Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2005, Jennifer’s mother found her 19-year-old daughter dead. Investigators found a chewed 100-microgram Duragesic fentanyl skin patch. The patch is a powerful opioid, not meant to be ingested. Jennifer did not have a prescription. Her friend, Krieger, had such a prescription for pain from severe spinal problems, and had given Jennifer a patch. Investigators also found a hypodermic needle, a small pipe with burnt residue on it, and two red capsules. Neither the capsules nor the pipe were taken into evidence and tested. The syringe was finally tested three years later. A medical examiner found many drugs in Jennifer's system, but concluded that she died from fentanyl toxicity. Krieger was charged with distribution of fentanyl with death resulting, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); 841(b)(1)(c). After its medical witness fled the country, with legal problems of his own, the government dropped the “death resulting” charge, which it would have had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Krieger pleaded guilty to distribution. The prosecution then proposed that “death resulting” be considered as a sentencing factor. The district court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that death had resulted from the distribution, and that it could only give a 20-year sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court later issued its decisions in “Alleyne” decision and Burrage v. United States, Krieger filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Seventh Circuit vacated her sentence. The district court can consider Jennifer’s death, using a preponderance of the evidence standard, as recommended under USSG 2D1.1; implementation of the mandatory minimum sentence, however, would require that a jury find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the patch provided by Krieger was the but-for cause of Curry’s death. The time for such a determination has passed. View "Krieger v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1999, three masked men broke into a Chicago apartment shared by Stone, his cousins, and Grant. Grant and one cousin were home. One intruder beat Grant with a bat. The intruders stole jewelry, marijuana, and cash before fleeing. Stone arrived home, called his half-brother, “Junior,” and explained what happened. Junior, Stone, and Jones decided that Gardner was to blame. They lured Gardner outside; an altercation ensued. They claim Gardner produced a gun. Gardner was fatally shot. Stone turned himself in the next day, claiming that he shot to protect Junior. Stone was convicted of murder. Jones was separately convicted. In his habeas petition, Jones alleged that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective under the Strickland rule for failure to present Stone’s testimony. Stone had consistently stated that he alone shot Gardner. Stone’s story matched the physical evidence and some eyewitness testimony. Jones failed to submit an affidavit from Stone, as Illinois law requires. The state appellate court found the claim procedurally defaulted and rejected the claim on the merits, holding that failure to call Stone was “trial strategy.” The federal district court excused the procedural default based on new evidence of Jones’s actual innocence (Stone’s testimony) and concluded that the state court unreasonably applied Strickland. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the grant of relief. Failure to call Stone cannot reasonably be classified as mere trial strategy within the range of objectively reasonable professional judgments. View "Jones v. Calloway" on Justia Law

Morrison and Novak (defendants) sold “herbal incense” from their retail store, JC Moon, in Ashland, Wisconsin. The substances included XLR-11, UR-144, PB- 22, and 5F-PB-22, which then were not listed on the controlled substance schedules but were similar to scheduled controlled substances. Undercover law enforcement officers made 28 controlled purchases at JC Moon and learned that defendants hid a significant portion of their cash income from the IRS by “skimming” large bills from the cash registers. From 2010 to 2012, defendants under-reported JC Moon’s business income by $575,752 for a tax loss of $186,095. Defendants pleaded guilty to violation of the Controlled Substances Analogue Act, 21 U.S.C. 813 and tax fraud, Novak was sentenced to 96 months and Morrison to 48 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting a Supreme Court holding that holding that the Analogue Act is not unconstitutionally vague due to its scienter requirement and rejecting challenges to the court’s acceptance of their pleas and to the sentences. The totality of the circumstances surrounding Novak’s and Morrison’s guilty pleas indicated that they entered into those pleas voluntarily and with sufficient understanding of the charges against them; there was sufficient factual basis for the pleas. View "United States v. Novak" on Justia Law

