Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The petitioners sought to place on the ballot a proposition that, if approved by the voters, would impose mayoral term limits. If approved, the proposition would prevent the incumbent mayor from running for reelection. The County Clerk refused to place the proposition on the ballot because Calumet City’s current administration already had placed three propositions on the ballot. State law, 10 ILCS 5/28‐1, permitted no more than three propositions in any single election. The administration’s ballot initiatives appeared to target specifically Alderman Jones, who had announced he was running for mayor. Jones and the petitioners sought injunctive relief, claiming violations of the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Illinois Constitution. The district court denied a preliminary injunction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The request for injunctive relief was not timely and considerable harm would have been visited on the electoral system if the requested relief had been granted. There was evidence that the petitioners knew that the statute displaced their ballot initiative by the end of June, but delayed in filing suit until September 15. Jones’s individual claims were not ripe; Jones could not challenge the constitutionality of the propositions unless they were enacted by the referendum process. View "Jones v. Qualkinbush" on Justia Law

Yates was sentenced as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. 924(e) in 2003. The district court concluded that he had six qualifying prior convictions; the statute provides that three or more require an enhanced sentence. After the Supreme Court held in 2015 that the “residual clause” in section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is unconstitutionally vague, and made the decision retroactive, Yates argued that he had only two qualifying convictions. The prosecutor conceded that the petition was timely under 28 U.S.C. 2255(f)(3) and that three of Yates’s convictions were disqualified, but argued that Yates’s conviction of battery by a prisoner (Wis. Stat. 940.20(1)), qualifies as a violent felony under the “elements clause” of 924(e)(2)(B)(i) because it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force” against a person. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. The elements of the offense, not the facts of the crime, control. The Wisconsin statute provided: Any prisoner … who intentionally causes bodily harm to an officer, employee, visitor or another inmate … is guilty of a Class D felony.” Section 939.22(4) added that bodily harm means “physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” The described offense categorically is a crime of violence under the elements clause. View "Yates v. United States" on Justia Law

Haywood, an inmate at Illinois’s Shawnee Correctional Center, accused a teacher of attacking him. Guards charged him with making false statements. A disciplinary panel found him guilty, ordered him transferred to segregation for two months, and revoked one month of good‐time credit. He was subsequently transferred to a different prison and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging First Amendment violations and that his conditions of confinement in segregation were cruel and unusual, violating the Eighth Amendment. The district court rejected both claims, dismissing the First Amendment claim because the disciplinary panel’s decision, which affected the duration of Haywood’s confinement, had not been set aside on collateral review or by executive clemency. The court cited Supreme Court holdings that section 1983 cannot be used to seek damages when relief necessarily implies the invalidity of a criminal conviction or prison discipline that remains in force. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to the First Amendment theory and reversed with respect to the Eighth Amendment theory, remanding for consideration under the deliberate indifference standard.The warden had actual knowledge of the unusually harsh weather, had been apprised of the specific problem with Haywood’s cell (the windows would not shut), and had toured the segregation unit. View "Haywood v. Hathaway" on Justia Law

Patrick, on parole, did not comply with the conditions of his release from state prison. A warrant issued for his arrest. Milwaukee police obtained a second warrant, which authorized them to locate Patrick using cell‐phone data. Police arrested him in a car, on a public street, in possession of a firearm. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress evidence of the gun, rejecting Patrick’s challenge to the validity of the location‐tracking warrant, in which he argued that his person was not contraband nor the proceeds of a crime, so that it was off limits to investigation. The court noted that no warrant was required. Patrick was visible to the general public. The court noted that, under recent Supreme Court precedent, even if the police had stopped Patrick’s car for no reason and later learned that he was a fugitive, the gun would have been admissible. The officers who arrested Patrick had both probable cause to believe that he was a fugitive and knowledge of the arrest warrant. The court discussed the use of a cell-site simulator, which potentially reveals information about many persons other than the suspect, but stated that a “fugitive cannot be picky about how he is run to ground.” View "United States v. Patrick" on Justia Law

In 1997, Rodriguez was convicted of two counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and sentenced to 60 years in prison. The Illinois State Police’s Division of Forensic Services had analyzed four semen stains on a blanket from the bed of the 11-year-old victim. Neither side presented the report at trial. The victim’s mother testified that Rodriquez had indicated he was “up all night” doing laundry; during closing arguments the prosecutor asked whether that might be “to get rid of evidence.” Objecting to the statement, in the presence of the jury, defense counsel stated “In fact, counsel knows that there was sperm on various items that was not presented.” The judge instructed the jury to consider only evidence admitted during trial. On direct appeal, Rodriguez argued, that he was denied effective assistance by the comment about evidence of sperm being found on “various items.” The Illinois Appellate Court denied relief, concluding that Rodriguez had not been prejudiced. The district court denied a subsequent federal habeas corpus petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the state court did not unreasonable the standard from Strickland v. Washington, in light of the other evidence and the judge’s curative instruction. View "Rodriguez v. Gossett" on Justia Law

