Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Former gang member Herron is serving long sentences. Before his transfer to Terre Haute, he was attacked by inmates and left permanently disabled and confined to a wheelchair. At Terre Haute, Herron was assigned to a wheel-chair-accessible cell. Terre Haute inmates told Herron that he had been targeted because he was believed to be a pedophile. Herron learned that his prison records contained references to the Adam Walsh Act, 42 U.S.C. 16901–91, although his convictions are for other crimes. He filed a grievance; the Bureau of Prisons corrected his record. Hearing other inmates were planning to attack him, he asked to be placed in segregation. The prison complied and assigned him a wheelchair-accessible cell. Within a month, his cellmate attacked him over his “Walsh Act stuff.” Herron rejected another assigned cellmate, whom he viewed as threatening, and filed grievances. Guards took Herron to a non-accessible cell and refused to help him to the toilet. He was found lying near the toilet. He was treated for head lacerations, a shoulder contusion, and a sprained spine. The Seventh Circuit vacated dismissal of his First Amendment retaliation claim and the district court's grant of qualified immunity on the Eighth Amendment theory, which accepted a claim that the guard was implementing a policy of moving every inmate who objects to a new cellmate, to prevent inmates from reserving one-person cells. View "Herron v. Meyer" on Justia Law

Indiana Pendleton Correctional Facility inmate Ellison was notified of a disciplinary proceeding concerning his possession of heroin that was confiscated by Officer Bynum during a cell-search. Ellison told Officer Guffey that two unfamiliar guards, not Bynum, had conducted the search and found nothing. Although Bynum's report stated that he found heroin in cell 10-5D, assigned to Ellison, a photo of the heroin is labeled “Cell 10-6D.” Ellison requested the identities of the guards who searched his cell and that they appear as witnesses, and sought surveillance video and test results for the substance. He later recognized one of the guards, who identified himself as Dorethery, and confirmed that he had searched Ellison’s cell on the day in question and that no contraband was found. Ellison specifically requested his presence. No witnesses, not even Bynum, appeared at the hearing and Ellison was not permitted to view the video. The hearing officer stripped Ellison of 90 days’ good-time credit. After exhausting administrative remedies, Ellison unsuccessfully sought collateral review under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Ellison was entitled to present evidence refuting Bynum’s report, and given the conflict between that report and the photo, the refusal to permit Ellison to exercise that right was “particularly troubling.” View "Ellison v. Zatecky" on Justia Law

DEA and Chicago Police officers observed Soto at the residence of a major drug supplier. They followed Soto as he entered his car with large garbage bags, which he discarded in a dumpster. Officers recovered the bags; they contained clear plastic tape, latex gloves, coffee grounds and aluminum foil molded into a brick-shape the size of a kilogram of cocaine. A canine alerted to the presence of narcotics and laboratory testing revealed the presence of cocaine. Officers had never heard of Contreras until they followed Soto to his house. An officer testified that after Soto went inside, the garage door opened and that, using binoculars, the officer saw the men touch hands in what he thought indicated the passing of money or drugs. A box removed from Conteras' Mercedes buckled and a rectangular, white, plastic-wrapped object fell out. Later, officers determined that the shoebox contained five wrapped bricks of cocaine. The officers moved in and read Contreras his Miranda rights; he signed a consent to search in both English and Spanish. Contreras expressed willingness to cooperate and admitted that he had been selling drugs with Soto for about one year. Contreras provided the combination to a bedroom safe that contained $99,153 in cash, two guns and ammunition. He told officers where to find 2.5 kilograms of cocaine. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress, rejecting an argument that the initial entry and protective sweep were illegal and that Contreras’ consent was tainted by the illegal acts. View "United States v. Contreras" on Justia Law

Seeing an internet advertisement for a 1997 FLTHTC Harley‐Davidson motorcycle, Hahn visited City Limits dealership, test‐drove a 2004 motorcycle, took pictures, and made a downpayment. Days later, Hahn returned, paid the balance, and drove the 2004 motorcycle home. The bill of sale listed the VIN, year, and mileage for the 1997 motorcycle. The newer model had half that mileage. The next day, Hahn tried to purchase insurance and discovered the discrepancy. Hahn thought this was a scrivener’s error and called City Limits, which demanded more money and eventually called the police. After being contacted by an officer, Hahn took the motorcycle to the police station. Hahn claims that City Limits has not returned the $7,626.66. He filed suit, alleging that the police violated the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving him of property without due process and that the business violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. There is no allegation that the officer violated any state law by making telephone calls or by facilitating the return of the motorcycle; even with such an allegation, the federal constitution is not automatically violated every time the police fail to follow state or local rules. The court correctly declined jurisdiction over the state law claims. View "Zappa v. Smith" on Justia Law

