Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Rollins pleaded guilty to selling crack cocaine and was sentenced to 84 months in prison. In his second appeal, he challenged the application of the career-offender guideline, which assigns a higher offense level if the defendant has two prior convictions for a “crime of violence,” U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a), including “any offense … that … otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” (residual clause). The district judge classified Rollins as a career offender based in part on a prior conviction for possession of a sawed-off shotgun, a crime that would qualify only under the residual clause of this definition. The Supreme Court’s “Johnson” decision invalidated the identically phrased residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), residual clause as unconstitutionally vague. In light of the government’s concession that Johnson’s constitutional holding applies to the residual clause in section 4B1.2(a)(2), the Seventh Circuit granted rehearing and held that under Johnson, the residual clause in the career-offender guideline is unconstitutionally vague and vacated Rollins’s sentence. View "United States v. Rollins" on Justia Law

Chicago Police officers executed a warrant and found a loaded pistol, a second gun, a plastic baggie containing 17 grams of heroin, a digital scale, and documents in Thomas’s name. Thomas was arrested. He moved to suppress, arguing that the warrant was deficient because it was supported by a confidential informant “of unknown background and unknown reliability.” According to Thomas, the judge did not know whether the informant was under arrest or on probation, whether he received favorable treatment or was paid, how he knew Thomas, whether he used aliases, whether he was a rival gang member, his criminal history, and his record as an informant. The district court denied Thomas’s motion and found that Thomas had not made the showing necessary for a Franks hearing. Thomas entered a conditional guilty plea. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a “Brady” argument. Even if Brady applies to pretrial motions to suppress, the warrant was supported by probable cause, so the information he sought concerning the CI is not material.The informant provided details about Thomas’s apartment, that Thomas was a member of a particular gang, and described the firearms in detail. The information was corroborated by a prior arrest report that noted Thomas’s nickname, description, gang affiliation, age, and residence. The informant selected Thomas from a photo array and identified Thomas’s residence. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Walker, convicted in 2006 of robbery, was adjudicated a habitual offender pursuant to Indiana Code 35-50-2-8. He was sentenced to 40 years in prison; 20 of those years were attributable to his habitual-offender status. The Indiana habitual-offender statute applied if a defendant had been convicted of two prior unrelated felonies: the second felony had to have been committed after the sentencing for the first, and the present crime had to have been committed after the sentencing of the second earlier offense. At Walker’s trial, the state provided evidence of three prior felonies but failed to offer evidence of the date when one of the crimes was committed. Seeking federal habeas relief, Walker argued that his lawyer on direct appeal should have challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for the habitual-offender conviction, given the missing date. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the petition. Even assuming that counsel’s performance fell below the constitutional minimum, the state appellate court’s conclusion that Walker’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not infringed meets the generous standards that apply under 28 U.S.C. 2254. View "Walker v. Griffin" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit denied petitions for initial hearing en banc in appeals concerning Wisconsin’s law requiring voters to have qualifying photo identification. The court noted that Wisconsin will start printing absentee ballots this month and that it is unlikely that qualified electors will be unable to vote under Wisconsin’s current procedures. The state had assured the court that temporary credentials will be available to all qualified persons who seek them. Wisconsin has enacted a rule that requires the Division of Motor Vehicles to mail automatically a free photo ID to anyone who comes to DMV one time and initiates the free ID process. No one must present documents, that, for some, have proved challenging to acquire; no one must show a birth certificate, or proof of citizenship, so the urgency needed to justify an initial en banc hearing has not been shown. The state adequately informed the general public of the plan and the district court​ has the authority to monitor compliance. View "One Wis. Inst., Inc. v. Thomsen" on Justia Law

Officer Sell saw a car turn right from the center lane on a three-lane road and then drive through private property to avoid a red light. Using his computer, Sell saw that the car was registered to McPhaul, whose license was suspended, and that the driver looked like McPhaul’s displayed picture. The driver led the police on a mile-long “slow-speed” chase, even after Sell activated his lights and siren. When the driver stopped and was arrested, a pat-down revealed that he was wearing body armor; a loaded gun was found in the car’s center console. The driver was McPhaul, who had been convicted of a crime of violence. He was charged as a felon in possession of a gun, and with being a violent felon in possession of body armor. While in pre-trial custody, he wrote to his cousin, telling her she could ignore a grand jury subpoena, and asking her to swear that she put the gun in his car without his knowledge. McPhaul unsuccessfully moved to suppress the body armor. At sentencing, the judge applied Guidelines enhancements for using the body armor in connection with another felony offense, and for attempting to obstruct justice. McPhaul’s Guidelines range was 24–30 months and the judge imposed a 24-month sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the sentencing enhancements. The pat-down was lawful because officers had probable cause to stop McPhaul. View "United States v. McPhaul" on Justia Law

