Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 1992 plaintiff, then age 48, was convicted of having sexually assaulted a boy repeatedly for five years beginning when the boy was eight years old. Before his probation expired he was convicted of having (in 1988) sexually assaulted a nine‐year‐old girl and sentenced to 10 years in prison. He was paroled after six years. His parole was revoked a year later after he admitted that he had sexual fantasies about two girls, ages four and five. Scheduled to be released in 2005, he was, instead, civilly committed as a “sexually violent person,” Wis. Stat. ch. 980. He was released in 2010, based on the opinion of a psychologist that he was no longer more likely than not to commit further sexual assaults. A 2006 Wisconsin law required that persons released from civil commitment (after 1/1/2008) for sexual offenses wear a GPS monitoring device 24 hours a day for the rest of their lives. Wis. Stat. 301.48. The district court found the Wisconsin monitoring statute unconstitutional. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that a study by the National Institute of Justice found that GPS monitoring of sex criminals has a greater effect in reducing recidivism than traditional parole supervision. View "Belleau v. Wall" on Justia Law

Donelson, an Illinois prisoner, lost a year of accumulated good time as punishment for two incidents involving the same guard. He claimed that the deprivation occurred without his having an opportunity to call supporting witnesses and to offer supporting evidence and that he was denied access to recordings of the incidents. The state appellate court denied relief without reaching the merits. The court’s reason, not mentioned at any earlier stage of the case, was that the prisoner had not followed the instruction on the paper form for requesting witnesses or evidence to tear off the top portion of the form. Donelson sought a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court ruled against Donelson, partly on the merits and partly on a procedural ground. The Seventh Circuit upheld the partial merits ruling but vacated the procedural ruling. The state court’s “novel ruling carried bureaucratic concerns about paperwork to an unreasonable extreme and does not bar federal consideration of the prisoner’s constitutional claim on the merits.” View "Donelson v. Pfister" on Justia Law

A Wisconsin jury convicted Ramirez of first‐degree intentional homicide in 2003. Ramirez discovered that his interpreter at trial has failed certification tests and has been declared ineligible for state compensation for his services; he claims that the court subsequently failed to execute a subpoena or obtain the telephonic testimony of appellate counsel and an expert witness on the translator certification process. In 2014 Ramirez filed his second petition for federal habeas relief, which the district court denied. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Ramirez did not make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right under 28 U.S.C. 2253(c), View "Flores-Ramirez v. Foster" on Justia Law

In 2000, Kubiak, a Chicago patrol officer for 14 years, was detailed to the Office of News Affairs, as a media liaison. In 2012, Zala, another media liaison, allegedly ran toward Kubiak, screaming, “Who the fuck do you think you are, you stupid bitch?” He swung his hand back as if to strike her. Officer Perez tried to calm Zala. Kubiak called Director Stratton, stating that Zala had previously directed similar outbursts toward her. During the call, Zala continued to berate and intimidate her. Kubiak alleges that Zala has a history of violence. Stratton told Kubiak that she had spoken with Zala and would not discuss the incident further. Kubiak’s supervising Lieutenant also declined to discuss the incident. Kubiak initiated an Internal Affairs Division investigation, which was “sustained.” Within days, Kubiak was reassigned as a patrol officer on a midnight shift in an allegedly dangerous neighborhood. Perez was also reassigned to patrol. Kubiak, the most senior ONA member, and Perez were the only officers reassigned although others had requested transfer. Kubiak alleges that Zala was never reprimanded. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of Kubiak’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims, concluding that Kubiak’s speech was not constitutionally protected since Kubiak did not speak as a private citizen and did not speak on a matter of public concern. View "Kubiak v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Madison, Wisconsin Detective Peterson prepared an affidavit for a warrant to search Slizewski’s car, describing four recent robberies. A search of his rental car revealed a gun in the trunk. Slizewski moved to suppress the gun, arguing that Peterson misrepresented and omitted critical information in his search‐warrant affidavit, necessitating a Franks hearing. The district court denied the motion, and Slizewski pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, but reserved his right to challenge the denial of his motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court ruling that any misstatements or omissions were unintentional or immaterial. Peterson supplied ample, truthful reasons to believe that evidence of the armed robberies was in the car. View "United States v. Slizewski" on Justia Law

