Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2005 the defendant was sentenced by Judge Reinhard to 300 months in prison for possessing a shotgun illegally. The sentence was later invalidated; in 2015 the defendant was resentenced by Judge Reinhard to 176 months. The defendant was then 54 years old, had a serious vision problem, and had been a model prisoner during the 140 months that he had served: because of his good behavior he was credited with having served 160 months of imprisonment, so that the 176‐month sentence was effectively a sentence of 16 more months in prison. Both the probation service and the U.S. Attorney’s Office had recommended that he be sentenced to time served. The judge rejected the suggestions, citing the gravity of the defendant’s criminal history before 2005 and the fact that, while he had never threatened any officials, defendant had filed complaints (and one civil suit) critical of judicial behavior by Reinhard and other judges and alleging conspiracies linking judges and other officials to grievances the defendant had suffered decades ago. The Seventh Circuit vacated, noting that most of the defendant’s criminal history before the shotgun incident consisted of driving offenses and that defendant had a constitutional right to petition for redress of grievances. The court called the judge’s reasoning “flimsy” and stated that further crimes by the defendant were unlikely. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Whatley was convicted, under a now‐repealed Indiana law, of possessing about three grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a “youth program center.” Whatley’s father’s home, where he was arrested, was 795 feet from the Robinson Community Church, which hosted events targeted to young persons, including religious services, mentoring programs, a Girl Scout troop, weekly Family Fun Night, and children’s choirs. On direct appeal and in federal habeas corpus proceedings, Whatley argued that the statutory definition of “youth program center,” as any: building or structure that on a regular basis provides recreational, vocational, academic, social, or other programs or services for persons less than eighteen (18) years of age,” was unconstitutionally vague. The district court declined to address the claim. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Whatley did not procedurally default his claim. The state courts were unreasonable in applying federal law on vagueness: the word “regular” in the definition provides no objective standard and fails to place persons of ordinary intelligence on notice of the conduct proscribed and allows for arbitrary enforcement; defendants are strictly liable for violating the nebulous provision; and the consequences of a violation were extreme. No one in Whatley’s position could have known that the Church would fall within the definition simply because it hosted a few children’s events each week. View "Whatley v. Zatecky" on Justia Law

McKenzie was killed when he fell to electrified train tracks during a gang-related fight. An Illinois jury convicted Evans of felony murder based on the felony “mob action.” Evans argued on direct appeal that independent purpose was an element of the crime of mob action and that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to have the jury to determine whether the underlying offense of mob action had a felonious purpose independent of the killing. The state court concluded that the trial court “adequately apprised” the jury. The federal district court denied relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, reasoning that Evans’s claim improperly asked a federal court to review a state court’s interpretation of state law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While Evans did properly present a federal claim: the denial of his Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine each element of a state crime, his assertion that Illinois defines felony murder to include “independent felonious intent” as a factual element is inaccurate. View "Evans v. Dorethy" on Justia Law

While working as a part-time Village of Orland Hills police officer, Kristofek cited and arrested a driver for car-insurance-related infractions. After several phone calls between the driver’s mother, local politicians, and Scully, the chief of police, the driver was released and the citations were voided. Months later, Kristofek participated in a police training session that involved hypothetical instances of misconduct. Based on these hypotheticals, Kristofek became concerned that official misconduct may have occurred involving the voided citations. After Kristofek shared this concern with other officers and with the FBI, Scully fired him. Kristofek sued Scully and the Village. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Kristofek’s statements to his colleagues and the FBI about the voided citations were protected under the First Amendment. Kristofek was speaking as a private citizen about a matter of public concern, and his interest in speaking outweighed Scully’s interest in promoting efficiency within the department. The Seventh Circuit agreed that the Village was not liable for Scully’s actions under Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services; Scully did not possess the requisite authority to unilaterally fire Kristofek or to set departmental firing policy. View "Kristofek v. Village of Orland Hills" on Justia Law

After a 2003 shooting, Lisle was convicted of first-degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm and was sentenced to 37 years in prison. He sought habeas corpus relief, arguing that the state trial court admitted as evidence testimonial statements made by the surviving victim (Hearn) in violation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the writ, finding that the state courts did not apply Supreme Court precedent unreasonably in holding that the testimony, about a wounded man’s statement to his aunt (Lee) while waiting for an ambulance that Lisle had shot him, was not a “testimonial” out-of-court statement and was permitted under the Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court had not held in 2007 that a statement to someone other than a law enforcement officer can be testimonial, and it was not unreasonable for the state court to find that Hearn’s statement to Lee was part of an effort to deal with an ongoing emergency and thus was nontestimonial. View "Lisle v. Pierce" on Justia Law

