosecuted for allegedly orchestrating a scheme to inflate company revenues through secret “overpayments-for-givebacks” deals with a business partner. The government alleged that the CEO arranged for the partner to pay inflated prices for joint ventures, with a secret understanding that the excess would be returned later, thereby allowing the company to report higher revenues to investors. The CEO was also accused of making false filings with the SEC and improperly influencing audits. The central factual dispute was whether the CEO actually made these undisclosed agreements.In 2021, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held a jury trial. The jury acquitted the CEO of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, make false SEC filings, and interfere with audits, but could not reach a verdict on the substantive charges, resulting in a mistrial on those counts. The government retried the CEO in 2022 on the substantive counts, and the second jury convicted him on all charges. The CEO moved to bar the retrial, arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded it because the first jury’s acquittal necessarily decided factual issues essential to the government’s case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the first jury’s acquittal on the conspiracy charge necessarily decided that the CEO did not make the alleged secret agreements, which was a factual issue essential to the substantive charges. Because the government’s case at the second trial depended on proving those same secret agreements, the Double Jeopardy Clause’s issue-preclusion doctrine barred the retrial. The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment, vacated the CEO’s convictions, and ordered dismissal of the indictment. View "United States v. Cole" on Justia Law

Several individuals and a firearms association challenged provisions of New York’s Concealed Carry Improvement Act (CCIA) that require ammunition sellers to conduct background checks on purchasers, pay a $2.50 fee per check, and register with the Superintendent of the New York State Police. The plaintiffs alleged that these requirements deterred them from purchasing or selling ammunition, and that one plaintiff was unable to complete a purchase due to a system failure. They also claimed that dealers were passing the background check fee onto purchasers, and that the registration requirement deterred private sales.The United States District Court for the Western District of New York found that the association lacked standing but that the individual plaintiffs did have standing to challenge the provisions. The district court denied a preliminary injunction, concluding that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their Second Amendment claims because the state had shown that the provisions were consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation, as required by the framework set out in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed that the individual plaintiffs had standing. However, the Second Circuit affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction on different grounds. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to show that the background check, fee, and registration provisions meaningfully constrained their ability to “keep” or “bear” arms under the first step of the Bruen framework. Because the plaintiffs did not meet this threshold, the court did not address the historical analysis. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "N.Y. State Firearms Ass'n v. James" on Justia Law

A transgender inmate serving a lengthy sentence in the Connecticut prison system was diagnosed with gender dysphoria after several years of incarceration. The inmate requested various treatments, including stronger hormone therapy and a vaginoplasty, but was initially denied hormone therapy due to a prison policy that only allowed continuation, not initiation, of such treatment. After a policy change, the inmate received hormone therapy, mental health counseling, antidepressants, and some lifestyle accommodations. Despite these measures, the inmate continued to request additional treatments, including surgery, and expressed dissatisfaction with the care provided, alleging it was inadequate and not delivered by specialists in gender dysphoria.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut reviewed the inmate’s claims of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs under the Eighth Amendment. The district court found that the corrections officials had deprived the inmate of adequate care by providing mental health treatment from unqualified providers, delaying and inadequately administering hormone therapy, and denying surgical intervention. The court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, holding that the right to be free from deliberate indifference to serious medical needs was clearly established.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s decision. The Second Circuit held that there is no clearly established constitutional right for inmates to receive specific treatments for gender dysphoria or to be treated by gender-dysphoria specialists. The court found that reasonable officials could disagree about the adequacy and legality of the care provided, which included talk therapy, antidepressants, and hormone therapy. The Second Circuit concluded that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and remanded the case with instructions to grant summary judgment in their favor. View "Clark v. Valletta" on Justia Law