In 2012, the City of Country Club Hills City Council adopted an ordinance that provided to homeowners a 25 percent rebate of 2010 city property taxes paid in 2011, subject to the completion of an application by the homeowner and approval by the City Clerk. This was the city’s twelfth consecutive year of offering a rebate program. The application stated that the “FILING OF THIS APPLICATION DOES NOT GUARANTEE APPROVAL BY THE CITY OF COUNTRY CLUB HILLS.” The city prepared the rebate checks but never distributed them. In 2012, the Cook County treasurer overpaid the city by more than $6 million. The county successfully sued to collect the overpayment. Bell filed a purported class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that refusal to issue the rebates amounted to an unconstitutional taking and asserting state law claims for conversion and unjust enrichment. The City Council then repealed the 2012 ordinance. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, agreeing that Bell had no constitutionally protected property interest in the expectation of a rebate, and that she had adequate state court remedies for her claims under state law. View "Bell v. City of Country Club Hills" on Justia Law

Midwest Fence, which provides guardrails, challenged federal and state programs that offer advantages in highway construction contracting to disadvantaged business enterprises (DBEs). For purposes of federally-funded highway construction, DBEs are small businesses that are owned and managed by “individuals who are both socially and economically disadvantaged,” 49 C.F.R. 26.5, primarily racial minorities and women, who have historically faced significant obstacles in the construction industry due to discrimination. States that accept federal highway funding must establish DBE participation goals for federally funded highway projects and must attempt to reach those goals through processes tailored to actual market conditions. Midwest, which is not a DBE, alleged that the DBE programs violated its equal protection rights. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the government-defendants. While DBE programs permit contracting decisions to be made with reference to racial classifications and are subject to strict scrutiny, they serve a compelling government interest and are narrowly tailored to further that interest. Remedying the effects of past or present discrimination can be a compelling governmental interest. The program provides states with ample discretion to tailor their DBE programs to the realities of their own markets and requires the use of race- and gender-neutral measures before turning to race- and gender-conscious ones. View "Midwest Fence Corp. v. United States Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Since 1935, federal law has regulated the hours of service of truck drivers operating in interstate commerce. Drivers must keep paper records showing their driving time and other on‐duty time. In 2012, Congress directed the Department of Transportation to issue regulations to require most interstate commercial motor vehicles to install electronic logging devices (ELDs) linked to vehicle engines to automatically record data relevant to hours of services: whether the engine is running, the time, and the vehicle’s approximate location. Congress instructed the Department to consider factors including driver privacy and preventing forms of harassment enabled by the ELDs, 49 U.S.C. 31137. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration promulgated the final rule: Electronic Logging Devices and Hours of Service Supporting Documents, 49 C.F.R. Pts. 385, 386, 390, 395 (2015). The Seventh Circuit rejected a challenge by the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association and drivers. The court rejected arguments that the rule permits ELDs that are not entirely automatic; uses a narrow definition of “harassment” that will not sufficiently protect drivers; that the agency’s cost‐benefit analysis was inadequate; that the agency did not sufficiently consider confidentiality protections for drivers; and that the ELD mandate imposed, in effect, an unconstitutional search or seizure on truck drivers. Even if the rule imposes a search or a seizure, inspection of ELD data recorded would fall within the “pervasively regulated industry” exception to the warrant requirement. View "Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, Inc. v. United States Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, was in his fourteenth year at a Wisconsin medium-security prison when he was placed in a cell with DaSilva, who, 12 days later, sexually assaulted plaintiff in their cell. DaSilva was in prison for having sexually assaulted a woman. Both were classified as “medium security” inmates. DaSilva had committed eight violations of the prison’s rules in two years, including fighting, lying, theft, and use of intoxicants—but no sexual offenses. An investigation resulted in a criminal charge being lodged against DaSilva and an official notice that plaintiff and DaSilva were not to share a cell. Plaintiff’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to the danger of sexual assaulted by DaSilva, was dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting plaintiff’s challenge to the practice of random assignment of cellmates. The court noted the prison’s compliance with the notification requirements of the 2003 Prison Rape Elimination Act, 42 U.S.C. 15601–15609, and that there was no evidence that plaintiff expressed any concern about being vulnerable to sexual assault. The staff was apparently unaware that the plaintiff was perceived by other prisoners to be homosexual; nor was there any evidence of such a perception, apart from the plaintiff’s unsupported claim. View "Ramos v. Hamblin" on Justia Law

