Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Smith pled guilty to two counts of possessing firearms as a felon under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and to other federal crimes and was sentenced to 200 months in prison. Smith challenged the enhancement of his sentence under the enumerated-offenses clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), under which a person who violates 18 U.S.C. 922(g) and has three previous convictions for a violent felony shall be imprisoned for a minimum of 15 years, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). Under the ACCA’s enumerated-offenses clause, a “violent felony” includes a crime “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” and “is burglary, arson, or extortion, [or] involves [the] use of explosives.” Smith argued cited the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision, Johnson v. United States, invalidating a different ACCA clause, the residual clause, as unconstitutionally vague. That clause includes as a “violent felony” a crime that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” The Sixth Circuit rejected his argument. Limiting language in the Johnson opinion makes clear that its holding does not extend to the enumerated-offenses clause. The enumerated-offenses clause gives ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes and does not invite arbitrary enforcement. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

A confidential informant told ATF agent Kloostra that a man called “D” was selling cocaine out of a particular Flint residence. Kloostra later observed, first-hand, as Dionte Jones emerged from the house, got into a car registered to an owner at that residence, drove to the site of a prearranged drug deal, and sold cocaine to the informant, whom Kloostra had known for two years. Kloostra promptly obtained a search warrant for the house, where agents found cocaine, guns, scales, and cash. The district court later granted Jones’s motion to suppress all this evidence, finding that Kloostra’s affidavit in support of the warrant application did not support the state judge’s finding of probable cause. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court’s mistake was to think of this case as one where the police conducted a search based on an informant’s tip alone: the warrant was actually based on Kloostra’s own observations more than it was the informant’s. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Binford, convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and of possessing with intent to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(D), was given an enhanced sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment. After the Supreme Court held that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1) was unconstitutionally vague, Binford appealed, arguing that his sentencing-guidelines range was substantially increased based on an identical provision in the Sentencing Guidelines that is also void. The Sixth CIrcuit affirmed Binford’s convictions, but vacated his sentence, and remanded for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Johnson v. United States. The court upheld denial of a motion to suppress evidence and incriminating statements under the exclusionary rule. An interrogation on Binford, in his bathroom while the search was in progress, lasted a short time and was not prolonged or repeated. While Binford said he was scared, he did not say he was scared into making the statements. An officer’s statement that he could help Binford if he cooperated did not amount to the level of police coercion required to suppress the statements. Binford knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. View "United States v. Binford" on Justia Law

Memphis Officers Dunaway and McMillen were at the Northside Market. Vanterpool, a black male, pulled up to the gas pumps, driving a purple 1993 Caprice. He attempted to pump gas, but the pump was turned off. He went inside and spoke to the clerk. He returned and began pumping gas. The officers also exited the Market. Dunaway, looking toward the pumps, made a call on his cellular phone to Officer Brooks, who stated that the purple Chevrolet was the vehicle he had followed the day before and had expired tags, not registered to that vehicle. Brooks had lost sight of the vehicle. Vanterpool finished pumping gas. The officers approached. Vanterpool began driving away. McMillen jumped in front of Vanterpool’s vehicle with his gun drawn. The officers fired seven shots into the vehicle, which stopped across from the Market. Vanterpool died as a result of the shooting. His estate sued (42 U.S.C. 1983), alleging a link between the Department's deficient policies and customs and the violation of Vanterpool’s constitutional rights. The court denied a motion to dismiss the supervisory liability claim, concluding that the complaint alleged facts supporting that MPD Director Armstrong “at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of the qualified immunity defense. View "Peatross v. City of Memphis" on Justia Law

All American, a health agency, purportedly provided a range of therapy-related services at the homes of patients and submitted claims to Medicare for the cost therapy services that were medically unnecessary and not provided. According to the government, its office manager, Mahbub, specifically created, fabricated and falsified medical and billing documents. All American was paid $5,809,435.74 by Medicare for home-health services between September 2008 and November 2009. In 2013, a jury convicted Mahbub of conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud under 18 U.S.C. 1349, and Mahbub was sentenced to 46 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit remanded, based on a Batson challenge, “for a proper determination of whether there is an inference that the government engaged in purposeful discrimination,” but otherwise affirmed. The government had challenged a prospective juror (Syed), alleged to be the only Muslim on the panel, but had claimed that the challenge was based on Syed’s response to a question about “younger people” becoming “caught up” in criminal activity. The court rejected challenges to a jury instruction and to the sentence. View "United States v. Mahbub" on Justia Law