Two individuals who hold valid New York State concealed carry licenses challenged several aspects of New York’s firearm regulations after the state enacted the Concealed Carry Improvement Act (CCIA) in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen. The plaintiffs objected to three main provisions: the prohibition on carrying firearms in designated “sensitive locations” (specifically Times Square, the New York City subway, and the Metro-North rail system), the statewide ban on open carry of firearms, and the requirement that state concealed carry license holders obtain a separate, city-specific permit to carry a firearm in New York City. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of these provisions, arguing they violated the Second Amendment.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied the motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found that the government had demonstrated a historical tradition of regulating firearms in crowded public places, supporting the sensitive locations restrictions. It also concluded that the open carry ban was consistent with historical regulations that allowed states to prohibit one form of public carry (open or concealed) as long as the other remained available. Regarding the city-specific permit, the court determined that localities have historically imposed their own firearm regulations. The court also found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the open carry ban, but otherwise rejected their constitutional claims on the merits.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their Second Amendment claims. The court concluded that each challenged provision—sensitive location restrictions, the open carry ban, and the city-specific permit requirement—fell within the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation and did not violate the Second Amendment. The denial of the preliminary injunction was therefore affirmed. View "Frey v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Several individuals and a firearms instruction company challenged various aspects of New York’s Concealed Carry Improvement Act (CCIA) and the way the Suffolk County Police Department (SCPD) implements the law. The individual plaintiffs, all Suffolk County residents, objected to requirements for obtaining a handgun license, including a “good moral character” standard, an in-person interview, disclosure of household members and character references, a list of social media accounts, and completion of eighteen hours of firearms training. They also alleged that the SCPD’s process for scheduling interviews and issuing licenses could take years, far exceeding statutory timelines. Additionally, the plaintiffs, including firearms instructors, challenged an alleged SCPD policy of arresting unlicensed individuals participating in live-fire training, despite a state law exemption for such training.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found that the individual applicants lacked standing to challenge the CCIA’s requirements because they had not completed the application process, and that none of the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the SCPD’s arrest policy due to a lack of credible threat of enforcement. The district court did not address the challenge to the SCPD’s processing delays.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the applicants did have standing to challenge the CCIA’s requirements and the SCPD’s processing delays, but affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction because the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their facial Second Amendment challenges, except for the social media disclosure requirement, which was already preliminarily enjoined in another case, rendering that issue moot. The court also found that at least one plaintiff had standing to challenge the SCPD’s arrest policy and vacated the district court’s ruling on that issue, remanding for further proceedings. The disposition was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Giambalvo v. Suffolk Cnty." on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was convicted by a jury in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York of transporting, receiving, and possessing child pornography, all in violation of federal law. The defendant’s conduct involved the use of the Kik messaging application, which uses software to detect and report child sexual abuse material (CSAM) to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC). Kik’s detection process relies on a database of known CSAM hash values provided by NCMEC. When Kik’s software identifies a match, a designated employee reviews the file and, if confirmed as CSAM, reports it to NCMEC, which then forwards the information to law enforcement. The defendant was linked to the offending accounts through IP address records and admitted during a post-arrest interview to using the relevant Kik accounts and sharing child pornography.After his arrest, the defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained from Kik’s searches and his own statements to law enforcement, arguing that Kik acted as an agent of NCMEC, which he claimed was a governmental entity for Fourth Amendment purposes. The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York denied the motion, finding that while NCMEC might be a governmental entity, Kik was not acting as its agent. The court also found that the defendant had validly waived his Miranda rights and that his statements were not coerced. The jury acquitted the defendant on some counts but convicted him on others. The court sentenced him to 151 months in prison and 15 years of supervised release.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that NCMEC is a governmental entity for Fourth Amendment purposes, but the defendant failed to show that Kik acted as a governmental agent when it searched his accounts. The court affirmed the denial of the suppression motion, found the evidence sufficient to support the convictions, and upheld the sentence as substantively reasonable. However, the court vacated and remanded in part, instructing the district court to amend the written judgment to conform with its oral pronouncement regarding certain conditions of supervised release. View "United States v. Guard" on Justia Law

A private Christian school in Vermont forfeited a girls’ basketball playoff game because it objected, on religious grounds, to playing against a team with a transgender athlete. The school believes that requiring its female athletes to compete against biological males would violate its religious convictions about the immutability of sex. Following the forfeit, the Vermont Principals’ Association (VPA), which oversees extracurricular activities for Vermont schools, expelled the school from all state-sponsored extracurricular activities, including both athletic and non-athletic events.After the expulsion, the school and several students and parents filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, seeking a preliminary injunction to reinstate the school’s VPA membership and alleging a violation of their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The district court denied the motion, finding that the VPA’s policies regarding transgender athletes were neutral and generally applicable, and thus subject only to rational-basis review. The court concluded that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. The Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs are likely to succeed in showing that the VPA’s expulsion was not neutral, as it was accompanied by official expressions of hostility toward the school’s religious beliefs. The court found that the plaintiffs also satisfied the requirements of irreparable harm and public interest. Accordingly, the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case with instructions to grant a preliminary injunction reinstating the school’s VPA membership pending further proceedings. View "Mid Vermont Christian School v. Saunders" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization sought to provide free legal advice to low-income New Yorkers facing debt-collection lawsuits by training nonlawyer “Justice Advocates” to help individuals complete a state-issued check-the-box answer form. The organization and a prospective Justice Advocate argued that many defendants in such cases default due to lack of understanding, leading to severe consequences. However, New York law prohibits nonlawyers from providing individualized legal advice, and all parties agreed that the proposed activities would violate the state’s unauthorized practice of law (UPL) statutes.The plaintiffs filed a pre-enforcement challenge in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, claiming that applying the UPL statutes to their activities would violate their First Amendment rights. The district court found that the plaintiffs had standing and were likely to succeed on the merits, holding that the UPL statutes, as applied, were a content-based regulation of speech that could not survive strict scrutiny. The court granted a preliminary injunction, barring the Attorney General from enforcing the UPL statutes against the plaintiffs and participants in their program.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed that the UPL statutes, as applied, regulate speech. However, the Second Circuit held that the regulation is content neutral, not content based, and therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny. Because the district court applied the wrong standard, the Second Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings under the correct legal standard. The court did not reach a final decision on whether the statutes, as applied, ultimately violate the First Amendment, leaving that determination for the district court on remand. View "Upsolve, Inc. v. James" on Justia Law