Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
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Plaintiff filed suit against NYCHA, alleging that its decision not to hire her as a bricklayer was sex-based and thus violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.; the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL); and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL). The district court granted summary judgment to NYCHA as to the Title VII and NYSHRL claims. The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the NYCHRL claim and dismissed it without prejudice. The court concluded that the district court erred when it failed to view plaintiff’s evidence as a whole and instead set aside each piece of evidence after deeming it insufficient to create a triable issue of fact that NYCHA’s refusal to hire her was based in part on the fact that she is female. In this case, plaintiff has proffered evidence that - when viewed as a whole - is sufficient to permit a rational finder of fact to infer that NYCHA’s decision not to hire her was more likely than not motivated in part by sex-based discrimination. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Walsh v. NYCHA" on Justia Law

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Laroe, a real estate development company, appealed the denial of its motion to intervene under FRCP 24 in pending litigation in which a now-deceased land developer filed suit against the Town of Chester, alleging a regulatory taking. The court vacated and remanded because the court does not require proposed intervenors in this circumstance to show that they independently have standing. Because neither a proposed intervenor’s lack of Article III standing nor its failure to state an independent claim necessarily renders a motion to intervene futile, the district court should have instead focused its analysis on the requirements of Rule 24. Because the factual record before the court is insufficiently developed at this stage to allow the court to resolve the issues, the court vacated and remanded for the district court to determine in the first instance whether Laroe satisfies the requirements of Rule 24. View "Laroe Estates, Inc. v. Town of Chester" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed suit against the Town alleging claims under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq. Plaintiff obtained limited variances from a land-use regulation prohibiting accessory structures on the lot of their newly purchased home, allowing plaintiffs to install a fence, pool, and deck designed to accommodate their son's disability. The Town Board’s resolutions allowing the variances required removal of the structures when, inter alia, the disabled child’s residency in the house terminated (Restoration Provision). The district court dismissed the complaint under FRCP 12(b)(6). The district court determined that it did not need to reach the issue of whether the Restoration Provisions were reasonable under the FHA because plaintiffs’ complaint did not allege facts sufficient to show either an intent to discriminate or to constitute disparate impact discrimination. The court concluded, however, that the reasonableness of the Town’s accommodations is in issue. The reasonableness issue here cannot be determined on the pleadings because the relevant factors are numerous and balancing them requires a full evidentiary record. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's dismissal as to this issue. The court affirmed as to the dismissal of plaintiffs' retaliation claim where the Restoration Provisions on their face simply restore the requirements applicable to all such properties in the area once the needs of plaintiff's disabled child are not an issue. View "Austin v. Town of Farmington" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit asserting claims for violation of his First Amendment rights under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, and for false imprisonment and negligence under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671–2680. Plaintiff alleged that he was placed in solitary confinement in retaliation for publishing an on-line article. The court concluded that, in light of the different interests at stake, the court's case law establishing a prisoner’s right to file a lawsuit or grievance does not clearly establish a prisoner’s right to publish an article under a byline. Therefore, the court held that Defendant Rivers, a BOP employee, is entitled to qualified immunity from the Bivens claim and did not reach the question of whether Rivers violated plaintiff's First Amendment rights. The court also concluded that the district court correctly dismissed plaintiff’s negligence claim on the ground that it lacks a private analogue. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "McGowan v. United States" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law for false arrest, excessive force, assault, failure to intervene, and unlawful entry. The district court granted summary judgment as to the claims of unlawful entry and the other claims were tried to a jury. After a verdict in favor of plaintiff on the remaining counts, the district court granted judgment for defendants under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 50(b). The court agreed with the district court's disposition of plaintiff’s false arrest claims. Because the trial record establishes that a reasonable law enforcement officer could have concluded that there existed probable cause to arrest plaintiff, defendants can claim the protection of qualified immunity. The court concluded that the force used in effecting plaintiff’s arrest was reasonable as a matter of law, and found no error in the district court’s dismissal of unnamed defendants or discovery rulings. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment insofar as it disposed of plaintiff’s claims for false arrest, excessive force, and assault, dismissed unnamed defendants, and refused to permit further discovery. However, the district court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that defendants had no realistic opportunity to intervene in an alleged assault on plaintiff by an unidentified police officer and that plaintiff lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in his mother’s apartment. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment in regard to the failure-to-intervene and unlawful-entry claims and remanded for further proceedings. View "Figueroa v. Mazza et al." on Justia Law

