Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 1996, a jury convicted Poe of narcotics‐related offenses, including engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE), 21 U.S.C. 848(c). In 1999, the Supreme Court decided Richardson v. United States, rendering the CCE jury instructions used in Poe’s trial erroneous: “You must unanimously find that the defendant committed at least two violations of the federal drug laws, but you do not have to agree on which two violations.” Poe sought habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2241, challenging his conviction under Richardson. Fourteen months later, the district court dismissed Poe’s petition without prejudice, because he should have filed under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Poe’s June 18, 2001 habeas petition, under section 2255, was denied as time‐barred. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in 2006. In 2014, Poe filed a new section 2241 petition, citing Alleyne v. United States (2013). The district court denied his petition, again for not filing it under section 2255. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Construing Poe’s petition as a successive one under section 2255 would be futile; that section allows a successive motion for “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” Alleyne is not retroactive on collateral review.” View "Poe v. LaRiva" on Justia Law

The Union erected a giant inflatable rat and an inflatable fat cat during a labor dispute in Grand Chute, Wisconsin. Both are staked to the ground in the highway median, to prevent the wind from blowing them away. Grand Chute forbids private signs on the public way and defines signs to mean “[a]ny structure, part thereof, or device attached thereto” that conveys a message. The Union removed them at the town's request and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, citing the First Amendment. The district court denied a preliminary injunction and, a year later, granted the town summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit vacated, reasoning that the case may be moot because the construction that led to the use of demonstrative inflatables was complete; the Union was no longer picketing. The court also noted that the town amended its code and changed the definition of a sign. If the Union persists in seeking damages, the district court must weigh the probability of a fresh dispute between this union and Grand Chute and the risk that it would be over too quickly to allow judicial review to apply the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine and must address the validity of current ordinances, rather than one that was changed before the final judgment. View "Constr. & Gen. Laborers' Local Union v. Town of Grand Chute" on Justia Law

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Riano was a hospital corpsman in the Navy. As a civilian, he became a registered nurse. In 2004 he began working as a registered nurse for the Veterans Health Administration, While examining male patients for genital warts, Riano manipulated their penises with his hands, attempting to induce erections. He used words like “pecker” and “balls,” rather than medical terms. The agency found his examination technique and his language to be inappropriate. His employment was terminated. He appealed and was given a hearing that included representation by counsel, live testimony from medical experts, written testimony from patients, and a written report from an investigator who had interviewed the patients. The appeals board affirmed his termination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Riano’s argument that he was not allowed to call patients to testify live to show that some patients were comfortable with his technique and language or that complaining patients had ulterior motives. The board’s decision to affirm Riano’s termination was based on its determination that his technique and language were inappropriate. That was a professional judgment that did not turn on the patients’ subjective views. View "Riano v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Someone used the email address gslabs@hotmail.com to contact a Vietnamese website in an attempt to buy sassafras oil, a chemical that can be used to make the illegal drug known as ecstasy. The website was being monitored by the Drug Enforcement Administration, which began an investigation that culminated in Caira being convicted on drug charges. A key step in the investigation was learning that Caira was the person behind the gslabs@hotmail.com address. The DEA made that discovery by issuing administrative subpoenas to technology companies, without getting a warrant. The district court denied a motion to suppress and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the DEA conducted an “unreasonable search” in violation of the Fourth Amendment, Because Caira voluntarily shared the relevant information with technology companies, he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information, so his Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. The court characterized as “harmless” the district court’s errors imposing conditions of supervised release without justifying them on the record. Caira is serving a life sentence for another conviction. He is not expected to be released from prison so the conditions are not expected to be imposed. View "United States v. Caira" on Justia Law

