Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Imani and Raziga were charged with bank robbery. While fleeing, Imani forced a driver to give him a ride. Police recovered Imani’s fingerprints from the car. The driver identified Imani, in a photo array and later during a preliminary hearing. Raziga pled guilty and testified against Imani. Imani’s lawyer unsuccessfully moved to suppress the driver’s identification as tainted by television coverage. Imani then sought to represent himself, stating that he questioned his lawyer’s abilities. The judge discounted Imani’s statements that he had been “working on this for 13 months;” that he read at a college level; and that he had appeared in court for at least five previous criminal matters, while represented by lawyers. The judge treated the request as requiring permission and as an “immature decision.” Although Imani said that he had no problem with the trial date, the judge denied permission, stating that, upon a further request, he would reconsider. There was no further request. Imani, represented by counsel, was convicted. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's new trial order and affirmed Imani’s conviction, stating that although the court did not conduct a full colloquy, its determination that Imani was not competent to proceed pro se was supported by the record. The district court stated that the competency finding appeared to violate the right to self‐representation, but denied Imani’s habeas petition, based on the finding that Imani’s invocation of that right was not knowing and voluntary. The Seventh Circuit reversed, citing Supreme Court precedent, Faretta v. California (1975). A judge may not deny a competent defendant’s timely invocation of his right to represent himself. View "Imani v. Pollard" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, walking her brown labrador retriever, “Dog,” encountered a gray and white pit bull running loose, which lunged at Dog’s neck. The dogs began to fight. Neighbors unsuccessfully tried to separate them. Plaintiff dropped Dog’s leash so that Dog could defend himself. Officer Davis, driving to a burglary call, received a report that a pit bull was attacking another dog at a corner along his route. Davis pulled over and trained his spotlight on the dogs. Plaintiff, who was crying, identified herself and described Dog. Davis has a form of colorblindness that makes it difficult for him to distinguish certain colors, but had not informed his employer of his condition. Davis shot at what he thought was the aggressor. The dogs separated. Dog limped toward plaintiff, who cried that Davis had shot her dog. Davis then aimed at the pit bull and fired several times. The pit bull left the scene. Dog died as a result of the gunshot wound. From the time Davis had arrived until the time he fired his seventh shot, about two minutes elapsed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a verdict in favor of Davis in a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging unconstitutional seizure of Dog. The court upheld a conclusion that Davis had not committed discovery violations and the court’s rejection of plaintiffs’ proffered Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis jury instruction. View "Saathoff v. Davis" on Justia Law

Rhein called and sent papers to Illinois Representative DeLuca, accusing DeLuca of violating the constitution and threatening violence. One document asserted: “Now you know why so many of you people or going to be shot because your too selfish too understand the truth.” There were hand-drawn crosshairs. Rhein visited DeLuca’s office and said that he was “ready to start shooting people.” The Illinois State Police discovered that Rhein was licensed to own firearms and had some registered in his name. Officer Coffman concluded that his “mental condition is of such a nature that it poses a clear and present danger,” 430 ILCS 65/8(f), sufficient to justify summary revocation. Police removed his weapons. Coffman sent a letter, stating that Rhein could apply to have the Card reinstated and strongly encouraging Rhein to include three character references plus a psychologist's report. Six months later Rhein requested the Card’s reinstatement, including three references plus a psychologist’s report concluding “that Rhein is all bark and no bite.” Eventually, the Director reinstated Rhein’s Card without a hearing; the firearms were returned. Rhein sued Coffman under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment, rejecting Rhein’s claims. Summary revocation, with hearing to follow, is proper when delay poses unacceptable risks; the officer is entitled to qualified immunity on the delay theory, because courts have yet to determine how quickly governmental bodies must act when the right to keep firearms is at stake. The court noted that Coffman had no role in the restoration of the Card or return of the guns. View "Rhein v. Coffman" on Justia Law

After the Supreme Court’s 2010 holding that the Second Amendment applies to the states, the Seventh Circuit concluded that states must permit law-abiding and mentally healthy persons to carry loaded weapons in public. Illinois enacted a system for issuing permits to carry concealed firearms, 430 ILCS 66/1. Plaintiffs applied for concealed-carry permits, but were rejected because law enforcement agencies objected. They were told that there were objections, but not by whom or why. Illinois subsequently changed its regulations to require that such information be given and that the applicant be allowed to respond. District judges then rejected plaintiffs’ claims, stating that plaintiffs’ proper recourse was to apply for licenses under the new rules. None of the plaintiffs filed another application. The Seventh Circuit rejected their “facial” challenges to the law. A federal court should not assume that the state will choose the unconstitutional path when a valid one is open. Rejecting a challenge to the existence of a permit requirement as a “prior restraint,” the court stated Illinois is entitled to check an applicant’s record of convictions, and any concerns about his mental health, close to the date the applicant proposes to go armed on the streets. The court upheld the statute’s placing the burden on the state to justify denials, using a preponderance standard, and rejected a challenge to the composition of the concealed carry board. View "Berron v. Ill. Concealed Carry Licensing Review Bd." on Justia Law

Patterson was an armed-robbery suspect. Officer Strayer and FBI Agent Stewart approached Patterson in a driveway. Neither was in a uniform, but both were armed. They identified themselves as FBI, and asked Patterson to show his hands. Strayer kept his hand on his gun. Stewart explained that Patterson's name came up in an investigation and asked Patterson to go to their office to “clear his name.” Patterson agreed and cooperated by allowing a pat down. Patterson affirmatively indicated that he was going voluntarily and got into the front passenger seat. While they talked in a conference room, there was nothing between Patterson and the door. Stewart accused Patterson of the robbery, then stated Patterson was not going to be arrested that day. After initially denying involvement, Patterson confessed. Following the unrecorded two-hour interview, Patterson asked when he would be arrested. Stewart told Patterson that a warrant would likely be secured in a week or two. Patterson agreed to turn himself in. The agents dropped Patterson off at his requested location. Patterson moved to suppress the incriminating statements as made in violation of Miranda. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of Patterson’s motion, agreeing that he was not in custody for purposes of Miranda. Nothing indicated that Patterson’s consent to accompany the agents and to speak with them was anything but voluntary. A reasonable person in Patterson’s position would have felt free to leave. View "United States v. Patterson" on Justia Law

