Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Freddie Knipp, Jr. was convicted of two counts of distributing methamphetamine and one count of knowingly selling a firearm to a felon. The convictions stemmed from controlled drug buys and a firearm purchase facilitated by law enforcement, with Knipp selling methamphetamine to Larry Eldridge and purchasing a firearm for him, knowing Eldridge was a felon. Eldridge cooperated with law enforcement, leading to Knipp's arrest and subsequent trial.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky denied Knipp's motion to dismiss the firearm charge, which he argued violated the Second Amendment. Knipp was found guilty on all counts by a jury and sentenced to 138 months in prison for the drug charges and 120 months for the firearm charge, to be served concurrently.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. Knipp challenged the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1), which prohibits selling firearms to felons, arguing it violated the Second Amendment. The court applied the two-step framework from N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen and found that while the Second Amendment covers the right to acquire firearms, historical precedent supports disarming dangerous individuals, including felons. Thus, the court upheld the statute's constitutionality.Knipp also contested the admission of Eldridge's testimony about prior drug transactions, arguing it was impermissible propensity evidence. The court found any potential error in admitting this evidence to be harmless, given the substantial other evidence of Knipp's guilt.Finally, Knipp argued that the district court erred in calculating his sentence by including drug quantities from prior transactions based on Eldridge's testimony. The appellate court found no clear error in the district court's credibility determination and upheld the sentence.The Sixth Circuit affirmed Knipp's conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Knipp" on Justia Law

Malgum Whiteside, Jr. was charged with being a felon in possession of firearms after police found the weapons during a search of his residence. The search was conducted while officers were looking for evidence related to stalking charges against Whiteside. Whiteside moved to suppress the firearms, arguing that the search warrant was invalid and no warrant exception applied. The district court denied the motion, and Whiteside pleaded guilty while reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan denied Whiteside's motion to suppress, finding that the warrant was valid despite the judge not signing the warrant itself, only the affidavit. The court also found that there was a sufficient nexus between the place to be searched and the evidence sought. Additionally, the court ruled that even if the warrant was invalid, the good-faith exception to the warrant requirement would apply, and the firearms were in plain view.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Sixth Circuit held that the warrant was validly issued despite the lack of a signature on the warrant itself, as there was clear and contemporaneous evidence that the judge made the necessary probable cause determination. The court also found that the warrant affidavit established a sufficient nexus between Whiteside's residence and the evidence of stalking. Furthermore, the court concluded that the plain-view doctrine applied to the seizure of the firearms, as the incriminating character of the firearms was immediately apparent to the officers, who knew Whiteside was a felon. Therefore, the seizure of the firearms was valid, and the district court's denial of the motion to suppress was affirmed. View "United States v. Whiteside" on Justia Law

Holly Lawson, a guidance counselor at Franklin County High School, alleged that her Fourth Amendment rights were violated by her coworkers, Kayla Creely and Lori Franke, and by School Superintendent Mark Kopp, along with the Franklin County, Kentucky Board of Education. Lawson claimed that Creely and Franke searched her bag without her consent, discovering a firearm, and that Kopp unlawfully detained and searched her in connection with this incident.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found that Creely and Franke were acting under color of state law but were entitled to qualified immunity. It also determined that Kopp's actions constituted a lawful investigative stop under Terry v. Ohio and that Lawson consented to the search of her bag.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court concluded that Creely and Franke did not act under color of state law because their actions were not authorized by any school policy or state authority. The court also agreed that Kopp's interaction with Lawson was a lawful investigative stop supported by reasonable suspicion and that Lawson voluntarily searched her own bag, negating any Fourth Amendment violation. Consequently, the court found no basis for municipal liability under Monell against the Board. View "Lawson v. Creely" on Justia Law