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The Nation filed suit against defendants contending that the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2701‐2721, preempts the application of a local anti‐gambling ordinance to a Nation‐owned gaming facility located on land owned by the tribe (the Lakeside facility). The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and, following a motion for reconsideration, concluded that the individual plaintiffs lacked standing. The court concluded that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction, as it was not required to resolve questions of tribal law to hear the lawsuit. The court held that it was entitled to defer to the BIA's recognition of an individual as authorized to act on behalf of the Nation, notwithstanding the limited issue that occasioned that recognition. The court also concluded that the individual plaintiffs have standing to sue because they will suffer an injury distinct from any felt by the Nation. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cayuga Nation v. Tanner" on Justia Law

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After the SEC commenced an administrative proceeding conducted by an ALJ against appellants, appellants contend that the SEC's administrative proceeding is unconstitutional because the presiding ALJ's appointment violated Article II's Appointments Clause. Appellants filed suit in district court asserting their Appointments Clause claim and seeking an injunction against the ALJ's adjudication based on its alleged unconstitutionality. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that appellants' Appointments Clause challenge fell within the exclusive scope of the SEC's administrative review scheme and could reach a federal court only on petition for review of a final decision by the Commission. The court agreed and concluded that, by enacting the SEC's comprehensive scheme of administrative and judicial review, Congress implicitly precluded federal district court jurisdiction over appellants' constitutional challenge. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Tilton v. SEC" on Justia Law

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Defendants appealed the district court's denial of their motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, or alternatively for a new trial under Rule 59, or relief from the judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) on plaintiff's New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) claim. Plaintiff, diagnosed with cancer, cross-appealed the dismissal of her New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) claim. Plaintiff and her husband cross-appealed the dismissal of their Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA), 29 U.S.C. 116(a), claims. The court held that, because plaintiff did not request a reasonable accommodation prior to her termination, the district court erred in denying defendants’ Rule 50 motion. Therefore, the court reversed that decision and vacated the jury award on the NYSHRL claim. However, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's NYCHRL claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denial of the COBRA claims on the merits. View "Vangas v. Montefiore Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

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Defendant, the former New York State Governor, launched the Sexually Violent Predator Initiative, which provided for the involuntary civil commitment at state psychiatric facilities of some ʺsexually violent predatorsʺ (SVPs) nearing the date of their release from incarceration or supervision. Plaintiffs, six individuals who were civilly committed to a psychiatric hospital, filed suit asserting claims under the Fourth Amendment, the substantive and procedural components of the Fourteenth Amendmentʹs Due Process Clause, the Fourteenth Amendmentʹs Equal Protection Clause, and several provisions of New York state law. The district court concluded that defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law, which the court affirmed on interlocutory appeal. Many of the claims were thereafter dismissed by the district court on judgments as a matter of law, while the remainder were tried to a jury. The jury found one defendant liable for procedural due‐process violations, and awarded each plaintiff one dollar in nominal damages against that defendant. On appeal, plaintiffs Warren and Brooks challenged the district courtʹs (1) jury instruction on personal involvement; (2) denial of judgment as a matter of law on procedural due‐process liability; (3) denial of judgment as a matter of law on plaintiffsʹ entitlement to actual, compensatory damages; (4) entry of judgment for the defendants on the plaintiffsʹ false‐imprisonment claims on the grounds that these claims were duplicative; and (5) limitations on depositions, and several other evidentiary decisions. The court concluded that plaintiffs' arguments lack merit and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Warren v. Pataki" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, two individual psychiatrists and three professional associations of psychiatrists, filed suit against defendants, four health‐insurance companies, alleging that the health insurers’ reimbursement practices discriminate against patients with mental health and substance use disorders in violation of the Mental Health Parity and Addition Equity Act of 2008 (MHPAEA), 29 U.S.C. 1185(a), and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001-1461. The court concluded that, because the psychiatrists are not among those expressly authorized to sue, they lack a cause of action under ERISA. The court also concluded that the association plaintiffs lack constitutional standing to pursue their respective ERISA and MHPAEA claims because their members lack standing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Am. Psychiatric Ass’n v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc." on Justia Law