Hamad owned a Chicago convenience store that store sold cigarettes. The county taxes and regulates the sale of cigarettes and employs inspectors to enforce its ordinance. Hamad’s store was on a list of prior violators. Inspectors made an undercover purchase of a pack of cigarettes for $6. The typical price of a properly-taxed pack of cigarettes in Chicago was $8 or $9. Inspectors determined that the pack did not bear the required county tax stamp. The inspectors entered the store and identified themselves, entered the area behind the counter to examine the cigarette inventory. On the floor behind the counter, they found a plastic bag that contained prescription bottles, loose pills, and a large, clear candy jar full of white pills. They believed that some were Vicodin, a narcotic painkiller. Inspectors felt and lifted a loose floorboard and found a shoebox, containing magazines for a gun. Under a pile of t-shirts on a shelf, inspectors found a velvet bag, realized it contained a gun, and called the police. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Hamad’s conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), upholding denial of his motion to suppress the firearm and his incriminating statement regarding the firearm. View "United States v. Hamad" on Justia Law

Vivas-Ceja, a citizen of Mexico, was removed from the U.S. on three occasions. In 2013, he was arrested at an airport in Madison, Wisconsin, for illegally reentering the country. He pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after removal, 8 U.S.C. 1326. The maximum sentence for a defendant with a prior conviction for an aggravated felony can be up to 20 years. The definition of “aggravated felony” is supplied by the definition of “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. 16(b), which includes “any … offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” The district court concluded that Vivas-Ceja’s Wisconsin conviction for fleeing an officer was a crime of violence, and imposed a sentence of 21 months. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding section 16(b)’s definition of “crime of violence” unconstitutionally vague in light of the 2015 decision, Johnson v. United States. In Johnson the Supreme Court found the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), unconstitutionally vague. Section 16(b) is materially indistinguishable from the ACCA’s residual clause. View "United States v. Vivas-Ceja" on Justia Law

A few months after Horsley turned 18, she mailed in an application for an Illinois Firearm Owner’s Identification Card (FOID) card along with the requisite check for $10. Horsley’s application was returned to her with a letter, informing her that the application was incomplete because she was not yet 21 years old and her application did not contain the signature of a parent or guardian. Horsley did not appeal or seek further review from the Director of the Illinois State Police, but filed suit, alleging that the Illinois statutory scheme violated her rights under the Second Amendment. The district court and Seventh Circuit rejected her claims. Illinois does not impose a categorical ban on firearm possession for 18-to- 20-year-olds whose parents do not consent. When an applicant cannot obtain a parent or guardian signature, he may appeal to the Director for a FOID card; the process for 18-to-20-year-olds is not unconstitutional. View "Horsley v. Trame" on Justia Law

An association of Indiana convenience stores filed suit seeking to invalidate a state law that restricts the sale of cold packaged beer. The suit claims the law violates the Equal Protection Clause because some kinds of stores may sell cold beer but grocery and convenience stores may not. The district court upheld the law; the Seventh Circuit affirmed. While rejecting the state’s argument that the Twenty-first Amendment gives it “nearly absolute” authority to regulate alcohol sales, the court held that the cold-beer statute is subject to rational-basis review and survives that lenient standard. To succeed on its claim, the Association would have to “negative every conceivable basis which might support” the statutory scheme. The Association’s policy arguments for allowing cold-beer sales by grocery and convenience stores are matters for the Indiana legislature, not the federal judiciary. View "IN Petroleum Mkters & Convenience Store Ass'n v. Cook" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate at the Illinois Stateville Prison, filed a complaint against members of the prison staff, claiming that a prison prohibition against inmates receiving any magazine that “includes sexually explicit material that by its nature or content poses a threat to security, good order, or discipline” violates his First Amendment rights. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the prison regulation is valid because it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, and Defendant made no valid case against the district judge’s grant of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. View "Payton v. Cannon" on Justia Law