Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Hughes was found to be a sexually violent person who suffers from a mental disorder that creates a substantial risk that, unless confined, he is apt to commit further sexual violence; he was civilly committed, at Rushville, under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207/1–99, “for control, care and treatment” until he “is no longer a sexually violent person.” In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Hughes claimed that Illinois has improperly curtailed his liberty, by employing detention staff who are unable to provide him with the care and treatment without which he will never be eligible for release. Illinois allows only persons licensed under the Act to treat Rushville’s civil detainees and determine whether they can be released without danger to the public. The Seventh Circuit reversed dismissal of Hughes’ complaint. The Supreme Court understands the Fourteenth Amendment to require that civil detainees receive treatment for the disorders that led to their confinement and be released when they are no longer dangerous. It is not clear whether Rushville is providing the plaintiff (and others) with treatment by licensed professionals who have authority to determine the detainees’ right to be released. Liberty Healthcare, which furnishes the Rushville personnel, does not require that all of them be licensed. View "Hughes v. Dimas" on Justia Law

Hinesley was convicted of molesting his 13-year‐old former foster daughter, V.V. At trial, the prosecution had elicited the initial, inculpatory out‐of‐court statements of V.V. and her former foster brother, Billy, at length, with no objection. Before trial, it had come to light that V.V. and Billy (age 20) had been in a sexual relationship and had tried to conceal that relationship. The two had changed their accounts. Defense counsel did not object to the admission of statements by the investigating detective and by Billy that they believed V.V. The defense highlighted the changed stories. The trial judge found V.V.’s testimony credible. After exhausting state court remedies, Hinesley sought federal habeas relief, claiming ineffective assistance by trial counsel. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of his petition. The Indiana Court of Appeals took the constitutional standard seriously and produced an answer within the range of defensible positions. The defense had a pre‐trial run‐through with V.V. and Billy at their depositions and knew that they would acknowledge inconsistencies in their statements. The risks of allowing the prosecution to elicit their original statements were low. With the judge serving as the trier of fact, it was unlikely that undue weight would be given to the out‐of‐court statements rather than their in‐court testimony. View "Hinesley v. Knight" on Justia Law

Davies and his then‐girlfriend got into an altercation. She called 911, stating that Davies had “pulled a gun.” Chicago police officers, including Benbenek, responded, kicked down the door because no one answered after they knocked and announced, then encountered Davies, who is paralyzed from the waist down, in his wheelchair, and Davies’ nephew. Police testified that, Davies was very angry, used profanity, and talked about suing them. Officers discovered illegal items in Davies’ bedroom. Davies asked whether his nephew could “take the rap,” then became increasingly agitated. When Benbenek told Davies he would be charged for spitting on her, Davies threw himself onto the floor, yelling. Davies claims Benbenek grabbed him and punched him in the face. Davies was taken to the hospital. The attending physician testified that Davies had a fractured femur, consistent with a fall, and that Davies had severe osteoporosis which made his bones more susceptible to breaking through minor trauma. Davies sued Benbenek, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court allowed testimony that unidentified “items” were recovered, that Davies had stated that he had previously sued, and that Davies wanted to blame his nephew. The testimony was not offered to prove that Davies had a prior history of litigation, nor did it include any description of the items. The Seventh Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of Benbenek. The evidence challenged by Davies was used for a permissible purpose and was not unduly prejudicial. View "Davies v. Benbenek" on Justia Law

Rivera, a federal inmate, was burned on his leg, foot, and ankle while working in the prison kitchen. A nurse initially treated the second-degree burn. Rivera returned to the healthcare unit daily so that staff could clean and dress the wound, and complained about pain and numbness. A physician assistant stated that his symptoms probably were normal and suggested that he return in six months. He did so and was told that his symptoms were probably permanent. He saw a physician, Gupta, explaining that his family was willing to pay for him to consult a burn specialist. According to Rivera, Gupta refused to examine him, look up his records, or authorize any treatment, admonishing him that he wouldn’t have scalded himself had he not been in prison, that “only God” could help him, and that if he complained again, Gupta would write a disciplinary report. Gupta disputes Rivera’s account. Rivera sued Gupta and Lopez, an administrator, who did not respond to Rivera’s complaints, for deliberate indifference, violating his Eighth Amendment rights. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to Lopez, who is not a medical professional, but reversed as to Gupta, noting that Lopez was without legal representation. A reasonable jury might infer that personal hostility, divorced from medical judgment, had motivated Gupta’s refusal to provide Rivera with any further treatment, even by a burn specialist whom Rivera’s family would have compensated. View "Rivera v. Gupta" on Justia Law

Defendants pleaded guilty to firearms offenses that carry an enhanced base offense level for prior conviction for a “crime of violence,” U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a). The Guidelines then defined “crime of violence” to include “any offense under federal or state law … that … is burglary of a dwelling,” U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(2). Both had Wisconsin convictions for burglary; each judge applied the higher offense level. The Seventh Circuit vacated. To determine whether a conviction is a crime of violence requires a categorical approach that focuses on the statutory definition. If state law defines the offense more broadly than the Guidelines, the conviction is not a crime of violence, even if the defendant’s conduct satisfies all of the elements of the Guidelines offense. When a single statute creates multiple offenses and is “divisible,” the court may consult a limited universe of documents to determine which offense the defendant was convicted of (modified categorical approach). In 2016, the Supreme Court clarified that a statute is divisible only if it creates multiple offenses by setting forth alternative elements. Wisconsin defines burglary more broadly than the Guidelines, referring to burglary of a “building or dwelling.” WIS. STAT. 943.10(1m)(a). The judges consulted charging documents, which revealed that defendants were charged with burgling dwellings. It is now clear that this recourse to state-court charging documents was improper. Wisconsin’s burglary statute sets forth alternative means of satisfying the location element of the state’s burglary offense. View "United States v. Edwards" on Justia Law

