Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs own and operate Chicago taxicabs or livery vehicles or provide services to such companies, such as loans and insurance. Taxi and livery companies are tightly regulated by the city regarding driver and vehicle qualifications, licensing, fares, and insurance. Ride-share services, such as Uber, are less heavily regulated and have a different business model. Chicago’s 2014 ride-share ordinance allows the companies to set their own fares. The plaintiffs challenged the ordinance on four Constitutional and three Illinois-law grounds. The district judge dismissed all but the two claims that accuse the city of denying the equal protection of the laws by allowing the ride-shares to compete with taxi and livery services without being subject to the same regulations. The Seventh Circuit ordered dismissal of all seven claims. There are enough differences between taxi service and ride-share service to justify different regulatory schemes. Chicago has legally chosen deregulation and competition over preserving the traditional taxicab monopolies. A legislature, having created a statutory entitlement, is not precluded from altering or even eliminating the entitlement by later legislation. View "Ill. Transp. Trade Ass'n v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Urbana police officers responded to a domestic dispute. In their report, the officers noted that Hamilton called Wright a “pedophile” during the altercation. No arrests were made. The following morning, McNaught, who specializes in crimes against children, reviewed the report as a matter of course, and called Hamilton. Hamilton granted permission to search the couple’s apartment and computers for evidence of child pornography. McNaught seized a desktop computer from the living room; forensic analysis revealed images of child pornography on the hard drive. Wright was charged with possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A, and sexually exploiting a minor. He moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that Hamilton lacked authority to consent to the warrantless search. McNaught testified that Hamilton had stated that Wright used his cellphone to visit a website called “Jailbait,” which McNaught recognized as featuring pornographic images of underage girls. Hamilton also mentioned seeing a video with a disturbing title on the computer. McNaught testified that he had “previewed” the hard drive by connecting it to his laptop, a standard procedure. Hamilton described the living arrangements at the apartment, which was leased in her name. The district judge denied the motion. Wright pleaded guilty, reserving his right to appeal the denial of suppression. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although Wright owned the computer, Hamilton was a joint user who enjoyed virtually unlimited access to and control over it. View "United States v. Wright" on Justia Law

Kubsch was twice convicted of the 1998 murders of his wife, her son, and her ex-husband and was sentenced to death. No eyewitness, DNA evidence, fingerprints, or other forensic evidence linked Kubsch to the murders. After exhausting state remedies, he filed an unsuccessful petition for federal habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit initially affirmed, rejecting Kubsch’s arguments that the Indiana trial court wrongfully excluded evidence of a nine-year-old witness’s exculpatory but hearsay statement to police; that he was denied effective assistance of counsel with respect to that witness’s statement; and that his decision to represent himself at sentencing was not knowing and voluntary. On rehearing en banc, the Seventh Circuit reversed. The case concerns the total exclusion of relevant evidence, not with a limitation on the way the evidence can be used; the defendant’s interest in the evidence was at its zenith. The excluded evidence was easily the strongest evidence on Kubsch’s only theory of defense—actual innocence. It was not cumulative, unfairly prejudicial, potentially misleading, or merely impeaching. It was unusually reliable. The Indiana Supreme Court’s conclusion that Supreme Court precedent (Chambers) did not require the admission of this critical evidence was either contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the Chambers line of Supreme Court precedent. View "Kubsch v. Neal" on Justia Law

Williams, serving a 65‐year prison sentence for murder at the Pontiac Illinois maximum‐security prison, ordered the death certificate of the woman whom he murdered. Staff confiscated the certificate (which had arrived from the county clerk's office with an unsigned note: “There is a place in hell waiting for you, as you must know you will reap what you have sowed!” The stated reason for confiscation was “it posed a threat to the safety and security of the institution and would negatively impact Inmate Williams’ rehabilitation.” The district court dismissed a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, reasoning that confiscating the certificate had decreased the risk that inmates would retaliate against “boasting inmates” like Williams, and had protected the victim’s family from being identified. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to defendants not involved in the confiscation, but otherwise reversed. The right of an inmate to read the mail he receives, provided that his reading it would not infringe legitimate interests, is clearly established. The prison must present “some evidence” to show that the restriction is justified. A prison has a legitimate safety concern about “boasting inmates” carrying around trophies, but Williams asserted that he needed the death certificate for use in state post‐conviction proceedings; the defendants presented no contrary evidence. View "Williams v. Hansen" on Justia Law

Hughes was found to be a sexually violent person who suffers from a mental disorder that creates a substantial risk that, unless confined, he is apt to commit further sexual violence; he was civilly committed, at Rushville, under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207/1–99, “for control, care and treatment” until he “is no longer a sexually violent person.” In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Hughes claimed that Illinois has improperly curtailed his liberty, by employing detention staff who are unable to provide him with the care and treatment without which he will never be eligible for release. Illinois allows only persons licensed under the Act to treat Rushville’s civil detainees and determine whether they can be released without danger to the public. The Seventh Circuit reversed dismissal of Hughes’ complaint. The Supreme Court understands the Fourteenth Amendment to require that civil detainees receive treatment for the disorders that led to their confinement and be released when they are no longer dangerous. It is not clear whether Rushville is providing the plaintiff (and others) with treatment by licensed professionals who have authority to determine the detainees’ right to be released. Liberty Healthcare, which furnishes the Rushville personnel, does not require that all of them be licensed. View "Hughes v. Dimas" on Justia Law

