Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

After he was temporarily suspended from Watseka Community High School for allegedly consuming or possessing drugs, Dietchweiler filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the defendants violated his due process rights, with state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, slander, and violations of the Illinois School Code, 105 ILCS 5/10-22.6, which provides procedures for suspending and expelling students. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on the due process claim and dismissed the state law claims without prejudice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The administrators explained to Dietchwieler and his parents the general nature of the charges against him and provided him with a written suspension notice. Most of Dietchweiler’s complaints about the hearing relate to the defendants’ alleged failure to follow their own published policies and procedures, but failure to follow state statutes or state-mandated procedures does not amount to a federal due process claim of constitutional magnitude. While the Board disbelieved the evidence he presented, due process does not guarantee that his version of events will be believed. View "Dietchweiler v. Lucas" on Justia Law

After a fight with another inmate, Ogurek required stitches and was charged with a disciplinary infraction. Ogurek says he told investigator Gabor that he wanted to charge the other inmate with starting the fight and that he wanted an investigation of the theft of property from his cell while he was in segregation after the fight. When 10 days elapsed with no response Ogurek complained to the warden. According to Ogurek, Gabor berated him for complaining and told him that, after watching a security video, he had determined that Ogurek had started the fight. Ogurek denied this. Gabor filed a disciplinary report for impeding an investigation, which led to Ogurek remaining in segregation for six months. An administrative appeal resulted in expungement, on grounds that Gabor had violated procedure and had failed to substantiate his charge. During discovery in his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Ogurek sought the video. The district judge ordered Gabor to respond within 17 days, which he did not do. The judge dismissed the suit before the video surfaced. The Seventh Circuit reversed. An inmate’s complaint of being assaulted and injured by another inmate and then framed by a guard is not a “personal gripe,” that is unprotected by the First Amendment. View "Ogurek v. Gabor" on Justia Law

Indiana Rules for the Admission to the Bar and the Discipline of Attorneys state: “No person who advocates the overthrow of the government of the United States or this state by force, violence or other unconstitutional or illegal means, shall be certified to the Supreme Court of Indiana for admission to the bar of the court and a license to the practice of law.” Plaintiff intends to engage in “revolutionary advocacy,” as by distributing the Charter of Carnaro and Marx and Engels’ Communist Manifesto. He challenged the Rule, without stating that he intends to advocate the overthrow of the government. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the suit as premature. Plaintiff has not applied for admission to the Indiana bar and lacks standing. The rule will harm him only if he would be admitted to the Indiana bar were the rule to be invalidated: “that is highly unlikely,” given “his tempestuous relations with the Illinois bar authorities,” who deemed him unfit to practice law, citing his failure to acknowledge on his applications his multiple arrests and firings over the previous decade. View "Otrompke v. Skolnik" on Justia Law

Gray, an inmate at Illinois’s Stateville Correctional Center for 15 years, sued the warden under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the warden violated the Eighth Amendment by failing adequately to address the infestation of vermin, insects, and birds in Gray’s cell. He alleged that the prison cleans only infrequently and does not fix broken windows and holes in the walls. Gray suffers from asthma and claims that he had not had an attack for seven years before arriving at Stateville and that he now takes a prescription for attacks that occur about every two years. Gray claims that he has also suffered rashes and is given inadequate access to cleaning supplies. Gray has submitted unsuccessful grievances through the prison’s system. The district court granted summary judgment to the warden, finding that none of the conditions Gray described were so bad that they violated the Eighth Amendment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Gray’s individual claims were dismissed prematurely. On remand, the district court can decide how to coordinate the case with a pending class action involving similar allegations. View "Gray v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Citilink, a municipal corporation that provides bus service in Fort Wayne, Indiana, has regulatory authority over advertisements inside the buses and on the buses’ exterior. Health Link, a nonprofit corporation, provides women’s healthcare and wanted to post an advertisement. Citilink refused because it forbids public service ads that “express or advocate opinions or positions upon political, religious, or moral issues.” Although the proposed ad did not express or advocate any such opinion or position, Citilink discovered that Health Link is pro‐life and suggests (not in the ad) that women with unplanned or crisis pregnancies consider health care and related services that provide alternatives to abortion. Even Health Link’s home page does not indicate its position. The ad referred to “life affirming healthcare.” Health Link and Allen County Right to Life share a street address. The Seventh Circuit reversed judgment in favor of Citilink. Once a government entity has created a facility (the ad spaces in and on the buses) for communicative activity, it “must respect the lawful boundaries it has itself set.” Citilink’s refusal to post the ad was groundless discrimination against constitutionally protected speech. View "Women's Health Link, Inc. v. Fort Wayne Pub. Transp. Corp." on Justia Law

