Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Ronald Davis, the owner of a corporation, was liable for over $1 million in unpaid federal employment taxes and penalties. After demands for payment went unanswered, the government filed suit against Ronald to reduce its tax assessments to judgment and sought to enforce its tax liens through the sale of the primary residence of Ronald and his wife, Diane. The government named Diane, who did not owe any unpaid taxes, as a defendant in the action because she had an interest in the properties. The district court issued an order of sale authorizing the sale of the primary residence. Diane appealed, arguing (1) the district court should have allowed the government to sell only Ronald’s interest in the property; and (2) the order of sale violated 26 U.S.C. 7403 and the Fifth Amendment’s Just Compensation Clause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order of sale, holding (1) the district court did not err when it declined to limit the government to the sale of Ronald’s interest in the property; and (2) the order of sale did not violate section 7403 or the Just Compensation Clause. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs (African-American adult males), and adult female friends, some of whom were Caucasian, walked past the Police Department’s EDU precinct, leaving the nearby Entertainment District. They had spent the evening socializing and drinking alcohol. Off-duty officers, including Flake (an African-American), had congregated in the EDU parking lot to socialize; some were drinking alcohol, as is commonplace at precincts throughout Memphis. Flake approached the plaintiffs and, telling them to move along, referred to their companions as “snow bunnies,” a racial slur. Plaintiff McDonald responded: “Who the fuck are you?” As the group walked away, Flake yelled, “I’m going to show y’all who I am,” and attacked McDonald. Other officers joined in, shouting “Stop resisting arrest!” McDonald’s injuries resulted in $7,000 in medical bills. Plaintiffs were taken into custody and transported to a hospital. Charges of resisting official detention, public intoxication, and disorderly conduct were later dismissed. The Inspectional Services Bureau found that the officers had used excessive force and violated departmental policies. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the court denied defendants’ motions seeking summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed rejection of qualified immunity claims and held that it lacked jurisdiction over the denial of summary judgment on municipal liability. Citing “the defendants’ disregard for the governing law and the particular circumstances,” the court awarded sanctions. View "McDonald v. Flake" on Justia Law

Ohio prohibited persons from disseminating false information about a political candidate in campaign materials during the campaign season “knowing the same to be false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not, if the statement is designed to promote the election, nomination, or defeat of the candidate.” Ohio Rev. Code 3517.21(B)(10), specifically prohibiting false statements about a candidate’s voting record. The statute established a multi-step complaint process involving the Elections Commission, culminating in referral to a prosecutor. If convicted in subsequent state court proceedings, violators could be sentenced to prison or fined. In 2010, then-Congressman Driehaus filed a complaint alleging that SBA issued a press release accusing him of voting for “taxpayer-funded abortion” by voting for the Affordable Care Act. The Commission issued a probable cause finding. SBA sued Driehaus and state officials. That case was consolidated with a similar case, adding the Commission as a defendant. The U.S. Supreme Court found the case ripe as a facial challenge, despite the dismissal of Commission proceedings. On remand, the district court granted SBA summary judgment, holding that Ohio’s political false statement laws were content-based restrictions that fail strict scrutiny review. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, characterizing the laws as content-based restrictions that burden core protected political speech, not narrowly tailored to achieve state interests in promoting fair elections. View "Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus" on Justia Law

Officers signaled for Brown to pull over. They claim that Brown was driving without headlights on, though eyewitnesses dispute this. Before Brown retrieved his license and registration, they ordered him out of the car. Brown complied. During a pat-down, Officer Chapman hit Brown in the neck and pushed Brown onto the vehicle. Brown wrestled free. The officers claim that Brown was resisting arrest, but eyewitnesses say that Brown was trying to protect himself. Chapman tasered Brown’s chest. Brown ran. The officers caught and wrestled him down, tasering him. The officers handcuffed Brown at 8:52 P.M., seven minutes after pulling Brown over. Brown repeatedly stated he was having trouble breathing and went limp before reaching the squad car. Officers request EMS at 8:55 P.M., stating that Brown was conscious and breathing. EMS was notified at 9:00 P.M., arrived at 9:07 P.M., found Brown “propped up,” with no pulse, and was unable to resuscitate him. Brown’s mother filed suit. The Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment to the officers on plaintiff’s claim that the officers stopped Brown’s vehicle without probable cause, holding that the city is not liable on that claim; reversed summary judgment to Chapman on plaintiff’s claim that use of a taser constituted excessive force, stating that the city is liable on that claim; and reversed summary judgment to an officer on plaintiff’s deliberate-indifference claim. View "Brown v. Chapman" on Justia Law

