Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 1988, Department of Professional Regulation investigator visited Gekas, a Springfield, Illinois dentist, and expressed concern that Gekas had administered nitrous oxide to a child. He ordered Gekas to provide information on all prescriptions on a continuing basis. Gekas contacted Deputy Governor Riley for assistance. After a meeting, the Department imposed less onerous requirements. In 2002, a Department investigator raided Gekas’ offices, with the assistance of the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency. After failed negotiations, the Department issued a cease and desist order against Gekas for the unlicensed practice of medicine and prescribing controlled substances while not a licensed physician and sought to have his license suspended, on grounds that Gekas had prescribed 4,600 doses of Hydrocodone and Vicoprofen to a patient. Gekas contacted his Senator. In 2008, the cease-and-desist was vacated and the complaint dismissed. Gekas submitted a FOIA request concerning the administrative complaint. The Department responded that no public documents were available. In 2009, Gekas filed suit; it was dismissed by stipulation in 2010. Meanwhile, a Chairman on the Illinois Board of Dentistry issued subpoenas against Gekas, stating that there was reasonable cause to believe that Gekas had violated the Illinois Dental Practice Act. Gekas filed suit, alleging First Amendment retaliation. The district court granted defendants summary judgment, finding no evidence of retaliatory motive. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Gekas v. Vasiliades" on Justia Law

A 2012 car accident rendered Hernandez a quadriplegic. He was convicted of aggravated driving under the influence involving an accident causing death. Hernandez was taken into custody while he was hospitalized for treatment of pressure wounds. Under Cook County Sheriff’s Office policy, officers must shackle one hand and one foot of a hospitalized pre‐trial detainee to his hospital bed. Hernandez was shackled and sent to Cook County Jail, then immediately transferred to Stroger Hospital, where he remained from March 14 to April 18, 2013; the shackling continued. Hernandez claims that doctors had instructed him to move every two hours to help his sores heal, and that the shackling stunted his recovery. Hernandez complained orally. The grievance process, described in a handbook that Hernandez did not receive, states that an inmate must file a written grievance within 15 days of the alleged incident. Hernandez never filed a written grievance. After discharge from Stroger, he entered the jail general population. Unable to write, he had other inmates write and file grievances, including an August 3, 2013, grievance stating that nursing staff refused to help him move between his chair and his bed. Hernandez received a response on September 11 and appealed. On February 19, 2014, Hernandez filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The district court stated that Hernandez’s oral complaints constituted a proper grievance but held that Hernandez had not exhausted his administrative remedies and dismissed. The Seventh Circuit remanded, finding that Hernandez did exhaust his remedies. View "Hernandez v. Dart" on Justia Law

Officer Homoky was under investigation by the Hobart Police Department for officer misconduct and was ordered to submit to a voice stress test, a type of lie detector. He was told that if he did not comply, he would be subject to dismissal. Homoky refused to sign a release form because his participation was not voluntary, and was charged with insubordination and placed on administrative leave. He was later assigned to garage duty, which included scrubbing toilets. Homoky had filed suit, alleging violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and abuse of process under state law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants, finding no constitutional violation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that forcing him to sign the release form under threat of dismissal deprived him of his right against self-incrimination in violation of the Constitution. The department informed him that any statement made would not be used against him in a criminal proceeding, so it was free to compel him to answer any question, even incriminating ones. View "Homoky v. Ogden" on Justia Law

Stanbridge was walking to his car carrying a duffel bag when Quincy police officers passed. Stanbridge looked surprised, so they shadowed him, hoping to catch him in a traffic violation. After driving a short distance, Stanbridge activated his turn signal, pulled over, and parked parallel to the curb. Officer Bangert, the driver, had not witnessed any traffic violation. Officer Hodges later reported that Stanbridge had turned left without signaling. Unaware of his partner’s observation, Bangert stopped behind Stanbridge and activated his flashers because Stanbridge had not activated his signal 100 feet before pulling over. Stanbridge had a valid driver’s license, but a criminal history check showed “priors.” Bangert requested a drug-sniffing dog. Stanbridge’s only drug conviction was for marijuana possession, 11 years earlier when he was 17. The dog arrived 10 minutes later; its alert led to the discovery of methamphetamine, marijuana, and pills inside Stanbridge’s duffel bag. He confessed to acting as a “middleman.” Stanbridge was charged with conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), and possession with intent to distribute. The court denied Stanbridge’s motion to suppress, finding the left turn irrelevant, but reasoning that the Illinois Vehicle Code is ambiguous concerning whether a driver must signal for 100 feet before pulling to a curb, and finding Bangert’s belief reasonable, if mistaken. The Seventh Circuit vacated, stating that Bangert's belief was not objectively reasonable. View "United States v. Stanbridge" on Justia Law

Indiana law forbids using a device to “text” or email while operating a vehicle, but allows other uses of a cell phone. A police officer, passing a car on an interstate highway, saw that the driver was holding a cellphone in his right hand, that his head was bent toward the phone, and that he “appeared to be texting.” Paniagua was not texting, but searching for music. An examination of his cell phone revealed that it had not been used to send a text message at the time. The officer received Paniagua’s permission to search the car and discovered five pounds of heroin concealed in the car’s trunk. After the court denied a motion to suppress, Paniagua pleaded guilty to possession of heroin intending to distribute it and was sentenced to 36 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The government failed to establish that the officer had probable cause or a reasonable suspicion that Paniagua was violating the no-texting law. The officer saw behavior consistent with several lawful cell phone uses. The court speculated: Suppose the officer had observed Paniagua drinking from a cup, would the district court's reasoning justify stopping the driver for possible drunk driving? View "United States v. Paniagua-Garcia" on Justia Law

