Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Chicago police responded to an emergency at the house where Pedro and Abraham lived with others. Pedro stated that armed intruders had broken in, tied up the occupants, and demanded money and drugs. In a bedroom, police saw a handgun, a digital scale, and a small amount of marijuana. A drug dog signaled the presence of drugs in Pedro’s van, parked outside. After obtaining a warrant, police discovered, in the van, a safe containing $271,080 and notes including dates and numbers. A second dog alerted to the safe. No drugs were found. Pedro stated that after the intruders left, he moved Abraham’s safe to the van in case they returned and that he did not know its contents. The government brought no criminal charges, but sought forfeiture, 21 U.S.C. 881(a)(6). The brothers swore that the money is their savings from working and that they were not involved in criminal activity. Weeks before the seizure, U.S. Immigration had recorded Abraham saying that he did not have any “equities” in the U.S.; Abraham’s application for cancellation of removal, filed with the assistance of counsel six months after the seizure, lists only $2,000 in “cash assets.” The Seventh Circuit vacated summary judgment in favor of the government. A jury reasonably could find that the evidence fails to establish, even by a preponderance, that the money is substantially connected to drug trafficking. View "Cruz-Hernandez v. Funds in the Amount of $271,080" on Justia Law

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001, sets minimum funding and vesting requirements, insures benefits through the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation and includes reporting, disclosures, and fiduciary responsibilities, but exempts church plans from its requirements. The plaintiffs, former and current employees, have vested claims to benefits under the Advocate retirement plan. Advocate operates Illinois healthcare locations, employing 33,000 people. Advocate maintains a non-contributory, defined-benefit pension plan that covers substantially all of its employees. Advocate is not a church. Its predecessor formed as a 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation from a merger between two health systems—Lutheran General and Evangelical. Advocate is affiliated with the Evangelical Lutheran Church and the United Church of Christ, but it is not owned or financially supported by either church. In contracts, the parties “affirm their ministry in health care and the covenantal relationship they share.” There is no requirement that Advocate employees or patients belong to any particular religious denomination, or uphold any particular beliefs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the plan “is not entitled to ERISA’s church plan exemption as a matter of law” because the statutory definition requires a church plan to be established by a church. The court rejected Advocate’s First Amendment arguments. View "Stapleton v. Advocate Health Care Network" on Justia Law

A confidential informant arranged to purchase cocaine at Duenas’s garage. Trailed by federal agents, the informant drove to the garage, parked, entered (with the consent of Duenas, the owner), and discussed the transaction. He left, ostensibly to get money from his car. He drove a short distance, parked, and phoned agents to report that there was cocaine in the garage, in Rivera’s truck. Agents arrived, arrested Duenas outside the open garage and Rivera. They searched the garage and seized two kilograms of cocaine. Between the informant’s departure and their arrival, about three minutes elapsed. The court denied a motion to suppress, citing “consent once removed.” If an informant is invited to a place by someone who has authority to invite him, and the informant, on the premises, discovers probable cause to make an arrest or search and immediately summons law enforcement officers, the occupant of the place to which they are summoned is deemed to have consented to their presence. The defendants pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess and distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The search and arrests invaded no protected right of privacy; pausing to obtain warrants would have risked the disappearance of the contraband. An attempt to obtain warrants before the informant phoned might have been denied for lack of probable cause, View "United States v. Duenas" on Justia Law

Davis trafficked heroin and crack cocaine in Rockford, Illinois. In 2010, he pleaded guilty to narcotics conspiracy in exchange for a sentence equal to 66 percent of the greater of the low end of the USSG sentencing range or the statutory minimum term. Davis expected to receive a sentence of no more than 80 months. The Guidelines range as calculated, after discovery that Davis had military offenses and a court martial conviction, was much longer than expected. The court ordered Davis to serve 172 months in prison--66 percent of the low end of the Guidelines range. No appeal was filed. In 2013, the Supreme Court held, in Alleyne v. United States, that any factual determination that increases the statutory mandatory minimum term to which a defendant is subject must be charged in the indictment and proven beyond reasonable doubt to the factfinder. Davis sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255 contending that sentencing findings regarding his criminal history increased the statutory minimum term and that his attorney was ineffective in advising him about the consequences of his plea and in failing to appeal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, reasoning that Davis had no viable claim under Alleyne because the Supreme Court has not yet declared that decision applicable retroactively on collateral review, and that Davis’s other claims were untimely. View "Davis v. USA" on Justia Law