In 2005 the defendant was sentenced by Judge Reinhard to 300 months in prison for possessing a shotgun illegally. The sentence was later invalidated; in 2015 the defendant was resentenced by Judge Reinhard to 176 months. The defendant was then 54 years old, had a serious vision problem, and had been a model prisoner during the 140 months that he had served: because of his good behavior he was credited with having served 160 months of imprisonment, so that the 176‐month sentence was effectively a sentence of 16 more months in prison. Both the probation service and the U.S. Attorney’s Office had recommended that he be sentenced to time served. The judge rejected the suggestions, citing the gravity of the defendant’s criminal history before 2005 and the fact that, while he had never threatened any officials, defendant had filed complaints (and one civil suit) critical of judicial behavior by Reinhard and other judges and alleging conspiracies linking judges and other officials to grievances the defendant had suffered decades ago. The Seventh Circuit vacated, noting that most of the defendant’s criminal history before the shotgun incident consisted of driving offenses and that defendant had a constitutional right to petition for redress of grievances. The court called the judge’s reasoning “flimsy” and stated that further crimes by the defendant were unlikely. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Whatley was convicted, under a now‐repealed Indiana law, of possessing about three grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a “youth program center.” Whatley’s father’s home, where he was arrested, was 795 feet from the Robinson Community Church, which hosted events targeted to young persons, including religious services, mentoring programs, a Girl Scout troop, weekly Family Fun Night, and children’s choirs. On direct appeal and in federal habeas corpus proceedings, Whatley argued that the statutory definition of “youth program center,” as any: building or structure that on a regular basis provides recreational, vocational, academic, social, or other programs or services for persons less than eighteen (18) years of age,” was unconstitutionally vague. The district court declined to address the claim. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Whatley did not procedurally default his claim. The state courts were unreasonable in applying federal law on vagueness: the word “regular” in the definition provides no objective standard and fails to place persons of ordinary intelligence on notice of the conduct proscribed and allows for arbitrary enforcement; defendants are strictly liable for violating the nebulous provision; and the consequences of a violation were extreme. No one in Whatley’s position could have known that the Church would fall within the definition simply because it hosted a few children’s events each week. View "Whatley v. Zatecky" on Justia Law

McKenzie was killed when he fell to electrified train tracks during a gang-related fight. An Illinois jury convicted Evans of felony murder based on the felony “mob action.” Evans argued on direct appeal that independent purpose was an element of the crime of mob action and that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to have the jury to determine whether the underlying offense of mob action had a felonious purpose independent of the killing. The state court concluded that the trial court “adequately apprised” the jury. The federal district court denied relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, reasoning that Evans’s claim improperly asked a federal court to review a state court’s interpretation of state law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While Evans did properly present a federal claim: the denial of his Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine each element of a state crime, his assertion that Illinois defines felony murder to include “independent felonious intent” as a factual element is inaccurate. View "Evans v. Dorethy" on Justia Law

While working as a part-time Village of Orland Hills police officer, Kristofek cited and arrested a driver for car-insurance-related infractions. After several phone calls between the driver’s mother, local politicians, and Scully, the chief of police, the driver was released and the citations were voided. Months later, Kristofek participated in a police training session that involved hypothetical instances of misconduct. Based on these hypotheticals, Kristofek became concerned that official misconduct may have occurred involving the voided citations. After Kristofek shared this concern with other officers and with the FBI, Scully fired him. Kristofek sued Scully and the Village. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Kristofek’s statements to his colleagues and the FBI about the voided citations were protected under the First Amendment. Kristofek was speaking as a private citizen about a matter of public concern, and his interest in speaking outweighed Scully’s interest in promoting efficiency within the department. The Seventh Circuit agreed that the Village was not liable for Scully’s actions under Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services; Scully did not possess the requisite authority to unilaterally fire Kristofek or to set departmental firing policy. View "Kristofek v. Village of Orland Hills" on Justia Law

After a 2003 shooting, Lisle was convicted of first-degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm and was sentenced to 37 years in prison. He sought habeas corpus relief, arguing that the state trial court admitted as evidence testimonial statements made by the surviving victim (Hearn) in violation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the writ, finding that the state courts did not apply Supreme Court precedent unreasonably in holding that the testimony, about a wounded man’s statement to his aunt (Lee) while waiting for an ambulance that Lisle had shot him, was not a “testimonial” out-of-court statement and was permitted under the Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court had not held in 2007 that a statement to someone other than a law enforcement officer can be testimonial, and it was not unreasonable for the state court to find that Hearn’s statement to Lee was part of an effort to deal with an ongoing emergency and thus was nontestimonial. View "Lisle v. Pierce" on Justia Law

Chicago Police officers pulled over a car driven by Rosado for failing to use a turn signal. After stopping the car, the officers “claimed to have seen” a badge, handcuffs, and a handgun in plain view “between the brake lever and center console.” They arrested Rosado for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon and for violating the armed habitual criminal statute. Another officer approved the report as establishing probable cause. Rosado spent about 18 months in jail before receiving a copy of the dash cam video recorded when he was arrested, which, contrary to the officers’ accounts, showed that Rosado had used an operable turn signal. The state court dismissed the charges. Rosado filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court dismissed Rosado’s false‐arrest claim as barred by the two‐year statute of limitations. Because his claims of conspiracy and failure to intervene arose from the false‐arrest claim, those were also dismissed. The court dismissed Rosado’s due‐process and respondeat‐superior claims on the merits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Rosado did not promptly file. He knew the officers had fabricated probable cause by February 2014, when he received the video, and still had seven months to timely file suit. Rosado’s unexplained failure to timely file precluded equitable tolling. View "Rosado v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law