Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2006, the Zoretics rented a Castilian Court condominium. Their landlord stopped paying condominium assessments and lost possession to Castilian in 2008. Castilian obtained an eviction order. The Cook County Sheriff evicted the family in January 2009. Later that day, Castilian’s agent allowed them to reenter the unit, agreeing they would sign a new lease. Zoretic never signed the lease or paid rent. After receiving no response to two letters, Castilian’s lawyers obtained a new date stamp (April 2009) from the Clerk on the September 2008 order and placed the order with the Sheriff. On June 5, deputies knocked, announced their presence, got no answer, opened the door, and entered the unit with guns drawn. They found Zoretic, put down their weapons, conducted a protective sweep, and escorted Zoretic out of the unit. Days later, Zoretic sued and was awarded possession until Castilian obtained a lawful eviction order. The family returned, continued not paying rent, and were evicted in March 2012. Zoretic sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed as to Fourth Amendment claims against the deputies, but affirmed as to claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress against the owners. Zoretic failed to create a material factual dispute about whether the owners were extreme and outrageous in pursuing eviction. View "Zoretic v. Darge" on Justia Law

Police executed a search warrant on a storage unit that Miranda rented, where Miranda and Rivas worked on cars. The owner said that he saw Rivas at that unit “just about every day.” The officers found drugs, drug paraphernalia, two loaded guns, Rivas’s student handbook, invoices from Rivas’s mechanic business, and a Western Union receipt tied to him. Miranda was arrested. He called Rivas from jail and, in a recorded call, told Rivas the police were looking for him, but that he would not say anything about Rivas to the police. Rivas was arrested. A fingerprint examiner testified at trial that he was certain the partial fingerprint found on a handgun belonged to Rivas. Rivas wanted to question the examiner about an unrelated case in which the FBI used the same method to erroneously conclude that the fingerprint of an Oregon lawyer was on a bag containing detonating devices used in terrorist bombings. The district court ruled the defense could not refer to that case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Rivas’s conviction. The examiner was not involved in the other case, and the cases were wholly unrelated. Rivas’s counsel was not prevented from questioning the examiner on the reliability of the fingerprint identification method. Counsel pursued multiple lines of cross‐examination. Rivas’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was not violated. View "United States v. Rivas" on Justia Law

In 1993 Bradford, then an Evansville police officer, was convicted in Indiana state court of murder and arson and was sentenced to 80 years in prison, where he remains. The victim, who was apparently killed by stabbing before the fire started, was the woman with whom Evans had been having an extramarital affair. In 2013 he filed a federal habeas corpus suit, claiming that he could prove his innocence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of relief. Bradford had his chance and failed to present reliable evidence that would establish his innocence. The Indiana Court of Appeals did not err in holding that Bradford’s trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by selecting a particular fire expert as a witness. This was not a case in which counsel made no meaningful investigation or failed to present a defense expert on a critical issue. View "Bradford v. Brown" on Justia Law

From 2009-2011, Robey operated a “chop shop.” He and his associates stole cars, altered their identities using office and computer equipment, and then sold them. He was convicted by a jury. The district court sentenced him to 110 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that Robey did not receive a speedy trial, in violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161(c)(1), 3162, and the Sixth Amendment and that district court erred in allowing the government to amend the indictment by dropping 19 of the 25 charges and erred at sentencing by finding that Robey’s theft of 10 vehicles, in addition to the four vehicles forming the basis of his conviction, constituted relevant conduct. The court upheld a finding that only 28 days had elapsed on Robey’s pre‐trial speedy trial clock. The court did not abuse its discretion in granting 10 ends‐of‐justice continuances for Robey and one for the prosecution. The evidence presented at trial and sentencing was more than sufficient to support the district court’s finding of a “pattern of relevant conduct that far exceeded in its details the four cars that were stolen that were before the jury.” View "United States v. Robey" on Justia Law

In 2003, a Wisconsin state court convicted Jordan of first‐degree reckless homicide, three counts of first‐degree endangerment, and as a felon in possession of a firearm, based on the shooting of Robinson, who was sitting in a car with three other people when he was killed by shots from a passing car. Before trial, Jordan repeatedly complained about his appointed attorney, Bohach. After a hearing, at which Jordan represented himself, the court denied Jordan’s motion asking for either appointment of new counsel, a delay to enable Bohach to do research Jordan thought necessary, or to waive counsel and represent himself. Jordan had an eighth‐grade education, but a fourth‐grade reading ability. At trial, “Bohach gave Jordan reason to be displeased.” In its closing argument, the prosecution made statements vouching for the detectives’ credibility and urged the jury to consider who had the most to lose—Jordan or the prosecutor. Bohach failed to object. After exhausting state remedies, Jordan filed an unsuccessful federal habeas petition. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for a hearing concerning Jordan’s ineffective assistance claim. The court affirmed with respect to self-representation. It was reasonable for the court to infer that Jordan would not be able to use necessary documents, which would prevent him from effectively representing himself. View "Jordan v. Hepp" on Justia Law