Smith was appointed to the Illinois House of Representatives to complete an unfinished term. During his campaign to be elected in his own right, his assistant, “Pete,” alerted the FBI that Smith might be corrupt. Pete began recording conversations. At the FBI’s suggestion, Pete told Smith that a constituent would provide $7,000 if Smith wrote a letter supporting her state grant application. There was no such woman; the money would come from the FBI. Smith wrote the letter and received $7,000. Smith used some of the money to pay campaign staff; a search of his home turned up the rest. At Smith’s trial for violating 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B) and 1951, the prosecutor introduced the recorded conversations with Pete. Neither side called Pete as a witness: he may have been stealing from the FBI. Pete said that he would not testify, asserting his constitutional self-incrimination privilege. The prosecutor did not seek use immunity; defense counsel did not call Pete to see whether the judge would honor his privilege assertion. Questioning why Smith did not raise the hearsay doctrine, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, rejecting an argument under the Confrontation Clause. If the statements are not hearsay, they are not testimonial. Smith was not convicted on hearsay or of out-of-court testimonial statements. Smith’s own words and deeds convicted him. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against USPS for employment discrimination based on race and age, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1963, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 and 2000e-3, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of USPS and plaintiff appealed. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that USPS has waived any timeliness arguments with regard to the denial of the non-competitive transfer at issue. On the merits, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of reverse racial discrimination where another officer's better performance in an interview is unquestionably a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis to hire one candidate over another. The court also concluded that plaintiff has developed no independent age discrimination argument in either the district court or in this appeal supporting his ADEA claims. Furthermore, plaintiff's retaliation claim fails where, plaintiff failed to present any direct or circumstantial evidence that the filing of the EEO complaint was the cause of his direct supervisor's, Captain Williams, rejection of the doctor’s note. Alternatively, a reasonable jury could not find a causal connection between the filing of plaintiff's informal EEO complaint and the activity of Captain Williams, as plaintiff's proffered pattern does not support a reasonable inference of retaliatory intent. Finally, plaintiff's retaliation claim also fails under the indirect method of proof because plaintiff failed to proffer any employees who are similarly situated for comparison purposes. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Formella v. Brennan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Illinois and the Board after the Board refused to put plaintiff's name on the ballot for a local government election in 2015. The district court dismissed plaintiff's amended complaint. The court concluded that, in this case, all three requirements of claim preclusion are satisfied where the parties in the state and federal actions are the same, and the Circuit Court of Cook County's order dismissing plaintiff's petitions for judicial review are a final judgment on the merits. Nor is there any doubt that the state court was competent to resolve plaintiff's federal claims. Finally, both the state and federal actions are clearly predicated on the same set of operative facts and are therefore the same cause of action under Illinois law; the state court proceedings to which plaintiff voluntarily submitted were constitutionally adequate; and plaintiff had a fair opportunity to appeal the state court's decision. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment, concluding that plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims in state court, and the minimum procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause were met. View "Rose v. Board of Election Commissioner" on Justia Law

After being terminated by Logansport when he was 61-years-old, plaintiff filed suit against the company under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq. The district court granted Logansport's motion for summary judgment. The ADEA defines “employer” as someone who has twenty or more employees for each working day, in each of twenty or more calendar weeks, in the calendar year of (or in the year preceding) the discriminatory act. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that Logansport was not an "employer" under the ADEA because it did not have twenty or more employees. View "Bridge v. New Holland Logansport, Inc." on Justia Law

When the defendant was sentenced, the guidelines range applicable to his multiple violations of the federal laws relating to child pornography was 360 months to life. Under the version of the guidelines in force years earlier, when the defendant had committed the crimes for which he was convicted, the guidelines range had been only 121 to 151 months. The judge sentenced him to 198 months. The Seventh CIrcuit affirmed the conviction and sentence in 2012. In 2013, the Supreme Court decided Peugh v. United States, prohibiting subjecting a criminal defendant to an increase in his guidelines sentencing range made by the Sentencing Commission after the defendant had committed the crime for which he is being sentenced. Defendant filed his 28 U.S.C. 2255(f)(3) petition exactly one year later. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the motion to vacate. The sentence was within the statutory range and was thus a sentence that the judge was constitutionally permitted to give both before and after Peugh. View "Conrad v. United States" on Justia Law

Alicea burglarized a Hammond residence; seeing a police vehicle, he fled, cutting through an alley and hiding in an above-ground pool in the backyard of another house. Sergeant Thomas was on canine duty, drove to the location, and released his 72-pound dog, Leo on a 30-foot leash. He announced his presence twice. Leo began barking by the pool. Officers Alvarez, Grisafi, and Fletcher arrived. Alicea was bleeding, looked in pain, and was screaming that a dog had bitten him and he needed medical help. Stories diverge about what happened. Alicea was taken to the squad car, where he was handcuffed. Someone called an ambulance. Alicea admits he may have told police and hospital personnel that he had used cocaine in order to explain why he started running and to gain admission into the hospital’s cardiac ward, where he believed he would receive better treatment. Aliciea sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Indiana Code 34-13-4-1, which governs indemnification of government employees for civil rights violations. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the facts taken in the light most favorable to Alicea create a material dispute as to whether each officer’s actions violated clearly established law. View "Alicea v. Thomas" on Justia Law