Imani and Raziga were charged with bank robbery. While fleeing, Imani forced a driver to give him a ride. Police recovered Imani’s fingerprints from the car. The driver identified Imani, in a photo array and later during a preliminary hearing. Raziga pled guilty and testified against Imani. Imani’s lawyer unsuccessfully moved to suppress the driver’s identification as tainted by television coverage. Imani then sought to represent himself, stating that he questioned his lawyer’s abilities. The judge discounted Imani’s statements that he had been “working on this for 13 months;” that he read at a college level; and that he had appeared in court for at least five previous criminal matters, while represented by lawyers. The judge treated the request as requiring permission and as an “immature decision.” Although Imani said that he had no problem with the trial date, the judge denied permission, stating that, upon a further request, he would reconsider. There was no further request. Imani, represented by counsel, was convicted. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's new trial order and affirmed Imani’s conviction, stating that although the court did not conduct a full colloquy, its determination that Imani was not competent to proceed pro se was supported by the record. The district court stated that the competency finding appeared to violate the right to self‐representation, but denied Imani’s habeas petition, based on the finding that Imani’s invocation of that right was not knowing and voluntary. The Seventh Circuit reversed, citing Supreme Court precedent, Faretta v. California (1975). A judge may not deny a competent defendant’s timely invocation of his right to represent himself. View "Imani v. Pollard" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, walking her brown labrador retriever, “Dog,” encountered a gray and white pit bull running loose, which lunged at Dog’s neck. The dogs began to fight. Neighbors unsuccessfully tried to separate them. Plaintiff dropped Dog’s leash so that Dog could defend himself. Officer Davis, driving to a burglary call, received a report that a pit bull was attacking another dog at a corner along his route. Davis pulled over and trained his spotlight on the dogs. Plaintiff, who was crying, identified herself and described Dog. Davis has a form of colorblindness that makes it difficult for him to distinguish certain colors, but had not informed his employer of his condition. Davis shot at what he thought was the aggressor. The dogs separated. Dog limped toward plaintiff, who cried that Davis had shot her dog. Davis then aimed at the pit bull and fired several times. The pit bull left the scene. Dog died as a result of the gunshot wound. From the time Davis had arrived until the time he fired his seventh shot, about two minutes elapsed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a verdict in favor of Davis in a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging unconstitutional seizure of Dog. The court upheld a conclusion that Davis had not committed discovery violations and the court’s rejection of plaintiffs’ proffered Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis jury instruction. View "Saathoff v. Davis" on Justia Law

Rhein called and sent papers to Illinois Representative DeLuca, accusing DeLuca of violating the constitution and threatening violence. One document asserted: “Now you know why so many of you people or going to be shot because your too selfish too understand the truth.” There were hand-drawn crosshairs. Rhein visited DeLuca’s office and said that he was “ready to start shooting people.” The Illinois State Police discovered that Rhein was licensed to own firearms and had some registered in his name. Officer Coffman concluded that his “mental condition is of such a nature that it poses a clear and present danger,” 430 ILCS 65/8(f), sufficient to justify summary revocation. Police removed his weapons. Coffman sent a letter, stating that Rhein could apply to have the Card reinstated and strongly encouraging Rhein to include three character references plus a psychologist's report. Six months later Rhein requested the Card’s reinstatement, including three references plus a psychologist’s report concluding “that Rhein is all bark and no bite.” Eventually, the Director reinstated Rhein’s Card without a hearing; the firearms were returned. Rhein sued Coffman under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment, rejecting Rhein’s claims. Summary revocation, with hearing to follow, is proper when delay poses unacceptable risks; the officer is entitled to qualified immunity on the delay theory, because courts have yet to determine how quickly governmental bodies must act when the right to keep firearms is at stake. The court noted that Coffman had no role in the restoration of the Card or return of the guns. View "Rhein v. Coffman" on Justia Law

After the Supreme Court’s 2010 holding that the Second Amendment applies to the states, the Seventh Circuit concluded that states must permit law-abiding and mentally healthy persons to carry loaded weapons in public. Illinois enacted a system for issuing permits to carry concealed firearms, 430 ILCS 66/1. Plaintiffs applied for concealed-carry permits, but were rejected because law enforcement agencies objected. They were told that there were objections, but not by whom or why. Illinois subsequently changed its regulations to require that such information be given and that the applicant be allowed to respond. District judges then rejected plaintiffs’ claims, stating that plaintiffs’ proper recourse was to apply for licenses under the new rules. None of the plaintiffs filed another application. The Seventh Circuit rejected their “facial” challenges to the law. A federal court should not assume that the state will choose the unconstitutional path when a valid one is open. Rejecting a challenge to the existence of a permit requirement as a “prior restraint,” the court stated Illinois is entitled to check an applicant’s record of convictions, and any concerns about his mental health, close to the date the applicant proposes to go armed on the streets. The court upheld the statute’s placing the burden on the state to justify denials, using a preponderance standard, and rejected a challenge to the composition of the concealed carry board. View "Berron v. Ill. Concealed Carry Licensing Review Bd." on Justia Law

Patterson was an armed-robbery suspect. Officer Strayer and FBI Agent Stewart approached Patterson in a driveway. Neither was in a uniform, but both were armed. They identified themselves as FBI, and asked Patterson to show his hands. Strayer kept his hand on his gun. Stewart explained that Patterson's name came up in an investigation and asked Patterson to go to their office to “clear his name.” Patterson agreed and cooperated by allowing a pat down. Patterson affirmatively indicated that he was going voluntarily and got into the front passenger seat. While they talked in a conference room, there was nothing between Patterson and the door. Stewart accused Patterson of the robbery, then stated Patterson was not going to be arrested that day. After initially denying involvement, Patterson confessed. Following the unrecorded two-hour interview, Patterson asked when he would be arrested. Stewart told Patterson that a warrant would likely be secured in a week or two. Patterson agreed to turn himself in. The agents dropped Patterson off at his requested location. Patterson moved to suppress the incriminating statements as made in violation of Miranda. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of Patterson’s motion, agreeing that he was not in custody for purposes of Miranda. Nothing indicated that Patterson’s consent to accompany the agents and to speak with them was anything but voluntary. A reasonable person in Patterson’s position would have felt free to leave. View "United States v. Patterson" on Justia Law