Hinesley was convicted of molesting his 13-year‐old former foster daughter, V.V. At trial, the prosecution had elicited the initial, inculpatory out‐of‐court statements of V.V. and her former foster brother, Billy, at length, with no objection. Before trial, it had come to light that V.V. and Billy (age 20) had been in a sexual relationship and had tried to conceal that relationship. The two had changed their accounts. Defense counsel did not object to the admission of statements by the investigating detective and by Billy that they believed V.V. The defense highlighted the changed stories. The trial judge found V.V.’s testimony credible. After exhausting state court remedies, Hinesley sought federal habeas relief, claiming ineffective assistance by trial counsel. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of his petition. The Indiana Court of Appeals took the constitutional standard seriously and produced an answer within the range of defensible positions. The defense had a pre‐trial run‐through with V.V. and Billy at their depositions and knew that they would acknowledge inconsistencies in their statements. The risks of allowing the prosecution to elicit their original statements were low. With the judge serving as the trier of fact, it was unlikely that undue weight would be given to the out‐of‐court statements rather than their in‐court testimony. View "Hinesley v. Knight" on Justia Law

Davies and his then‐girlfriend got into an altercation. She called 911, stating that Davies had “pulled a gun.” Chicago police officers, including Benbenek, responded, kicked down the door because no one answered after they knocked and announced, then encountered Davies, who is paralyzed from the waist down, in his wheelchair, and Davies’ nephew. Police testified that, Davies was very angry, used profanity, and talked about suing them. Officers discovered illegal items in Davies’ bedroom. Davies asked whether his nephew could “take the rap,” then became increasingly agitated. When Benbenek told Davies he would be charged for spitting on her, Davies threw himself onto the floor, yelling. Davies claims Benbenek grabbed him and punched him in the face. Davies was taken to the hospital. The attending physician testified that Davies had a fractured femur, consistent with a fall, and that Davies had severe osteoporosis which made his bones more susceptible to breaking through minor trauma. Davies sued Benbenek, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court allowed testimony that unidentified “items” were recovered, that Davies had stated that he had previously sued, and that Davies wanted to blame his nephew. The testimony was not offered to prove that Davies had a prior history of litigation, nor did it include any description of the items. The Seventh Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of Benbenek. The evidence challenged by Davies was used for a permissible purpose and was not unduly prejudicial. View "Davies v. Benbenek" on Justia Law

Rivera, a federal inmate, was burned on his leg, foot, and ankle while working in the prison kitchen. A nurse initially treated the second-degree burn. Rivera returned to the healthcare unit daily so that staff could clean and dress the wound, and complained about pain and numbness. A physician assistant stated that his symptoms probably were normal and suggested that he return in six months. He did so and was told that his symptoms were probably permanent. He saw a physician, Gupta, explaining that his family was willing to pay for him to consult a burn specialist. According to Rivera, Gupta refused to examine him, look up his records, or authorize any treatment, admonishing him that he wouldn’t have scalded himself had he not been in prison, that “only God” could help him, and that if he complained again, Gupta would write a disciplinary report. Gupta disputes Rivera’s account. Rivera sued Gupta and Lopez, an administrator, who did not respond to Rivera’s complaints, for deliberate indifference, violating his Eighth Amendment rights. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to Lopez, who is not a medical professional, but reversed as to Gupta, noting that Lopez was without legal representation. A reasonable jury might infer that personal hostility, divorced from medical judgment, had motivated Gupta’s refusal to provide Rivera with any further treatment, even by a burn specialist whom Rivera’s family would have compensated. View "Rivera v. Gupta" on Justia Law

Defendants pleaded guilty to firearms offenses that carry an enhanced base offense level for prior conviction for a “crime of violence,” U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a). The Guidelines then defined “crime of violence” to include “any offense under federal or state law … that … is burglary of a dwelling,” U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(2). Both had Wisconsin convictions for burglary; each judge applied the higher offense level. The Seventh Circuit vacated. To determine whether a conviction is a crime of violence requires a categorical approach that focuses on the statutory definition. If state law defines the offense more broadly than the Guidelines, the conviction is not a crime of violence, even if the defendant’s conduct satisfies all of the elements of the Guidelines offense. When a single statute creates multiple offenses and is “divisible,” the court may consult a limited universe of documents to determine which offense the defendant was convicted of (modified categorical approach). In 2016, the Supreme Court clarified that a statute is divisible only if it creates multiple offenses by setting forth alternative elements. Wisconsin defines burglary more broadly than the Guidelines, referring to burglary of a “building or dwelling.” WIS. STAT. 943.10(1m)(a). The judges consulted charging documents, which revealed that defendants were charged with burgling dwellings. It is now clear that this recourse to state-court charging documents was improper. Wisconsin’s burglary statute sets forth alternative means of satisfying the location element of the state’s burglary offense. View "United States v. Edwards" on Justia Law

Zaya, an inmate at the Henry Hill Correctional Center in Galesburg, Illinois, broke his wrist. The prison physician, Dr. Sood, sent Zaya to an off-site orthopedic surgeon who took x-rays, fitted Zaya with a cast, and sent him back to the prison with instructions that he return in three weeks. Sood did not follow those instructions, but waited nearly seven weeks to send Zaya back to the orthopedic surgeon. By then, Zaya’s wrist had healed at an improper angle, and two surgeries were required to repair the defect. Zaya filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 claiming that Sood was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted Sood summary judgment, holding that the decision to delay Zaya’s return to the orthopedic surgeon constituted a mere difference of opinion between medical professionals. The Seventh Circuit reversed. A difference of opinion between two doctors is insufficient to survive summary judgment on a deliberate-indifference claim, but when a plaintiff provides evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that the defendant doctor disregarded rather than disagreed with the course of treatment recommended by another doctor, summary judgment is unwarranted. Zaya provided such evidence. View "Zaya v. Sood" on Justia Law