Chicago Police officers pulled over a car driven by Rosado for failing to use a turn signal. After stopping the car, the officers “claimed to have seen” a badge, handcuffs, and a handgun in plain view “between the brake lever and center console.” They arrested Rosado for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon and for violating the armed habitual criminal statute. Another officer approved the report as establishing probable cause. Rosado spent about 18 months in jail before receiving a copy of the dash cam video recorded when he was arrested, which, contrary to the officers’ accounts, showed that Rosado had used an operable turn signal. The state court dismissed the charges. Rosado filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court dismissed Rosado’s false‐arrest claim as barred by the two‐year statute of limitations. Because his claims of conspiracy and failure to intervene arose from the false‐arrest claim, those were also dismissed. The court dismissed Rosado’s due‐process and respondeat‐superior claims on the merits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Rosado did not promptly file. He knew the officers had fabricated probable cause by February 2014, when he received the video, and still had seven months to timely file suit. Rosado’s unexplained failure to timely file precluded equitable tolling. View "Rosado v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

In 2006, the Zoretics rented a Castilian Court condominium. Their landlord stopped paying condominium assessments and lost possession to Castilian in 2008. Castilian obtained an eviction order. The Cook County Sheriff evicted the family in January 2009. Later that day, Castilian’s agent allowed them to reenter the unit, agreeing they would sign a new lease. Zoretic never signed the lease or paid rent. After receiving no response to two letters, Castilian’s lawyers obtained a new date stamp (April 2009) from the Clerk on the September 2008 order and placed the order with the Sheriff. On June 5, deputies knocked, announced their presence, got no answer, opened the door, and entered the unit with guns drawn. They found Zoretic, put down their weapons, conducted a protective sweep, and escorted Zoretic out of the unit. Days later, Zoretic sued and was awarded possession until Castilian obtained a lawful eviction order. The family returned, continued not paying rent, and were evicted in March 2012. Zoretic sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed as to Fourth Amendment claims against the deputies, but affirmed as to claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress against the owners. Zoretic failed to create a material factual dispute about whether the owners were extreme and outrageous in pursuing eviction. View "Zoretic v. Darge" on Justia Law

Police executed a search warrant on a storage unit that Miranda rented, where Miranda and Rivas worked on cars. The owner said that he saw Rivas at that unit “just about every day.” The officers found drugs, drug paraphernalia, two loaded guns, Rivas’s student handbook, invoices from Rivas’s mechanic business, and a Western Union receipt tied to him. Miranda was arrested. He called Rivas from jail and, in a recorded call, told Rivas the police were looking for him, but that he would not say anything about Rivas to the police. Rivas was arrested. A fingerprint examiner testified at trial that he was certain the partial fingerprint found on a handgun belonged to Rivas. Rivas wanted to question the examiner about an unrelated case in which the FBI used the same method to erroneously conclude that the fingerprint of an Oregon lawyer was on a bag containing detonating devices used in terrorist bombings. The district court ruled the defense could not refer to that case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Rivas’s conviction. The examiner was not involved in the other case, and the cases were wholly unrelated. Rivas’s counsel was not prevented from questioning the examiner on the reliability of the fingerprint identification method. Counsel pursued multiple lines of cross‐examination. Rivas’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was not violated. View "United States v. Rivas" on Justia Law

In 1993 Bradford, then an Evansville police officer, was convicted in Indiana state court of murder and arson and was sentenced to 80 years in prison, where he remains. The victim, who was apparently killed by stabbing before the fire started, was the woman with whom Evans had been having an extramarital affair. In 2013 he filed a federal habeas corpus suit, claiming that he could prove his innocence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of relief. Bradford had his chance and failed to present reliable evidence that would establish his innocence. The Indiana Court of Appeals did not err in holding that Bradford’s trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by selecting a particular fire expert as a witness. This was not a case in which counsel made no meaningful investigation or failed to present a defense expert on a critical issue. View "Bradford v. Brown" on Justia Law

From 2009-2011, Robey operated a “chop shop.” He and his associates stole cars, altered their identities using office and computer equipment, and then sold them. He was convicted by a jury. The district court sentenced him to 110 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that Robey did not receive a speedy trial, in violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161(c)(1), 3162, and the Sixth Amendment and that district court erred in allowing the government to amend the indictment by dropping 19 of the 25 charges and erred at sentencing by finding that Robey’s theft of 10 vehicles, in addition to the four vehicles forming the basis of his conviction, constituted relevant conduct. The court upheld a finding that only 28 days had elapsed on Robey’s pre‐trial speedy trial clock. The court did not abuse its discretion in granting 10 ends‐of‐justice continuances for Robey and one for the prosecution. The evidence presented at trial and sentencing was more than sufficient to support the district court’s finding of a “pattern of relevant conduct that far exceeded in its details the four cars that were stolen that were before the jury.” View "United States v. Robey" on Justia Law