Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Wilson and Hanson, business partners, had a property ownership dispute. Warren County issued a letter stating that real property occupied by Wilson had to be cleaned up, but sent the letter to Hanson. Hanson, attorney Johnson, and Reiners, photographed Wilson’s property. Wilson, who suffers from psychological disorders, became upset and was hospitalized. Wilson’s friend called State’s Attorney Algren, who stated that the men could not take Wilson's property without a court order. Hanson, through Johnson, sought such an order, but was unsuccessful because the judge was unavailable. Johnson told Algren about the suit but did not disclose his failure to get the order. When the men began removing items, Wilson called the sheriff’s department, which dispatched Carithers, who believed that Hanson owned the property. Johnson told Carithers that they had a legal right to remove property and handed him a stack of "court papers." Carithers called Algren, who advised him that if Johnson had the proper papers, they were within their rights. Wilson suffered another anxiety attack. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment, rejecting Wilson’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Hanson, Johnson, Reiners, the county, Carithers, and Algren, and dismissal of a Fair Housing Act claim against the three private defendants.There was insufficient raise the inference that the private defendants would not have removed Wilson's property if he wasn’t disabled or that they acted under color of law. View "Wilson v. Warren County" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a prisoner and a Wiccan, was denied permission to wear a “pentacle medallion,”a five-pointed silver star set in a circle less than an inch in diameter. The pentacle medallion is to the Wiccan religion what the cross is to many Christians. Plaintiff’s medallion was small enough to comply with prison regulations regarding jewelry; the day after issuing him a jewelry retention permit, the prison confiscated the medallion. In plaintiff’s suit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc–1, the warden argued that the Illinois Department of Corrections prohibits inmates from possessing “five and six-point star symbols” because they are usable as gang identifiers. Without addressing the merits of the suit or the defense, the district judge denied a preliminary injunction. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that RLUIPA’s “substantial burden” inquiry asks whether the government has substantially burdened religious exercise, not whether the claimant is able to engage in other forms of religious exercise. The court noted that the plaintiff is willing to wear his medallion under his shirt whenever he’s outside his cell to protect himself from being identified as a gang member and had tendered an affidavit from another Wiccan prisoner, who attested that he has worn his medallion in maximum security prisons since 1998 without experiencing threats or violence. View "Knowles v. Pfister" on Justia Law

Ohio tollways assess a toll only when a driver exits a highway. Illinois’ toll system assesses periodic tolls as a driver continues on the highway and allows drivers to use electronic transponders. At each toll plaza, Illinois has full‐speed lanes for transponder users and lanes for drivers who stop and pay cash. If a driver without a transponder uses a transponder lane, there is a seven‐day grace period for payment online or by mail, without incurring a fine, after which the car's owner incurs a $20 fine per violation. If an owner incurs three fines in two years, the tollway sends a notice, showing the date, time, and location of each violation, and explaining the right to contest the violations at a hearing. Toll evasion is a strict liability and vicarious liability offense. Transponder users are granted a second grace period: After notice is mailed, transponder users have until the due date on the notice to pay their missed tolls and update their account information to avoid fines. In December 2013, an Ohio resident drove to Chicago. He alleges that there was no signage informing him of how Illinoisʹ toll system worked, and that he did not understand the signage at the toll plazas. Plaintiff used the transponder lanes and missed three tolls before he realized his mistake. He called the tollway authority and was told that no violations appeared in the database. Weeks later, he received notice of the violations and his right to a hearing. Plaintiff paid $64.50, then filed a putative class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging equal protection and due process violations. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, applying the rational basis test. View "Cochran v. Ill. State Toll Highway Auth." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, current and former detainees, brought a class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Cook County, claiming that the level of dental care at the Jail demonstrated deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court originally certified two classes of plaintiffs under FRCP 23, but later decertified one class and modified the other, finding that the Jail’s implementation of a consent order with the Department of Justice eliminated a common question concerning inadequate staffing and brought care into compliance with national standards. The court could not find another common factor among the claims, noting that “treatment of dental pain may fall below the deliberate indifference threshold for many reasons and at many stages.” The court then determined that the detainees’ motion for injunctive relief was moot. While an appeal was pending, the detainees unsuccessfully moved for a new trial (FRCP 60(b)) based on newly discovered evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding decertification of the classes because of the lack of a common issue of fact or law. The detainees’ questions do not point to the type of systematic and gross deficiency that would lead to a finding that all detainees are effectively denied treatment; they did not allege a specific policy that directly causes delay, nor a pattern of egregious delays across the entire class. Filing a Rule 60(b) motion during the interlocutory appeal was inappropriate; there was no final judgment in the case. View "Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook County" on Justia Law

Morris filed an application under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3), seeking authorization to file a successive motion to vacate under section 2255. Morris was sentenced as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. 924(e) and wanted to challenge his sentence under the Supreme Court’s 2015 holding, in Johnson v. United States, that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act is unconstitutionally vague. The Supreme Court made Johnson retroactive. The Seventh Circuit granted the petition. Morris made a prima facie showing that he may be entitled to relief. Morris proposes to challenge only one of his three predicate offenses: his conviction for attempted robbery in Illinois, 720 ILCS 5/8‐4(a), 18‐1(a). To determine whether an attempt offense constitutes a violent felony, a court must examine how state courts have applied the general attempt statute to the particular crime attempted. View "Morris v. United States" on Justia Law