A woman reported that her former boyfriend, Giddeon, had attacked and threatened to shoot her. The police searched near the home without success, but later spotted a woman (Giddeon’s sister) leaving the victim’s house and entering a car in which the police could see other occupants. The police followed, stopped the car, recognized Giddeon among the passengers, handcuffed him, and put him in their squad car. The driver consented to a search that revealed a shopping bag that contained a gun wrapped in clothing. Giddeon, told of the discovery, admitted after a half hour that it was his gun. In Wisconsin state court he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and disorderly conduct and was sentenced to five years in prison. In Giddeon’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the defendants conceded that the police lacked probable cause to stop the car. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. While the search was consensual, Giddeon's arrest in a public place was not unlawful, and Giddeon’s discomfort in sitting in the squad car for 30 minutes on a hot day was not disabling, the stop was an unreasonable seizure of Giddeon’s person, entitling him to damages. View "Giddeon v. Flynn" on Justia Law

In 1993, Figgs was convicted of murder, committed while on bond for a drug offense. His 40-year sentence was to be served consecutively to his four-year sentence for the drug offense and was to include credit for time served prior to conviction. His planned release date of November 23, 2013, was apparently calculated under the mistaken belief that he had violated the terms of his mandatory supervised release on the drug charge. He was released on June 28, 2012, having survived summary judgment in his state‐court mandamus proceeding, in which he challenged his release date. Figgs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the possibility that he was being held unlawfully. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to the warden, whose conduct did not demonstrate a sufficiently culpable state of mind. The court vacated as to the record office supervisor, who did not attempt to calculate Figgs’s sentence until June 2012, nor thoroughly review Figgs’s master file; a jury could find her minimal action so ineffectual that it amounted to criminal recklessness. Her conduct violated Figgs's established constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment; the supervisor is not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Figgs v. Dawson" on Justia Law

Chicago police learned from an informant that Anthony was selling crack cocaine from his apartment and answered the door carrying a handgun during drug transactions. They obtained a search warrant. The SWAT team executed a “High Risk Warrant Services” form. The plan called for a team of 20 officers to effect a “dynamic entry” to secure the premises within 30 seconds and authorized the use of “flashbang” grenades. The team executed the warrant while Flournoy was visiting her son “Tony,” with his girlfriend and another of Flournoy’s sons. An officer knocked on the door and yelled, “Chicago police, search warrant!” When no one answered after several seconds, officers breached the door with a battering ram and cleared the windows. Officer Colbenson saw Flournoy move toward the door. Officer Quinn looked through the doorway, did not see anyone, and tossed a flashbang inside. The blast severely wounded Flournoy’s leg. Officers administered first aid until Flournoy was transported. A search uncovered narcotics and a loaded handgun. In Flournoy’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the jury ruled in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The jury’s verdict was supported by the record; the exclusion of a handwritten notation--two flashbangs deployed––on one of Colbenson’s typed reports was not an abuse of discretion. A jury statement that “While we agree that this was a horrible instance ... the errors made by the Chicago Police Department as a whole cannot fall on the shoulders of these two defendants” was consistent with the verdict. View "Flournoy v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

From 2008-2010, the FBI and Chicago Police Department conducted a narcotics investigation, “Operation Blue Knight.” As the operation was wrapping up, Officer O’Donnell applied for dozens of arrest warrants, including one for White. Other officers had observed White and his brother sell heroin to an informant. The observations were in a more comprehensive report (NAGIS) that O’Donnell used as the basis for his arrest warrant application. White was arrested, but the charge was dropped. He then brought a civil rights lawsuit alleging that O’Donnell’s actions and a city policy violated his Fourth Amendment rights. White’s claims are based on a theory that O’Donnell failed to present the judge who issued the warrant enough information to establish probable cause for the arrest. The district court dismissed the claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. O’Donnell’s written application for an arrest warrant, supported by his oral testimony about the NAGIS report of the surveillance of the drug deal, provided probable cause for the warrant. Probable cause also establishes that White did not suffer a constitutional injury, which was a necessary element of his “Monell claim” against the city. View "White v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Neita formerly owned and operated a dog-grooming business and rescue shelter. In 2012, he went to Chicago’s Department of Animal Care and Control to surrender a dog that had killed another dog and a dog that had become ill after whelping puppies. Travis, an Animal Control employee, called the police. Officers arrested and searched Neita, then searched his vehicle, and his business premises. Neita was charged with animal cruelty and 13 counts of violating an animal owner’s duties under Illinois law. He was found not guilty on all counts. After his acquittal, Neita suedTravis, the officers, and the city. The judge dismissed the federal claims, holding that Neita not adequately pled any constitutional violation and relinquished supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding the complaint’s allegations sufficient to state 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims for false arrest and illegal searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Neita alleged that he surrendered two dogs, neither of which showed signs of abuse or neglect, and was arrested without any evidence that he had mistreated either dog. If these allegations are true, no reasonable person would have cause to believe that Neita had abused or neglected an animal. View "Neita v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law