Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2002, Nina Buckner was found brutally murdered in her home. Forensic testing confirmed that the blood on a hammer and knife found at the scene belonged to Buckner; the blood was also found on King’s clothes. Buckner’s neighbors reported seeing King near Buckner’s home the night of Buckner’s murder. When questioned, King gave multiple, very different, versions of his actions during that night. King was convicted of the first‐degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.The trial judge that presided over King’s trial and sentencing had represented King over 15 years earlier as an assistant public defender. King’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal and denied review by the Illinois Supreme Court. King's petition for post‐conviction relief was dismissed by the trial court, affirmed on appeal, and denied review by the Illinois Supreme Court. Subsequently, King unsuccessfully petitioned for habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254, arguing that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, for not seeking substitution of the trial judge. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, noting that the judge had no independent recollection of King and that the evidence against King was overwhelming. King did not “fairly present” a federal due process claim of ineffective assistance in a complete round of state court review. View "King v. Pfister" on Justia Law

Illinois prisoner Petties was climbing stairs when he felt a “pop” and extreme pain in his ankle. At the prison infirmary, the examining physician prescribed Vicodin and crutches and a week of “lay-in.” The medical director, Dr. Carter, noted in the file that Petties had suffered an “Achilles tendon rupture” and modified the instructions, directing that Petties be scheduled for an MRI and orthopedic examination as an “urgent” matter. Prison lockdowns resulted in cancelation of three appointments. Eight weeks passed before he received an orthopedic boot. Petties claimed that a year later, he still experienced “serious pain, soreness, and stiffness” in his ankle. Petties argued that Carter was deliberately indifferent by failing to immobilize his ankle with a boot or cast immediately and that a physician he saw later was deliberately indifference in not ordering physical therapy despite a recommendation. The Seventh Circuit initially affirmed summary judgment in favor of the doctors, but on rehearing, en banc, reversed. Even if a doctor denies knowing that he was exposing a plaintiff to a substantial risk of serious harm, evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer a doctor knew he was providing deficient treatment is sufficient to survive summary judgment. Petties produced sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the doctors knew the care they were providing was insufficient. View "Petties v. Carter" on Justia Law

In 1996, a jury convicted Poe of narcotics‐related offenses, including engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE), 21 U.S.C. 848(c). In 1999, the Supreme Court decided Richardson v. United States, rendering the CCE jury instructions used in Poe’s trial erroneous: “You must unanimously find that the defendant committed at least two violations of the federal drug laws, but you do not have to agree on which two violations.” Poe sought habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2241, challenging his conviction under Richardson. Fourteen months later, the district court dismissed Poe’s petition without prejudice, because he should have filed under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Poe’s June 18, 2001 habeas petition, under section 2255, was denied as time‐barred. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in 2006. In 2014, Poe filed a new section 2241 petition, citing Alleyne v. United States (2013). The district court denied his petition, again for not filing it under section 2255. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Construing Poe’s petition as a successive one under section 2255 would be futile; that section allows a successive motion for “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” Alleyne is not retroactive on collateral review.” View "Poe v. LaRiva" on Justia Law

The Union erected a giant inflatable rat and an inflatable fat cat during a labor dispute in Grand Chute, Wisconsin. Both are staked to the ground in the highway median, to prevent the wind from blowing them away. Grand Chute forbids private signs on the public way and defines signs to mean “[a]ny structure, part thereof, or device attached thereto” that conveys a message. The Union removed them at the town's request and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, citing the First Amendment. The district court denied a preliminary injunction and, a year later, granted the town summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit vacated, reasoning that the case may be moot because the construction that led to the use of demonstrative inflatables was complete; the Union was no longer picketing. The court also noted that the town amended its code and changed the definition of a sign. If the Union persists in seeking damages, the district court must weigh the probability of a fresh dispute between this union and Grand Chute and the risk that it would be over too quickly to allow judicial review to apply the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine and must address the validity of current ordinances, rather than one that was changed before the final judgment. View "Constr. & Gen. Laborers' Local Union v. Town of Grand Chute" on Justia Law