Officers signaled for Brown to pull over. They claim that Brown was driving without headlights on, though eyewitnesses dispute this, They walked to Brown’s vehicle and asked for his license and registration. Before Brown could retrieve the documents, they ordered him out of the car, unsettled by his slow speech. Brown complied. While the officers were patting him down, one hit Brown in the back of his neck and pushed Brown onto the vehicle. Brown wrestled free. The officers claim that Brown was resisting arrest, but eyewitnesses say that Brown was trying to protect himself. An officer tasered Brown’s chest. Brown ran. The officers caught Brown and wrestled him to the ground, tasering him. The officers notified dispatch that they handcuffed Brown at 8:52 P.M., seven minutes after pulling Brown over. Brown repeatedly stated he was having trouble breathing and went limp before he reached the squad car. Officers request EMS at 8:55 P.M., stating that Brown was conscious and breathing. EMS was notified at 9:00 P.M. EMS arrived at 9:07 P.M., and found Brown “propped up,” with no pulse. EMS was unable to resuscitate him. Brown’s mother filed suit. The Sixth Circuit upheld allowing plaintiff to amend her complaint and application of the deliberate-indifference standard, and dismissed the remainder of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction over appeals from denial of summary judgment. View "Brown v. Chapman" on Justia Law

Haines operates a tour bus company. In 2000, he modified the luggage compartment in a bus to become a sleeper area, designed to comply with Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) regulations. In May, 2011, FMCSA informed Haines that he could use the luggage compartment as a sleeper area without additional approval if he complied with 49 C.F.R. 393.76. On May 29, 2011, Haines permitted family members to ride in the sleeper area while the bus was in motion. An unidentified individual notified authorities. On June 10, FMCSA placed all of Haines’ busses, including three without sleeper areas, out of service, and identified Haines Tours as an “imminent hazard” to public safety based on its finding that the “unauthorized transportation of passengers in the cargo area . . . substantially increase[d] the likelihood of serious injury or death.” The suspension lasted five days. Haines sued, alleging that the handling of the temporary suspension violated his due process and equal protection rights and gave rise to a claim under the Administrative Procedures Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal without leave to amend; “Bivens” claims were time-barred by Michigan’s three-year statute of limitations and a Bivens remedy was not available because Haines had an adequate, alternative remedy. View "Haines v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin." on Justia Law

Tessier was on probation for a 2011 Tennessee felony conviction for sexual exploitation of a minor. His probation order contained a “standard” search condition that applied to all probationers in Tennessee: “I agree to a search, without a warrant, of my person, vehicle, property, or place of residence by any Probation/Parole officer or law enforcement officer, at any time.” After being subjected to a search that was not otherwise supported by reasonable suspicion, Tessler unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence of child pornography and pled guilty to child pornography charges. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, applying the totality-of-the-circumstances reasonableness approach employed by the Supreme Court. View "United States v. Tessier" on Justia Law

Ohio elects its state judges through a hybrid process. Judicial candidates are first selected through partisan primary elections. On the general-election ballot, their names show no partisan affiliation, even though judicial candidates may affiliate with political parties throughout their campaigns. The Ohio Democratic Party, three individuals who were candidates for state court judgeships in the 2010 election, and a statewide labor organization, challenged the law’s constitutionality as burdening their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by precluding candidates from being associated with their political parties in the general election. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment, rejecting the claims. The burden is minimal and is outweighed by Ohio’s interest in minimizing partisanship in judicial elections. Judicial candidates are not restricted from associating with political parties in other contexts. Political parties may even communicate with voters outside of polling places on the day of the general election and distribute sample ballots identifying their preferred candidates, which voters may take with them into the voting booth. View "Ohio Council 8 v. Husted" on Justia Law

Convicted-felon Houston resided on a farm containing signs critical of government and depicting the dead bodies of an officer and his companion. Houston and his brother (Leon) were acquitted of those murders. The farm is not enclosed. The Roane Sheriff’ informed ATF that Houston possessed firearms. ATF attempted drive-by surveillance. Later, at the direction of ATF and without a warrant, the utility company installed a surveillance camera on a utility pole 200 yards from Leon’s trailer, which broadcast recordings. An ATF agent testified that the captured footage was identical to what he would have observed by driving down public roads. After 10 weeks of warrantless monitoring, ATF obtained a warrant on the same day that the Sixth Circuit expressed “some misgivings” about the constitutionality of long-term warrantless surveillance of an individual’s backyard via a pole camera. Weeks later, agents arrested Houston, away from the farm. No firearms were found on his person. Agents executed warrants for the farm and seized 17 firearms from Houston’s house, five from Leon’s trailer, and three from Leon’s person. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Houston’s conviction, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Use of the camera did not violate Houston’s reasonable expectations of privacy because it recorded the view as seen by passersby on public roads. The court also rejected challenges to his classification as a “prohibited person” and to the reasonableness of his 108-month sentence. View "United States v. Houston" on Justia Law

Alsante pleaded guilty to failing to register as a sex offender under 42 U.S.C. 16913. At his sentencing hearing, the district court permitted the government to introduce evidence that Alsante had committed other sexual-misconduct crimes with a minor, all of which were the subject of pending Tennessee state court charges. The district court relied on that conduct in imposing a 54-month sentence, an upward variance from his advisory guidelines range of 15-21 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Alsante’s argument that his due process rights or his rights against self-incrimination were violated by permitting the government to introduce evidence related to pending state court charges at his federal sentencing hearing because any attempt to rebut the government’s evidence at the federal sentencing hearing hampered his ability to defend himself in state court. The court noted that Alsante did not seek a continuance and did not suffer “actual or threatened physical harm” for remaining silent, not face “mental coercion overbearing the will.” View "United States v. Alsante" on Justia Law