Michael Poffenbarger, a First Lieutenant in the Air Force Reserve, filed a lawsuit challenging the Air Force’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate, claiming it violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the First Amendment. He sought a religious exemption, which was denied, and subsequently refused the vaccine. As a result, he received a letter of reprimand and was placed on inactive status, losing pay and retirement points. Poffenbarger sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including restoration of lost pay and points.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio initially granted a preliminary injunction preventing the Air Force from taking further punitive action against Poffenbarger. In a related case, Doster v. Kendall, the same court certified a class of affected service members and issued similar injunctions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed these injunctions, but the Supreme Court later vacated the decision on mootness grounds after Congress directed the rescission of the vaccine mandate. The district court then dismissed Poffenbarger's case as moot.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The court held that Poffenbarger’s claim for lost drill pay and retirement points was barred by federal sovereign immunity. The court explained that RFRA’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not unequivocally include claims for money damages against the federal government. Since Poffenbarger’s claim sought retrospective compensation for a previous legal wrong, it constituted money damages, which are not covered by RFRA’s waiver. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case. View "Poffenbarger v. Kendall" on Justia Law

John Doe, a convicted sex offender, challenged the enforcement of Tennessee's sex-offender statutes against him, arguing that the requirements imposed by these statutes constituted retroactive punishment in violation of the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause. Tennessee's sex-offender statutes require offenders to register with the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, update their personal information quarterly, limit where they can live and work, and allow the state to publish information about registrants. Doe committed his offenses before the passage of the 2004 statutes and sought to prevent Tennessee officials from enforcing these laws against him.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee issued a preliminary injunction barring Tennessee officials from enforcing any of the state’s sex-offender statutes against Doe. This decision was influenced by a related case, Does #1–9 v. Lee, where the district court had issued a similar injunction for nine other convicted sex offenders. After the Sixth Circuit reviewed Does #1–9, it held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue the governor and directed the trial court to modify its injunction against the director, stating that the district court had misinterpreted precedent and that only specific provisions of the sex-offender statutes could be enjoined.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court's refusal to dissolve or modify the preliminary injunction following the Does #1–9 decision. The Sixth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by not dissolving or modifying the injunction, as the Does #1–9 decision clarified that the injunction was overly broad. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s order administratively closing the case and remanded for proceedings consistent with the Does #1–9 opinion, instructing the district court to determine which specific provisions of Tennessee’s sex-offender statutes could be enjoined. View "Doe v. Lee" on Justia Law

In 2017, Gratiot County foreclosed on Donald Freed’s home due to unpaid taxes. Freed’s property, valued at $98,800, was sold for $42,000, although he owed just under $1,110. The county kept all proceeds from the sale, as Michigan’s General Property Tax Act (GPTA) did not require returning surplus proceeds to the property owner. Freed sued Gratiot County and its treasurer, Michelle Thomas, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming a violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Michigan intervened to defend the GPTA’s constitutionality.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed Freed’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing Wayside Church v. Van Buren County. Freed appealed, and the Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal, recognizing that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Knick v. Township of Scott partially abrogated Wayside Church. On remand, the district court granted partial summary judgment to Freed, affirming that the county had to pay Freed the difference between the foreclosure sale and his debt, but dismissed claims against Thomas due to qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed Freed’s entitlement to attorneys’ fees from Gratiot County and Michigan. However, the court vacated the district court’s fee calculation and remanded for further proceedings. The Sixth Circuit held that Freed prevailed against both Gratiot County and Michigan, and Michigan’s intervention under 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b) subjected it to attorneys’ fee liability. The court found the district court’s explanation for reducing Freed’s hours and rate by 35% insufficient and required a more detailed justification for the fee award calculation. View "Freed v. Thomas" on Justia Law

In November 2021, a school shooting occurred at Oxford High School in Michigan, resulting in the deaths of four students and injuries to several others. This event had a profound impact on the local community, leading some families to transfer their children to other schools. Plaintiff C.S., a third-grade student at Robert Kerr Elementary School in Durand, Michigan, wore a hat depicting an AR-15-style rifle and the phrase "COME AND TAKE IT" to school during a "Hat Day" event. School officials, concerned about the potential for disruption given the recent shooting and the presence of transfer students from Oxford, asked C.S. to remove the hat.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the school officials, concluding that their actions were justified under the circumstances. The court found that the school officials reasonably forecasted a substantial disruption due to the hat's imagery and message, particularly considering the recent trauma experienced by some students.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the school officials did not violate C.S.'s First Amendment rights by asking her to remove the hat. The court emphasized the unique context of the recent school shooting and the young age of the students, which justified the school officials' concerns about potential disruption. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering the defendants' untimely motion for summary judgment. View "C.S. v. McCrumb" on Justia Law

