Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2006, Bell was adjudicated a sexually dangerous person and civilly detained. After attacking a guard at the Rushville Treatment and Detention Facility, he was convicted and spent the four years in prison. When his sentence expired in 2010, he was returned to Rushville, where he declined to cooperate with intake procedures and threatened guards. Housed in segregation, he resisted the Facility’s normal operation. After 20 days, Bell was taken to a secure infirmary room, with large windows, and denied clothing. Bell's resistance resulted in some use of force. He spent eight days naked in the infirmary. On the ninth day Bell cooperated, was given clothes ,and moved to the general population. He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court granted all defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit remanded. Because he is a civil detainee, not a prisoner, Bell invoked the Due Process Clause, not the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. To say that harsh conditions are proper as a penalty for crime does not justify Bell’s treatment. Spending eight days naked in a fan-blown stream of chilled air might not be proper for a convicted prisoner, when the goal was to get the prisoner to pose for a photograph. While Bell did not file a timely appeal, he did file other papers that could be treated as notice of appeal or a request for an extension. View "Bell v. McAdory" on Justia Law

Smith, pretending to be pregnant, took her half-sister’s newborn son from his bassinette during the night and started to drive from Beloit, Wisconsin, to her home in Colorado. In Iowa, she learned that Wisconsin police wanted to interview her. She spoke by phone with a Beloit police officer who told her to pull over so that local law enforcement could speak with her. Before dawn, Smith pulled off the interstate, wrapped the baby in blankets, placed him in a plastic container, and put the container behind a gas station, in subzero mid-winter temperatures. She drove to another gas station, called the Beloit officer back, and was eventually arrested on an unrelated Texas warrant. When officers questioned her, she denied any knowledge of the child’s whereabouts until after he was found alive the next day. A jury convicted her of kidnapping. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Smith’s claims that her statements to officers were the product of coercion; that statements the district court suppressed based on a Miranda violation were improperly admitted for impeachment; that no rational jury could conclude that she lacked parental permission to take the child or that she attained a benefit from the kidnapping; and challenging the government’s inquiry into the conduct underlying the Texas warrant. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

During an argument, Burris fired his handgun, hitting Kamal in the neck and paralyzing him. Burris fled and evaded police for five months, before surrendering. The state judge instructed the jury on first-degree reckless injury, possession of a firearm by a felon, and the lesser included offense of second-degree reckless injury. For first-degree liability, the government had to prove circumstances showing an “utter disregard for human life.” Burris argued that the shooting was an accident. The jury submitted a written question: “Regarding the element of utter disregard, all other facts and circumstances relating to the incident, do we consider facts and circumstances after the shooting?” The judge gave a supplemental instruction: First of all, I want to emphasize that you are to rely on the instructions that I gave you. All right? And to rely on all of the instructions that I gave you. And in response to this question, if this clarifies anything, after-the-fact regard for human life does not negate utter disregard otherwise established by the circumstances before and during the crime. It may be considered by the fact-finder as a part of the total factual picture, but it does not operate to preclude a finding of utter disregard for human life. The element of utter disregard for human life is measured objectively on the basis of what a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have known. The jury convicted Burris of first-degree reckless injury. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that, although the instruction may have been ambiguous, it was not reasonably likely that it misled the jury. The federal district court denied habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed; the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law . View "Burris v. Smith" on Justia Law

Miller was convicted in Indiana of three counts of child molestation and sentenced to three consecutive 40-year terms. The sexual abuse, including anal intercourse, began when the victim was nine and continued for six years. When imposing the lengthy term the state judge relied on the nature of Miller’s conduct, on his four prior convictions, his failure to reform after stretches of imprisonment, and the absence of any mitigating factors. The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal in 2004. Miller then filed a collateral attack, contending that his appellate lawyer furnished ineffective assistance by failing to contest his sentence. The state’s court of appeals concluded that counsel should have raised this issue, but that its omission did not result in prejudice under the standard of Strickland v. Washington because Miller did not establish that his sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. A federal district judge then denied Miller’s petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the state’s decision was not “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” View "Miller v. Zatecky" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee at Cook County Jail, fell and injured his back. It was a month before he was able to see a doctor. Correctional officers did not move him although the doctor determined that he needed to be in a lower bunk. There was no ladder to his upper bunk, so had to sleep on the floor until his term of confinement ended. He sued correctional officers, contending that they had manifested deliberate indifference to an acute medical need. The district judge granted the defendants summary judgment, stating only that “it is undisputed that Plaintiff never received a lower bunk permit at any time while at the jail.” The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, stating that it was disputed and he did receive an order from a doctor directing that he be assigned to a lower bunk. The defendants’ brief did not discuss the dispute and did not substantiate its denial. View "Bolling v. Carter" on Justia Law

