Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Waldman, an inmate, was convicted of forcibly assaulting a correctional officer after head‐butting him during an argument about a pat‐down search. Waldman and the guard dispute how the pat-down request advanced to a confrontation. Waldman advanced an unsuccessful self‐defense argument at trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction. While the district court erred in holding that there needed to be an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm before he could justifiably use force in self‐defense, the court was correct in finding that Waldman had a legal alternative to force in complying with the pat‐down. Requiring that an inmate fear serious bodily harm or death before using force to protect himself is in‐ consistent with both the Eighth Amendment and common law principles justifying the use of self‐defense. Congress intended to protect correctional officers from harm in passing 28 U.S.C. 111, but that purpose must be harmonized with Eighth Amendment protections. View "United States v. Waldman" on Justia Law

Rebirth ran a child care ministry—a “child care operated by a church or religious ministry that is a religious organization exempt from federal income taxation,” Ind. Code 12‐7‐2‐28.8. After an unannounced inspection, a Bureau of Child Care employee gave Rebirth a “Plan of Improvement,” stating that Rebirth had violated statutes and regulations governing registered child care ministries and directed Rebirth to cure the purported infractions and submit proof within 10 days. Rebirth believed that it had not committed any violations and did not submit any documentation. The Bureau sent Rebirth a notice of termination. Despite Rebirth’s request to appeal administratively, the Bureau terminated Rebirth’s registration and the child care operation closed. Indiana’s statutory scheme does not give providers an administrative opportunity to challenge the decision to revoke a certificate of registration. Rebirth sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of the due‐process clause. The district court dismissed Rebirth’s individual‐capacity claims, citing qualified immunity. After the parties developed an evidentiary record on the official‐capacity claims, Rebirth prevailed on its claims for injunctive relief. The Seventh Circuit reinstated the individual-capacity claims, concluding that the complaint adequately alleged that the defendants violated clearly established law by depriving Rebirth of a property interest (its registration) without first providing any opportunity to be heard. View "Rebirth Christian Acad. Daycare, Inc. v. Brizzi" on Justia Law

Chicago Police officers arrested Bell for possession of a controlled substance while he was driving Spinks’s vehicle. They impounded the vehicle after Bell’s arrest. Chicago Municipal Code 7‐24‐225 permits police to impound a vehicle when officers have probable cause to believe it contained a controlled substance or was used in an illegal drug transaction. Spinks challenged the impoundment in the Chicago Department of Administrative Hearings. The ALJ determined that probable cause existed to impound the vehicle. A month later, an ALJ found Spinks liable for violating the Code and ordered that she pay the prescribed penalty of $2,000 plus $180 in storage and towing fees. Spinks and Bell filed suit, alleging that the ordinances were facially invalid under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the Code permits warrantless seizure of vehicles in all instances and allows for a non‐judicial officer to determine whether probable cause exists to allow the vehicle to remain seized. Under the Code, the officer seizing the vehicle without a warrant must have probable cause to believe it contains illegal drugs or has been used in an illegal drug transaction. The court noted that plaintiffs did not employ post-seizure state law remedies. View "Bell v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Hurlburt and Gillespie pleaded guilty in separate cases to unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). To calculate the Sentencing Guidelines range in each case, the district court began with U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a), which assigns progressively higher offense levels if the defendant has one or more prior convictions for a “crime of violence.” The term “crime of violence” is defined in the career-offender guideline to include any offense that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” (residual clause).” The U.S.S.G. residual clause mirrors the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B). One year ago the Supreme Court’s “Johnson decision” invalidated the ACCA’s residual clause as unconstitutionally vague. The Seventh Circuit previously held that the Guidelines are not susceptible to challenge on vagueness grounds. Overruling that precedent and applying Johnson, the Seventh Circuit vacated the sentences imposed on Hurlburt and Gillespie, holding that the residual clause in section 4B1.2(a)(2) is unconstitutionally vague. View "United States v. Hurlburt" on Justia Law

Rollins pleaded guilty to selling crack cocaine and was sentenced to 84 months in prison. In his second appeal, he challenged the application of the career-offender guideline, which assigns a higher offense level if the defendant has two prior convictions for a “crime of violence,” U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a), including “any offense … that … otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” (residual clause). The district judge classified Rollins as a career offender based in part on a prior conviction for possession of a sawed-off shotgun, a crime that would qualify only under the residual clause of this definition. The Supreme Court’s “Johnson” decision invalidated the identically phrased residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), residual clause as unconstitutionally vague. In light of the government’s concession that Johnson’s constitutional holding applies to the residual clause in section 4B1.2(a)(2), the Seventh Circuit granted rehearing and held that under Johnson, the residual clause in the career-offender guideline is unconstitutionally vague and vacated Rollins’s sentence. View "United States v. Rollins" on Justia Law