Tri-Corp, a nonprofit corporation, offered low-income housing to mentally disabled persons in Milwaukee. Its lender, the Wisconsin Housing and Economic Development Authority, filed a foreclosure action. Tri-Corp blamed others for its financial problems and named several third-party defendants. The state court allowed the foreclosure and rejected the third-party claims except those against Milwaukee Alderman Bauman, who removed the claims to federal court. Tri-Corp contends that Bauman is liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for issuing statements critical of its operations and for lobbying other officials to rule against it in administrative proceedings, in violation of the Fair Housing Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. The Seventh Circuit joined six circuit courts in holding that section 1983 cannot be used to alter the categories of persons potentially liable in private actions under the Rehabilitation Act or the Americans with Disabilities Act. Tri-Corp did not allege that Bauman himself denied it any right under the Fair Housing Act, or even was a member of a public body that did so. Tri-Corp accuses Bauman of speech, not action. Public officials enjoy the right of free speech and the Noerr-Pennington doctrine applies to claims under the Act, allowing governmental officials to try to persuade other officials to take particular actions. View "Tri-Corp Hous. Inc. v. Bauman" on Justia Law

Indiana Code 3‐5‐9‐5, enacted in 2012, provides that “an individual is considered to have resigned as a government employee when the individual assumes an elected office of the unit that employs the individual.” A grandfather clause allowed then‐current officeholders to complete their terms before becoming subject to the law. Plaintiffs are civil servants who also serve on city and town councils that have the authority to set the annual compensation for the municipal employees (their own compensation). Most plaintiffs earn a significantly higher salary in their civil service positions than in their elected positions. They contend that if the law takes effect, they will be forced to resign from elected office. Plaintiffs argued that the law violated the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the complaint, reasoning that the law imposes a small burden on plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights, and any burden is outweighed​ by Indiana’s compelling interest in avoiding corruption by public officeholders and the appearance of the same. There is a clear, rational relationship between pre‐ venting actual and perceived corruption and Indiana’s treatment of municipal employees. View "Claussen v. Pence" on Justia Law

Schmid was convicted of murdering her boyfriend. She testified that she had heard a voice telling her that she is the Messiah and that the boyfriend had sexually abused her daughter. The jury found her guilty but mentally ill. Her conviction and sentence of 55 years were affirmed in 2004. Schmid unsuccessfully sought Indiana state court collateral review, after which, appointed counsel stopped representing her. Federal law gives state prisoners one year to commence proceedings under 28 U.S.C. 2254, with time suspended while state collateral proceedings are pending. When Schmid sought state collateral review, 178 days remained in the one-year period. Schmid filed a federal petition 15 months after state proceedings ended. Schmid, representing herself, contended that equitable tolling was justified, given her mental problems and delay by former counsel in turning over legal papers. The court denied Schmid’s petition as untimely, stating that Schmid failed to explain which documents she needed in order to file or why she needed them, and did not address Schmid’s claim of mental disability. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The court’s first step should have been to appoint counsel for Schmid under 18 U.S.C. 3006A(a)(2)(B). Counsel could have investigated Schmid’s mental condition and explored the contents of prior counsel’s files, formulating an explanation for delay satisfactory to the judge. View "Schmid v. McCauley" on Justia Law

Heinz was the victim of a 2011 home invasion. One burglar entered, punched Heinz and locked him in a closet, then was joined by a second burglar. They stole Heinz’s possessions, including his car. Police arrested Jackson. After he was acquitted, Jackson sued the police under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that there was probable cause for the arrest. Heinz identified Jackson’s picture in a photo spread; Heinz’s neighbor identified Jackson as one of two people he saw loitering outside Heinz’s house near the time of the burglary. Jackson’s son told the police that his father had committed some burglaries recently. Jackson had no evidence for his claim that the photo spreads were conducted improperly. A search of Jackson’s home was authorized by a warrant. Jackson claimed that he was mistreated during this custody by being held incommunicado and without food for several days, but did not sue any of the guards. The court characterized Jackson’s claims as irresponsible and stated that his attorney “should count himself lucky that the appellees have not requested sanctions under Fed. R. App. P. 38.” View "Jackson v. City of Peoria" on Justia Law

The Board of Education has a written policy that forbids teachers from using racial epithets in front of students, no matter the purpose. Brown, a Chicago sixth grade teacher, caught students passing a note in class. The note contained music lyrics with the offensive word “nigger.” Brown used the episode as an opportunity to conduct an apparently well‐intentioned discussion of why such words must not be used. The school principal happened to observe the lesson. Brown was suspended and brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Two of his theories were rejected on summary judgment: that his suspension violated his First Amendment rights, and that the school’s policy was so vague that his suspension violated the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating “not everything that is undesirable, annoying, or even harmful amounts to a violation of the law, much less a constitutional problem.” Public‐employee speech is subject to a special set of First Amendment rules. Brown himself emphasized that he was speaking as a teacher, an employee, not as a citizen, so his suspension did not implicate his First Amendment rights. Brown’s surprise at being disciplined, along with a few episodes of non‐enforcement, do not support a substantive due process claim. View "Brown v. Chicago Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law