Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

On the day he was moved to a new unit at the Terre Haute prison, Miller told a circulating guard, Rogers, that he had a brain tumor and was entitled to a lower bunk. Rogers replied that Miller must follow his assignment or be put on report . Days later, Miller fell out of the bunk. He was examined in the emergency room, then returned to the prison, where he still had an upper bunk. He again complained to Rogers, but did not follow procedures for obtaining a new bunk assignment. He subsequently fell out of the bunk and broke his back. After surgery, he was temporarily returned to the upper bunk. Contending that he should have been in a lower bunk, Miller sought compensation, naming two defendants, Rogers, and then-warden Marberry. Miller did not seek relief from any physician or nurse, although the prison’s medical department is responsible for deciding who has a medical need for a lower bunk, nor did he sue the guard responsible for making bunk assignments. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that there is a material dispute about what Rogers would have found, had he consulted the database. Inaction following receipt of a complaint about someone else’s conduct is not a source of liability, View "Miller v. Marberry" on Justia Law

In 1998 Maryetta was raped, strangled to death, and left in an abandoned garage. In 2004 Milwaukee police arrested Avery, who was convicted of first-degree homicide. Avery spent six years in prison before DNA evidence proved that a serial killer linked to nine similar homicides was responsible for the murder. Avery alleged that detectives concocted a fake confession and induced jailhouse informants to falsely incriminate him and that the detectives failed to disclose, as required by Brady v. Maryland, impeachment evidence about the informants’ false statements. Avery added a “Monell” claim against the city. The district judge rejected the Brady claims on summary judgment, reasoning that the detectives had no duty to disclose the impeachment evidence because Avery already knew the informants’ statements were false. A jury found two detectives liable for violating Avery’s due-process rights, found the city liable, and awarded $1 million, but the judge invalidated the verdict based on “mixed signals” from the Seventh Circuit on whether an officer’s fabrication of evidence is actionable as a due process violation, and holding that without a constitutional violation by the detectives, Monell liability was not possible. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Avery’s due-process claims fall “comfortably within” circuit precedent. That Avery knew the informants’ statements were false did not relieve the detectives of their duty to disclose impeachment evidence. View "Avery v. City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

Indiana’s 2015 Vapor Pens and E-Liquid Act regulates the manufacture and distribution of vapor pens and the liquids used in e-cigarettes, Ind. Code 7.1-7- 1-1. The Act has extraterritorial reach and imposed detailed requirements of Indiana law on out-of-state manufacturing operations. It purported to regulate the design and operation of out-of-state production facilities, including requirements for sinks, cleaning products, and even the details of contracts with outside security firms and the qualifications of those firms’ personnel. The Seventh Circuit reversed dismissal of a challenge to the Act. Imposing these Indiana laws on out-of-state manufacturers violates the dormant Commerce Clause. Indiana has ample authority to regulate in-state commerce in vapor pens, e-liquids, and e-cigarettes to protect the health and safety of its residents, by prohibiting sales to minors and requiring child-proof packaging, ingredient labeling, and purity. The requirements for in-state production facilities pose no inherent constitutional problems. Indiana may not, however, try to achieve its health and safety goals by directly regulating out-of-state factories and commercial transactions. View "Legato Vapors, LLC v. Cook" on Justia Law

A resident of Elkhart’s housing for low-income elderly people and disabled adults was strangled to death. Canen and Royer, recipients of disability benefits, were also residents. They were convicted of felony murder in Indiana state court in 2005. Seven years later, Canen’s conviction was vacated after Chapman, the state’s fingerprint expert, recanted his testimony, conceding that he mistakenly had identified a latent fingerprint found at the crime scene as belonging to Canen. Chapman only was trained to compare “known prints” (i.e., digital, ink, or powder fingerprint exemplars), not “latent prints” (i.e., invisible, unknown fingerprints found at a crime scene), and lacked the necessary qualifications to identify the latent print. He had not disclosed his lack of training in the state proceeding. Canen sued Chapman under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that he had withheld his lack of qualification to perform latent fingerprint analysis in violation of Brady v. Maryland. The district court dismissed, holding that Chapman was entitled to qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Chapman’s failure to disclose that he was not trained as a latent print examiner is not a violation of any clearly established right, and, to the degree that Canen’s claims are premised on the preparation or presentation of his testimony, absolute immunity protects him. View "Canen v. Chapman" on Justia Law

Illinois’ Rushville Treatment and Detention Facility houses persons adjudged to be sexually violent; many have completed prison sentences for sexually violent acts but are considered too dangerous to be released into the general population. Rushville detainee Hayes alleged deliberate indifference to Hayes’s hydration needs during a five-day “boil order” imposed by the city and applicable to the detention facility. The boil order directed residents to boil tap water before drinking it. The detainees have sinks in their rooms and access to a microwave oven, so Hayes could boil the water from his sink in his microwave. He was also given an eight-ounce carton of milk at each of three daily meals. He nonetheless claimed to have gone without drinkable water for five days, during which time he felt dizzy and dehydrated. The district judge rejected the suit on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that detainees were notified of the order and how to cope with it (by boiling water in their microwave ovens). The facility ordered extra boiled water. The court noted that Hayes did not report feeling dizzy and dehydrated during the boil order: “there can’t be deliberate indifference if the indifferent person did not know what harm he was being indifferent to.” View "Hayes v. Scott" on Justia Law