Chicago Police officers executed a warrant and found a loaded pistol, a second gun, a plastic baggie containing 17 grams of heroin, a digital scale, and documents in Thomas’s name. Thomas was arrested. He moved to suppress, arguing that the warrant was deficient because it was supported by a confidential informant “of unknown background and unknown reliability.” According to Thomas, the judge did not know whether the informant was under arrest or on probation, whether he received favorable treatment or was paid, how he knew Thomas, whether he used aliases, whether he was a rival gang member, his criminal history, and his record as an informant. The district court denied Thomas’s motion and found that Thomas had not made the showing necessary for a Franks hearing. Thomas entered a conditional guilty plea. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a “Brady” argument. Even if Brady applies to pretrial motions to suppress, the warrant was supported by probable cause, so the information he sought concerning the CI is not material.The informant provided details about Thomas’s apartment, that Thomas was a member of a particular gang, and described the firearms in detail. The information was corroborated by a prior arrest report that noted Thomas’s nickname, description, gang affiliation, age, and residence. The informant selected Thomas from a photo array and identified Thomas’s residence. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Walker, convicted in 2006 of robbery, was adjudicated a habitual offender pursuant to Indiana Code 35-50-2-8. He was sentenced to 40 years in prison; 20 of those years were attributable to his habitual-offender status. The Indiana habitual-offender statute applied if a defendant had been convicted of two prior unrelated felonies: the second felony had to have been committed after the sentencing for the first, and the present crime had to have been committed after the sentencing of the second earlier offense. At Walker’s trial, the state provided evidence of three prior felonies but failed to offer evidence of the date when one of the crimes was committed. Seeking federal habeas relief, Walker argued that his lawyer on direct appeal should have challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for the habitual-offender conviction, given the missing date. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the petition. Even assuming that counsel’s performance fell below the constitutional minimum, the state appellate court’s conclusion that Walker’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not infringed meets the generous standards that apply under 28 U.S.C. 2254. View "Walker v. Griffin" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit denied petitions for initial hearing en banc in appeals concerning Wisconsin’s law requiring voters to have qualifying photo identification. The court noted that Wisconsin will start printing absentee ballots this month and that it is unlikely that qualified electors will be unable to vote under Wisconsin’s current procedures. The state had assured the court that temporary credentials will be available to all qualified persons who seek them. Wisconsin has enacted a rule that requires the Division of Motor Vehicles to mail automatically a free photo ID to anyone who comes to DMV one time and initiates the free ID process. No one must present documents, that, for some, have proved challenging to acquire; no one must show a birth certificate, or proof of citizenship, so the urgency needed to justify an initial en banc hearing has not been shown. The state adequately informed the general public of the plan and the district court​ has the authority to monitor compliance. View "One Wis. Inst., Inc. v. Thomsen" on Justia Law

Officer Sell saw a car turn right from the center lane on a three-lane road and then drive through private property to avoid a red light. Using his computer, Sell saw that the car was registered to McPhaul, whose license was suspended, and that the driver looked like McPhaul’s displayed picture. The driver led the police on a mile-long “slow-speed” chase, even after Sell activated his lights and siren. When the driver stopped and was arrested, a pat-down revealed that he was wearing body armor; a loaded gun was found in the car’s center console. The driver was McPhaul, who had been convicted of a crime of violence. He was charged as a felon in possession of a gun, and with being a violent felon in possession of body armor. While in pre-trial custody, he wrote to his cousin, telling her she could ignore a grand jury subpoena, and asking her to swear that she put the gun in his car without his knowledge. McPhaul unsuccessfully moved to suppress the body armor. At sentencing, the judge applied Guidelines enhancements for using the body armor in connection with another felony offense, and for attempting to obstruct justice. McPhaul’s Guidelines range was 24–30 months and the judge imposed a 24-month sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the sentencing enhancements. The pat-down was lawful because officers had probable cause to stop McPhaul. View "United States v. McPhaul" on Justia Law

In 2001, 15‐year‐old Stacy opened the door of her Dale, Indiana home to Ward, ostensibly looking for a lost dog. Stacy let him in. Her sister, who was upstairs, heard screams. Looking down, she saw Stacy on the ground with a man on top of her. Her sister called 911; police arrived 10 minutes later. Marshal Keller entered and saw Ward, near the door with a knife in his hand, sweating. Keller took Ward, in custody, outside, and returned to see Stacy lying in a pool of blood, disemboweled, evidently raped, trying to speak. She died hours later. After a conviction was vacated for failure to grant a change of venue, Ward pleaded guilty. A jury recommended death; the trial court sentenced him accordingly. His conviction and sentence were upheld in state courts. The district court denied habeas corpus relief (28 U.S.C. 2254), rejecting an argument that trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by portraying him as a dangerous, incurable “psychopath,” which was enough to undermine confidence in the sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Indiana Supreme Court’s decision that Ward suffered no prejudice was reasonable. “Against the mitigating evidence counsel did not use, and the psychological labels that were used, stood a mountain of stark evidence against Ward.” View "Ward v. Neal" on Justia Law