Zaya, an inmate at the Henry Hill Correctional Center in Galesburg, Illinois, broke his wrist. The prison physician, Dr. Sood, sent Zaya to an off-site orthopedic surgeon who took x-rays, fitted Zaya with a cast, and sent him back to the prison with instructions that he return in three weeks. Sood did not follow those instructions, but waited nearly seven weeks to send Zaya back to the orthopedic surgeon. By then, Zaya’s wrist had healed at an improper angle, and two surgeries were required to repair the defect. Zaya filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 claiming that Sood was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted Sood summary judgment, holding that the decision to delay Zaya’s return to the orthopedic surgeon constituted a mere difference of opinion between medical professionals. The Seventh Circuit reversed. A difference of opinion between two doctors is insufficient to survive summary judgment on a deliberate-indifference claim, but when a plaintiff provides evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that the defendant doctor disregarded rather than disagreed with the course of treatment recommended by another doctor, summary judgment is unwarranted. Zaya provided such evidence. View "Zaya v. Sood" on Justia Law

Bradley’s third civil rights suit involving alleged improprieties with revocation of her license to operate a childcare center named six defendants—five of whom Bradley had sued in her second suit. She claims that Wisconsin Department of Children and Families employees, without permission, interviewed her adopted son; photographed the space in her home where she operated the daycare program and was in the process of reorganizing; falsely accused her of child abuse and neglect and forced her to surrender her license; and violated the “Federal Right to Privacy Act” (likely referring to 5 U.S.C. 552a), the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. 5106(a), the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Due Process Clause, and 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985(3). The district court dismissed; claim preclusion barred the claims against the five second-lawsuit defendants because the claims there were based on the same events. As for the sixth defendant, the court concluded that the complaint failed to state a claim under any constitutional provision or federal statute identified by Bradley. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The prior suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits. The court warned Bradley that submitting further frivolous appeals may result in sanctions. View "Bradley v. Sabree" on Justia Law

In 1999, Werner was convicted of multiple sex offenses and was a Special Bulletin Notification (SBN) sex offender under Wisconsin law. Werner’s release was deferred until his 2010 mandatory release date. Werner and his probation agents were unable to secure an approved residence as required by his rules of supervision, so the Department of Corrections detained him pursuant to Administrative Directive No. 02‐10, under which persons who had reached their mandatory release date but could not secure approved housing were detained in the county jail at night but permitted to seek housing during certain hours of the day. In 2011, he moved into an approved residence. Werner filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court permitted Werner to proceed on individual‐capacity claims under the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause and to maintain an official‐capacity claim, for injunctive relief, that AD 02‐10 violated the Due Process and Ex Post Facto Clauses. The court ultimately granted the defendants summary judgment on all claims, finding the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims barred by qualified immunity and that his challenge to the policy was moot. AD 02‐10 was replaced in 2015 by AD 15‐12, under which SBN sex offenders lacking approved residences are no longer held in jail. Werner has twice violated probation and is again incarcerated. The Seventh Circuit affirmed; clearly established law at the time would not have notified the defendants that the AD 02‐10 procedures were unlawful. View "Werner v. Wall" on Justia Law

In 2001, Carrion entered the apartment of 69‐year‐old Zymal and stabbed her, causing her death. Carrion, who lived in an apartment above Zymali’s, was a 19-year‐old immigrant who spoke almost no English. He was interviewed in Spanish, denied involvement with Zymali’s death, but agreed to provide fingerprint samples. His fingerprint was found on a knife recovered from Zymali’s apartment. Illinois courts affirmed his convictions for residential burglary and first‐degree murder on direct appeal and on post-conviction review. Carrion’s habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254 was denied. The court concluded that although it probably was timely filed, most of the claims were procedurally defaulted and remaining claims were meritless. The Seventh Circuit granted a certificate of appealability to address: whether there was sufficient evidence to support his convictions, whether Carrion’s confession was voluntary, and whether appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the voluntariness of his confession. The court concluded that, whether applying the deferential review of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act or de novo review, Carrion is not entitled to relief. The prosecution met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. There was no due process violation in the reception into evidence of Carrion’s statement, as translated by an investigating officer. Any ambiguities in the statement were examined thoroughly at trial. View "Carrion v. Butler" on Justia Law

McGuire pleaded guilty to interfering with commerce by threat or violence. The district court classified McGuire as a career offender under section 4B1.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines, which increases the offense level if the defendant has two prior felony convictions for a “crime of violence.” “Crime of violence” is defined in section 4B1.2 and includes “any offense … that … is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” (the residual clause). The district judge counted two of McGuire’s prior convictions as crimes of violence. One conviction, for fleeing the police, qualified only under the residual clause. With the career-offender enhancement, McGuire’s Guidelines range increased from 63–78 months to 151–188 months. Citing McGuire’s extensive criminal history, the judge imposed a sentence of 188 months, noting her surprise that the government hadn’t asked for the statutory maximum sentence of 20 years. The Seventh Circuit remanded for resentencing, citing the Supreme Court’s 2015 Johnson holding that the residual clause in the career-offender guideline is unconstitutionally vague. View "United States v. McGuire" on Justia Law