Former gang member Herron is serving long sentences. Before his transfer to Terre Haute, he was attacked by inmates and left permanently disabled and confined to a wheelchair. At Terre Haute, Herron was assigned to a wheel-chair-accessible cell. Terre Haute inmates told Herron that he had been targeted because he was believed to be a pedophile. Herron learned that his prison records contained references to the Adam Walsh Act, 42 U.S.C. 16901–91, although his convictions are for other crimes. He filed a grievance; the Bureau of Prisons corrected his record. Hearing other inmates were planning to attack him, he asked to be placed in segregation. The prison complied and assigned him a wheelchair-accessible cell. Within a month, his cellmate attacked him over his “Walsh Act stuff.” Herron rejected another assigned cellmate, whom he viewed as threatening, and filed grievances. Guards took Herron to a non-accessible cell and refused to help him to the toilet. He was found lying near the toilet. He was treated for head lacerations, a shoulder contusion, and a sprained spine. The Seventh Circuit vacated dismissal of his First Amendment retaliation claim and the district court's grant of qualified immunity on the Eighth Amendment theory, which accepted a claim that the guard was implementing a policy of moving every inmate who objects to a new cellmate, to prevent inmates from reserving one-person cells. View "Herron v. Meyer" on Justia Law

Indiana Pendleton Correctional Facility inmate Ellison was notified of a disciplinary proceeding concerning his possession of heroin that was confiscated by Officer Bynum during a cell-search. Ellison told Officer Guffey that two unfamiliar guards, not Bynum, had conducted the search and found nothing. Although Bynum's report stated that he found heroin in cell 10-5D, assigned to Ellison, a photo of the heroin is labeled “Cell 10-6D.” Ellison requested the identities of the guards who searched his cell and that they appear as witnesses, and sought surveillance video and test results for the substance. He later recognized one of the guards, who identified himself as Dorethery, and confirmed that he had searched Ellison’s cell on the day in question and that no contraband was found. Ellison specifically requested his presence. No witnesses, not even Bynum, appeared at the hearing and Ellison was not permitted to view the video. The hearing officer stripped Ellison of 90 days’ good-time credit. After exhausting administrative remedies, Ellison unsuccessfully sought collateral review under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Ellison was entitled to present evidence refuting Bynum’s report, and given the conflict between that report and the photo, the refusal to permit Ellison to exercise that right was “particularly troubling.” View "Ellison v. Zatecky" on Justia Law

DEA and Chicago Police officers observed Soto at the residence of a major drug supplier. They followed Soto as he entered his car with large garbage bags, which he discarded in a dumpster. Officers recovered the bags; they contained clear plastic tape, latex gloves, coffee grounds and aluminum foil molded into a brick-shape the size of a kilogram of cocaine. A canine alerted to the presence of narcotics and laboratory testing revealed the presence of cocaine. Officers had never heard of Contreras until they followed Soto to his house. An officer testified that after Soto went inside, the garage door opened and that, using binoculars, the officer saw the men touch hands in what he thought indicated the passing of money or drugs. A box removed from Conteras' Mercedes buckled and a rectangular, white, plastic-wrapped object fell out. Later, officers determined that the shoebox contained five wrapped bricks of cocaine. The officers moved in and read Contreras his Miranda rights; he signed a consent to search in both English and Spanish. Contreras expressed willingness to cooperate and admitted that he had been selling drugs with Soto for about one year. Contreras provided the combination to a bedroom safe that contained $99,153 in cash, two guns and ammunition. He told officers where to find 2.5 kilograms of cocaine. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress, rejecting an argument that the initial entry and protective sweep were illegal and that Contreras’ consent was tainted by the illegal acts. View "United States v. Contreras" on Justia Law

Seeing an internet advertisement for a 1997 FLTHTC Harley‐Davidson motorcycle, Hahn visited City Limits dealership, test‐drove a 2004 motorcycle, took pictures, and made a downpayment. Days later, Hahn returned, paid the balance, and drove the 2004 motorcycle home. The bill of sale listed the VIN, year, and mileage for the 1997 motorcycle. The newer model had half that mileage. The next day, Hahn tried to purchase insurance and discovered the discrepancy. Hahn thought this was a scrivener’s error and called City Limits, which demanded more money and eventually called the police. After being contacted by an officer, Hahn took the motorcycle to the police station. Hahn claims that City Limits has not returned the $7,626.66. He filed suit, alleging that the police violated the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving him of property without due process and that the business violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. There is no allegation that the officer violated any state law by making telephone calls or by facilitating the return of the motorcycle; even with such an allegation, the federal constitution is not automatically violated every time the police fail to follow state or local rules. The court correctly declined jurisdiction over the state law claims. View "Zappa v. Smith" on Justia Law

Indiana inmate Flynn claims that the prison impermissibly favored Honor Program participants by allowing them more time outside their cells, more visits, exclusive access to video games, and greater use exercise machines and microwaves. To be eligible for the Program, inmates must be at least 30 (previously 35) years old and cannot have committed any infraction for 24 months or an infraction involving violence for 48 months. Flynn alleges that his first application was denied because he was too young. His reapplication after the minimum age was lowered was denied because the program and waiting list were full. He sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking the same privileges as Program inmates. The court construed the complaint as claiming age discrimination and dismissed because using age as a proxy for maturity is rationally related to conferring greater trust and responsibility. Flynn unsuccessfully sought reconsideration, arguing that the court ignored his equal protection claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Where disparate treatment is not based on a suspect class and does not affect a fundamental right, prison administrators may treat inmates differently if that treatment is rationally related to a legitimate penological interest. There are obvious reasons to extend preferential treatment to Program inmates; there are rational reasons for evaluating the prisoner before awarding benefits. The court noted that Flynn incurred one “strike” for filing his complaint and another for his appeal. View "Flynn v. Thatcher" on Justia Law