Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

After the 2013 robbery of a Milwaukee auto repair shop, one of the participants, Green, called the ATF and became a confidential informant. Green did not initially admit to the auto shop robbery, but provided information about the other participants, Anglin and his brother, and gave authorities information that led to Anglin’s arrest as he was travelling to rob a drug house. A jury convicted Anglin of Hobbs Act robbery, discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (the Hobbs Act robbery) under 18 U.S.C. 924(c), and related offenses. The district court sentenced him to 230 months’ imprisonment, plus three years of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the police arrested Anglin without probable cause, requiring suppression of the evidence. Corroborating evidence concerning Anglin’s criminal history, residence, and vehicle provided probable cause for Anglin’s arrest and the subsequent search of his vehicle, which uncovered the gun and ammunition. The court also rejected an argument that the 924(c) conviction was improper because Hobbs Act robbery is not a qualifying crime of violence. The court vacated and remanded certain conditions of supervised release. View "United States v. Anglin" on Justia Law

Petitioner and his associates sold cocaine base to a police informant, Hurd, and were charged in Indiana state court. The county clerk erroneously included Hurd’s name on a public filing. Weeks later, Hurd waskilled. Petitioner was then indicted on federal drug charges. The court appointed public defender Brattain to represent Petitioner. The Assistant U.S. Attorney orally informed Brattain that the government was willing to recommend a 20-year sentence in exchange for Petitioner’s cooperation with the Hurd murder investigation. Brattain met with Petitioner and discussed the proposal three times; Petitioner repeatedly rejected the plea. Brattain sent Petitioner two letters, describing thes offer, advising Petitioner that it was in his best interest, stating that the evidence made it “almost absolutely certain” that Petitioner would be convicted, and referencing a witness who would corroborate Petitioner's involvement in Hurd’s murder. Petitioner again rejected the offer. After his conviction under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), the district court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Petitioner participated in the murder, and applied Sentencing Guidelines, 2D1.1(d)(1) to sentence Petitioner to life imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Petitioner then sought post‐conviction relief (28 U.S.C. 2255), contending that Brattain provided ineffective assistance by not producing the government’s offer in writing and not advising him adequately. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the petition, finding that counsel’s performance was adequate and that Petitioner could not demonstrate that, absent any deficient performance, he would have accepted the plea offer. View "Mitchell v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2010 the Seventh Circuit invalidated a Chicago ordinance prohibiting possession of handguns. The city then established a regime that required one hour of range training as a prerequisite to obtaining a permit to possess a handgun, but banned shooting ranges throughout the city. In 2011 the Seventh Circuit held that the ban was incompatible with the Second Amendment. The city replaced it with regulations governing shooting ranges. The district judge invalidated a restriction allowing gun ranges only as special uses in manufacturing districts, but upheld a restriction prohibiting gun ranges within 100 feet of another range or within 500 feet of a residential district, school, place of worship, and multiple other uses, and a provision barring anyone under age 18 from entering a shooting range. The Seventh Circuit invalidated all three restrictions, noting that the manufacturing-district classification and the distancing rule together render only 2.2% of the city’s total acreage even theoretically available. No shooting range yet exists, which severely limits Chicagoans’ Second Amendment right to maintain proficiency in firearm use. The court rejected the city’s “speculative claims of harm to public health and safety” as inadequate to survive the heightened scrutiny that applies to burdens on Second Amendment rights. Nor did the city adequately justify the “overbroad” age restriction; its own witness agreed that youth firearm instruction is prudent and can be conducted in a safe manner. View "Ezell v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Featherly lived in a Wisconsin trailer park when law enforcement discovered that Featherly’s Internet‐service account was sharing child pornography. FBI agent Hauser obtained a warrant to search Featherly’s residence, stating that an agent “was able to determine the IP address of this [user’s] computer” and to ascertain that an Internet‐service provider, Charter, had assigned that unique IP address to Featherly’s account. Based on the images found, Featherly was charged with receipt and possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2), 2252(a)(4). Featherly moved for a “Franks” hearing, seeking to quash the warrant and suppress evidence because Hauser had falsely stated in his affidavit that the IP address was traced to Featherly’s computer; an IP address identifies only a modem, not a particular computer. The magistrate concluded that probable cause supported the warrant, but that even if Featherly’s explanation were correct, Wilkins did not perpetrate any knowing or reckless falsehood. The judge agreed that any mistake was irrelevant because Charter's identification of the modem was sufficient to support an inference that pornography would be found on Featherly's computer. Featherly pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 144 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the inaccuracy kept the judge from considering the possibility that someone else in the trailer park connected to Featherly’s modem wirelessly, without his knowledge. Hauser's affidavit specified that he used the term “computer” consistently with 18 U.S.C. 1030(e)(1), which includes a “communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with” a computer. View "United States v. Featherly" on Justia Law