While conducting surveillance, based on information about a cocaine transaction, agents followed Bausley to a Chicago apartment building. Bausley parked on the street. Thompson came out wearing a backpack and entered Bausley’s car. Bausley drove around the block and again stopped outside the building. Thompson got out and reentered the building. Agents who saw Thompson communicated with agent Reynolds, who was present but could not see Thompson. Reynolds eventually approached Thompson, who had returned to the lobby from the ninth floor without the backpack. Thompson repeatedly denied living in the building but allowed Reynolds to use his keys. Reynolds used Thompson’s key to open unit 902. Inside the apartment, Reynolds again told Thompson that he was not under arrest and that he did not have to talk to the agents. Thompson signed a consent form, then stated that there was a gun in the TV stand and that there were drugs and cash elsewhere in the apartment. The agents recovered the gun, a kilogram of cocaine, and $10,000 in cash. Thompson was not arrested and agreed to cooperate. Days later, when Thompson stopped answering calls, he was arrested. Thompson was indicted for possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of Thompson’s motion to suppress; the agents did not commit any violations of Thompson’s Fourth Amendment rights that could have tainted his consent to search his apartment. View "United States v. Thompson" on Justia Law

In 2005, Jennifer’s mother found her 19-year-old daughter dead. Investigators found a chewed 100-microgram Duragesic fentanyl skin patch. The patch is a powerful opioid, not meant to be ingested. Jennifer did not have a prescription. Her friend, Krieger, had such a prescription for pain from severe spinal problems, and had given Jennifer a patch. Investigators also found a hypodermic needle, a small pipe with burnt residue on it, and two red capsules. Neither the capsules nor the pipe were taken into evidence and tested. The syringe was finally tested three years later. A medical examiner found many drugs in Jennifer's system, but concluded that she died from fentanyl toxicity. Krieger was charged with distribution of fentanyl with death resulting, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); 841(b)(1)(c). After its medical witness fled the country, with legal problems of his own, the government dropped the “death resulting” charge, which it would have had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Krieger pleaded guilty to distribution. The prosecution then proposed that “death resulting” be considered as a sentencing factor. The district court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that death had resulted from the distribution, and that it could only give a 20-year sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court later issued its decisions in “Alleyne” decision and Burrage v. United States, Krieger filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Seventh Circuit vacated her sentence. The district court can consider Jennifer’s death, using a preponderance of the evidence standard, as recommended under USSG 2D1.1; implementation of the mandatory minimum sentence, however, would require that a jury find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the patch provided by Krieger was the but-for cause of Curry’s death. The time for such a determination has passed. View "Krieger v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1999, three masked men broke into a Chicago apartment shared by Stone, his cousins, and Grant. Grant and one cousin were home. One intruder beat Grant with a bat. The intruders stole jewelry, marijuana, and cash before fleeing. Stone arrived home, called his half-brother, “Junior,” and explained what happened. Junior, Stone, and Jones decided that Gardner was to blame. They lured Gardner outside; an altercation ensued. They claim Gardner produced a gun. Gardner was fatally shot. Stone turned himself in the next day, claiming that he shot to protect Junior. Stone was convicted of murder. Jones was separately convicted. In his habeas petition, Jones alleged that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective under the Strickland rule for failure to present Stone’s testimony. Stone had consistently stated that he alone shot Gardner. Stone’s story matched the physical evidence and some eyewitness testimony. Jones failed to submit an affidavit from Stone, as Illinois law requires. The state appellate court found the claim procedurally defaulted and rejected the claim on the merits, holding that failure to call Stone was “trial strategy.” The federal district court excused the procedural default based on new evidence of Jones’s actual innocence (Stone’s testimony) and concluded that the state court unreasonably applied Strickland. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the grant of relief. Failure to call Stone cannot reasonably be classified as mere trial strategy within the range of objectively reasonable professional judgments. View "Jones v. Calloway" on Justia Law

Morrison and Novak (defendants) sold “herbal incense” from their retail store, JC Moon, in Ashland, Wisconsin. The substances included XLR-11, UR-144, PB- 22, and 5F-PB-22, which then were not listed on the controlled substance schedules but were similar to scheduled controlled substances. Undercover law enforcement officers made 28 controlled purchases at JC Moon and learned that defendants hid a significant portion of their cash income from the IRS by “skimming” large bills from the cash registers. From 2010 to 2012, defendants under-reported JC Moon’s business income by $575,752 for a tax loss of $186,095. Defendants pleaded guilty to violation of the Controlled Substances Analogue Act, 21 U.S.C. 813 and tax fraud, Novak was sentenced to 96 months and Morrison to 48 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting a Supreme Court holding that holding that the Analogue Act is not unconstitutionally vague due to its scienter requirement and rejecting challenges to the court’s acceptance of their pleas and to the sentences. The totality of the circumstances surrounding Novak’s and Morrison’s guilty pleas indicated that they entered into those pleas voluntarily and with sufficient understanding of the charges against them; there was sufficient factual basis for the pleas. View "United States v. Novak" on Justia Law

In 2012, the City of Country Club Hills City Council adopted an ordinance that provided to homeowners a 25 percent rebate of 2010 city property taxes paid in 2011, subject to the completion of an application by the homeowner and approval by the City Clerk. This was the city’s twelfth consecutive year of offering a rebate program. The application stated that the “FILING OF THIS APPLICATION DOES NOT GUARANTEE APPROVAL BY THE CITY OF COUNTRY CLUB HILLS.” The city prepared the rebate checks but never distributed them. In 2012, the Cook County treasurer overpaid the city by more than $6 million. The county successfully sued to collect the overpayment. Bell filed a purported class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that refusal to issue the rebates amounted to an unconstitutional taking and asserting state law claims for conversion and unjust enrichment. The City Council then repealed the 2012 ordinance. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, agreeing that Bell had no constitutionally protected property interest in the expectation of a rebate, and that she had adequate state court remedies for her claims under state law. View "Bell v. City of Country Club Hills" on Justia Law