Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Allin and Baskett lived together in Allin’s residence. Allin, in poor health, signed over the titles to several vehicles, including a 2001 FLSTS Harley Davidson motorcycle, to “make it easier for his survivors.” The Illinois Secretary of State issued a certificate of title in Baskett’s name. Months later, Baskett moved in with her sister, McClure. Allin refused Baskett’s request for financial help. He discovered that the Harley title was missing. He filed a theft report. McClure contacted her co-worker (Sergeant Barr’s wife) about Baskett’s fears about retrieving her belongings. Springfield officers, including Barr, were present when she went to collect her property. Allin and Baskett presented conflicting stories about the motorcycle. A title search showed that the motorcycle had been in Baskett’s name for six months. A computer search did not indicate that it was reported stolen. Barr stated that he would not prevent Baskett from taking the motorcycle. Hours later, with no officers present, Baskett removed the motorcycle. Later, police officers and Baskett met at a motorcycle dealership to have the security system modified so that the motorcycle was operational. Barr bought the motorcycle from Baskett for $7,000, Allin sued the city, Barr, and Baskett, raising 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law claims. The Seventh Circuit held that Barr was entitled to qualified immunity on unreasonable seizure of property and civil conspiracy claims. Barr did not act plainly incompetently nor knowingly violate the law. The parties presented their dispute; Baskett produced a certificate of title, which “provide[s] the public with a readily available means of identifying the owners.” View "Allin v. City of Springfield" on Justia Law

In Presley v. Georgia (2010), the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extends to voir dire. In one of the cases consolidated for appeal, Pinno was convicted of assisting in the mutilation of a corpse and interference with police, having assisted her son in disposing of the body of his girlfriend, whom the son had murdered. The trial judge called for a pool of more than 80 prospective jurors. To assure that enough seats were available for the prospective jurors and to prevent members of the public from influencing the jury by remarks or facial expressions, given the “gruesome and bizarre facts,” the Wisconsin state judge ordered spectators to leave and the door locked until all the prospective jurors were seated. After they were seated the door was unlocked and members of the public were able to enter. The other defendant, Seaton, was convicted of first‐degree reckless homicide. The public was, similarly, temporarily excluded. In neither case did defense counsel object. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of their habeas petitions, noting that the trial judge may have had no option but to exclude the public until all the panel members were seated and that it is possible that the defendants would have been harmed by the presence of the public. View "Seaton v. Smith" on Justia Law

A veterans’ group challenged an anti‑robocall statute, Ind. Code 24‑5‑14‑5, under the First Amendment. The law prohibits automated calls with recorded messages unless the recipient has previously consented or the message is immediately preceded by a live operator who obtains consent. The Seventh Circuit upheld the law, noting that the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, which contains similar restrictions, has been sustained by the Ninth and Eighth Circuits. The court rejected a claim of content-based discrimination. While the law exempts messages from school districts to students, parents, or employees; messages to recipients with whom the caller has a current business or personal relationship; messages advising employees of work schedules, nothing in the law, including those exceptions, disfavors political speech. The exceptions primarily concern who may be called, not what may be said. The court noted the legitimate purposes of the law. View "Patriotic Veterans, Inc. v. State of Indiana" on Justia Law

In 2003, Murdock was convicted of first-degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm. In connection with his post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a suppression hearing was held to determine whether Murdock's statements to the police were voluntary, given that Murdock was 16 years old and was without an attorney or other adult present. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed denial of a motion to suppress. The federal district court denied habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, finding that the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision was not unreasonable. The Seventh Circuit affirmed: the court applied the correct test in a reasonable manner in finding that the totality of the circumstances indicated that Murdock gave his statements voluntarily. The court considered Murdock’s age, and that he did not have an attorney or other adult present, but found that he was able to understand and provide an adequate waiver of his rights. The court considered that Murdock was detained for approximately seven hours, but noted that the interview lasted only three hours and that Murdock was given the opportunity to eat and use the restroom. There was no evidence that the officers threatened him or otherwise created a coercive environment. The court found that Murdock did not appear to be under distress or frightened on a video recording. View "Murdock v. Dorethy" on Justia Law

Hancock, charged with possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and possession of an unregistered firearm, 26 U.S.C. 5841, 5845(a)(2), and 5861(d), unsuccessfully challenged the search warrant that had led to his arrest by requesting a “Franks” hearing. He argued that critical evidence bearing on a confidential informant’s credibility had been omitted from the probable cause affidavit. Hancock also moved to preclude the use of prior convictions as the basis for the section 922(g)(1) count, arguing that the release document issued by the Colorado Department of Corrections lulled him into believing that all of his rights, including the right to possess a weapon, had been restored. The district court, assessing the release document within its four corners, held that the document did not communicate any restoration of rights to Hancock. After his conviction on both counts, the court imposed concurrent sentences of 120 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the affidavit established probable cause, despite the omission of information about the informant’s criminal history, and that the release document did not indicate a restoration of rights. View "United States v. Hancock" on Justia Law