Allin and Baskett lived together in Allin’s residence. Allin, in poor health, signed over the titles to several vehicles, including a 2001 FLSTS Harley Davidson motorcycle, to “make it easier for his survivors.” The Illinois Secretary of State issued a certificate of title in Baskett’s name. Months later, Baskett moved in with her sister, McClure. Allin refused Baskett’s request for financial help. He discovered that the Harley title was missing. He filed a theft report. McClure contacted her co-worker (Sergeant Barr’s wife) about Baskett’s fears about retrieving her belongings. Springfield officers, including Barr, were present when she went to collect her property. Allin and Baskett presented conflicting stories about the motorcycle. A title search showed that the motorcycle had been in Baskett’s name for six months. A computer search did not indicate that it was reported stolen. Barr stated that he would not prevent Baskett from taking the motorcycle. Hours later, with no officers present, Baskett removed the motorcycle. Later, police officers and Baskett met at a motorcycle dealership to have the security system modified so that the motorcycle was operational. Barr bought the motorcycle from Baskett for $7,000, Allin sued the city, Barr, and Baskett, raising 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law claims. The Seventh Circuit held that Barr was entitled to qualified immunity on unreasonable seizure of property and civil conspiracy claims. Barr did not act plainly incompetently nor knowingly violate the law. The parties presented their dispute; Baskett produced a certificate of title, which “provide[s] the public with a readily available means of identifying the owners.” View "Allin v. City of Springfield" on Justia Law

In Presley v. Georgia (2010), the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extends to voir dire. In one of the cases consolidated for appeal, Pinno was convicted of assisting in the mutilation of a corpse and interference with police, having assisted her son in disposing of the body of his girlfriend, whom the son had murdered. The trial judge called for a pool of more than 80 prospective jurors. To assure that enough seats were available for the prospective jurors and to prevent members of the public from influencing the jury by remarks or facial expressions, given the “gruesome and bizarre facts,” the Wisconsin state judge ordered spectators to leave and the door locked until all the prospective jurors were seated. After they were seated the door was unlocked and members of the public were able to enter. The other defendant, Seaton, was convicted of first‐degree reckless homicide. The public was, similarly, temporarily excluded. In neither case did defense counsel object. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of their habeas petitions, noting that the trial judge may have had no option but to exclude the public until all the panel members were seated and that it is possible that the defendants would have been harmed by the presence of the public. View "Seaton v. Smith" on Justia Law

A veterans’ group challenged an anti‑robocall statute, Ind. Code 24‑5‑14‑5, under the First Amendment. The law prohibits automated calls with recorded messages unless the recipient has previously consented or the message is immediately preceded by a live operator who obtains consent. The Seventh Circuit upheld the law, noting that the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, which contains similar restrictions, has been sustained by the Ninth and Eighth Circuits. The court rejected a claim of content-based discrimination. While the law exempts messages from school districts to students, parents, or employees; messages to recipients with whom the caller has a current business or personal relationship; messages advising employees of work schedules, nothing in the law, including those exceptions, disfavors political speech. The exceptions primarily concern who may be called, not what may be said. The court noted the legitimate purposes of the law. View "Patriotic Veterans, Inc. v. State of Indiana" on Justia Law

In 2003, Murdock was convicted of first-degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm. In connection with his post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a suppression hearing was held to determine whether Murdock's statements to the police were voluntary, given that Murdock was 16 years old and was without an attorney or other adult present. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed denial of a motion to suppress. The federal district court denied habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, finding that the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision was not unreasonable. The Seventh Circuit affirmed: the court applied the correct test in a reasonable manner in finding that the totality of the circumstances indicated that Murdock gave his statements voluntarily. The court considered Murdock’s age, and that he did not have an attorney or other adult present, but found that he was able to understand and provide an adequate waiver of his rights. The court considered that Murdock was detained for approximately seven hours, but noted that the interview lasted only three hours and that Murdock was given the opportunity to eat and use the restroom. There was no evidence that the officers threatened him or otherwise created a coercive environment. The court found that Murdock did not appear to be under distress or frightened on a video recording. View "Murdock v. Dorethy" on Justia Law

Hancock, charged with possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and possession of an unregistered firearm, 26 U.S.C. 5841, 5845(a)(2), and 5861(d), unsuccessfully challenged the search warrant that had led to his arrest by requesting a “Franks” hearing. He argued that critical evidence bearing on a confidential informant’s credibility had been omitted from the probable cause affidavit. Hancock also moved to preclude the use of prior convictions as the basis for the section 922(g)(1) count, arguing that the release document issued by the Colorado Department of Corrections lulled him into believing that all of his rights, including the right to possess a weapon, had been restored. The district court, assessing the release document within its four corners, held that the document did not communicate any restoration of rights to Hancock. After his conviction on both counts, the court imposed concurrent sentences of 120 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the affidavit established probable cause, despite the omission of information about the informant’s criminal history, and that the release document did not indicate a restoration of rights. View "United States v. Hancock" on Justia Law

Illinois inmate Jackson filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that, during his transfer between institutions, he was subjected to excessive force, and failure to protect by the refusal of his request to be placed in a prison in which he had no known enemies. He claims that other inmates were able to refuse transfers on that basis, but that officers lifted him over their heads and threw him, head first, into the van. The officers disputed his testimony, stating that he never claimed any injury, nor did he request medical treatment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a verdict in favor of the defendants, rejecting a claim that Jackson was entitled to a new trial because the court refused to grant a continuance when his attorney withdrew on the eve of trial. The court had denied requests for appointed counsel, finding that Jackson had experience litigating and his pleadings demonstrated a grasp of the relevant facts and law, so that he was competent to proceed pro se. In permitting his attorney to withdraw, the court required him to remain as standby counsel. The court also upheld the admission of a seven‐year‐old disciplinary report without a limiting instruction or explanation, and of a 12‐year-old burglary conviction as evidence of Jackson’s truthfulness. View "Jackson v. Willis" on Justia Law