In 2014, federal law enforcement began investigating a website known as "Playpen," used to distribute child pornography. The Department of Justice obtained a warrant to reveal the IP addresses of Playpen users, leading to the identification of Eric Schuster in Ohio. A search of Schuster's residence uncovered multiple devices containing thousands of images and videos of child pornography. In May 2016, Schuster was indicted on three felony child pornography counts and detained pretrial.The case experienced significant delays in the district court. Initially, Schuster requested several continuances to review discovery and prepare motions. Over the next three years, Schuster's litigation conduct, including filing and withdrawing motions and requesting new counsel, contributed to the delays. In April 2019, Schuster's motions were fully briefed, but the district court took no action for twenty months. In December 2020, Schuster requested a status conference, and the court stayed proceedings for additional discovery. Another eighteen months passed without action on Schuster's motions.Schuster moved to dismiss his indictment in August 2022, arguing the delay violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The district court initially denied the motion but later reconsidered and dismissed the indictment with prejudice, finding the delay attributable to the court and the impact of incarceration during the COVID-19 pandemic.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and applied the Barker v. Wingo factors. The court found that Schuster was responsible for much of the delay and failed to assert his right to a speedy trial in a timely and consistent manner. Additionally, Schuster did not demonstrate substantial prejudice resulting from the delay. The court concluded that Schuster's Sixth Amendment right was not violated and reversed the district court's decision, allowing the prosecution to proceed. View "United States v. Schuster" on Justia Law

Sonya Kenette Brown, a City Council member in Albion, Michigan, was prosecuted for allegedly violating a City Charter provision that prohibits council members from directing the appointment or removal of city employees. Brown claimed that her political opponents on the City Council engaged in retaliatory prosecution and arrest, malicious prosecution, and conspiracy to violate her civil rights. She also challenged the constitutionality of the City Charter provision.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan dismissed Brown's claims of retaliatory prosecution and arrest, malicious prosecution, and conspiracy, finding that there was probable cause for her prosecution based on her Facebook messages. The court also granted summary judgment to the defendants on Brown's claim that the City Charter provision was unconstitutional.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Brown's claims, agreeing that there was probable cause for her prosecution. The court found that Brown's Facebook messages provided sufficient evidence to believe she had violated the City Charter by directing the removal of a city employee. The court also held that the City Charter provision was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, as it provided clear standards and did not prohibit a substantial amount of protected speech.The Sixth Circuit concluded that Brown's claims failed because she could not demonstrate an absence of probable cause, and the City Charter provision was constitutionally valid. The court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Brown v. City of Albion, Mich." on Justia Law

Lathfield Investments, LLC, Lathfield Holdings, LLC, and Lathfield Partners, LLC (collectively, "Lathfield") own three commercial buildings in Lathrup Village, Michigan, rented to various commercial tenants. The City of Lathrup Village and its Downtown Development Authority (collectively, the "City") require landlords to obtain a rental license and list each tenant's name and principal business. Lathfield applied for a landlord rental license in July 2020 but did not list the required tenant information, leading to the denial of their application and their tenants' business license applications. Lathfield sued the City, alleging unlawful compulsion to apply for unnecessary licenses and make unnecessary property improvements, bringing eleven claims, nine against the City.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment to the City on all nine claims. Lathfield appealed, arguing that the City improperly required site plan approval, violated due process and equal protection rights, and engaged in inverse condemnation, among other claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Lathfield's request for declaratory relief regarding site plan approval was moot since the site plan process was already completed. The court also found that Lathfield was required to obtain a general business license under the City Code and that the City Code's tenant registration requirement applied to Lathfield. The court rejected Lathfield's due process claims, noting that the City’s adoption of the Michigan Building Code was a legislative act not subject to procedural due process requirements. The court also dismissed Lathfield's equal protection claim due to a lack of evidence of differential treatment and found no basis for the Contracts Clause claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Lastly, the court concluded that Lathfield failed to establish an inverse condemnation claim or a civil conspiracy. View "Lathfield Investments, LLC v. City of Lathrup Village, Mich." on Justia Law