Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 1999, Brinkley robbed the diner where he worked at gunpoint. In jail, Brinkley, then 32, said he would get his 18 year-old girlfriend, Smith, to post his bond, that he would skip town, and that “I’m going to kill that bitch [Smith].” Smith posted the bond. After skipping his pretrial hearing, Brinkley strangled Smith, slit her throat, stole her ATM card, and used Smith’s phone to call the bus terminal. Cameras recorded Brinkley wearing Smith’s coat and trying to withdraw cash 16 times. Smith’s mother found her body. Officers found bloody footprints that matched Brinkley’s size-15 Nike shoes and a bogus note, written in Brinkley’s handwriting (bearing his thumbprint). Officers arrested Brinkley at his mother’s residence, wearing Smith’s coat and the size-15 Nike shoes. Two different teams of appointed attorneys found Brinkley extremely difficult to work with. A jury found Brinkley guilty, with death-penalty specifications. The defense elicited testimony from Brinkley’s sister, aunts, and mother. The jury found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances and recommended the death penalty. Brinkley spoke at length on his own behalf, . The court imposed a death sentence. Ohio court rejected direct appeals and post-conviction petitions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of federal habeas relief, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, a claim of ineffective assistance during the penalty phase, and a challenge to a limitation imposed on cross-examination of a prosecution witness. View "Brinkley v. Houk" on Justia Law

Bickerstaff, a private investigator for Ohio criminal-defense law firms, was conducting an investigation on behalf of a defendant accused of breaking into the Harris house. After speaking with Harris, Bickerstaff received a phone call from Detective Lucarelli, telling her to discontinue her contacts with Harris. Bickerstaff claimed that Lucarelli was involved in a “personal and/or sexual relationship” with Harris, and with other female crime victims, based upon text messages and photos that Bickerstaff alleges were sent from Lucarelli’s cell phone. Bickerstaff alleged that Lucarelli’s supervisor and a fellow detective were aware of Lucarelli’s “improper relationships” and received sexually explicit pictures of and text messages concerning the victims from Lucarelli. Harris had filed a complaint, attached to a report prepared by Lucarelli, indicating that Harris had originally agreed to an interview but later felt harassed by Bickerstaff’s repeated calls and unannounced visit. Bickerstaff was indicted for intimidating a crime victim or witness and for telecommunications harassment. The charges were dismissed the following month.The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of Bickerstaff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging malicious prosecution, abuse of process, retaliation, supervisory liability, municipal liability, civil conspiracy, and reckless, wanton, or willful conduct, calling the allegations “naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement,” not sufficient to survive the motion-to-dismiss stage. View "Bickerstaff v. Lucarelli" on Justia Law

In 2007, Harper, then 70 years old and partially paralyzed, allowed McKinney to move into his Michigan home in exchange for chores. On October 22, 2009, Harper's caregiver left the men by themselves. McKinney shot Harper at point-blank range while Harper slept, killing him. McKinney fled in Harper’s van. Police arrested him in Illinois following a traffic stop during which McKinney claimed to be Harper. Officers searched the van and discovered two handguns, including the one used to kill Harper, and Harper’s wallet. After reading McKinney his Miranda rights, officers asked for “his side of the story.” McKinney replied: Well if you don’t mind, I just assume wait until I get a public defender or whatever. The officer stated: Well that’s fine, but like I said. McKinney said, “We can talk over all the other circumstances” and proceeded to confess. McKinney successfully moved to suppress the confession. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, holding that McKinney did not unequivocally request counsel. McKinney was convicted of first-degree murder after his videotaped confession was played at trial. A federal district court conditionally granted McKinney’s habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit reversed: the district court failed to show the requisite deference to state court decisions on habeas review. The Michigan Supreme Court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of established federal law. View "McKinney v. Hoffner" on Justia Law