Todd sold 22.1 grams of cocaine to an undercover police officer. In 2010, he pled guilty and, having a criminal record that included five prison sentences totaling 22 years, was sentenced to 25 years in prison. He unsuccessfully appealed, claiming ineffective assistance because his lawyer told him the government would recommend no more than a 10‐year sentence. Four years later he unsuccessfully sought habeas corpus in federal court on the same ground. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, noting the evidence in support of state court findings that Todd had not been confused about the terms of the plea agreement and that defense counsel was not ineffective. Even if Todd believed in the claimed 10‐year cap, he either lied or was confused in replying “no” when asked by the judge whether any promises had been made to him other than that his bond would be reduced and the other charge against him dropped. If he was confused and still believed there was a sentencing cap, the trial judge disabused him of his mistake by telling him he could be sentenced to anywhere from six to 60 years even if he pleaded guilty. View "Todd v. Roberson" on Justia Law

Officer McVicker pulled over a vehicle with Colorado license plates, traveling in Madison County, Illinois. The vehicle contained Smoot, the driver, and Walton, a passenger and had been traveling 68 mph in a 65 mph zone. It was following too closely; it appeared that Walton was not wearing his seatbelt, a violation of Illinois law. McVicker informed them that he intended only to issue a written warning. Walton stated that they had been stopped in Kansas the previous evening and had received a warning for an improper signal. Walton gave the written warning to McVicker. The warning noted that Walton was driving with a suspended license. Walton said that the police had searched their vehicle, which was a rental car. He produced the rental agreement, which showed that the Suburban had been rented at the Denver International Airport and that Smoot was not an authorized driver; neither could legally drive the Suburban. McVicker stated that he could have the vehicle towed, but would not do so. McVicker noted that Smoot appeared “extremely nervous.” After 22 minutes of conversation, McVicker learned, from dispatch, that Walton’s extensive criminal history included a drug trafficking offense. The two denied permission to search the vehicle. Approximately 33 minutes after the stop, McVicker requested a canine unit, which arrived 22 minutes later. The dog alerted that drugs were present. McVicker searched the interior; seven minutes into the search, McVicker located cocaine concealed in a void within the rear quarter panel. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress. McVicker was justified in detaining the two beyond the time necessary to complete the written warning in order to confirm or dispel his reasonable suspicion and acted with reasonable diligence in requesting a canine unit. View "United States v. Walton" on Justia Law

Officer Johnson spotted defendant driving on an interstate highway in Bloomington, Illinois. Defendant was not speeding, swerving, or committing any moving violation, but had an Indiana temporary vehicle registration tag “that was unlike any Indiana registration tag” Johnson had seen before. In Johnson’s experience temporary Indiana tags were normally “in the back of a window, not a piece of paper where the license plate normally goes.” When his own check and then a dispatcher’s separate check of the database found no record of the registration, Johnson made a traffic stop to investigate whether the tag might be a forgery. When Johnson asked defendant for his license, he admitted that he was driving on a suspended license. Johnson arrested him. During an inventory search, police discovered two guns that led to defendant’s conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress. The officer based the stop on the fact that the number on the car’s temporary registration tag did not appear in the law enforcement database. That discrepancy gave the officer a reasonable suspicion that the car was either stolen or not properly registered. The court remanded for reconsideration of certain conditions of supervised release. View "United States v. Miranda-Sotolongo" on Justia Law

Felton was in a car in Harvey, Illinois, when he was approached by an unmarked car with tinted windows. Felton, who was unarmed, claims that he feared for his life and fled onto the expressway, heading toward Chicago. Officers “chased” him, firing guns, then “ram[med]” their cars into his, causing him to crash. He states he was “shot by 6 different stu[n] guns,” “put into critical condition,” and suffered broken bones, bruises, a concussion, lost vision, and other injuries. He underwent several surgeries and suffered “excruciating pain and mental anguish.” He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Because Felton was incarcerated at the time, the judge conducted an initial screening under, 28 U.S.C. 1915A, noting that the allegations were insufficient to state claims against the only named defendants: Chicago and its police superintendent (in his official capacity). The judge found it “painfully obvious” that Felton’s complaint “had omitted critical facts” and consulted newspaper accounts of Felton’s arrest. “Instead of expending further resources in recapping what those newspaper accounts reflected,” the judge attached them as exhibits to his order, dismissing the suit as “frivolous.” The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that at least one part of Felton’s complaint was legally viable: his allegation that he was shot by multiple stun guns. View "Felton v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

After he was temporarily suspended from Watseka Community High School for allegedly consuming or possessing drugs, Dietchweiler filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the defendants violated his due process rights, with state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, slander, and violations of the Illinois School Code, 105 ILCS 5/10-22.6, which provides procedures for suspending and expelling students. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on the due process claim and dismissed the state law claims without prejudice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The administrators explained to Dietchwieler and his parents the general nature of the charges against him and provided him with a written suspension notice. Most of Dietchweiler’s complaints about the hearing relate to the defendants’ alleged failure to follow their own published policies and procedures, but failure to follow state statutes or state-mandated procedures does not amount to a federal due process claim of constitutional magnitude. While the Board disbelieved the evidence he presented, due process does not guarantee that his version of events will be believed. View "Dietchweiler v. Lucas" on Justia Law