Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Leaver’s car was struck by a driver whose insurer provided Leaver a rental car. Leaver went to Hertz’s Wisconsin office, signed a rental agreement, and drove to Montana. When Leaver failed to return the car by the contract date, Hertz reported it stolen. Weeks later, the car was located in Montana. Six months later, Leaver was charged with theft by lessee. Leaver contacted the prosecutor, identifying Hertz employees from whom he claimed to have permission to act as he did. The rental agreement contained three inconsistent statements about the maximum time the car could be kept. Leaver claims that he returned the car to the Hertz Belgrade, Montana parking lot within two weeks of the stated return date. Leaver was arrested in Montana, remained in jail for two months, and was extradited to Wisconsin. The court denied motions to dismiss. Weeks later, the prosecutor dropped the charge. Leaver filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming intentional or reckless omission from his police reports of facts that would have affected the probable-cause determination. The judge rejected the claim on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no evidence that the officer was aware of the information at issue; if he was aware of it, qualified immunity applies. It is unclear whether the information would have negated probable cause. View "Leaver v. Shortess" on Justia Law

Jones was a family counselor and collected dozens of guns and thousands of rounds of ammunition, although he had a prior felony conviction. The FBI discovered the weapons while investigating Jones for fraudulent health care billing. He was convicted of illegally possessing firearms, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and of health care fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347. His concurrent sentences amount to 100 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the ex parte pretrial restraint of life insurance policies violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights; that the court erroneously denied his request for new counsel and he was denied the opportunity to testify during his fraud trial; and challenging the sentencing guideline computation. Jones did not object at the time that his life insurance policies were restrained, nor did he object during the district court proceedings, although the restraining order invited him to “petition for a pre-trial hearing if he can demonstrate that he has no other assets available with which to retain counsel” or if he could show that the policies were “not subject to forfeiture.” Given Jones’s pattern of delay and obstruction, the district judge did not abuse her discretion in denying Jones’s request for appointment of yet another lawyer. Jones willingly waived his right to testify. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Foreman alleged that Rockford police officers came to his restaurant because the man living in an upstairs apartment accused Foreman of cutting off his electricity. Foreman refused to answer questions and was arrested. Prosecutor Leisten charged Foreman with obstructing a police officer. The charge was dismissed. The court ordered Foreman to show cause why claims against Leisten should not be dismissed; the prosecutor would have absolute immunity in her individual capacity and the Eleventh Amendment bars official capacity claims. In a previous case Foreman’s lawyer, Redmond, had raised similar claims against prosecutors that were dismissed, so the court ordered Redmond to show cause why he should not be sanctioned. The court granted Leisten judgment on the pleadings, noting that Foreman had not offered a basis for challenging the existing law of prosecutorial immunity and that the official capacity claim would not fall under the Eleventh Amendment's exception for injunctive relief because Foreman’s complaint did not allege an ongoing constitutional violation. The court censured Redmond, stating that he did not argue for a change in the law until after he was faced with a recommendation of censure. The court dismissed 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against the officers, concluding that they had probable cause to arrest Foreman. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing Supreme Court precedent that state prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from suits under section 1983 for activities that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” View "Foreman v. Wadsworth" on Justia Law

Davila pleaded guilty to conspiring to commit robbery in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951, and to possessing a firearm in connection with the planned robbery and a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). The separate drug count was dismissed. The judge sentenced Davila to consecutive sentences of six months’ imprisonment under the Hobbs Act and 60 months’ imprisonment under section 924(c). He did not appeal. After the Supreme Court held, in Johnson v. United States, that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), is unconstitutionally vague, Davila filed a collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that conspiracy to commit a robbery could be deemed a crime of violence only under the residual clause in section 924(c)(3)(B) and that this clause should be held unconstitutional under Johnson’s reasoning. The district judge held that Davila’s conviction is valid no matter how conspiracy to rob is classified. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of relief, rejecting and argument that the drug deal cannot be considered under section 924(c). The ACCA is a sentence-enhancement statute, but section 924(c) defines a stand-alone crime. Conviction of a drug crime is not essential to a conviction under section 924(c) for possessing a gun in relation to a drug offense; Davila’s guilty plea foreclosed his collateral attack. View "Davila v. United States" on Justia Law

About a decade ago, Holt was convicted of possessing a firearm despite prior convictions that barred gun ownership, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The court deemed him an armed career criminal, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), and imposed a 200-month sentence, counting a burglary conviction as one of his three prior violent felonies. Without that enhancement, Holt’s maximum sentence would have been 120 months. After the Supreme Court held that the residual clause in 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is unconstitutionally vague, Holt challenged his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of his petition. While Holt’s appeal was pending the Seventh Circuit held that the version of the Illinois burglary statute under which he was convicted is not a “violent felony” because it does not satisfy the definition of “burglary” used for indivisible statutes. The court acknowledged that the holdings apply retroactively, but noted that this is Holt’s second section 2255 proceeding. A successive collateral attack is permissible only if the court of appeals certifies that it rests on newly discovered evidence or “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” His current argument rests on a Seventh Circuit precedent and on a decision that has not been declared retroactive by the Supreme Court and is not a new rule of constitutional law. Holt’s claim depends on the meaning of “burglary” rather than the meaning of the Constitution. View "Holt v. United States" on Justia Law