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Riano was a hospital corpsman in the Navy. As a civilian, he became a registered nurse. In 2004 he began working as a registered nurse for the Veterans Health Administration, While examining male patients for genital warts, Riano manipulated their penises with his hands, attempting to induce erections. He used words like “pecker” and “balls,” rather than medical terms. The agency found his examination technique and his language to be inappropriate. His employment was terminated. He appealed and was given a hearing that included representation by counsel, live testimony from medical experts, written testimony from patients, and a written report from an investigator who had interviewed the patients. The appeals board affirmed his termination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Riano’s argument that he was not allowed to call patients to testify live to show that some patients were comfortable with his technique and language or that complaining patients had ulterior motives. The board’s decision to affirm Riano’s termination was based on its determination that his technique and language were inappropriate. That was a professional judgment that did not turn on the patients’ subjective views. View "Riano v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Someone used the email address gslabs@hotmail.com to contact a Vietnamese website in an attempt to buy sassafras oil, a chemical that can be used to make the illegal drug known as ecstasy. The website was being monitored by the Drug Enforcement Administration, which began an investigation that culminated in Caira being convicted on drug charges. A key step in the investigation was learning that Caira was the person behind the gslabs@hotmail.com address. The DEA made that discovery by issuing administrative subpoenas to technology companies, without getting a warrant. The district court denied a motion to suppress and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the DEA conducted an “unreasonable search” in violation of the Fourth Amendment, Because Caira voluntarily shared the relevant information with technology companies, he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information, so his Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. The court characterized as “harmless” the district court’s errors imposing conditions of supervised release without justifying them on the record. Caira is serving a life sentence for another conviction. He is not expected to be released from prison so the conditions are not expected to be imposed. View "United States v. Caira" on Justia Law

In 2005 the defendant was sentenced by Judge Reinhard to 300 months in prison for possessing a shotgun illegally. The sentence was later invalidated; in 2015 the defendant was resentenced by Judge Reinhard to 176 months. The defendant was then 54 years old, had a serious vision problem, and had been a model prisoner during the 140 months that he had served: because of his good behavior he was credited with having served 160 months of imprisonment, so that the 176‐month sentence was effectively a sentence of 16 more months in prison. Both the probation service and the U.S. Attorney’s Office had recommended that he be sentenced to time served. The judge rejected the suggestions, citing the gravity of the defendant’s criminal history before 2005 and the fact that, while he had never threatened any officials, defendant had filed complaints (and one civil suit) critical of judicial behavior by Reinhard and other judges and alleging conspiracies linking judges and other officials to grievances the defendant had suffered decades ago. The Seventh Circuit vacated, noting that most of the defendant’s criminal history before the shotgun incident consisted of driving offenses and that defendant had a constitutional right to petition for redress of grievances. The court called the judge’s reasoning “flimsy” and stated that further crimes by the defendant were unlikely. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Whatley was convicted, under a now‐repealed Indiana law, of possessing about three grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a “youth program center.” Whatley’s father’s home, where he was arrested, was 795 feet from the Robinson Community Church, which hosted events targeted to young persons, including religious services, mentoring programs, a Girl Scout troop, weekly Family Fun Night, and children’s choirs. On direct appeal and in federal habeas corpus proceedings, Whatley argued that the statutory definition of “youth program center,” as any: building or structure that on a regular basis provides recreational, vocational, academic, social, or other programs or services for persons less than eighteen (18) years of age,” was unconstitutionally vague. The district court declined to address the claim. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Whatley did not procedurally default his claim. The state courts were unreasonable in applying federal law on vagueness: the word “regular” in the definition provides no objective standard and fails to place persons of ordinary intelligence on notice of the conduct proscribed and allows for arbitrary enforcement; defendants are strictly liable for violating the nebulous provision; and the consequences of a violation were extreme. No one in Whatley’s position could have known that the Church would fall within the definition simply because it hosted a few children’s events each week. View "Whatley v. Zatecky" on Justia Law

McKenzie was killed when he fell to electrified train tracks during a gang-related fight. An Illinois jury convicted Evans of felony murder based on the felony “mob action.” Evans argued on direct appeal that independent purpose was an element of the crime of mob action and that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to have the jury to determine whether the underlying offense of mob action had a felonious purpose independent of the killing. The state court concluded that the trial court “adequately apprised” the jury. The federal district court denied relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, reasoning that Evans’s claim improperly asked a federal court to review a state court’s interpretation of state law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While Evans did properly present a federal claim: the denial of his Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine each element of a state crime, his assertion that Illinois defines felony murder to include “independent felonious intent” as a factual element is inaccurate. View "Evans v. Dorethy" on Justia Law

While working as a part-time Village of Orland Hills police officer, Kristofek cited and arrested a driver for car-insurance-related infractions. After several phone calls between the driver’s mother, local politicians, and Scully, the chief of police, the driver was released and the citations were voided. Months later, Kristofek participated in a police training session that involved hypothetical instances of misconduct. Based on these hypotheticals, Kristofek became concerned that official misconduct may have occurred involving the voided citations. After Kristofek shared this concern with other officers and with the FBI, Scully fired him. Kristofek sued Scully and the Village. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Kristofek’s statements to his colleagues and the FBI about the voided citations were protected under the First Amendment. Kristofek was speaking as a private citizen about a matter of public concern, and his interest in speaking outweighed Scully’s interest in promoting efficiency within the department. The Seventh Circuit agreed that the Village was not liable for Scully’s actions under Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services; Scully did not possess the requisite authority to unilaterally fire Kristofek or to set departmental firing policy. View "Kristofek v. Village of Orland Hills" on Justia Law