In 1996 (Free Press I), the Sixth Circuit held that the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, requires government agencies to honor requests for the booking photographs of criminal defendants who have appeared in court during ongoing proceedings. Despite that holding, the U.S. Marshals Service denied the Free Press’s 2012 request for the booking photographs of Detroit-area police officers indicted on federal charges. The district court, bound by Free Press I, granted summary judgment to the newspaper in the ensuing lawsuit. A Sixth Circuit panel affirmed in 2015, while urging the full court to reconsider the merits of Free Press I. The court subsequently reversed, overruling Free Press I. FOIA Exemption 7(C) protects a non-trivial privacy interest in keeping “personal facts away from the public eye.” Individuals do not forfeit their interest in maintaining control over information that has been made public in some form. Criminal defendants do not forfeit their interest in controlling private information while their cases remain pending. View "Detroit Free Press v. Dep't of Justice" on Justia Law

In 1992, Messinger was murdered while working at a convenience store overnight. Hill surrendered and provided information, with which police obtained a search warrant for Carter’s apartment, where they recovered the murder weapon. During a recorded interview, Carter eventually admitted that he was the shooter. Carter was a heavy user of crack cocaine; Hill was his supplier. He admitted that he, Hill, and another had robbed “a lot” of drug dealers that evening. Carter maintained that he did not aim at Messinger, but fired a shot to scare her. Carter was referred to specialists. The evaluations indicated “malingering to avoid prosecution.” At sentencing, the defense's mitigation expert, Dr. Chiappone,spoke of trauma that Carter had experienced during childhood, but also mentioned his drug use, abuse of women, interest in violence, and animal cruelty. Jurors indicated that they could not hear the witness and later requested a transcript of Chiappone’s testimony, which was denied. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed Carter’s conviction and death sentence; the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. State courts denied post-conviction relief; the Supreme Court again denied certiorari. In 1999, after filing a federal habeas petition, Carter unsuccessfully returned to state court, under Ohio R. App. 26(B). Carter filed another unsuccessful 26(B) application in 2000. In 2003, Carter filed another state petition, arguing that he was mentally retarded. After a remand, Carter voluntarily dismissed that petition in 2005. In 2013, following a remand, the federal district court denied a stay to allow Carter to introduce new evidence in state court and denied habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments related to counsel’s eliciting unfavorable testimony from a mitigation expert and failure to call Carter's mother as a witness during the penalty phase and failure to insist that the jury receive a transcript of Chiappone’s testimony. View "Carter v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Cooperating witness, “DEA1,” provided information concerning Middleton’s heroin trafficking, including phone numbers DEA1 used to contact Middleton. DEA1 identified Middleton’s residence as the drug distribution point and set up a controlled buy. Middleton agreed to deliver the heroin, stating he would leave in “ten minutes.” A Denali arrived at Middleton’s residence. Men left minutes later with a large, dark-colored object, which was placed in a Silverado that had been parked at the residence. Both vehicles headed toward the meeting area. Police stopped the Silverado. The sole occupant was Woods, driving on a suspended license; he verbally consented to a search, which revealed a black tool case, containing a substance that field-tested as heroin. Troopers also stopped the Denali, driven by Middleton. Brown was a passenger, in possession of $4,813, cash. Officers recovered cell phones during an inventory search, including one DEA1 had used to contact Middleton. DEA obtained a warrant to search Brown’s Detroit residence. The Sixth Circuit initially affirmed, but in an amended opinion, vacated, Brown’s convictions for possession with intent to distribute marijuana, possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, and possession of a firearm after a felony conviction. The warrant affidavit supplied a tenuous nexus between drug trafficking; under the totality of the circumstances, the warrant was issued without probable cause and the good-faith exception did not apply. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 2010, Eggers fired four shots into a home where he thought his rival, Bryant, was staying. A bullet struck and killed Snyder, the woman both men loved, sparing Bryant. Eggers pled guilty to felony murder. During allocution, Eggers said: “I’d like to apologize to the family. You know I loved her. You know I didn’t do this. I didn’t do this. I love you, mom. I don’t know. That’s it. I don’t know what else to say.” Days later, Eggers tried to withdraw his plea. He claimed that this “assertion of innocence” made his guilty plea involuntary, suggested that he was actually innocent, and required the state court to conduct an “Alford” hearing to ascertain the voluntariness of his plea and to ensure that there was evidence supporting his plea. The state courts upheld the guilty plea. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of Eggers’ federal habeas petition, holding that the state courts did not unreasonably apply clearly established Supreme Court precedent or unreasonably determine the facts in Eggers’ case. View "Eggers v. Warden, Lebanon Corr. Inst." on Justia Law