Brunson purchased the only liquor store in Bridgeport, Illinois. Bridgeport Police Chief Murray was a frequent visitor and often told Brunson that he was violating liquor laws that did not actually exist. Once, Bridgeport Mayor Schauf, also the local liquor commissioner, “confirmed” a non-existent law. Schauf had made a competing offer to purchase the store and had an interest another alcohol-serving establishment by subterfuge. Schauf’s son opened another Bridgeport bar. In 2010, Brunson applied to renew his liquor license weeks before it would expire. A licensee with no violations is entitled to pro forma renewal. Chief Murray told Bronson to hire a lawyer; Schauf told Brunson that he would not renew the license in time. Brunson had to close his business, hired counsel, and contacted the state Commission, which ordered that Brunson be allowed to remain open pending a hearing. Brunson’s liquor supplier then was told by the city clerk to not sell to Brunson. Before the Commission’s scheduled hearing, Schauf retroactively renewed the license without explanation. Subsequently Brunson discovered an attempted break-in; Murray did not file a report. The following weekend, the store was vandalized and the police took no action. Brunson stood guard the next weekend. During the night, the store’s windows were shattered. Bronson found Harshman—a convicted felon, and occasional employee at Schauf’s businesses. After a fight and a chase, Bronson held Harshman at gunpoint until police arrived. Brunson pointed out Schauf’s son waiting nearby. Brunson was charged with felony aggravated battery. Brunson sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the prosecutor, based on absolute prosecutorial immunity, and with respect to false arrest. The court reversed summary judgment on Brunson’s class-of-one equal protection claim and for Schauf, who is not entitled to absolute immunity on Brunson’s due process claim. View "Brunson v. Murray" on Justia Law

Lewisbey purchased guns at Indiana gun shows with a fake I.D., sold them in Illinois, and boasted about it on Facebook. Federal agents began an undercover operation. After Lewisbey sold a total of 43 guns to a confidential informant in five separate controlled purchases, he was charged with unlawful dealing in firearms without a license, 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(1)(A); illegally transporting firearms across state lines, sections 922(a)(3), 924(a)(1)(D); and traveling across state lines with intent to engage in unlicensed dealing of firearms, section 924(n). Lewisbey was represented by Attorney Brindley, who was facing a criminal contempt proceeding. Questioned by the judge about the potential conflict of interest, Lewisbey expressly waived any conflict and consented to Brindley’s continuation as his counsel. Lewisbey was convicted and sentenced to 200 months’ imprisonment. The government subsequently obtained a limited remand to address a new criminal investigation targeting Brindley. Brindley withdrew. Another attorney took over Lewisbey’s appeal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of violation of Lewisbey’s Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel; that the Facebook posts and text messages taken from his phones should have been excluded on hearsay and authentication grounds or based on prejudicial impact under Federal Rule 403; and that the government’s cell-phone location expert did not satisfy the “Daubert” factors. View "United States v. Lewisbey" on Justia Law

In 2004, Nelms retained Katz-Crank, a Michigan lawyer with a practice in cemetery management, to assist in his acquisition of cemeteries and funeral homes in Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio. Trust funds associated with these cemeteries were valued at about $22 million. In 2007 Katz‐Crank learned that Nelms was under investigation by the Indiana Secretary of State for misappropriating cemetery trust assets. Katz‐Crank called Haskett, an investigator in that office, to offer cooperation. Haskett did not return the call. In 2008, Nelms was indicted for embezzling $22 million, pleaded guilty, and agreed to testify against Katz‐Crank. Haskett called some of Katz‐Crank’s clients and stated that Katz‐Crank was under criminal investigation. The Secretary of State and the Marion County prosecutor’s office issued press releases publicizing Katz-Crank’s arrest. A jury acquitted Katz‐Crank. Two years later Katz‐Crank sued Marion County and officials who were involved in her investigation and prosecution, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, with three federal conspiracy claims and state‐law claims for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district judge rejected all claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Most of Katz‐Crank’s claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment or prosecutorial immunity; the rest were properly dismissed for failure to state a plausible claim. View "Katz-Crank v. Haskett" on Justia Law

The petitioners sought to place on the ballot a proposition that, if approved by the voters, would impose mayoral term limits. If approved, the proposition would prevent the incumbent mayor from running for reelection. The County Clerk refused to place the proposition on the ballot because Calumet City’s current administration already had placed three propositions on the ballot. State law, 10 ILCS 5/28‐1, permitted no more than three propositions in any single election. The administration’s ballot initiatives appeared to target specifically Alderman Jones, who had announced he was running for mayor. Jones and the petitioners sought injunctive relief, claiming violations of the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Illinois Constitution. The district court denied a preliminary injunction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The request for injunctive relief was not timely and considerable harm would have been visited on the electoral system if the requested relief had been granted. There was evidence that the petitioners knew that the statute displaced their ballot initiative by the end of June, but delayed in filing suit until September 15. Jones’s individual claims were not ripe; Jones could not challenge the constitutionality of the propositions unless they were enacted by the referendum process. View "Jones v. Qualkinbush" on Justia Law

Yates was sentenced as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. 924(e) in 2003. The district court concluded that he had six qualifying prior convictions; the statute provides that three or more require an enhanced sentence. After the Supreme Court held in 2015 that the “residual clause” in section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is unconstitutionally vague, and made the decision retroactive, Yates argued that he had only two qualifying convictions. The prosecutor conceded that the petition was timely under 28 U.S.C. 2255(f)(3) and that three of Yates’s convictions were disqualified, but argued that Yates’s conviction of battery by a prisoner (Wis. Stat. 940.20(1)), qualifies as a violent felony under the “elements clause” of 924(e)(2)(B)(i) because it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force” against a person. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. The elements of the offense, not the facts of the crime, control. The Wisconsin statute provided: Any prisoner … who intentionally causes bodily harm to an officer, employee, visitor or another inmate … is guilty of a Class D felony.” Section 939.22(4) added that bodily harm means “physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” The described offense categorically is a crime of violence under the elements clause. View "Yates v. United States" on Justia Law