Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Thomas was convicted of the 2001 murder of Shakir. In 2005, after his conviction was final, Thomas received a letter informing him that unidentified gang members told police that Thomas did not commit the murder and that the shooter was Pinkston, a drug dealer. Thomas filed an unsuccessful state court petition for post‐conviction relief, arguing that he was actually innocent in light of the newly discovered evidence. Thomas filed a second state court petition in 2007, this time alleging that the government withheld evidence that the officer was told that Pinkston was the shooter in violation of Brady v. Maryland. The state court held that the claim was defaulted; Thomas had not raised it in his first petition. The district court denied federal habeas corpus petition raising the Brady claim, holding that it was procedurally defaulted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Given the overwhelming evidence of his guilt and the questionable reliability of his alibi, it was not more likely than not that a jury would have acquitted Thomas based solely on evidence that unidentified gang members told someone who told someone that Thomas did not commit the murder. Thomas’s gateway claim of actual innocence was, therefore, insufficient to excuse his procedural default. View "Thomas v. Williams" on Justia Law

Milwaukee police saw a car stopped within 15 feet of a crosswalk, which is unlawful unless the car is “actually engaged in loading or unloading or in receiving or discharging passengers”. One police car drew up parallel to the stopped car, and another drew up behind. Shining lights through the car’s windows (it was after sunset), police saw a passenger in the back seat try to hide a firearm. Johnson, the passenger, was prosecuted for possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). After the district court denied his motion to suppress the gun, Johnson entered a conditional guilty plea and was sentenced to 46 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the statutory exception for receiving or discharging cargo or passengers means that the police could not have probable cause until they had observed the car long enough to know that it was not within the scope of the exception. The police would have discovered the same evidence without a seizure because any officer was free to walk up to the parked car, which lacking a driver, was not going anywhere. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Becker sued Evansville, Indiana police officer Elfreich under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging Elfreich used excessive force in arresting him because, after Becker had surrendered, Elfreich pulled him down three steps and placed his knee on his back while allowing a police dog to continue to bite him. Officers had arrived with an arrest warrant, which alleged that three weeks earlier Becker had held a knife to his brother-in-law’s neck and threatened to kill him. Elfreich claimed that he released the dog only after Becker failed to respond to warnings to come out of hiding and that the dog could not hear the release command because of screaming; he argued he was entitled to qualified immunity because his conduct did not constitute excessive force or, alternatively, that it did not violate clearly established constitutional law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of Elfreich’s motion for summary judgment. A jury could reasonably find the force was excessive; it was clearly established at the time of Becker’s arrest that no more than minimal force was permissible to arrest a non-resisting, or passively resisting, suspect. View "Becker v. Effriechs" on Justia Law

McDonald was diagnosed with arthritis and high cholesterol while serving a life sentence at Stateville Correctional Center in Illinois. For 10 years, he received a low-cholesterol diet planned by a prison dietician In 2009, a new warden discharged the dietician and cancelled all special diets; decreased the frequency of outdoor recreation for inmates; and altered the prison’s job-assignment policy to restrict inmates from working in a particular job for more than one year. McDonald filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, citing the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment and the Equal Protection Clause (inmates at the other Illinois maximum-security prisons were allowed to have prescription diets and more time for outdoor recreation). The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. The wardens were not entitled to summary judgment on McDonald’s claim concerning the cancellation of his prescription diet. View "McDonald v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Cairel and Johnson, lawfully repossessing cars, were stopped for a traffic violation. The officers, aware of recent robberies in the area, grew suspicious and called a victim to the scene. The victim identified Cairel and Johnson as the men who had robbed him the night before. The officers arrested them. During subsequent questioning, Cairel, who has a learning disability and low IQ, confessed to several robberies and implicated Johnson. Prosecutors filed charges. Johnson pled guilty in exchange for probation. Further investigation revealed that both men were innocent. A year later, prosecutors dismissed Cairel’s case and allowed Johnson to withdraw his plea. Neither man was imprisoned. They sued the detectives under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for allegedly fabricating Johnson’s confession, failing to disclose a potential alibi witness, and coercing Cairel’s confession. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for defendants. Plaintiffs were not deprived of sufficient liberty to support their fabrication claim. There was no evidence that defendants concealed evidence unknown to plaintiffs supporting their alibi or that any failure to disclose caused a deprivation of liberty. No reasonable jury could find that Cairel’s interrogation “shocked the conscience” or that defendants’ conduct was so “extreme and outrageous” as to prove intentional infliction of emotional distress.Probable cause for the criminal charges defeated claims for malicious prosecution. View "Cairel v. Alderden" on Justia Law