A 2012 event at Allegan High School was intended to educate the public about House Bill 4769, which aimed to limit foreign law’s influence in Michigan. The organizers wanted to warn citizens about the “internal threat to America posed by radical Muslims” and “the dangers ... of Sharia law.” The District agreed to rent the organizers a room. They paid the customary $90 fee. Objectors wrote a letter arguing that the speaker, Saleem, was a purveyor of hatred and asked the district to rescind its permission. The School received calls expressing the same view; the event received local press coverage. Shortly before the event began, an unidentified woman approached the police, claiming that Saleem had a $25 million bounty on his head. Saleem’s body guard discounted the threat. The event began. When it was underway, authorities shut it down. The organizers allege that people were allowed to stay in the building for 30-45 minutes and that Saleem remained inside without law enforcement surveillance. The organizers filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of claims against the city, for lack of evidence of an applicable municipal policy or custom, and reversed and remanded an order allowing the school district to withdraw its Fed.R.Civ.P. 68 offer to stipulate to judgment of $500. View "Agema v. City of Allegan" on Justia Law

Lee, now 47, moved to the U.S. from South Korea with his family in 1982 and has lived here legally ever since. After completing high school, he became a successful Memphis restaurateur. He also became a small-time drug dealer, and, in 2009, following a sting operation, he was charged with possession of ecstasy with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The case against him was very strong. Lee’s attorney advised him to plead guilty in exchange for a lighter sentence. Lee, unlike his parents, never became an American citizen. His lawyer incorrectly assured him that he would not be subject to deportation. Possession of ecstasy with intent to distribute is an “aggravated felony,” rendering Lee deportable, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Lee moved to vacate his conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, contending that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Applying the Strickland v. Washington test, the Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of relief. A claimant’s ties to the U.S. should be taken into account in evaluating, alongside the legal merits, whether counsel’s bad advice caused prejudice. Lee had no bona fide defense, not even a weak one, so despite his very strong ties to the U.S., he cannot show prejudice. View "Lee v. United States" on Justia Law

Wayne County Sheriff’s Officer Ferris had a confidential source who indicated that a black male was selling crack-cocaine and heroin from his residence. Farris identified individuals associated with that residence, including Crumpton, and presented Crumpton's photograph to the CI, who identified him and indicated that Crumpton “sells narcotics on a regular basis and accepts money, firearms, vehicles, and other stolen property as payment.” Farris utilized that CI to conduct a purchase of crack cocaine from the home, then obtained a search warrant. During the search, agents found that the house was divided and apparently had multiple residents. The search revealed ammunition, crack cocaine, powder cocaine, marijuana, and heroin, including in the bedroom in which Crumpton was found. ATF Agent Lotoczky read Crumpton his Miranda rights. The court denied motions to suppress Crumpton's two subsequent, recorded, statements. At the close of the government’s case, Crumpton argued inadequate Miranda warnings. The court agreed, suppressed one statement, and instructed the jury not to consider it. After Crumpton was convicted by the jury, the court ruled, sua sponte, that Crumpton’s second statement must be suppressed, which rendered the evidence insufficient to support the possession-of-ammunition verdict. The court granted Crumpton a new trial out of concern that the jury was prejudiced by hearing Crumpton’s first statement. The Sixth Circuit reversed as to the ammunition charge, reinstating the guilty verdict, and affirmed the narcotics conviction. View "United States v. Crumpton" on Justia Law