In 2007, Dr. Eli examined Indiana inmate James, diagnosed his ingrown toenail as infected, ordered antibiotics, and referred him to a foot specialist. A week later, Eli prescribed additional drugs because of continuing pain. A month later, the toenail was removed. The following month, James, who was taking a narcotic for the continuing pain, fell while “hopping up the steps” and hurt his jaw. Thrice he unsuccessfully requested emergency treatment. A month later his jaw “cracked” while he was eating. X‐rays revealed a fractured left mandible. A plastic surgeon, advised against surgery because of the passage of time since the injury. He recommended a soft diet. Two years later, James filed a pro se suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference. James, now incarcerated in Arizona, was unable to recruit an attorney or obtain all of his medical records. The Seventh Circuit vacated summary judgment in favor of the defendants. If a pro se plaintiff in a case like this is unable, despite best efforts, to obtain a lawyer and a medical expert, and if the case would have a chance of success were the plaintiff represented by counsel, the trial judge should endeavor to obtain them for him. It is possible that James has a meritorious Eighth Amendment claim, given his current medical problems, which may be attributable to the injury and lack of adequate medical treatment. View "James v. Eli" on Justia Law

After the 2013 robbery of a Milwaukee auto repair shop, one of the participants, Green, called the ATF and became a confidential informant. Green did not initially admit to the auto shop robbery, but provided information about the other participants, Anglin and his brother, and gave authorities information that led to Anglin’s arrest as he was travelling to rob a drug house. A jury convicted Anglin of Hobbs Act robbery, discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (the Hobbs Act robbery) under 18 U.S.C. 924(c), and related offenses. The district court sentenced him to 230 months’ imprisonment, plus three years of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the police arrested Anglin without probable cause, requiring suppression of the evidence. Corroborating evidence concerning Anglin’s criminal history, residence, and vehicle provided probable cause for Anglin’s arrest and the subsequent search of his vehicle, which uncovered the gun and ammunition. The court also rejected an argument that the 924(c) conviction was improper because Hobbs Act robbery is not a qualifying crime of violence. The court vacated and remanded certain conditions of supervised release. View "United States v. Anglin" on Justia Law

Petitioner and his associates sold cocaine base to a police informant, Hurd, and were charged in Indiana state court. The county clerk erroneously included Hurd’s name on a public filing. Weeks later, Hurd waskilled. Petitioner was then indicted on federal drug charges. The court appointed public defender Brattain to represent Petitioner. The Assistant U.S. Attorney orally informed Brattain that the government was willing to recommend a 20-year sentence in exchange for Petitioner’s cooperation with the Hurd murder investigation. Brattain met with Petitioner and discussed the proposal three times; Petitioner repeatedly rejected the plea. Brattain sent Petitioner two letters, describing thes offer, advising Petitioner that it was in his best interest, stating that the evidence made it “almost absolutely certain” that Petitioner would be convicted, and referencing a witness who would corroborate Petitioner's involvement in Hurd’s murder. Petitioner again rejected the offer. After his conviction under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), the district court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Petitioner participated in the murder, and applied Sentencing Guidelines, 2D1.1(d)(1) to sentence Petitioner to life imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Petitioner then sought post‐conviction relief (28 U.S.C. 2255), contending that Brattain provided ineffective assistance by not producing the government’s offer in writing and not advising him adequately. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the petition, finding that counsel’s performance was adequate and that Petitioner could not demonstrate that, absent any deficient performance, he would have accepted the plea offer. View "Mitchell v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2010 the Seventh Circuit invalidated a Chicago ordinance prohibiting possession of handguns. The city then established a regime that required one hour of range training as a prerequisite to obtaining a permit to possess a handgun, but banned shooting ranges throughout the city. In 2011 the Seventh Circuit held that the ban was incompatible with the Second Amendment. The city replaced it with regulations governing shooting ranges. The district judge invalidated a restriction allowing gun ranges only as special uses in manufacturing districts, but upheld a restriction prohibiting gun ranges within 100 feet of another range or within 500 feet of a residential district, school, place of worship, and multiple other uses, and a provision barring anyone under age 18 from entering a shooting range. The Seventh Circuit invalidated all three restrictions, noting that the manufacturing-district classification and the distancing rule together render only 2.2% of the city’s total acreage even theoretically available. No shooting range yet exists, which severely limits Chicagoans’ Second Amendment right to maintain proficiency in firearm use. The court rejected the city’s “speculative claims of harm to public health and safety” as inadequate to survive the heightened scrutiny that applies to burdens on Second Amendment rights. Nor did the city adequately justify the “overbroad” age restriction; its own witness agreed that youth firearm instruction is prudent and can be conducted in a safe manner. View "Ezell v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Featherly lived in a Wisconsin trailer park when law enforcement discovered that Featherly’s Internet‐service account was sharing child pornography. FBI agent Hauser obtained a warrant to search Featherly’s residence, stating that an agent “was able to determine the IP address of this [user’s] computer” and to ascertain that an Internet‐service provider, Charter, had assigned that unique IP address to Featherly’s account. Based on the images found, Featherly was charged with receipt and possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2), 2252(a)(4). Featherly moved for a “Franks” hearing, seeking to quash the warrant and suppress evidence because Hauser had falsely stated in his affidavit that the IP address was traced to Featherly’s computer; an IP address identifies only a modem, not a particular computer. The magistrate concluded that probable cause supported the warrant, but that even if Featherly’s explanation were correct, Wilkins did not perpetrate any knowing or reckless falsehood. The judge agreed that any mistake was irrelevant because Charter's identification of the modem was sufficient to support an inference that pornography would be found on Featherly's computer. Featherly pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 144 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the inaccuracy kept the judge from considering the possibility that someone else in the trailer park connected to Featherly’s modem wirelessly, without his knowledge. Hauser's affidavit specified that he used the term “computer” consistently with 18 U.S.C. 1030(e)(1), which includes a “communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with” a computer. View "United States v. Featherly" on Justia Law