In 2009-2011, Callahan frequently drove a taxicab in Chicago. She does not own a cab, nor does she own a medallion that represents the city’s permission to operate a taxi. She leased both from owners by the week, day, or half day. Callahan asserts that her net proceeds (fares and tips, less lease fees and gasoline) averaged less than the minimum wages required by the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law. Callahan contends that Chicago must make up the difference because its regulations (Chicago sets rates that taxis may charge) are confiscatory and are so extensive that Chicago must be treated as her employer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. Callahan does not own any asset whose market value has been reduced by the regulation of taxi fares. Persons who own cabs or medallions are (potentially) adversely affected by caps on what owners can charge; Callahan owns her own time, but Chicago does not require her to devote any of that time to taxi driving. Extensive regulation does not make the government the employer of the regulated parties. View "Callahan v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Diagnosed with laryngeal cancer in 2003, Glisson underwent surgery that removed his larynx, part of his pharynx, portions of his mandible and 13 teeth. The surgery left him with a permanent opening in his throat, with a tracheostomy tube. He was later fitted with a voice prosthesis, and received postoperative radiation treatment. In 2008, doctors inserted a gastrojejunostomy tube through his stomach to help with nutrition. In 2010, a cancerous lesion was found on his tongue, but was successfully excised. Glisson also suffered ongoing memory issues, hypothyroidism, depression, smoking, and alcohol abuse. In 2010, Glisson was sentenced to incarceration for dealing in a controlled substance. Prison medical personnel noted spikes in Glisson’s blood pressure, an occasional low pulse, low oxygen saturation level, confusion, and anger. He was at one point deemed a suicide risk. His condition worsened: his symptoms suggested acute renal failure. After a short stay a local hospital, Glisson died in prison. The district court rejected his mother’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that failure to implement a particular Indiana Department of Corrections Health Care Service Directive, requiring a plan for management of chronic diseases, violated Glisson’s Eighth Amendment rights. View "Glisson v. Corr. Med. Servs, Inc." on Justia Law

At 3 a.m., inmate Mathison, who suffers from chronic high blood pressure, was awakened by excruciating pain in his chest and left arm and other symptoms of a heart attack. He summoned a guard (Wickman), who summoned supervising lieutenant Omelson, who called the nurse on call (Wall). Wall stated that Mathison’s condition was not an emergency and instructed that Mathison to go to the infirmary in the morning. Mathison went at 6:45 a.m., almost four hours after he suffering a heart attack, and was transported by ambulance to the nearest hospital emergency room, in Pekin. From Pekin he was taken immediately to a Peoria hospital to receive advanced cardiac care. He stayed in the hospital for two days. The district court rejected Mathison’s claims of deliberate indifference on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to Wickman and the prison doctor, but reversed dismissal of the claims against Omelson and Wall. The court stated that “civilization requires more in a life and death situation,” and questioned “what the judge thinks the minimum level of care is to which a prisoner who is suffering a heart attack is entitled.” View "Mathison v. Moats" on Justia Law

In 2011, Solano was indicted on two counts of distributing cocaine and one count of conspiring to obtain and distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841. Solano pleaded guilty; the government agreed to dismiss one of the cocaine counts and recommend a reduction of the sentencing guideline range to reflect acceptance of responsibility. Solano’s written plea agreement included a waiver of Solano’s right to appeal his conviction, sentence, or any restitution order on any ground, including any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. At the hearing, the judge explained the rights that Solano was giving up and reviewed particular provisions contained in the plea agreement, including Solano’s appeal waiver, and found that Solano had knowingly waived his rights and that his plea was voluntary. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of his motion (28 U.S.C. 2255) based on trial counsel’s failure to file an appeal at his request, which, he claimed, constituted ineffective assistance. While the district court found the petition untimely, the Seventh Circuit stated that the Sixth Amendment does not require an attorney to accede to a defendant’s request to file an appeal where the defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived that right as part of a valid plea agreement. View "Solano v. United States" on Justia Law

An informant bought crack from Thompson at the La Crosse apartment where Thompson was staying. The informant was equipped with two hidden audio-video recording devices that captured the transaction. Thompson moved to suppress the video recordings The district court denied the motion because Thompson had invited the informant into the apartment, forfeiting his expectation of privacy as to anything he voluntarily disclosed. The court imposed a sentence of 36 months’ imprisonment, significantly below the guidelines range of 151 to 188 months, based on Thompson’s status as a career offender because of two convictions for a controlled substance offense. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction for possessing for distribution the crack found during execution of the search warrant. 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and his sentence. The court rejected arguments that the informant exceeded the scope of his license to be in the apartment as an invitee when he recorded videos of the encounter and that making the video recordings violated his reasonable expectation of privacy because the information they revealed was not voluntarily disclosed. View "United States v. Thompson" on Justia Law