Viramontes was charged with mob action, aggravated assault, and resisting arrest, arising out of an incident at a Puerto Rican street festival in Chicago. The state court judge held, “I find the Defendant guilty of resisting a police officer and aggravated assault in that he took a substantial step and actively swung in the direction of the police officer and missed,” and that “after the Defendant swung … he did actively resist” and sentenced Viramontes to 100 days’ imprisonment. Viramontes then sued officers involved in the arrest and the city, alleging that the officers used excessive force. A jury returned a verdict for the defendants on Viramontes’s claims. Viramontes unsuccessfully moved for a new trial, arguing attorney misconduct and procedural and evidentiary errors. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Because the 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim involved the incident for which Viramontes was convicted of aggravated assault and resisting arrest, the claim implicated the Supreme Court’s holding in Heck v. Humphrey, that such a claim is barred if it “necessarily impl[ies] the invalidity of his conviction.” While the excessive‐force claim was not inconsistent with Viramontes’s conviction, the court properly instructed the jury that the facts underlying the conviction had to be taken as true. View "Viramontes v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit has held that states must permit law-abiding, mentally healthy persons to carry loaded weapons in public. Illinois’ Concealed Carry Act, 430 ILCS 66/1, authorizes an Illinois resident to carry, on his person or next to him in a car, a firearm that is fully or partially concealed if he meets qualifications set forth in the Act: that the permit applicant not present a clear and present danger or a threat to public safety and not in the last five years have been a patient in a mental hospital, or been convicted of a misdemeanor involving the use or threat of physical force, or been in a residential or court-ordered drug or alcohol treatment program, or have committed two or more DUI violations, or be subject to a legal proceeding that could lead to being disqualified to possess a gun. A non-resident can obtain a permit if he resides in a state or territory that has “laws related to firearm ownership, possession, and carrying, that are substantially similar to the requirements to obtain” an Illinois concealed-carry license, and submits a notarized statement confirming that he is eligible under federal law and the laws of his home state to own a gun and licensed by that state to carry a gun. A person from a state that is not substantially similar, but who has a firearm license from his own state. is allowed to carry a firearm while hunting or at a firing range or on property whose owner permits him to carry a gun, The Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of a preliminary injunction sought by nonresidents, calling the law “imperfect,” but not unreasonable. The court noted that a trial may cast a different light on the law, given the problems inherent in verification of an application. View "Culp v. Madigan" on Justia Law

In 2011, Bloomington Officers, surveilling for loud-music violations, saw Tapley drive by and decided to make a stop. Tapley turned into a parking lot. Officer Stanfield followed. Tapley went into a store, then returned to his truck. Stanfield testified that he heard Tapley’s music emanating from the truck as Tapley was preparing to drive away and that he had difficulty following because Tapley was driving “at a very high rate of speed.” When Tapley saw Stanfield’s unmarked cruiser behind him, he turned his music down. Stanfield stopped Tapley, explaining that the stop was for loud music. They also discussed Tapley’s excessive speed. Other officers arrived and told Tapley to get out of the truck. The parties dispute what happened next. Tapley claims he was threatened with a taser; the officers claim that Tapley refused to exit the truck. The officers arrested Tapley for obstruction of justice and resisting arrest and searched Tapley and the truck. Tapley was acquitted of obstruction charges. After an earlier suit was dismissed, Tapley reasserted a claim of illegal seizure that he had previously voluntarily dismissed. The Seventh Circuit declined to review the earlier case for lack of an adequate record and affirmed the dismissal of the 2015 case, finding probable cause for the arrest. View "Tapley v. Chambers" on Justia Law