Illinois inmate Jackson filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that, during his transfer between institutions, he was subjected to excessive force, and failure to protect by the refusal of his request to be placed in a prison in which he had no known enemies. He claims that other inmates were able to refuse transfers on that basis, but that officers lifted him over their heads and threw him, head first, into the van. The officers disputed his testimony, stating that he never claimed any injury, nor did he request medical treatment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a verdict in favor of the defendants, rejecting a claim that Jackson was entitled to a new trial because the court refused to grant a continuance when his attorney withdrew on the eve of trial. The court had denied requests for appointed counsel, finding that Jackson had experience litigating and his pleadings demonstrated a grasp of the relevant facts and law, so that he was competent to proceed pro se. In permitting his attorney to withdraw, the court required him to remain as standby counsel. The court also upheld the admission of a seven‐year‐old disciplinary report without a limiting instruction or explanation, and of a 12‐year-old burglary conviction as evidence of Jackson’s truthfulness. View "Jackson v. Willis" on Justia Law

Leaver’s car was struck by a driver whose insurer provided Leaver a rental car. Leaver went to Hertz’s Wisconsin office, signed a rental agreement, and drove to Montana. When Leaver failed to return the car by the contract date, Hertz reported it stolen. Weeks later, the car was located in Montana. Six months later, Leaver was charged with theft by lessee. Leaver contacted the prosecutor, identifying Hertz employees from whom he claimed to have permission to act as he did. The rental agreement contained three inconsistent statements about the maximum time the car could be kept. Leaver claims that he returned the car to the Hertz Belgrade, Montana parking lot within two weeks of the stated return date. Leaver was arrested in Montana, remained in jail for two months, and was extradited to Wisconsin. The court denied motions to dismiss. Weeks later, the prosecutor dropped the charge. Leaver filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming intentional or reckless omission from his police reports of facts that would have affected the probable-cause determination. The judge rejected the claim on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no evidence that the officer was aware of the information at issue; if he was aware of it, qualified immunity applies. It is unclear whether the information would have negated probable cause. View "Leaver v. Shortess" on Justia Law

Jones was a family counselor and collected dozens of guns and thousands of rounds of ammunition, although he had a prior felony conviction. The FBI discovered the weapons while investigating Jones for fraudulent health care billing. He was convicted of illegally possessing firearms, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and of health care fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347. His concurrent sentences amount to 100 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the ex parte pretrial restraint of life insurance policies violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights; that the court erroneously denied his request for new counsel and he was denied the opportunity to testify during his fraud trial; and challenging the sentencing guideline computation. Jones did not object at the time that his life insurance policies were restrained, nor did he object during the district court proceedings, although the restraining order invited him to “petition for a pre-trial hearing if he can demonstrate that he has no other assets available with which to retain counsel” or if he could show that the policies were “not subject to forfeiture.” Given Jones’s pattern of delay and obstruction, the district judge did not abuse her discretion in denying Jones’s request for appointment of yet another lawyer. Jones willingly waived his right to testify. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Foreman alleged that Rockford police officers came to his restaurant because the man living in an upstairs apartment accused Foreman of cutting off his electricity. Foreman refused to answer questions and was arrested. Prosecutor Leisten charged Foreman with obstructing a police officer. The charge was dismissed. The court ordered Foreman to show cause why claims against Leisten should not be dismissed; the prosecutor would have absolute immunity in her individual capacity and the Eleventh Amendment bars official capacity claims. In a previous case Foreman’s lawyer, Redmond, had raised similar claims against prosecutors that were dismissed, so the court ordered Redmond to show cause why he should not be sanctioned. The court granted Leisten judgment on the pleadings, noting that Foreman had not offered a basis for challenging the existing law of prosecutorial immunity and that the official capacity claim would not fall under the Eleventh Amendment's exception for injunctive relief because Foreman’s complaint did not allege an ongoing constitutional violation. The court censured Redmond, stating that he did not argue for a change in the law until after he was faced with a recommendation of censure. The court dismissed 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against the officers, concluding that they had probable cause to arrest Foreman. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing Supreme Court precedent that state prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from suits under section 1983 for activities that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” View "Foreman v. Wadsworth" on Justia Law

Davila pleaded guilty to conspiring to commit robbery in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951, and to possessing a firearm in connection with the planned robbery and a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). The separate drug count was dismissed. The judge sentenced Davila to consecutive sentences of six months’ imprisonment under the Hobbs Act and 60 months’ imprisonment under section 924(c). He did not appeal. After the Supreme Court held, in Johnson v. United States, that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), is unconstitutionally vague, Davila filed a collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that conspiracy to commit a robbery could be deemed a crime of violence only under the residual clause in section 924(c)(3)(B) and that this clause should be held unconstitutional under Johnson’s reasoning. The district judge held that Davila’s conviction is valid no matter how conspiracy to rob is classified. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of relief, rejecting and argument that the drug deal cannot be considered under section 924(c). The ACCA is a sentence-enhancement statute, but section 924(c) defines a stand-alone crime. Conviction of a drug crime is not essential to a conviction under section 924(c) for possessing a gun in relation to a drug offense; Davila’s guilty plea foreclosed his collateral attack. View "Davila v. United States" on Justia Law