Indiana inmate Flynn claims that the prison impermissibly favored Honor Program participants by allowing them more time outside their cells, more visits, exclusive access to video games, and greater use exercise machines and microwaves. To be eligible for the Program, inmates must be at least 30 (previously 35) years old and cannot have committed any infraction for 24 months or an infraction involving violence for 48 months. Flynn alleges that his first application was denied because he was too young. His reapplication after the minimum age was lowered was denied because the program and waiting list were full. He sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking the same privileges as Program inmates. The court construed the complaint as claiming age discrimination and dismissed because using age as a proxy for maturity is rationally related to conferring greater trust and responsibility. Flynn unsuccessfully sought reconsideration, arguing that the court ignored his equal protection claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Where disparate treatment is not based on a suspect class and does not affect a fundamental right, prison administrators may treat inmates differently if that treatment is rationally related to a legitimate penological interest. There are obvious reasons to extend preferential treatment to Program inmates; there are rational reasons for evaluating the prisoner before awarding benefits. The court noted that Flynn incurred one “strike” for filing his complaint and another for his appeal. View "Flynn v. Thatcher" on Justia Law

Milwaukee ordinances required certain licenses before a business was permitted to offer nude or partially nude entertainment. Six Star, which applied for a license, and Ferol, which did not apply challenged these ordinances, seeking injunctive relief and damages. Once the ordinances were repealed, they dropped their requests for injunctive relief but continued to pursue damages. The district court held that the ordinances addressed time, place, and manner of expression, but did not include the necessary procedural safeguards. A jury then decided that but for the unconstitutional ordinances, Ferol would have opened a club providing nude entertainment. It awarded Ferol compensatory damages in the form of lost profits, and gave Six Star nominal damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting the city’s argumens that Ferol had no injury and therefore no standing to challenge the ordinances, and its challenge to Ferol’s theory of causation and the award of nominal damages to Six Star. View "Six Star Holdings, LLC v. City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

In 2011 Wisconsin enacted a statute requiring voters to present photographic identification. A federal district judge found violation of the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act and enjoined its application. The Seventh Circuit reversed. After the Supreme Court declined review, the state amended Act 23 to require acceptance of veterans’ IDs. The district court declined to address plaintiffs' remaining argument that some persons qualified to vote are entitled to relief because they face daunting obstacles to obtaining acceptable photo ID. The Seventh Circuit vacated in part; it did not previously hold that persons unable to get a photo ID with reasonable effort lack a serious grievance. The right to vote is personal and is not defeated by the fact that 99% of other people can secure the necessary credentials easily. Under Wisconsin’s law, people who do not have qualifying photo ID cannot vote, even if it is impossible for them to get such an ID. Plaintiffs want relief from that prohibition, not from the general application of Act 23. The district court should permit the parties to explore how the state’s system works today before considering plaintiffs’ remaining substantive contentions. View "Frank v. Walker" on Justia Law

Acting on information that drugs were being sold from a certain Madison apartment, law enforcement obtained permission from the apartment property manager and brought a narcotics- detecting dog to the locked, shared hallway of the apartment building. The dog alerted to the presence of drugs at a nearby apartment door and then went to the targeted apartment where Whitaker lived. After the officers obtained a search warrant, Whitaker was arrested and charged with drug and firearm crimes based on evidence found in the apartment. At the time, Whitaker was serving a term of supervised release for a conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). After the district court denied his pretrial motions challenging the search and the dog’s reliability, Whitaker entered a conditional guilty plea that preserved his right to appeal. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the use of the dog was a search under the Fourth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision, Florida v. Jardines. No “good faith” exception applied. View "United States v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

Mays left the scene of a fight, followed by an investigating officer who wanted to interview him about the altercation. Mays repeatedly declined to stop and talk to the officer, using “colorful and abusive language.” Observing Mays’s demeanor and suspecting that he might be armed, the officer told him to stop and touched his shoulder in order to keep a distance between the two. Mays’s manner of turning made the officer concerned for his safety, and he employed his already drawn Taser. A semi-automatic firearm fell to the ground. Mays ultimately was prosecuted for possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). He pleaded guilty reserving the right to appeal the court’s denial of his motions to suppress the firearm, which he contended was the product of an illegal seizure, and to suppress a statement he had made to while he was in pretrial confinement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The officer’s stop was supported by reasonable suspicion as required by the Fourth Amendment. With respect to the statement, there was no independent violation of Mays’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel; there was no evidence that his waiver of his right to counsel was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. View "United States v. Mays" on Justia Law

In September 2008 Dixon was sent to the Cook County jail as a pretrial detainee. A month later, he developed severe and persistent pain in his back and abdomen. In December, he had a CT scan that revealed a paratracheal mass. Over the next few weeks, the mass grew rapidly. Medical personnel at the jail were aware of the problem, but accused Dixon of malingering, gave him over-the-counter analgesics, and ordered him to seek psychiatric care. By January 2009, Dixon’s condition had deteriorated severely. He was finally taken to Stroger Hospital, where he was diagnosed with lung cancer. He died two months later. Dixon’s mother sued Cook County and the doctor and nurse who had overseen Dixon’s care at the jail, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for deliberate indifference to Dixon’s serious medical condition in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment, and state-law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed the claims. The Seventh Circuit vacated. A reasonable jury could find that pervasive systemic deficiencies in the detention center’s health-care system were the moving force behind Dixon’s injury. View "Kevin Dixon v. Cook County, Illinois" on Justia Law