In 2006, Bell was adjudicated a sexually dangerous person and civilly detained. After attacking a guard at the Rushville Treatment and Detention Facility, he was convicted and spent the four years in prison. When his sentence expired in 2010, he was returned to Rushville, where he declined to cooperate with intake procedures and threatened guards. Housed in segregation, he resisted the Facility’s normal operation. After 20 days, Bell was taken to a secure infirmary room, with large windows, and denied clothing. Bell's resistance resulted in some use of force. He spent eight days naked in the infirmary. On the ninth day Bell cooperated, was given clothes ,and moved to the general population. He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court granted all defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit remanded. Because he is a civil detainee, not a prisoner, Bell invoked the Due Process Clause, not the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. To say that harsh conditions are proper as a penalty for crime does not justify Bell’s treatment. Spending eight days naked in a fan-blown stream of chilled air might not be proper for a convicted prisoner, when the goal was to get the prisoner to pose for a photograph. While Bell did not file a timely appeal, he did file other papers that could be treated as notice of appeal or a request for an extension. View "Bell v. McAdory" on Justia Law

Smith, pretending to be pregnant, took her half-sister’s newborn son from his bassinette during the night and started to drive from Beloit, Wisconsin, to her home in Colorado. In Iowa, she learned that Wisconsin police wanted to interview her. She spoke by phone with a Beloit police officer who told her to pull over so that local law enforcement could speak with her. Before dawn, Smith pulled off the interstate, wrapped the baby in blankets, placed him in a plastic container, and put the container behind a gas station, in subzero mid-winter temperatures. She drove to another gas station, called the Beloit officer back, and was eventually arrested on an unrelated Texas warrant. When officers questioned her, she denied any knowledge of the child’s whereabouts until after he was found alive the next day. A jury convicted her of kidnapping. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Smith’s claims that her statements to officers were the product of coercion; that statements the district court suppressed based on a Miranda violation were improperly admitted for impeachment; that no rational jury could conclude that she lacked parental permission to take the child or that she attained a benefit from the kidnapping; and challenging the government’s inquiry into the conduct underlying the Texas warrant. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

During an argument, Burris fired his handgun, hitting Kamal in the neck and paralyzing him. Burris fled and evaded police for five months, before surrendering. The state judge instructed the jury on first-degree reckless injury, possession of a firearm by a felon, and the lesser included offense of second-degree reckless injury. For first-degree liability, the government had to prove circumstances showing an “utter disregard for human life.” Burris argued that the shooting was an accident. The jury submitted a written question: “Regarding the element of utter disregard, all other facts and circumstances relating to the incident, do we consider facts and circumstances after the shooting?” The judge gave a supplemental instruction: First of all, I want to emphasize that you are to rely on the instructions that I gave you. All right? And to rely on all of the instructions that I gave you. And in response to this question, if this clarifies anything, after-the-fact regard for human life does not negate utter disregard otherwise established by the circumstances before and during the crime. It may be considered by the fact-finder as a part of the total factual picture, but it does not operate to preclude a finding of utter disregard for human life. The element of utter disregard for human life is measured objectively on the basis of what a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have known. The jury convicted Burris of first-degree reckless injury. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that, although the instruction may have been ambiguous, it was not reasonably likely that it misled the jury. The federal district court denied habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed; the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law . View "Burris v. Smith" on Justia Law

Miller was convicted in Indiana of three counts of child molestation and sentenced to three consecutive 40-year terms. The sexual abuse, including anal intercourse, began when the victim was nine and continued for six years. When imposing the lengthy term the state judge relied on the nature of Miller’s conduct, on his four prior convictions, his failure to reform after stretches of imprisonment, and the absence of any mitigating factors. The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal in 2004. Miller then filed a collateral attack, contending that his appellate lawyer furnished ineffective assistance by failing to contest his sentence. The state’s court of appeals concluded that counsel should have raised this issue, but that its omission did not result in prejudice under the standard of Strickland v. Washington because Miller did not establish that his sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. A federal district judge then denied Miller’s petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the state’s decision was not “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” View "Miller v. Zatecky" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee at Cook County Jail, fell and injured his back. It was a month before he was able to see a doctor. Correctional officers did not move him although the doctor determined that he needed to be in a lower bunk. There was no ladder to his upper bunk, so had to sleep on the floor until his term of confinement ended. He sued correctional officers, contending that they had manifested deliberate indifference to an acute medical need. The district judge granted the defendants summary judgment, stating only that “it is undisputed that Plaintiff never received a lower bunk permit at any time while at the jail.” The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, stating that it was disputed and he did receive an order from a doctor directing that he be assigned to a lower bunk. The defendants’ brief did not discuss the dispute and did not substantiate its denial. View "Bolling v. Carter" on Justia Law