Collazo was driving on I-40. His wife, Cinthia, was the passenger. Officer Hill initiated a traffic stop after concluding that Collazo’s van was following too closely. Hill observed a jar of what appeared to be urine between the seats and Cinthia behaving erratically. Collazo said that Cinthia might be on pain medication due to recent surgeries. Hill concluded the traffic stop 21 minutes after it began. Collazo remained by the patrol car chatting for another eight minutes, until Officer Montgomery returned with Cinthia’s purse. Montgomery had asked Cinthia if she was nervous because something illegal was in the van. She hesitated, so he asked, “is it a lot?” Cinthia said that it was a lot and handed over her purse, where Montgomery discovered a prescription bottle for Suboxone and several loose Suboxone strips. Hill returned to the van and received Cinthia’s consent to search. Hill did not ask for or obtain written consent, despite the West Tennessee Drug Task Force’s policy. The officers discovered three kilograms of cocaine in the van approximately 90 minutes into the stop. A later search, following an attempted controlled delivery of the cocaine to its intended recipient, revealed 14 kilograms more. After an unsuccessful motion to suppress, Collazo pled guilty to conspiracy to possess five kilograms or more of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846; 18 U.S.C. 2. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Taken together, the circumstances provided ample evidence to conclude that the officers possessed probable cause to search Collazo’s van. View "United States v. Collazo" on Justia Law

DS attended Rutledge School, 2010-2012 as a seventh and eighth grader, where he was was involved in several verbal and physical altercations with other students. DS and his mother repeatedly complained to school officials that other students were bullying DS. School officials investigated these complaints, disciplined the students found culpable, and took other proactive measures such as placing DS in different classes from his alleged harassers. Despite these efforts, DS continued to have problems with other students, culminating in an attack in the school bathroom that led DS to transfer to another school. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a complaint alleging violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 and deprivation of DS’s constitutional rights to equal protection and substantive due process under 42 U.S.C. 1983. There was no evidence concerning how the defendants treated other students—male or female, heterosexual or homosexual—who similarly complained about bullying. “The law does not require that [defendants] . . . have a pleasant demeanor” in responding to harassment, but only that they respond to it in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable; the defendants acted on DS’s complaints. There was no state-created danger, nor any special duty to protect. View "Stiles v. Grainger County, Tenn." on Justia Law

In 2010 the IRS began to pay unusual attention to applications for exemption from federal taxes under Internal Revenue Code 501(c) coming from groups with certain political affiliations. It used "inappropriate criteria" to identify organizations with "Tea Party’" in their names, expanded the criteria to include "Patriots and 9/12," and gave heightened scrutiny to organizations concerned with “government spending, government debt or taxes,” “lobbying to ‘make America a better place to live[,]’” or “criticiz[ing] how the country is being run[.]” The IRS used a “‘Be On the Lookout’ listing” for more than 18 months. Applicants flagged by the criteria were sent to a “team of specialists,” where they experienced significant delays and requests for unnecessary information. The IRS demanded that many groups provide names of donors; a list of issues important to the organization and its position regarding such issues; and political affiliations. After the release of the Inspector General’s report, the plaintiffs sued, citing the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, the First and Fifth Amendments, and the Internal Revenue Code’s prohibition on the unauthorized inspection of confidential “return information,” 26 U.S.C. 6103(a), 7431. Plaintiffs sought discovery of basic information relevant to class certification. The district court ordered production of “Lookout” lists. A year later, the IRS had not complied, but sought a writ of mandamus. The Sixth Circuit denied that petition and ordered the IRS to comply. View "United States v. NorCal Tea Party Patriots" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Adams of burglary, kidnapping, two counts of rape, and three counts of aggravated murder. The court followed the jury’s recommendation and sentenced Adams to death. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio vacated Adams’s kidnapping conviction, but affirmed the remaining convictions and the death sentence. In 2003, Adams filed an unsuccessful state petition for post-conviction relief. In 2006, Adams filed a federal habeas petition, challenging the use of a stun belt during trial and to Ohio’s lethal injection protocol. In 2013, the district court denied Adams’s motions for additional discovery and to take judicial notice of another challenge to Ohio’s lethal injection protocol. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief after holding the case in abeyance pending the Supreme Court’s 2015 holding in Glossip v. Gross. The court rejected arguments that requiring Adams to wear a stun belt throughout trial denied him a fundamentally fair trial and that Ohio’s lethal injection protocol violated the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that the stun belt inflicted no harm, was unknown to the jury, and was necessary because Adams had threatened bodily harm and posed a risk for escape, View "Adams v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

Nashville Officer Ranney’s confidential informant arranged to meet a suspected drug dealer to purchase cocaine. The informant parked in the lot at the expected time, with officers watching. Another car (matching the description provided) pulled next to the informant’s vehicle, then pulled away. Ranney did not see anything indicating a drug sale. Officers followed the car. The driver, without signaling, turned left into an apartment complex. Ranney activated his lights, stopping the car. In response to a question, the suspect, Pittman, confessed that there was cocaine in the car. Police recovered cocaine and a digital scale and found $1000 in Pittman’s pocket. An officer read Pittman his Miranda rights. Pittman suggested that there might be something at his house and signed a consent document. Police searched his house, recovering two firearms. Ranney administered Miranda warnings again. Pittman admitted that he had purchased both guns. The court denied a motion to suppress, reasoning that failing to signal provided probable cause for the stop and that Pittman consented to the search of his home. After five lawyers withdrew, the court found that Pittman had “effectively waived his right to counsel” and appointed stand-by counsel. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm and for distributing cocaine, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 235-month sentence, the lowest point on the guidelines range. View "United States v. Pittman" on Justia Law