In 2001, 15‐year‐old Stacy opened the door of her Dale, Indiana home to Ward, ostensibly looking for a lost dog. Stacy let him in. Her sister, who was upstairs, heard screams. Looking down, she saw Stacy on the ground with a man on top of her. Her sister called 911; police arrived 10 minutes later. Marshal Keller entered and saw Ward, near the door with a knife in his hand, sweating. Keller took Ward, in custody, outside, and returned to see Stacy lying in a pool of blood, disemboweled, evidently raped, trying to speak. She died hours later. After a conviction was vacated for failure to grant a change of venue, Ward pleaded guilty. A jury recommended death; the trial court sentenced him accordingly. His conviction and sentence were upheld in state courts. The district court denied habeas corpus relief (28 U.S.C. 2254), rejecting an argument that trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by portraying him as a dangerous, incurable “psychopath,” which was enough to undermine confidence in the sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Indiana Supreme Court’s decision that Ward suffered no prejudice was reasonable. “Against the mitigating evidence counsel did not use, and the psychological labels that were used, stood a mountain of stark evidence against Ward.” View "Ward v. Neal" on Justia Law

During a “shakedown” of several cells, Stateville guards handcuffed Anderson behind his back and ordered him to walk down a flight of stairs to wait in a holding area while his cell was searched. These stairs were “covered [with] food, milk, and other garbage, and had been for several days.” The guards refused Anderson’s request to help him walk. He slipped and fell down 13 stairs. He was knocked unconscious and suffered “continuing and permanent” injuries. Anderson sued the guards, alleging they were deliberately indifferent to the obvious risk, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, reasoning that the risk was not substantial enough to violate the Eighth Amendment. The Seventh Circuit vacated, reasoning that the risk of serious harm involved in negotiating the stairs, strewn with litter and slick from milk, unaided and cuffed behind the back, was substantial. View "Anderson v. Morrison" on Justia Law

Weldon, Fields, and Roth pooled $120 to buy heroin from Weldon’s drug dealer. Roth drove. Weldon got out of Roth’s car, walked to the dealer’s car, gave the dealer the $120, and returned with the heroin. At Roth’s home, Fields mixed the heroin with water, divided it, and injected it into the three of them. Roth died as a result. Fields was tried, but argued that injecting Roth was not distribution; she was acquitted. Weldon pleaded guilty to having distributed an illegal drug, resulting in a death, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). Because he agreed to cooperate in the prosecution of another person he received a prison sentence of only eight years. Three years later he moved to vacate his conviction on grounds that his lawyer had rendered ineffective assistance by persuading him to plead guilty. The Seventh Circuit vacated denial of the motion. Individuals who “simultaneously and jointly acquire possession of a drug for their own use, intending only to share it together,” are not distributors, “since both acquire possession from the outset and neither intends to distribute the drug to a third person.” Fields was acquitted and the defendants were participants in the same transaction. The insistence of Weldonʹs lawyer that a defense to the charge of distribution had no chance of success was constitutionally deficient. View "Weldon v. United States" on Justia Law

For 60 years, a butcher shop operated on property in Black Earth that is zoned for commercial use, as a legal nonconforming use. In 2001, BEM purchased the property. After 2009, the volume and frequency of slaughter increased. By 2011, neighbors were complaining about increased traffic, trucks blocking the road, livestock noise, foul odors, improper storage of animal parts, and the presence of offal, blood, and animal waste in the streets. Steers escaped from the facility three times and had to be shot dead on Village streets. In 2013, the Village held several public meetings, and, because citations had no effect on BEM’s behavior, ordered BEM to propose an acceptable plan for relocating its slaughter activities. BEM did not relocate. After several delays, the Village threatened litigation. As a result of that threat, the USDA refused to guarantee a bank loan to BEM. BEM lost its financing, closed, and sued the Village and board members. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Even if the threat of litigation could, itself, constitute a due process violation and were a sufficiently direct cause of BEM’s alleged deprivations, there is no evidence that the process accorded to BEM was inadequate. Procedural due process generally requires only “notice and an opportunity to be heard.” View "Black Earth Meat Mkt., LLC v. Village of Black Earth" on Justia Law

Sutton has been convicted of violent crimes in multiple separate Illinois prosecutions, including 1991 and 1997 convictions for attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual assault. The state concedes that it unlawfully collected a sample of Sutton’s blood during the 1991 prosecution and then used that blood sample in the 1997 prosecution. In his habeas conviction, relating to the 1997 case, the district court granted relief. The Seventh Circuit reversed, citing the inevitable discovery doctrine. Although the court order under which the blood was collected was not supported by probable cause, the blood (and thus the DNA) would inevitably have been produced under a state law that provided legal authority for collecting the sample. The relevant statute stated that persons convicted of certain sexual offenses “shall … be required to submit blood samples and saliva to the Illinois State Police.” (currently codified at 730 ILCS 5/5-4-3). View "Sutton v. Pfister" on Justia Law